UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4862
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL W. EVERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (1:07-cr-00044-LHT-DLH-1)
Submitted: February 12, 2009 Decided: March 13, 2009
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dennis Gibson, LAW OFFICE OF DENNIS GIBSON, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael W. Evers appeals from the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing a sentence
of six months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Evers was notified
of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but did not do
so. Finding no error, we affirm.
We find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in revoking Evers’ supervised release. See United
States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992) (providing
standard of review). The district court need only find a
violation of a condition of supervised release by a
preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West
2000 & Supp. 2008). Based on Evers’ admission of his violation
of the terms of supervised release, we conclude the district
court’s decision to revoke supervised release was not an abuse
of discretion.
A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release will be affirmed if it is within the applicable
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We
must initially determine the reasonableness of the revocation
sentence by generally following the procedural and substantive
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considerations employed in a review of original sentences, “with
some necessary modifications to take into account the unique
nature of supervised release revocation sentences.” Id. at 438-
39. If the revocation sentence is not unreasonable, it will be
affirmed; however, if the sentence is in some manner
procedurally or substantively unreasonable, there must be a
determination of whether it is plainly so. Id. at 439.
During the revocation hearing, the district court had
available for its consideration the supervised release violation
worksheet which noted the three-to-nine-month advisory
imprisonment range provided under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 7B1.4(a) (2007). While the court did not specifically
reference 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) when announcing its
sentence, see United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th
Cir. 2006) (stating district court need not explicitly address
each § 3553(a) factor or refer to the statute); see also Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), we find that the sentence
imposed was within the advisory range and below the statutory
maximum, and was not plainly unreasonable. See Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 439.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in
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writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If the client requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave
to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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