UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4524
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
YAHYA WATSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:07-cr-00396-CMH-1)
Submitted: February 25, 2009 Decided: March 23, 2009
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Matthew A. Wartel, LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW A. WARTEL, PLLC,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United
States Attorney; Stephen Sola, Kristin A. Taylor, Special
Assistant United States Attorneys, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Yahya Watson appeals from a 324-month sentence imposed
after his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). Watson argues that
the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, on the basis that he was informed at his plea
hearing that he faced a statutory minimum sentence of ten years,
whereas he actually faced a statutory minimum sentence of twenty
years. Watson cited United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400 (4th
Cir. 1995), in support of his motion to withdraw. Because we
hold that the error was harmless and did not affect Watson’s
substantial rights, we affirm.
This court generally reviews the adequacy of a guilty
plea proceeding de novo. See United States v. Damon, 191 F.3d
561, 564 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Goins, 51
F.3d 400, 402 (4th Cir. 1995)). Rule 11 violations, however,
are reviewed under a harmless error standard. See id. The
court ultimately asks whether the error likely affected the
defendant’s decision to plead guilty. Id. Any variance from
the Rule 11 requirements that does not affect the substantial
rights of the defendant is disregarded. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(h); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 117 (4th Cir.
1991).
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Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B), Watson needed to
provide the court a “fair and just reason” for withdrawal. The
court evaluates the proffered reason in light of whether the
plea was knowing and voluntary; the defendant has credibly
asserted his legal innocence; the length of delay between the
entry of the plea and the filing of the motion to withdraw;
whether the defendant had close assistance of competent counsel;
whether withdrawal will prejudice the government; and whether
withdrawal will inconvenience the court or waste judicial
resources. See United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th
Cir. 1991). Denial of a motion to withdraw is proper if the
first four factors all weigh against the movant, as the last two
factors are counterbalancing considerations. Id.
In Goins, this court found that the district court
erred when it failed to advise the appellant of the mandatory
minimum sentence of five years, above the then-mandatory
guidelines range of 33 to 41 months. 51 F.3d at 404. In
addition, the court found that the error was not harmless
because Goins was not otherwise aware of the mandatory minimum
and Goins’ counsel was not aware of the mandatory minimum. Id.
at 404-05. Thus, the court vacated Goins’ conviction and
remanded so that Goins could replead. Id.
Unlike Goins, Watson faced a guidelines imprisonment
range well above the statutory minimum, and he was aware of his
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expected guidelines range, as evidenced by a letter sent to him
by counsel who represented him when he pled guilty, discussing
the possibility of his sentence being reduced from thirty years
to twenty-four years. Although the letter discusses the
possibility of further reduction in Watson’s sentence through
cooperation with the Government, that possibility would not
necessarily have been foreclosed by the statutory minimum.
Watson’s ultimate sentence of 324 months is well above the
statutory minimum, so his sentence was not affected by the
statutory enhancement. In addition, Watson has not argued that
he would not have pled guilty if he had known of the statutory
minimum sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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