IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs April 21, 2011
GREG LANCE
v.
RANDALL YORK, District Attorney General, 13th Judicial District
Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Putnam County
No. 2009-340 Ronald Thurman, Chancellor
No. M2010-01864-COA-R3-CV - Filed May 13, 2011
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition for access to
public records under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 10-7-505. The trial court dismissed
the petition upon its finding that: (1) the Appellee records custodian responded to Appellant’s
records request; (2) the fee charged to Appellant was reasonable and in compliance with
those set by the open records counsel; and (3) Appellant had, in fact, received the records that
he requested. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3. Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
J. S TEVEN S TAFFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which A LAN E. H IGHERS, P.J.,
W.S., and D AVID R. F ARMER, J., joined.
Greg Lance, Pikeville, Tennessee, pro se.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Joseph F. Whalen, Associate Solicitor
General; and Benjamin A. Whitehouse, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee, Randall
York, District Attorney General, 13th Judicial District.
OPINION
The Tennessee Public Records Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 10-7-501 et
seq. (the “Act”), provides, in relevant part, that:
(2)(A) All state, county and municipal records shall, at all times
during business hours, which for public hospitals shall be during
the business hours of their administrative offices, be open for
personal inspection by any citizen of this state, and those in
charge of the records shall not refuse such right of inspection to
any citizen, unless otherwise provided by state law.
(B) The custodian of a public record or the custodian's designee
shall promptly make available for inspection any public record
not specifically exempt from disclosure. In the event it is not
practicable for the record to be promptly available for
inspection, the custodian shall, within seven (7) business days:
(i) Make the information available to the
requestor;
(ii) Deny the request in writing or by completing
a records request response form developed by the
office of open records counsel. The response shall
include the basis for the denial; or
(iii) Furnish the requestor a completed records
request response form developed by the office of
open records counsel stating the time reasonably
necessary to produce the record or information.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2).
On July 7, 2009, Appellant Greg Lance, an inmate at the Southeastern Tennessee State
Regional Correctional Facility, sent a public records request, pursuant to the foregoing
statute, to Appellee Randy York, District Attorney General for the 13th Judicial District. By
his request, Mr. Lance sought a copy of all documents in District Attorney York’s possession
regarding Mr. Lance’s 1999 criminal conviction in Putnam County, Tennessee. Although
Mr. Lance claims that District Attorney York’s assistant replied to his request on July 10,
2009, and denied his request for photocopies of the criminal case, this reply letter is not
contained in the record.
The record does contain a letter from District Attorney York, dated October 9, 2009.
This letter explains that the records requested constitute approximately 7,500 pages of
documents and that the fee for copying the records is $0.15 per page, or $1,125.00. The
letter also states that the additional costs of labor and postage would bring the total cost to
$1,212.16. The records that Mr. Lance requested were kept in paper-form only and were not
available in electronic format.
On September 29, 2009, Mr. Lance filed this action in the Chancery Court for Putnam
County. By his petition, Mr. Lance asserted that District Attorney York had denied him
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access to the requested public records. District Attorney York filed an answer on April 7,
2010, stating that Mr. Lance would receive a copy of the requested documents upon payment
of the reasonable copying, postage, and labor costs. District Attorney York’s October 9,
2009 letter was attached to the answer.
On May 7, 2010, the trial court conducted a telephonic hearing, and determined that
Mr. Lance was not entitled to any relief under the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tennessee
Code Annotated Section 10-7-503. The court entered an order to this effect on May 14,
2010.
The parties subsequently agreed to vacate the court’s May 14, 2010 order to allow Mr.
Lance more time to submit additional information to the court. A subsequent hearing was
held on July 22, 2010. At this hearing, Mr. Lance stated that his mother had paid for the
requested documents and that he had received the records from District Attorney York’s
office. On August 2, 2010, the trial court entered a final order, dismissing Mr. Lance’s
petition. The trial court specifically held that Mr. Lance was not entitled to demand copies
of the requested records for an amount lower than the reasonable copying charge established
by the Tennessee Open Records Counsel, and as authorized in Tennessee Code Annotated
Section 8-4-604. The court further found that, because Mr. Lance admitted that he had
received the requested records, he was not entitled to any further relief.
Mr. Lance appeals and submits three issues for our review, which are as follows:
1. Whether the trial court correctly held that Appellee did not
wrongfully withhold the public records sought by Mr. Lance,
and did not violate the Public Records Act by charging Mr.
Lance for copies of the requested documents?
2. Whether the public records requested by Mr. Lance were
required to be electronically scanned and produced in digital
format?
3. Whether the trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Lance’s
petition after Mr. Lance received the requested records?
We first note that we are cognizant of the fact that Mr. Lance is proceeding pro se.
While a party who chooses to represent himself or herself is entitled to the fair and equal
treatment of the courts, Hodges v. Tenn. Att'y Gen., 43 S.W.3d 918, 920 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2000) (citing Paehler v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1997)), "[p]ro se litigants are not ... entitled to shift the burden of litigating their case
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to the courts." Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)
(citing Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Pro se litigants
must comply with the same substantive and procedural law to which represented parties must
adhere. Hodges, 43 S.W.3d at 920-21.
It is well settled that factual findings of the trial court are accorded a presumption of
correctness, and will not be overturned unless the evidence preponderates against them. See
Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). With respect to legal issues, this court's review is conducted under
a pure de novo standard of review. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ.,
58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001). Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo
with no presumption of correctness, but appellate courts have “great latitude to determine
whether findings as to mixed questions of fact and law made by the trial court are sustained
by probative evidence on appeal.” Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1995).
The instant appeal requires us to review the trial court’s interpretation of the
Tennessee Public Records Act and its determination that it was not violated under the
specific facts of this case. It is well settled that, in interpreting statutes, courts must “ascertain
and give effect to the legislative intent without restricting or expanding a statute's coverage
beyond its intended scope.” Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995). Issues
involving construction of a statute and its application to facts involve questions of law.
Memphis Publ'g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 74 (Tenn.
2002). Therefore, the trial court's resolution of these issues is not entitled to the Tennessee
Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(d) presumption of correctness on appeal. This Court will
review these issues de novo and reach our own independent conclusions regarding them.
King v. Pope, 91 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tenn. 2002).
Mr. Lance first argues that the trial court erred when it held that District Attorney
York met his burden to show that the requested documents were not wrongfully withheld.
Specifically, Mr. Lance contends that, because District Attorney York did not submit
evidence in the form of live testimony or affidavits, he did not meet the required burden
under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 10-7-505(c), infra.
As set out in full context above, the Act provides, in pertinent part that, “[a]ll state,
county, and municipal records shall, at all times during business hours, ... be open for
personal inspection by any citizen of this state ... unless otherwise provided by state law.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A). The Act grants access to records of government
agencies throughout the state. Cole v. Campbell, 968 S.W.2d 274, 275 (Tenn. 1998). The
purpose of the Act is to promote public oversight of governmental activities. Memphis
Publ'g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d at 74. This Court has
interpreted the legislative mandate of the Act to be very broad and to require disclosure of
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government records even when there are significant countervailing considerations. Memphis
Publ'g Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tenn. 1994).
The Act specifically places the burden for justification of nondisclosure of records on
the party to whom the request is made:
The burden of proof for justification of nondisclosure of records
sought shall be upon the official and/or designee of the official
of those records and the justification for the nondisclosure must
be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(c).
Tennessee has established an expedited court procedure for reviewing and
adjudicating disputes concerning access to records under the Act. Specifically, Tennessee
Code Annotated Section 10-7-505(b) provides, in relevant part, that:
Upon filing of the petition, the court shall, upon request of the
petitioning party, issue an order requiring the defendant or
respondent party or parties to immediately appear and show
cause, if they have any, why the petition should not be granted.
A formal written response to the petition shall not be required,
and the generally applicable periods of filing such response shall
not apply in the interest of expeditious hearings. The court may
direct that the records being sought be submitted under seal for
review by the court and no other party. The decision of the court
on the petition shall constitute a final judgment on the merits.
As noted above, in his answer to Mr. Lance’s petition, District Attorney York stated
that he had informed Mr. Lance that copies of all requested documents would be given to Mr.
Lance upon payment of the reasonable labor, copying, and mailing costs. In support of his
answer, District Attorney York attached a copy of the October 9, 2009 letter he sent to Mr.
Lance explaining the costs. In short, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Mr.
Lance’s request was not, in fact, denied by District Attorney York; rather, the October 9,
2009 letter clearly stated that the records were available to Mr. Lance.
Concerning the charge for copies of the records, the Tennessee Legislature has
mandated that the office of open records counsel shall establish “[a] schedule of reasonable
charges that a records custodian may use as a guideline to charge a citizen requesting copies
of public records pursuant to title 10, chapter 7, part 5.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-4-
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604(a)(1)(A). To this end, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 10-7-503(a)(7)(C) states that
“[a] records custodian may require a requestor to pay the custodian's reasonable costs
incurred in producing the requested material and to assess the reasonable costs in the manner
established by the office of open records counsel pursuant to § 8-4-604.” The Open Records
Counsel has established and disseminated a “Schedule for Reasonable Charges for Copies
of Public Records,” a copy of which is included in the appellate record. This document states
that a records custodian “may assess a charge of 15 cents per page for each...black and white
copy produced.” This document also outlines criteria for imposing labor and mailing costs
for handling record requests. No evidence was presented demonstrating that the costs request
by the District Attorney York in his letter to Mr. Lance exceeded the amounts allowable
under either the statute or the open records counsel’s recommendations.
Mr. Lance next asserts that District Attorney York did not comply with Tennessee
Code Annotated Section 8-4-604(a)(1)(A)(ii)(d) when he refused to provide the requested
documents in a scanned, electronic format. Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8-4-
604(a)(1)(A)(ii)(d) provides that “the requestor be given the option of receiving information
in any format in which it is maintained by the agency, including electronic format....”
(emphasis added). Mr. Lance contends that District Attorney York could have provided the
requested records at less costs if he had caused the records to be scanned and produced
e le c tro n ic a lly ra th e r th a n p h o t o c o p i e d . I n W e lls v . W h a r to n , N o .
W2005-00695-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3309651, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2005), perm
app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2006), this Court specifically held that the “Tennessee Public
Records Act does not require a custodian of records to provide public records in the manner
a citizen requests.” Rather, we explained that:
Section 10-7-506 of the Tennessee Code allows for citizens “to
take extracts or make copies of public records ... and to make
photographs or photostats of the same” and allows the custodian
of those records “to adopt and enforce reasonable rules
governing the making of such extracts, copies, photographs or
photostats.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-506(a). This statute,
however, does not mention the manner in which the custodian
of the record may present the record to the citizen. See Id. §
10-7-506 (2005). In addition, section 10-7-121 of the Tennessee
Code sets forth the requirements a custodian of records must
meet if he or she decides to maintain the public records by
computer. Id. § 10-7-121. Under this section, in order for a
custodian to maintain a public record on computer, the custodian
must be able to provide “a paper copy of the information when
needed or when requested by a member of the public.” Id. §
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10-7-121(a)(1)(D). Further, the section provides that “[n]othing
in this section shall be construed to require the government
official to sell or provide the media upon which such
information is stored or maintained.” Id. § 10-7-121(a)(2).
Wells, 2005 WL 3309651 at *9.
Mr. Lance argues that Wells is no longer good law because the General Assembly
effectively overruled the holding in Wells by adding Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8-4-
604(a)(1)(A)(ii)(d). We find this argument unpersuasive. While we concede that Tennessee
Code Annotated Section 8-4-604(a)(1)(A)(ii)(d) would prohibit an agency from denying a
public records request to be provided in electronic form if those records were, in fact, already
in electronic form, the statute does not, as Mr. Lance argues, go so far as to require the
records custodian to convert paper records into electronic form. In this case, the records
requested by Mr. Lance were in paper-form only; consequently, District Attorney York was
only required to produce them in paper-form, i.e., photocopies.
As noted above, at the conclusion of the July 22, 2010 hearing, Mr. Lance announced
that his mother had paid the costs requested in District Attorney York’s letter, and that she
had obtained the requested documents on his behalf. Mr. Lance now argues that the court
should not have dismissed his petition because he was not “provided any of the requested
records before or dur[]ing the hearing.”
Having determined above that Mr. Lance’s rights under the Public Records Act were
not violated insomuch as District Attorney York properly responded to his request for
records, notified him of the reasonable charges for the record, and provided those documents
in the form in which they were maintained, and given the fact that Mr. Lance ultimately
received these documents, we consider this issue moot. A case will be considered moot if
it no longer serves as a means to provide some sort of relief to the party who may prevail or
if it no longer presents a present, live controversy. State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 717 n. 3
(Tenn. 2001); County of Shelby v. McWherter, 936 S.W.2d 923, 931 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
A case is not justiciable if it does not involve a genuine, continuing controversy requiring the
adjudication of presently existing rights. State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18
S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tenn. 2000); Ford Consumer Fin. Co. v. Clay, 984 S.W.2d 615, 616
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Under the facts of this case, once Mr. Lance was provided copies of
the records and had paid only the reasonable fees for their production, there was no further
relief the court could have granted.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court, dismissing Mr.
Lance’s petition. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the Appellant, Greg Lance.
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_________________________________
J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE
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