UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4677
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHAPELLE JORDAN BORDEAUX,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (7:00-cr-00042-BR)
Submitted: February 14, 2007 Decided: March 7, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Christine Witcover Dean, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Chapelle J. Bordeaux appeals the district court’s order
revoking her term of supervised release and sentencing her to
thirty-six months’ imprisonment. Bordeaux contends that the
sentence imposed by the district court was plainly unreasonable in
light of the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006)
factors, as the court refused to run the sentence concurrent to her
state term of incarceration. Bordeaux also asserts that the
district court gave no explanation as to why it imposed the maximum
sentence, thereby providing this court with no basis to determine
whether the sentence was reasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.
Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261
(2005), this court has held that “revocation sentences should be
reviewed to determine whether they are ‘plainly unreasonable’ with
regard to those § 3553(a) factors applicable to supervised release
revocation sentences.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437
(4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Nov. 3,
2006) (No. 06-7631). The sentence must first be assessed for
reasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and
substantive considerations that we employ in our review of original
sentences . . . .” Id. at 438. Only if a sentence is found
unreasonable will this court “decide whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable.” Id.
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While Bordeaux claims that her revocation sentence should
be considered in light of her state sentence, the primary goal of
a revocation sentence is not to apply punishment for any new
criminal conduct. Instead, a revocation sentence is meant to
“sanction the violator for failing to abide by the conditions of
the court-ordered supervision.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437-38.
Additionally, the Chapter 7 policy statements are clear that the
sanction for the “breach of trust inherent in the conditions of
supervision” should be consecutive to any sentence imposed for the
new criminal conduct, thereby rejecting the position that the
sentences should run concurrently. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual, Ch.7, Pt.A, intro. comment. 3(b) & § 7B1.3(f). Therefore,
we find that the district court’s decision to run the sentences
consecutively was not unreasonable.
As for the reasonableness of the thirty-six month term of
incarceration, the sentence was not above the three-year statutory
maximum, and the probation officer’s recommendation provided
sufficient grounds for the court to impose the maximum sentence,
noting Bordeaux’s extensive criminal history and the brief period
between her release from prison and subsequent arrest. While the
guideline imprisonment range in this case was only 21 to 27 months,
departure from that range for revocation sentencing was
appropriate, as the district court had previously imposed a
significant upward departure from the guideline range for
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Bordeaux’s underlying conviction for bank fraud. See USSG § 7B1.4,
p.s., comment. (n.2). Therefore, we find that the district court’s
imposition of a thirty-six month sentence of imprisonment was not
substantively unreasonable, much less plainly so.
Bordeaux’s final contention is that the district court’s
lack of an explanation for its sentence was procedurally
unreasonable. The district court heard argument from both Bordeaux
and the Government on the sentencing issues and was provided with
a recommendation from the probation officer that sufficiently
justified imposition of the maximum term of imprisonment. The
district court also noted that it had reviewed and considered the
Chapter 7 policy statement on revocation. Even if it is considered
that the district court failed to adequately explain its reasons
for Bordeaux’s thirty-six month sentence, thus rendering the
sentence unreasonable, we conclude that the sentence is not plainly
unreasonable. The district court was fully aware of the brief
period between Bordeaux’s release from prison and subsequent
arrest, as well as her extensive criminal history and the court’s
upward departure from the guidelines range for Bordeaux’s original
sentence. These factors were fully addressed by the probation
officer’s recommendations, as well as by Bordeaux and the
Government at the revocation hearing. In light of this record, and
the “substantial latitude” and “broad discretion” accorded district
courts in devising appropriate revocation sentences, Crudup, 461
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F.3d at 439, we are confident that the court properly took all
relevant factors into account in devising its revocation sentence.
See United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995)
(consideration of issues fully presented for determination is
implicit in court’s ruling).
Accordingly, we affirm Bordeaux’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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