Present: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims,
JJ., and Russell, and Koontz, S.JJ.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
v. Record No. 100070 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
April 21, 2011
JOHN T. GORDON, JR.
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal in which a claimant's change-in-condition
application for benefits was rejected by the Workers'
Compensation Commission ("commission") as being time-barred, we
consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the
commission's decision and by holding that the provision in Code
§ 65.2-708(C) tolling the statute of limitations set out in
Code § 65.2-708(A) runs anew under each successive award of
compensation for a compensable injury.
I. Facts and Proceedings Below
John T. Gordon, Jr. ("Gordon") suffered a compensable
injury by accident on January 9, 2000, while working at Ford
Motor Company's ("Ford") production plant in Norfolk. Based on
this injury, the commission entered a series of awards of
compensation to Gordon for various periods of temporary total
and temporary partial disability. The last of these awards,
entered on January 13, 2003, was an open-ended award for
temporary partial disability. Gordon received his last direct
payment of compensation under this award on February 23, 2003.
Following his injury, Gordon continued to work for Ford
intermittently, between periods of temporary total disability,
in a light-duty position due to restrictions arising from the
injury. From October 23, 2000 to January 3, 2001, and from
April 1, 2002 through June 30, 2002, Gordon worked in this
light-duty position and earned wages at or above his pre-injury
wage. Gordon also worked in a light-duty capacity for Ford
from April 20, 2003 through September 11, 2006, again earning
wages equal to or higher than his pre-injury average weekly
wage.
On September 11, 2006, Gordon was temporarily laid off
from his position at Ford because the plant was shut down for
production reasons. On September 25, 2006, Gordon filed a
change-in-condition application seeking temporary total
disability benefits based on lost wages caused by this
"change in condition." Shortly thereafter, Gordon also
requested that the commission "address[] the issue of
temporary partial [disability] benefits," and added
additional dates for which he was seeking "an award for . . .
benefits and a change in condition as well." 1
1
While the record in this case indicates that Gordon
submitted additional claims in November 2006, after the
September 25, 2006 application, the language of both the
commission's and Court of Appeals' decisions indicate that
Gordon's claims have been treated as a single change-in-
condition application. See Gordon v. Ford Motor Co., 55 Va.
2
Ford defended against Gordon's 2006 application for
benefits, in part, by arguing that it was time-barred. Ford
asserted that the application was not filed within two years
of Gordon's last payment of compensation on February 23,
2003, that this last payment triggered the running of the
two-year statute of limitations under Code § 65.2-708(A), and
therefore the application was untimely.
Relying on Code § 65.2-708(C), Gordon argued that his
application was not time-barred because all the wages he
received for the first twenty-four months of the last period
he worked for Ford in a light-duty capacity, from April 20,
2003 to September 11, 2006, were deemed to be compensation.
Gordon therefore asserted that the two-year statute of
limitations in Code § 65.2-708(A) did not begin to run until
April 20, 2005, meaning that his application filed in
September 2006 was timely.
Ford responded that the twenty-four-month tolling
provision in Code § 65.2-708(C) could be triggered only once,
App. 363, 374, 685 S.E.2d 880, 885 (2009); Gordon v. Ford Motor
Co., 53 Va. App. 616, 624, 674 S.E.2d 545, 549 (2009).
Accordingly, we will do likewise for the purposes of this
opinion because, regardless whether Gordon's claims are treated
as a single change-in-condition application, the relevant dates
at issue affect neither the analysis nor outcome of this
opinion.
3
which occurred when Gordon returned to work in a light-duty
position in October 2000. Ford asserted that when Gordon was
again awarded temporary total disability benefits in January
2001, the tolling provision was no longer applicable. Thus,
Ford concluded, "thereafter, all claims for further
compensation would have to be filed within two years from the
date for which compensation was last paid per [Code] § 65.2-
708(A) and that [Code § 65.2-708(C)] could not be used to
extend the period during which compensation was said to be
paid." Ford maintained that because Gordon was last paid
workers' compensation benefits on February 23, 2003, he only
had until February 23, 2005, to apply for benefits based on a
change in condition.
The deputy commissioner rejected Ford's argument and
awarded Gordon the benefits he requested. The deputy
commissioner determined that "[n]othing in the statute
indicates that the provisions of Code § 65.2-708(C) do not
begin to run anew after later periods of temporary partial
disability or temporary total disability for which awards are
entered."
Ford appealed the deputy commissioner's decision to the
full commission. The commission held that Gordon's change-
in-condition application was time-barred based, in part, upon
its conclusion that the Code § 65.2-708(C) tolling provision
4
does not " 'begin to run anew' after later periods of awarded
disability." In other words, the commission held that the
provision is applicable only once to a compensable injury
regardless of the number of awards of compensation for
subsequent periods of disability that may arise from the
injury. Gordon appealed the commission's decision to the
Court of Appeals.
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the
commission's decision. Gordon v. Ford Motor Co., 53 Va. App.
616, 624, 674 S.E.2d 545, 548-49 (2009). Ford subsequently
moved for a rehearing en banc, and the Court of Appeals again
reversed the commission's decision, concluding that
the Code § 65.2-708(A) statute of limitations
runs anew under each successive award of
compensation for a particular compensable injury,
and is triggered on the last day for which
compensation was paid. Subsection C, in providing
for wages to be treated as compensation under
subsection A, is likewise subject to application
under each such award as subsection C supplements
subsection A, A and C operating in conjunction
with each other. Subsection C is not a stand-
alone provision – it instead provides a
definition for the tolling mechanism applied to
subsection A, where a claimant has received wages
(rather than compensation) as provided in
subsection C. The Code § 65.2-708 change-in-
condition/statute of limitations scheme thereby
functions, in its entirety, on an award-by-award
basis – not on what amounts to a hybrid award-by-
award/injury-by-injury basis under the
commission's construction of the statute.
5
Gordon v. Ford Motor Co., 55 Va. App. 363, 373-74, 685 S.E.2d
880, 885 (2009). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded
that when Gordon returned to light-duty work equal to or above
his pre-injury wage on April 20, 2003, following the
commission's January 2003 award of compensation to Gordon for
temporary partial disability, his wages for the next two years
"were to be 'considered compensation' for purposes of tolling
the Code § 65.2-708 statute of limitations," which was "thus
tolled through April 20, 2005, meaning Gordon's change-in-
condition application, filed in 2006, was not time-barred."
Id.
Ford timely filed its notice of appeal, and we granted an
appeal on the following assignments of error:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Commission
based on its interpretation that the tolling provision
set forth in Va. Code § 65.2-708(C) allows a claimant
numerous periods of tolling so long as he has not
remained at work for an uninterrupted period of 24
consecutive months.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Commission
because it erroneously interpreted Va. Code § 65.2-
708(C) to restart each time an award is modified by the
Commission.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Commission
because it erroneously interpreted Va. Code § 65.2-
708(C) as providing multiple period [sic] of tolling
instead of one period.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
6
An issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question of
law which we review de novo. Conyers v. Martial Arts World of
Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007).
When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we
are bound by the plain meaning of that language.
Furthermore, we must give effect to the
legislature’s intention as expressed by the
language used unless a literal interpretation of
the language would result in a manifest
absurdity. If a statute is subject to more than
one interpretation, we must apply the
interpretation that will carry out the
legislative intent behind the statute.
Id. (citations omitted). "The plain, obvious, and rational
meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any curious,
narrow, or strained construction." Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274
Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Additionally,
we have a duty, whenever possible, to interpret
the several parts of a statute as a consistent
and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the
legislative goal. Generally, the Court will look
to the whole body of [a statute] to determine the
true intention of each part. [A] statute should
be read and considered as a whole, and the
language of a statute should be examined in its
entirety to determine the intent of the General
Assembly from the words contained in the statute.
In doing so, the various parts of the statute
should be harmonized so that, if practicable,
each is given a sensible and intelligent effect.
Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488, 498, 621 S.E.2d 48, 52-53
(2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
7
B. Code § 65.2-708
According to Code § 65.2-708(A), a party may ask the
commission to "review any award" of benefits based upon "the
ground of a change in condition." However, "[n]o such review
shall be made after twenty-four months from the last day for
which compensation was paid, pursuant to an award under this
title . . . ." Code § 65.2-708(A). Code § 65.2-708(C)
operates as a tolling provision that extends subsection A's
limitation by expanding the definition of "compensation" under
subsection A to include wages which meet certain conditions.
Specifically, Code § 65.2-708(C) declares:
All wages paid, for a period not exceeding
twenty-four consecutive months, to an employee
(i) who is physically unable to return to his
pre-injury work due to a compensable injury and
(ii) who is provided work within his capacity at
a wage equal to or greater than his pre-injury
wage, shall be considered compensation.
It is undisputed in this case that: (i) Gordon was
physically unable to return to his pre-injury work due to his
compensable injury; and (ii) Ford paid Gordon "at a wage equal
to or greater than his pre-injury wage" for performing light-
duty work while under awards for temporary partial disability
during three different periods following his compensable
injury. Code § 65.2-708(C). The first two such periods
occurred from October 2000 into January 2001 and from April
2002 through June 2002. The third such period occurred between
8
April 20, 2003 and September 11, 2006, after the commission's
January 2003 award of compensation to Gordon for temporary
partial disability.
The parties disagree, however, as to the meaning and
application of Code § 65.2-708(C) to the facts of this case.
The commission concluded, and Ford argues, that Code § 65.2-
708(C) "grants one period of tolling to each claimant," and
does not grant new periods of tolling each time an award is
entered pursuant to Title 65.2. We disagree with the
commission and Ford.
According to the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, a
claimant may be paid compensation pursuant to multiple awards
based on multiple periods of disability arising from the same
compensable injury, as occurred in this case. Code § 65.2-708,
in particular, contemplates a series of awards by authorizing
the commission to "review any award" upon "the ground of a
change in condition," and "on such review . . . make an award
ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously
awarded . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Subsection A also includes
language that acts, in effect, as a statute of limitations.
Specifically, Code § 65.2-708(A) provides that "[n]o such
review shall be made after twenty-four months from the last day
for which compensation was paid, pursuant to an award under
this title . . . ." This two-year statute of limitations under
9
subsection A is tolled while the claimant receives
compensation, "pursuant to an award." Code § 65.2-708(A).
Accordingly, the determining factor concerning whether a
change-in-condition application is time-barred under Code
§ 65.2-708(A) is the date "for which compensation was [last]
paid, pursuant to an award . . . ."
Code § 65.2-708(C) provides that, "[a]ll wages paid [under
particular circumstances] shall be considered compensation."
In so providing, Code § 65.2-708(C) tolls the operation of the
subsection A statute of limitations in the same manner as the
payment of compensation pursuant to an award. However, the
tolling provision of subsection C has its own restrictive
language. It is subject to the condition that all wages paid
"for a period not exceeding twenty-four consecutive months
. . . shall be considered compensation" under Code § 65.2-
708(A). Code § 65.2-708(C).
We agree with the Court of Appeals that "subsection C
supplements subsection A," Gordon, 55 Va. App. at 373, 685
S.E.2d at 885, and that the two subsections "operat[e] in
conjunction with each other. Subsection C is not a stand-alone
provision – it instead provides a definition for the tolling
mechanism applied to subsection A, where a claimant has
received wages (rather than compensation) as provided in
subsection C." Id.
10
Accordingly, we hold that the Code § 65.2-708(A) statute
of limitations runs anew under each successive award of
compensation for a particular compensable injury and is
triggered on the last day for which compensation was paid. We
also hold that Code § 65.2-708(C), by providing for wages
meeting certain prescribed conditions to be treated as
compensation under Code § 65.2-708(A), applies to each such
award.
In this case, Gordon received his last direct payment of
compensation pursuant to an award on February 23, 2003. Gordon
subsequently worked in a light-duty capacity for Ford from
April 20, 2003 through September 11, 2006, and was paid wages
equal to or greater than his pre-injury wage. Accordingly,
Code § 65.2-708(C) requires that the wages Ford paid to Gordon
during the first twenty-four months of the third period of
Gordon’s light-duty employment for Ford, from April 20, 2003
through April 20, 2005, be considered "compensation" for
purposes of tolling the Code § 65.2-708(A) statute of
limitations. Consequently, we hold that the Code § 65.2-708(A)
statute of limitations was tolled through April 20, 2005, and
that Gordon’s change-in-condition application, filed in
September 2006, was not time-barred under the statute.
11
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the Court of
Appeals' judgment reversing the commission's decision. 2
Affirmed.
2
The Court of Appeals relied, in part, upon its
interpretation of the language, "for a period not exceeding
twenty-four consecutive months," as it appears in Code § 65.2-
708(C), to reach the conclusion that Gordon's application was
not time-barred. Gordon, 55 Va. App. at 372-74, 685 S.E.2d at
884-85. Because the facts of this case render such analysis
unnecessary, we decline to address or interpret that language
in this opinion.
12