Taylor v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Beales
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

KAITLIN AIRELE TAYLOR
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2236-09-1 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY
JUNE 28, 2011
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
Randall D. Smith, Judge

James B. Melton for appellant.

Kathleen Martin, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T.
Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General of Virginia, on brief), for appellee.

Kaitlin Airele Taylor appeals her conviction for grand larceny. She does not claim she

was wrongly convicted or innocent of the crime. Instead, Taylor argues the trial court erred by

not using its “inherent discretion and authority” to acquit her of grand larceny and substitute in

its place a lesser crime of petit larceny. See Appellant’s Br. at 4. The trial court held it had no

such power. We agree and affirm.

I.

A grand jury indicted Taylor for grand larceny. The evidence at Taylor’s bench trial

proved she stole more than $200 of merchandise from a Sears store. After hearing closing

arguments, the trial court pronounced Taylor guilty of grand larceny. Taylor’s counsel asked if

the court would “entertain a motion at the time of sentencing to find her guilty of a misdemeanor

versus a felony.” App. at 106. The court did not answer the question directly but stated it would

“hear whatever evidence you have at sentencing.” Id. Shortly after the trial, the court entered an

order reciting that “[a]t the conclusion of the evidence” presented at trial, the court found Taylor

guilty of grand larceny and continued the case for sentencing. See Order (May 18, 2009).
 At the sentencing hearing, Taylor’s counsel made a “motion to reduce this to a

misdemeanor.” App. at 110-11. Counsel conceded, however, there was “no legal basis” for the

motion given that the court had already concluded Taylor was “involved” in the theft and the

property stolen “exceeded $200.” Id. at 113. Nevertheless, counsel argued, Taylor had assisted

law enforcement in another matter. For that reason, counsel said, “we’re asking the Court to

consider reducing the ultimate charge to a misdemeanor, perhaps even deferring findings for a

year’s worth of probation and then deciding whether to reduce the charge, and I do believe the

Court has the discretion to do that whether or not — the Commonwealth objects or not.” Id. at

115. The prosecutor opposed Taylor’s motion.

The trial court pointed out the $200 threshold for grand larceny and the court’s ability to

defer and dismiss criminal charges were “legislative decisions.” Id. at 116. Taylor’s counsel

then suggested the court could “revisit” its earlier factfinding and declare the stolen property’s

value to be less than $200. Id. The court rejected the suggestion as a pretextual effort to call a

“duck a dog.” Id. “I would be happy to do that if that was provided for in the law,” the trial

judge explained, “but I think what I would have to do is create a fiction to go outside, and when

the Commonwealth — it is their role in the system to determine the charge, and then it’s my role

to determine whether the evidence meets the charge. If it didn’t, I would have found the

defendant not guilty, but I’ll have to deny your motion.” Id. at 116-17. 1

1
For our purposes, it is inconsequential that the trial court entered the written conviction
order a few days after orally pronouncing Taylor guilty at the conclusion of the trial. “The
rendition of a judgment must be distinguished from its entry on the court records. The rendition
of a judgment duly pronounced is the judicial act of the court, and the entry or recording of the
instrument memorializing the judgment ‘does not constitute an integral part of, and should not be
confused with, the judgment itself.’” Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 136, 139, 607 S.E.2d
107, 109 (2005) (citation omitted). This point does not contradict the oft-repeated maxim that a
court speaks only through its orders, a proposition which “deals with evidence of judicial action,
that is, a declaration of historical fact.” Id. at 139-40, 607 S.E.2d at 109-10.
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 II.

On appeal, Taylor argues the court “erred by concluding that it did not have the inherent

discretion and authority to find appellant guilty of a misdemeanor despite its finding that the

value of the stolen property was $200.00 or more.” Appellant’s Br. at 4 (emphasis added). Put

another way, Taylor contends the trial court erred by not using its inherent discretion to acquit

her of grand larceny — a crime the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt she committed.

We reject Taylor’s argument as inconsistent with first principles of judicial power. A

Virginia court’s authority comes from one of three sources: (i) the express and implied powers

invested in the judiciary by the Virginia Constitution; (ii) the inherent common law authority

inherited from England at the time of our Commonwealth’s founding; and (iii) specific

legislative enactments by the General Assembly. None of these sources of power authorized the

trial court in this case to acquit Taylor of grand larceny.

A. THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION

Adopted over a decade before the United States Constitution, the 1776 Virginia

Declaration of Rights provided that “the legislative and executive powers of the State should be

separate and distinct from the judiciary.” Va. Decl. of Rights § 5 (1776); see also Va. Const. ¶ 2

(1776). The original principle has endured to this day, ensuring that the legislative, executive,

and judicial branches of government “shall be separate and distinct” and that no one branch

could “exercise the powers properly belonging to the others.” Va. Const. art. III § 1 (1971).

The separate and independent status of the judiciary in the Commonwealth’s tripartite

system of government implies certain inherent powers “incident to the exercise of judicial

power” vested in the courts. 2 A. E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of

Virginia 718-20 (1974) (citation omitted). Such powers include, for example, the “authority to

discipline attorneys,” In re Moseley, 273 Va. 688, 697, 643 S.E.2d 190, 195 (2007), the power of

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summary contempt, Robinson v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 137, 145, 583 S.E.2d 60, 64

(2003), and the power to continue a case for a lawful disposition at a later date, Hernandez v.

Commonwealth, 281 Va. 222, 226, 707 S.E.2d 273, 275 (2011); Moreau v. Fuller, 276 Va. 127,

137, 661 S.E.2d 841, 846-47 (2008).

But nothing in the separation-of-powers doctrine suggests a court has the inherent power

to acquit a defendant of a crime that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt she

committed. To be sure, just the opposite is true. The assertion of a power to acquit the guilty

rests upon the fallacy “that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently

refuse to do so.” Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916); see also Ex parte United States,

287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932). The asserted power stands in defiance of, not in conformity with, the

separation-of-powers doctrine.

As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the constitutional “distribution of

powers” is unbalanced when the judiciary relies on “elements of consideration which would be

otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority” under statutes governing matters of crime and

punishment. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. at 42.

[T]he disregard of the Constitution which would result from sustaining
the proposition is made if possible plainer by considering that, if it be
that the plain legislative command fixing a specific punishment for crime
is subject to be permanently set aside by an implied judicial power upon
considerations extraneous to the legality of the conviction, it would seem
necessarily to follow that there could be likewise implied a discretionary
authority to permanently refuse to try a criminal charge because of the
conclusion that a particular act made criminal by law ought not to be
treated as criminal. And thus it would come to pass that the possession
by the judicial department of power to permanently refuse to enforce a
law would result in the destruction of the conceded powers of the other
departments and hence leave no law to be enforced.

Id.; see also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 449-50 (1932); accord The Federalist No. 78

(Alexander Hamilton) (“The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be

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disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the

substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.”).

For this reason, a court simply has no “authority to free guilty defendants,” Sorrells, 287

U.S. at 449, whose guilt was proved in a lawful trial. When a “defendant has been duly indicted

for an offense found to be within the statute, and the proper authorities seek to proceed with the

prosecution, the court cannot refuse to try the case in the constitutional method because it desires

to let the defendant go free.” Id. at 450. Such a practice “is inconsistent with the Constitution,

since its exercise in the very nature of things amounts to a refusal by the judicial power to

perform a duty resting upon it and, as a consequence thereof, to an interference with both the

legislative and executive authority as fixed by the Constitution.” Ex parte United States, 242

U.S. at 50-52 (emphasis added) (declaring unlawful the practice then called “laying the case on

file”).

We agree with the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court. 2 The Virginia

Constitution vests the General Assembly with the final authority to define the elements of a

crime and, by negative implication, to identify the host of impermissible judicial “considerations

extraneous to the legality of the conviction,” id. at 37, which have nothing to do with the

defendant’s guilt or innocence. Virginia courts have no authority to “evaluate the ‘propriety,

wisdom, necessity and expediency’ of legislation.” Laurels of Bon Air, LLC v. Med. Facilities

of Am. Living, 51 Va. App. 583, 599, 659 S.E.2d 561, 569 (2008) (citation omitted). Faithful to

this tradition of judicial self-restraint, a Virginia court cannot refuse to convict a guilty defendant

merely because it questions the category of offense assigned by the legislature, considers the

2
Moreau likewise applied the “division of powers within the federal constitution” to its
analysis of “fundamental powers in [the] three branches of government” established by the
Constitution of Virginia. Moreau, 276 Va. at 136-37, 661 S.E.2d at 846. See also Taylor v.
Worrell Enters., 242 Va. 219, 223, 409 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1991) (relying on a “separation of
powers doctrine” that was “succinctly articulated by the United States Supreme Court”).
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range of statutory punishment too harsh, or believes certain guilty offenders undeserving of a

criminal conviction. 3 “Judicial nullification” of a constitutionally valid criminal statute “has,

happily, no place in our system.” Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 450.

Equally important, the Virginia Constitution vests Commonwealth Attorneys with “the

discretion to decide under which of several applicable statutes the charges shall be instituted.” In

re Horan, 271 Va. 258, 264, 634 S.E.2d 675, 679 (2006) (citation omitted). 4 Absent an

unconstitutional abuse of that discretion, Virginia judges have no authority to substitute their

judgment for the prosecutor’s on such matters. See Boyd v. Cnty. of Henrico, 42 Va. App. 495,

522, 592 S.E.2d 768, 781 (2004) (en banc). 5

The Governor, moreover, has the exclusive constitutional power to “grant reprieves and

pardons” after conviction. See Va. Const. art. V § 12. The Virginia judiciary “may not assume a

power of clemency or pardon which is a unique function of executive power.” Moreau, 276 Va. at

136, 661 S.E.2d at 846; see also Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 449 (“Clemency is the function of the

Executive.”). The claim that the judiciary shares these powers “lacks historical justification” and

seeks to justify an indirect, but effectual, “infringement upon the pardoning power.” Note, The

Inherent Power of Criminal Courts to Control Their Sentences, 12 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 544 (1912).

3
See, e.g., Lilly v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 173, 184, 647 S.E.2d 517, 522 (2007)
(“legislative ‘specification of punishments’” are “matters ordinarily understood as ‘peculiarly
questions of legislative policy’” (citation omitted)); Mouberry v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App.
576, 585-86, 575 S.E.2d 567, 571 (2003) (holding that concerns about the wisdom and propriety
of legislation “can only be resolved by the legislative branch” (citations omitted)).
4
See also Mason v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 321, 323, 228 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1976)
(recognizing prosecutorial discretion to proceed “under the misdemeanor statute or the felony
statute”); Brown v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 243, 250, 516 S.E.2d 678, 682 (1999) (finding
prosecution had discretion to charge under applicable misdemeanor or felony statutes).
5
Here, the prosecutor opposed Taylor’s request that the trial court acquit her of grand
larceny and consider the evidence only in support of a petit larceny charge. Nothing in our
analysis precludes a prosecutor from seeking under Code § 19.2-231 to amend an indictment to
assert a lesser-included charge.
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 B. THE COMMON LAW

Taylor also contends our analysis would be incomplete if we failed to consider the

common law. Under common law principles, Taylor argues, a trial court has the discretion to

make a “reduction of charges without regard to the facts proven at trial,” Appellant’s Br. at 9,

and, in essence, acquit a defendant of a crime that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable

doubt she committed. We agree with Taylor’s opening premise — that we should consult the

common law — but find no support for her conclusion that the common law authorized a trial

court to acquit a criminal defendant after finding the evidence proved her guilt.

“The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill

of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same,

and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly.” Code § 1-200

(recodifying former Code § 1-10); see Satterwhite v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 557, 560, 695

S.E.2d 555, 556-57 (2010). This principle is older than the Commonwealth itself. See W.

Hamilton Bryson, Virginia Civil Procedure 47 (3d ed. 1997) (tracing Virginia’s adoption of

common law to the royal instructions to the Virginia Company which planted the colony at

Jamestown).

In Virginia, “our adoption of English common law, and the rights and benefits of all writs

in aid of English common law, ends in 1607 upon the establishment of the first permanent

English settlement in America, Jamestown.” Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 82, 705

S.E.2d 503, 508 (2011). As many courts have noted, Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on

the Laws of England were accepted by the Founders “as the most satisfactory exposition of the

common law of England.” Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904). Nowhere in his

four-volume work does Blackstone describe any common law judicial power to acquit the guilty.

To the contrary, the common law does “not permit, that in criminal cases a power should be

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lodged in any judge, to construe the law otherwise than according to the letter.” 1 William

Blackstone, Commentaries *92. When a defendant contends the letter of the law “induces any

apparent hardship,” Blackstone explained, “the crown has the power to pardon.” Id. Under such

circumstances, a common law court’s only authority was to offer the defendant a temporary

“reprieve” of judgment while he sought an executive pardon. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *394.

This limited common law power, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized, cannot be

converted “into the existence of an arbitrary judicial power to permanently refuse to enforce the

law.” Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. at 44.

So strong was this principle that it precluded common law courts from suspending any

portion of a criminal sentence absent express statutory authorization:

The power of courts to suspend sentence, this phrase being frequently
employed as meaning either delay in the imposition of a sentence for
crime or the staying of execution of the sentence imposed, has been
much discussed. The weight of authority appears to be that, under the
common law, courts do not possess the power to delay the imposition or
execution of sentences for crime, except temporarily, as for instance, in
order to give time for motions for new trial, writs of error, or to
determine the precise sentence to be imposed.

Richardson v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 802, 808, 109 S.E. 460, 461-62 (1921) (emphasis added)

(relying on Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. at 51-52). 6

If the common law precluded trial courts from suspending a criminal sentence without

express statutory authority, then, a fortiori, it is inconceivable the common law would

nonetheless authorize courts to refuse to convict a criminal defendant (for reasons wholly

6
Also citing Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916), the revisers of the 1919 Code of
Virginia “did not believe that such power existed” under the common law. Judge Martin P.
Burks, The Code of 1919, Address before the Virginia State Bar Association (May 16, 1919), in
5 Va. L. Reg. (n.s.) 97, 105 (1920). The General Assembly later enacted legislation providing
statutory authority for suspension of sentences under certain circumstances. See Code
§ 19.2-303. So, too, did the United States Congress. See Affronti v. United States, 350 U.S. 79,
80 (1955) (noting Congress enacted the Probation Act in 1925 in response to Ex Parte United
States).
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unrelated to guilt or innocence) where the defendant’s guilt was proved beyond a reasonable

doubt. Under English common law, only the crown had the prerogative power of pardon. There

simply was no such thing as a judicial pardon. See Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. at 43-52. 7

On appeal, Taylor concedes she has no legal authority for asserting common law courts

had the power to acquit a guilty defendant. See Oral Argument Audio at 3:20 to 4:13.

Undeterred by this admission, however, Taylor contends we should simply declare by ipse dixit

that the power is within our common law authority. The assumption underlying this request,

however, presupposes the common law is not merely a library of discrete legal principles honed

over centuries of judicial application — but is instead a metaphor of judicial lawmaking power,

one which we may rely upon to enact improvements in the unwritten law or to justify

innovations on topics not specifically addressed by statutes. 8 We do not share this view of the

common law.

In his 1803 edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, St. George Tucker acknowledged a

certain elasticity in the incorporation of English common law into the corpus of our law at the

time of the 1776 Virginia Constitutional Convention. English common law, Tucker explained,

governed Virginians only “so far as the same were applicable to the nature of their situation and

circumstances . . . .” 1 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, Editor’s App. Note E at

432 (1803). As heirs of this tradition, Virginia jurists are free to trim off or excise altogether

those aspects of English common law which “are repugnant to the nature and character of our

7
As Blackstone explained, “it would be impolitic for the power of judging and of
pardoning to centre in one and the same person” because, among other things, “it would tend to
confound all ideas of right among the mass of the people; as they would find it difficult to tell
whether a prisoner were discharged by his innocence or obtained a pardon through favour.” 4
Blackstone, Commentaries *397.
8
Cf. Anthony D’Amato, Legal Realism Explains Nothing, 1 Wash. U. Juris. Rev. 1, 2
(2009) (Historically, “[h]ardly anyone thought that judges made the law or were entitled to make
it. Instead, law was believed to be a body of concepts . . . that judges had to study, understand,
respect, and apply.”).
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political system, or which the different and varied circumstances of our country render

inapplicable to us,” Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 400, 315 S.E.2d 847, 852 (1984)

(citation and emphasis omitted), as those aspects “are either not in force here, or must be so

modified in their application as to adapt them to our condition,” id.

Unless a common law maxim fails the repugnancy test, Tucker continued, it “remained in

full force . . . until repealed, altered, or amended by the legislative authority of the colonies,

respectively; or by the constitutional acts of the same, when they became sovereign and

independent states.” 1 Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, Editor’s App. Note E at 432

(emphasis added). From 1776 until today, Virginia law has recognized this distinction. Unless

“repugnant” to the principles of our constitutional republic, English common law governs

“except as altered by the General Assembly.” Code § 1-200. 9

Framed from this perspective, simply restating Taylor’s request should be sufficient to

refute it. She asks us to recognize — for the first time — a common law power of a Virginia

court to acquit a criminal defendant whose guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Nothing in English common law or, for that matter, the “common law developed in Virginia”

after Jamestown, Morris, 281 Va. at 82, 705 S.E.2d at 508-09, authorizes the assertion of such an

anomalous judicial power.

C. STATUTORY AUTHORITY

In various contexts, the General Assembly has authorized trial courts in Virginia to acquit

a defendant of a criminal offense for reasons unrelated to guilt or innocence if certain statutory

conditions are met. The General Assembly “is presumed to have known and to have had the

9
See, e.g., Morris, 281 Va. at 81, 705 S.E.2d at 508; Jenkins v. Mehra, 281 Va. 37, 44,
704 S.E.2d 577, 581 (2011); Collins v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 355, 361, 702 S.E.2d 267,
269-70 (2010); Wade v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 689, 693, 696 S.E.2d 258, 260 (2010);
Satterwhite, 56 Va. App. at 560, 695 S.E.2d at 556.
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common law in mind” when enacting statutes. Jenkins v. Mehra, 281 Va. 37, 44, 704 S.E.2d

577, 581 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The enactment of these

statutes demonstrates the General Assembly correctly concluded no common law precedent

authorized such extraordinary relief and that, if Virginia courts were to have this power, it must

be granted by statute. 10 Because statutes in derogation of the common law must be “strictly

construed” and not “enlarged” beyond their “express terms,” id. at 45, 704 S.E.2d at 581 (citation

omitted), the trial court correctly refused to apply any of these statutes to Taylor’s grand larceny

charge — a crime none of the statutes specifically address. 11 Thus, the trial court had no

statutory authority to grant the relief she requested.

D. MOREAU & HERNANDEZ

Finally, Taylor argues our reasoning cannot be reconciled with Moreau v. Fuller, 276 Va.

127, 661 S.E.2d 841 (2008), and Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 222, 707 S.E.2d 273

(2011). We disagree.

Neither Moreau nor Hernandez addressed the issue before us. In Moreau, a

Commonwealth Attorney sought a mandamus remedy to preclude a district court judge from

continuing a case and to compel the judge to issue a final decision. The Virginia Supreme Court

denied the relief because continuing a case for purposes of “rendering judgment” involves a

10
Accord United States v. Cannon, 778 F.2d 747, 749 (11th Cir. 1985) (“We are cited to
no federal authority, however, and we know of none, which empowers a federal judge to
withhold adjudication and impose probation or any other sentence. Whether such authority
should exist is a matter within the province of the Congress.”).
11
See, e.g., Code §§ 4.1-305(F) (underage “consumption, purchase or possession” of
alcohol); 15.2-1812.2(B) (malicious damage to property); 16.1-278.9(A) (children found
delinquent for certain drug and alcohol offenses); 18.2-57.3(A) (assault and battery against a
family or household member); 18.2-61(C) (marital rape); 18.2-67.1(C) (marital forcible
sodomy); 18.2-67.2(C) (marital object sexual penetration); 18.2-251 (possession of controlled
substances or marijuana); and 19.2-303.2 (certain property crimes constituting misdemeanors).

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discretionary, not ministerial, act outside the scope of mandamus. Moreau, 276 Va. at 138, 661

S.E.2d at 847.

But “[w]hat may in a proper case be reasonably subject to challenge,” Moreau clarified,

“is whether the judge may decline to render judgment and continue the case with or without

terms akin to probation status with the promise from the court of a particular disposition at a later

date.” Id. at 137, 661 S.E.2d at 847. “However, the case before us does not present such

questions,” Moreau held, because the record did not show the district court employed this

practice. Id. (emphasis added). To further underscore the point, three justices in Moreau

emphasized the authority of a trial court to defer and dismiss criminal charges without statutory

authority “is the precise question that the Court does not answer today because it is not properly

before us. The Court’s inability to address this issue should not be viewed as a tacit approval of

the practice.” Moreau, 276 Va. at 140, 661 S.E.2d at 848 (Kinser, J., concurring) (emphasis

added).

Hernandez did little more than “revisit” Moreau in “a different factual context.”

Hernandez, 281 Va. at 223, 707 S.E.2d at 273. Holding only that a trial court had the

discretionary authority to continue a case on its docket for a future decision, Hernandez left

unresolved the question unaddressed in Moreau. “In Moreau, we left open the question whether

a court may defer judgment and continue a case with a promise of a particular disposition at a

later date. That question was not before the Court in Moreau and is not before us here, as neither

case involved such a promise.” Hernandez, 281 Va. at 225, 707 S.E.2d at 274 (citation omitted

and second emphasis added).

If anything, Hernandez supports our reasoning. “We agree with the Court of Appeals’

observation in the present case,” Hernandez acknowledges, “that once a court has entered a

judgment of conviction of a crime, the question of the penalty to be imposed is entirely within

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the province of the legislature, and the court has no inherent authority to depart from the range of

punishment legislatively prescribed.” Id. at 225, 707 S.E.2d at 275. In our case, Taylor’s

request went beyond merely questioning the penalty and asking the trial court to depart from the

range of punishment authorized by statute. Taylor wanted a downward departure in the charge

itself. If a trial court lacks the inherent authority to reduce a sentence below the statutory range,

it likewise has no inherent authority to reduce or dismiss the criminal charge altogether when the

evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

In short, Moreau and Hernandez merely hold a trial court has the discretion to continue a

case for a future disposition. Neither case addresses what future disposition the court has

authority to impose. In other words, neither Moreau nor Hernandez addressed whether the

decision ultimately made by the trial court, after the discretionary continuance, could be one

acquitting a criminal defendant whose guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Ex parte

United States, 242 U.S. at 46 (recognizing the inherent power of a court to order a “mere

postponement” in the entry of a final order but denying any such power exists as a pretext for

granting a criminal defendant “a pardon for his crime” (citation omitted)). Given the limited

scope of Moreau and Hernandez, we disagree with Taylor’s claim that either case supports her

challenge to the trial court’s decision in this case.

III.

In sum, the trial court correctly held it had no authority — constitutional, common law, or

statutory — to acquit Taylor of grand larceny after finding the evidence proved her guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt. We thus affirm her conviction.

Affirmed.

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