UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4224
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KENDRICK BYRON LAMAR DANIELS, a/k/a T,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:07-cr-01484-PMD-1)
Submitted: August 7, 2013 Decided: August 13, 2013
Before KING, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ann Briks Walsh, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kendrick Byron Lamar Daniels appeals the district
court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing
him to twelve months in prison followed by twelve months of
supervised release. Daniels’s attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising
the issue of whether his sentence is substantively unreasonable
but concluding that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal.
Daniels was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief but has not done so. We affirm.
We review a district court’s judgment revoking
supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th
Cir. 1992). We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation
of supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether
the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id.
at 438. In this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion
than reasonableness review for Guidelines sentences. United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if
we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable
must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.
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While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven
policy statements and the statutory factors applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006),
the court need not robotically tick through every subsection,
and ultimately, the court has broad discretion to revoke the
previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum. Id. at 656-57. Moreover, while a district
court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence, the
court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as when imposing a post-conviction sentence.
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that
Daniels’s sentence is reasonable, and the district court did not
abuse its discretion. The sentence is within the prescribed
statutory range and the policy statement range, and the district
court reasonably determined that a sentence at the high end of
the policy statement range was appropriate in this case.
Moreover, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform his or her client, in
writing, of his or her right to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for further review. If the client requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
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petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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