UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 95-10626
(Summary Calendar)
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HERBERT R GRAFF; CARL W MANGUS; STEVE FEDORKO;
ED J PAYNE; LARRY FLOOD; VINCE SCARICH; OTTO
NASS; JEFF FEDORKO,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
KOVAR-ANDREWS PROGRAM; MITCHELL MCDADE MCDADE
PROGRAM
Plaintiffs
versus
GANDY MICHENER SWINDLE & WHITAKER; RAMSAY H
SLUGG; WAYNE M WHITAKER; TAYLOR GANDY; JOHN W
MICHENER, JR; DONALD O PRATT; H DAVID FLOWERS;
JOHN V HOWARD; ROBERT D AKERS; BRUCE W MCGEE;
KENDALL A HALL; JERRY K SAWYER; TOM L
LARIMORE; RAGAN S TATE; JOHN ALLEN CHALK; PAUL
M BUCHANAN; JOSEPH W SPENCE; LINDA TODD
MURPHY; TERRIE LIVINGSTON; RICKY BALTHROP;
GEORGE BARLOW; WILLIAM T FITZGERALD; JAMES G
REYNOLDS; MACK ED SWINDLE; INVESTAMERICA
FINANCIAL SERVICES CORP; LEON W SNEARLY; DON H
FORD; DAVID M BECKHAM; ROBERT W STEWART, III;
R GERALD HUGHES; DONALD L FIELD, JR; DIAMOND M
DRILLING & EXPLORATION COMPANY; JANE WIGGIN
GUDGEN; WHITE CARRIAGE PROPERTY CORPORATION;
WHITE FEATHER ROYALTY CORPORATION; TM
CORPORATION; DON H FORD & ASSOCIATES,
Defendants.
and
ALFRED E BREMERS
Defendant-Appellant
ROBERT W STEWART, III
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(4:93-CV-667-A)
September 17, 1996
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Alfred E. Bremers and Robert W. Stewart, III appeal a jury
verdict in their disfavor following a trial concerning violations
of Texas securities laws. They argue that the district court
improperly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over their case;
that the district court abused its discretion in disallowing an
amendment raising a “joint venture” defense and a jury instruction
regarding the defense; and that the district court abused its
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
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discretion in making evidentiary rulings. Bremers also argues that
the district court delivered an erroneous instruction regarding the
reliance element of fraud.
We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in exercising jurisdiction over the pendent state claims after the
federal claims which originally provided jurisdiction were
dismissed. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir.)
(stating that district court has “discretionary power to adjudicate
pendent claims after it has dismissed the federal claims that
originally invoked its jurisdiction”), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
115 S. Ct. 189, 130 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1994). The district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the Appellants’ request to
amend their pleadings to allege the joint venture defense. See
Moody v. FMC Corp., 995 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating
standard as abuse of discretion). Accordingly, the district court
did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the joint venture
defense. Because Bremers and Stewart failed to provide us with a
copy of the trial transcript, we are unable to review their
contentions regarding the district court’s evidentiary rulings.
See Piper v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 94-41368 (5th Cir. June 19,
1995) (holding that failure to provide transcript prevented
meaningful review of Appellant’s contentions that the trial court
made incorrect evidentiary rulings). Finally, the district court
correctly instructed the jury concerning the reliance element of
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fraud. See Koral Indus. v. Security-Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 802
S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. 1990) (stating that the only defense to fraud
is actual knowledge of the misrepresentation).
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
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