Present: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and
Millette, JJ., and Russell, S.J.
RAFAEL HERNANDEZ
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 092524 SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL
January 13, 2011
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In Moreau v. Fuller, 276 Va. 127, 661 S.E.2d 841 (2008),
we considered the question whether a court, having taken a
criminal case under advisement for deferred disposition, had a
ministerial duty, enforceable by mandamus, to enter final
judgment in the case. We held that the act of rendering
judgment was within the inherent power of the court and that
it was discretionary, not ministerial, and therefore not
subject to compulsion by mandamus. Id. at 138-39, 661 S.E.2d
at 847-48. Today, we revisit that question in a different
factual context.
Facts and proceedings
The facts are undisputed and the appeal presents a pure
question of law. Rafael Hernandez was indicted for
feloniously assaulting a police officer in violation of Code
§ 18.2-57(C). At the conclusion of the evidence at a bench
trial, defense counsel, citing Moreau, moved the court to
defer disposition of the case for a period of time to be fixed
by the court, to continue the defendant’s bond in effect for
that period, subject to such conditions as the court might
prescribe, and at the end of that period to consider dismissal
of the case in lieu of a conviction if the defendant complied
with all the prescribed conditions. The attorney for the
Commonwealth did not agree. The court stated from the bench
that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt
and held that even though the case might be an appropriate one
for a deferred disposition, the court did not have inherent
authority to do so. The defense waived a pre-sentence report
and the court imposed a sentence of eleven months in jail with
five months suspended subject to probation for eleven months
after release.
Hernandez appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted
him an appeal limited to the question whether the trial court
erred in concluding that it lacked inherent authority to
continue the defendant’s case for future determination. By a
published opinion, a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment, holding that the circuit court had neither
statutory nor inherent authority to defer disposition of the
case. Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 190, 684 S.E.2d
845 (2009). We awarded Hernandez an appeal on a single
assignment of error, that the Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that the trial court lacked inherent authority to
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defer judgment “upon terms contemplating a future dismissal of
criminal charges.”
Analysis
Because the appeal presents a pure question of law, we
apply a de novo standard of review. Moreau, 276 Va. at 133,
661 S.E.2d at 845. There are marked similarities between this
case and Moreau. Here, as in Moreau, the Commonwealth did not
agree to a deferred disposition. Here, as in Moreau, the
trial judge stated that the evidence was sufficient to support
a finding of guilt. Here, as in Moreau, the trial court
considered the question of deferred disposition before
entering an order finding the defendant guilty of a crime.
The trial courts, however, reached opposite conclusions in the
two cases. Here, the circuit court held that it lacked
authority to defer disposition, while the juvenile and
domestic relations district court in Moreau held that it had
such authority.
Moreau was a civil case, a petition for mandamus brought
by a Commonwealth’s Attorney in a circuit court to compel the
judge of a juvenile and domestic relations district court to
perform the allegedly ministerial duty of entering final
judgment in a criminal case that had been taken under
advisement and continued for further disposition. Our
holdings in Moreau, although arising in a different context,
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nevertheless control the present case. There, we held that
“the act of rendering judgment is within the inherent power of
the court and that the very essence of adjudication and entry
of judgment by a judge involves discretionary power of the
court.” Id. at 139, 661 S.E.2d at 847-48. In reaching that
holding, we said:
Upon hearing the evidence in the criminal
proceeding at issue in this case, it was within the
inherent authority of the court to "take the matter
under advisement" or "continue the case for
disposition" at a later date. Such practices
involve the essence of rendering judgment. No one
contends that the judge must immediately render
judgment upon the instant that the presentation of
evidence has been concluded.
Id. at 137, 661 S.E.2d at 846-47. We noted that while such a
case was pending, the court has statutory authority to
continue bail requirements. Id. at 137 n.4, 661 S.E.2d at 847
n.4.
In Moreau, we left open the question whether a court may
defer judgment and continue a case with a promise of a
particular disposition at a later date. Id. at 137, 661
S.E.2d at 847. That question was not before the Court in
Moreau and is not before us here, as neither case involved
such a promise.
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation in the
present case that once a court has entered a judgment of
conviction of a crime, the question of the penalty to be
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imposed is entirely within the province of the legislature,
and the court has no inherent authority to depart from the
range of punishment legislatively prescribed. Hernandez, 55
Va. App. at 196-97, 684 S.E.2d at 848-49. We do not agree,
however, with the Court of Appeals’ holding that the mere
statement by a judge that the evidence was sufficient to
support a conviction amounts to a judgment of conviction. See
55 Va. App. at 202, 684 S.E.2d at 851.
As we have repeatedly held, "a court speaks only through
its written orders." Moreau, 276 Va. at 137-38, 661 S.E.2d at
847 (citing Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc.,
273 Va. 96, 103, 639 S.E.2d 174, 177 (2007)). An observation
by the court as to the sufficiency of the evidence does not
amount to a formal adjudication of guilt. Until the court
enters a written order finding the defendant guilty of a
crime, the court has the inherent authority to take the matter
under advisement or to continue the case for disposition at a
later date.
Conclusion
In the present case, during the interval between the
conclusion of the evidence and the entry of a written order
adjudicating the defendant guilty, the circuit court had the
inherent power, in the exercise of its discretion, to take the
matter under advisement and to continue the case for future
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disposition, subject to such lawful conditions as the court
might prescribe. The circuit court erred in holding that it
lacked that power and in denying the defendant’s motion for
that reason. The Court of Appeals also erred in holding that
the circuit court lacked that inherent power and in affirming
the judgment accordingly.
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that Court with
direction to further remand the same to the circuit court for
such consideration of the defendant’s motion for deferred
disposition as the circuit court in its discretion may deem
appropriate.
Reversed and remanded.
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