UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1283
ESSIE MORGAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District
Judge. (6:03-cv-01578-HMH)
Submitted: January 12, 2007 Decided: March 20, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W. Daniel Mayes, THE LAW OFFICES OF W. DANIEL MAYES, Aiken, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States
Attorney, Marvin J. Caughman, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina; Allan D. Berger, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Deana R. Ertl-Lombardi, Regional Chief Counsel,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Essie L. Morgan appeals the district court’s order
denying her motion for attorney’s fees and costs filed pursuant to
the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000).
For the following reasons, we vacate the district court’s order and
remand for further proceedings.
In March 2001, Morgan filed an application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. Her
application was initially denied, and she requested a hearing
before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). The ALJ denied
Morgan’s application, and the Appeals Council affirmed the
decision. Morgan then filed a complaint in the district court
against the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”),
alleging that the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence. After reviewing the case, the magistrate
judge recommended that the ALJ’s decision be reversed. Following
the Commissioner’s objections to the report, the district court
rejected the magistrate judge’s conclusions and affirmed the
decision of the Commissioner.
On appeal, this court ruled that the ALJ had misapplied
the findings contained in the functional capacity examination
(“FCE”), leading to flawed hypothetical questions that were posed
to the vocational expert and resulting in testimony that was
incapable of producing a reliable assessment of relevant work
- 2 -
opportunities. See Morgan v. Barnhart, 04-1692, 2005 WL 1870019
(4th Cir. Aug. 5, 2005) (unpublished). The case was remanded to
the district court with instructions to vacate and remand in order
to permit the ALJ to redetermine Morgan’s residual functional
capacity and determine whether relevant jobs exist for Morgan in
the national economy. After the case was remanded to the ALJ,
Morgan filed the underlying motion for attorney’s fees and costs.
The district court denied Morgan’s motion, stating only that the
Commissioner’s position was “substantially justified.”
The EAJA provides that, in actions brought by or against
the United States, attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the other
party if it prevails, unless the United States’ position was
“substantially justified” or special circumstances make an award
unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1). It is the government’s burden to
demonstrate that its position was substantially justified.
Crawford v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1991). A
district court’s determination that the government’s position was
substantially justified is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557-59 (1988). For a position
to be substantially justified, it must be “more than merely
undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness,” as it must be
justified to a degree as to satisfy a reasonable person. Id. at
565-66. In making such a determination, the district court should
avoid an “issue-by-issue analysis,” and instead should look at the
- 3 -
“totality of circumstances.” Roanoke River Basin Ass’n v. Hudson,
991 F.2d 132, 138-39 (4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the view that any
unreasonable position taken by the government during litigation
automatically leads to a fee award).
We conclude that the district court abused its discretion
by not providing an explanation for its conclusion that the
Commissioner’s position was substantially justified. See Libas,
LTD. v. United States, 314 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining
that for appellate review of an EAJA fee award, “it is imperative
that the court explain its rationale supporting its conclusion that
the government’s position was substantially justified”); Kerin v.
United States Postal Serv., 218 F.3d 185, 193 (2d Cir. 2000)
(vacating an EAJA fee award because the “lack of a clear
explanation of the reasons for the fee award” handicapped appellate
review and remanding “for a thorough explanation of the reasons”);
United States v. Hallmark Constr. Co., 200 F.3d 1076, 1081 (7th
Cir. 2000) (remanding the denial of an EAJA fee award for “a
thorough explanation of the reasoning behind the district court’s
decision”); United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 200 F.3d 203, 211
(3d Cir. 2000) (vacating an EAJA fee award and remanding “to the
district court for an explanation of its reasons for the fee
award”). The district court may well be correct in its ultimate
conclusion that the Commissioner’s position was substantially
justified, but we cannot properly review the district court’s
- 4 -
decision without an explanation for how it reached that decision.
See United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1166 (4th Cir. 1992)
(stating that the abuse of discretion deference accorded to EAJA
orders is “considerably short of a simple, accept-on-faith, rubber-
stamping of the district court decisions on this issue”).
Accordingly, we vacate the order of the district court
and remand for further proceedings. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
- 5 -