UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-2276
JULIE RAGSDALE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JOHN POTTER, Postmaster General, United States
Postal Service,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 06-2277
ADELE STRISS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General, United
States Postal Service,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. R. Bryan Harwell, Henry F. Floyd,
District Judges. (8:05-cv-00142-RBH; 8:04-cv-22435-HFF)
Submitted: March 28, 2007 Decided: April 12, 2007
Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Julie Ragsdale, Adele Striss, Appellants Pro Se. Lora M. Taylor,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Adele Striss and Julie Ragsdale, career employees of the
United States Postal Service (“USPS”), each filed separate civil
complaints against the USPS. Amy Gaffney served as counsel for
both Striss and Ragsdale. Each complaint asserted that the
plaintiff was the victim of gender and race discrimination and
retaliation for protected conduct when they were denied certain
temporary details and/or permanent assignments. The USPS filed
motions for summary judgment that stated its alleged reasons for
denying Striss and Ragsdale the details and permanent positions.
A magistrate judge issued a report and recommended that the
district court grant the motions. Striss and Ragsdale filed
objections to the report; however, the district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and granted summary
judgment to the USPS in each case.
Following the dismissals, Gaffney entered into a
settlement agreement with USPS in which she agreed, purportedly on
behalf of Striss and Ragsdale, that neither would appeal the
district court’s judgment in exchange for the USPS forgoing the
right to pursue costs from either woman. Striss and Ragsdale,
nonetheless, timely appealed pro se. The USPS has now filed a
motion to dismiss both appeals based on the settlement agreement.
Striss and Ragsdale have responded, arguing they did not agree to
settle and Gaffney had no authority to enter into a settlement
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agreement on their behalf. “[I]f there is a material dispute about
. . . the authority of an attorney to enter a settlement agreement
on behalf of his client, a trial court must conduct a plenary
evidentiary hearing to resolve that dispute.” Columbus-America
Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 291, 298 (4th
Cir. 2000). Because there is a material dispute as to whether
Gaffney had the express or apparent authority to enter into a
settlement agreement on Striss and Ragsdale’s behalf,* we remand
these appeals to the district court for the limited purpose of
making this determination. We suggest that, for purposes of this
limited remand only, these cases be administratively consolidated
in the district court and assigned to the same district judge. The
cases will then be returned to this court for further proceedings.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
REMANDED
*
A finding of express or apparent authority is necessary for
Gaffney’s actions to bind Striss or Ragsdale because an attorney
does not possess implied authority to enter into a settlement
agreement. See Hensley v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 277 F.3d 535, 541 n.*
(4th Cir. 2002) (citing Auvil v. Grafton Homes, Inc., 92 F.3d 226,
229-30 (4th Cir. 1996)).
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