Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d. 571, 573 (1992), and the jury's verdict will not be
disturbed on appeal where, as here, substantial evidence supports the
verdict, see NRS 453.337; NRS 453.3385(3); Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71,
73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981).
Second, Bright argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial because the State claimed
in its opening statement that Bright gave a fake name to law enforcement
and no witness testified to such at trial. Bright is mistaken. Officer
Anton Gorup testified that Bright gave his name as "Michael Harris" to
either himself or another officer. Bright did not object and this testimony
and was not stricken from the record. We conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Bright's request for a mistrial on
this ground. 1 See Rudin, 120 Nev. at 142-44, 86 P.3d at 586-87 (noting
that a defendant's request for a mistrial may be granted where "prejudice
occurs that prevents the defendant from receiving a fair trial," and giving
deference to a district court's decision whether a mistrial is warranted).
Third, Bright argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial because evidence was
presented at trial that was not provided to the defense in violation of
discovery orders and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We review a
district court's resolution of a Brady claim de novo, Mazzan v. Warden, 116
Nev. 48, 66, 993 P.2d 25, 36 (2000), and a district court's enforcement of
'We note that the district court incorrectly used the "manifest
necessity" or "manifest injustice" standard when ruling on Bright's
multiple motions for mistrials. Nonetheless, we will affirm the district
court's rulings if it reached the correct result. See Rudin v. State, 120 Nev.
121, 142, 86 P.3d 572, 586 (2004).
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discovery orders for an abuse of discretion, Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609,
638, 28 P.3d 498, 518 (2001). Bright contends that the State failed to turn
over an administrative subpoena which established that he owned a cell
phone found at the scene. Because there is not a reasonable possibility
that the verdict would have been different had the evidence been timely
turned over, see Mazzan, 116 Nev. at 66, 67, 993 P.2d at 36, 37
(summarizing the three components of a Brady violation), and Bright
failed to demonstrate prejudice or that the State acted in bad faith, see
Evans, 117 Nev. at 638, 28 P.3d at 518, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Bright's motion for a mistrial on
these grounds. See Rudin, 120 Nev. at 142, 86 P.3d at 586.
Fourth, Bright argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial when the arresting police
officer stated that a confidential informant identified the defendant. 2
Bright contends that a mistrial was warranted because the statement was
hearsay and he was unable to cross-examine the informant in violation of
his right to confrontation. The district court concluded that a mistrial was
not warranted because Bright opened the door to this testimony by asking
questions regarding the confidential informant—even after being cautioned
by the district court about doing so—and by asking the question which
prompted the officer's response. We agree, and conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bright's request for a
2 Tothe extent that Bright contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his request to dismiss the charges against him
outright, he fails to support this claim with any relevant authority or
cogent argument and therefore we decline to consider it. See Maresca v.
State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987).
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mistrial. See Rudin, 120 Nev. at 142, 86 P.3d at 586; see also United
States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 733 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that "a
defendant can open the door to the admission of evidence otherwise barred
by the Confrontation Clause," and discussing cases).
Fifth, Bright argues that cumulative error entitles him to
relief. Because we have found no error, this claim lacks merit.
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 3
GH
LYbons
Dougl
Saitta
cc: Hon. Valorie J. Vega, District Judge
Clark County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
We note that appellant's fast track statement does not contain
3
adequate citation to the appendix. See NRAP 3C(e)(1)(c). We caution
appellant's counsel, Kedric A. Bassett, that future failure to comply with
the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure when filing briefs with this court
may result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n).
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'