UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1358
JING YUN LI,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals. (A95-462-098)
Submitted: November 18, 2005 Decided: July 11, 2006
Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG,* and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Matthew L. Guadagno, Kerry W. Bretz, Jules E. Coven, BRETZ & COVEN,
L.L.P., New York, New York, for Petitioner. Rod J. Rosenstein,
United States Attorney, Ariana Wright Arnold, Assistant United
States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
*
Judge Luttig was a member of the original panel but did not
participate in this decision. This opinion is filed by a quorum of
the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
PER CURIAM:
Jing Yun Li, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“Board”) order affirming the immigration judge’s decision
to deny her applications for asylum, withholding from removal and
protection under the Convention Against Torture. We deny the
petition for review.
The INA authorizes the Attorney General to confer asylum
on any refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2000). It defines a refugee
as a person unwilling or unable to return to her native country
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(2000).
An applicant can establish refugee status based on past
persecution in her native country on account of a protected ground.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2005). “An applicant who demonstrates
that he was the subject of past persecution is presumed to have a
well-founded fear of persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d
182, 187 (4th Cir. 2004). This presumption can be rebutted on a
finding of a fundamental change of circumstances so that the alien
no longer has a well-founded fear, or a finding that the alien
could avoid persecution by relocating within the country of
removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A), (B) (2005).
- 2 -
Without regard to past persecution, an alien can
establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected ground.
Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 187. The well-founded fear of persecution
standard contains both a subjective and an objective component.
“An applicant may satisfy the subjective element by presenting
‘candid, credible, and sincere testimony demonstrating a genuine
fear of persecution.’” Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 201-02 (4th Cir.
1999) (quoting Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 1256 (9th
Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The objective
element requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would
lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution.
Huaman-Cornelio v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 979 F.2d 995, 999
(4th Cir. 1992).
An applicant has the burden of demonstrating her
eligibility for asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2005); Gonahasa v.
INS, 181 F.3d 538, 541 (4th Cir. 1999). Credibility findings,
relevant to the subjective component, are reviewed for substantial
evidence. A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony on
credibility grounds must offer specific, cogent reasons for doing
so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989). We accord
broad, though not unlimited, deference to credibility findings
supported by substantial evidence. Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d
361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004).
- 3 -
To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an
alien must show a clear probability that, if she was removed to her
native country, her “life or freedom would be threatened” on a
protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2000); see Camara, 378
F.3d at 370 (4th Cir. 2004). A “clear probability” means it is
more likely than not the alien would be subject to persecution.
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984). “The burden of proof
is on the applicant for withholding of removal . . . to establish
that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed
country of removal” on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(b) (2005). A showing of past threat to life or freedom
on such a ground creates a rebuttable presumption that the threat
would recur upon removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i); Camara, 378
F.3d at 370. Withholding of removal is mandatory if the alien
meets the standard of proof. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 429-30.
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings
of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(2000). We will reverse the Board “only if ‘the evidence presented
was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find
the requisite fear of persecution.’” Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316,
- 4 -
325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Huaman-Cornelio, 979 F.2d at 999
(internal quotation marks omitted)). We find the immigration
judge’s negative credibility finding was supported by substantial
evidence. We further find the evidence was not so compelling as to
warrant reversal.
With respect to the Board’s affirmation of the
immigration judge’s finding regarding relief under the Convention
Against Torture, we find Li failed to establish it was more likely
than not she will be tortured if she were to return to China.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
- 5 -