Present: Koontz, Kinser, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, JJ., and
Russell and Lacy, S.JJ.
COUNTY OF ALBEMARLE
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 091590 JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN
September 16, 2010
KESWICK CLUB, L.P.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY
James A. Luke, Judge Designate
In this appeal, a county challenges the circuit court’s
reduction of an assessment, for the 2003 and 2004 tax years, of
the fair market value of real estate owned by a taxpayer. We
consider whether the circuit court erred in finding the
county’s assessment erroneous and reducing the assessment.
This case was previously remanded to the Circuit Court of
Albemarle County for reconsideration of an assessment made by
the County of Albemarle (the County) of the fair market value
of the Keswick Club. Keswick Club, L.P. v. County of
Albemarle, 273 Va. 128, 639 S.E.2d 243 (2007). This Court
instructed the circuit court, on remand, to apply the proper,
less stringent standard of review, applicable under the facts
of this particular case, in determining whether the County’s
assessment was erroneous. Id. at 141, 639 S.E.2d at 250.
Facts
In 2003, Keswick Club, L.P. (the taxpayer), the owner of
Keswick Club, an approximately 153-acre private recreational
club in Albemarle County, challenged a judgment upholding the
County’s assessment of the fair market value of the Keswick
Club real property for the 2003 and 2004 tax years. The County
issued a notice of reassessment to the taxpayer that valued
Keswick Club’s real estate at a fair market value of
$12,771,500.1 The taxpayer disputed the assessment value and
filed an application in the circuit court, pursuant to Code
§ 58.1-3984, to correct the erroneous assessment.
At the bench trial, David J. Sangree was qualified,
without objection, as an expert real estate appraiser and
hospitality consultant and testified on behalf of the taxpayer.
He was licensed in Ohio and had a temporary appraisal license
in Virginia. Sangree stated that he had conducted a recent
appraisal of the Keswick Club real estate in preparation for
the tax appeal. He further stated that the income approach to
valuation was the most appropriate because a potential buyer of
a golf course looks primarily at its profitability. Sangree
also conducted an appraisal using the sales comparison approach
and included in his appraisal purportedly representative sales
of golf courses in Virginia and South Carolina, as well as the
2002 sale of the Keswick Club. Using both valuation
approaches, Sangree valued the property at $2.9 million.
1
The 2003 notice of reassessment stated that the previous
assessment of the property was $11,318,900.
2
Sangree did not use the cost approach, stating that it was more
relevant for a proposed property or a new construction
property.
The county assessor, Bruce M. Woodzell, testified that he
utilized the cost approach in assessing the value of the
property because it rendered the “most accurate appraisal of
the property” and is “appropriate when you have a special-use
property” such as a golf course. Woodzell stated that he
rejected the income approach because he had not received any
income statements or other financial information from the
taxpayer. However, he had not requested such information.
Woodzell also stated that he could not develop an appraisal
based on the sales approach because there was only one
comparable sale in Albemarle County.
Ivo H. Romenesko, a licensed appraiser, also testified for
the County. He stated that he did not use the income approach
because projecting future profits would require an inordinate
amount of speculation since Keswick Club had been operating at
a loss. Romenesko used both the sales and cost approaches to
evaluate the property. Using the cost approach, Romenesko
valued the property at $12,950,000. Using the sales approach,
Romenesko valued the property at $12 million. His final
appraised value for the property was $12.5 million.
3
At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court found
that the taxpayer failed to prove that the County “committed
manifest error in its evaluation,” and affirmed the County’s
assessment. The taxpayer appealed to this Court. We held that
the circuit court had erred in upholding the County’s
assessment because the assessment was not entitled to a
presumption of correctness, and therefore the taxpayer was not
required to establish that, in making its assessment, the
County committed “manifest error.” Keswick Club, 273 Va. at
141, 639 S.E.2d at 250. Rather, to prevail, the taxpayer was
required only to show that the assessment was erroneous. Id.
Accordingly, we remanded the case for the circuit court to
evaluate the County’s assessment, applying the proper and less
stringent standard of review applicable under the facts of this
case. Id.
On remand, over the objection of the taxpayer, the circuit
court allowed the County to present additional evidence.
Romenesko testified that he had analyzed the fair market value
of the property using the income approach and found that using
that approach resulted in a fair market value of $9.9 million.
However, he discounted the accuracy of the income approach, in
this instance, stating that it required considerable
speculation. Therefore, he discarded the valuation he found
using the income approach, and testified that he still believed
4
that his previous appraisal valuing the property at $12.5
million was accurate because the sales and cost valuation
approaches were better measures of value.
In response, the taxpayer sought to introduce additional
testimony from Sangree, critiquing the income approach
valuation done by Romenesko. The County objected to Sangree’s
testimony because Sangree did not hold a Virginia real estate
appraiser license, his previous Virginia temporary appraiser
license having expired. The taxpayer argued that Sangree was
solely testifying in rebuttal to Romenesko’s testimony about
the appraisal process. The circuit court overruled the
County’s objection on the basis that Sangree had not done a new
appraisal. Further, the court stated that because it was a
continuing proceeding and Sangree was fully qualified and
accepted without objection as an expert appraiser earlier in
the proceeding, the court could allow Sangree to testify
pursuant to Code § 54.1-2010(B).
Sangree testified that the methodology used by Romenesko
in applying the income approach to value the property was
flawed. Sangree also pointed out various mathematical errors
and errors in the figures Romenesko used to calculate both the
possible sale price and potential income of the property.
Also, two additional witnesses testified concerning the
discrepancy between the assumptions made by Romenesko in doing
5
his income approach analysis and how the Keswick Club property
was actually operated or could be operated.
The circuit court issued its ruling by way of a letter
opinion. The circuit court stated that “in effect, the Supreme
Court stated that based on its review of the record, the
[County’s] assessment was erroneous, on the ground that the
County used an improper methodology.” It also stated that the
County, on remand, had reasserted its previous value and that
the taxpayer also reaffirmed that it was relying upon the same
appraisal as asserted at trial. “Thus, the evidence before the
Court at present is substantially similar to the evidence
before the Court at trial.” The circuit court stated that it
had analyzed the evidence presented to it and “the Court, in
applying the less stringent standard of review set forth by the
Supreme Court, concludes that Keswick has proven that the
County’s assessment was erroneous and sets aside the
assessment.”
The circuit court also found that neither the County nor
the taxpayer had arrived at a correct fair market value figure
for the property, and concluded that the correct fair market
value of the property was somewhere between the parties’
valuations. The circuit court set the value of the property at
$7 million, a value figure that had been testified to by
Michael Pownall, Keswick Club’s general manager, in the initial
6
trial. That valuation amount was also admitted into evidence
in a letter from Pownall to the Board of Equalization. The
County appeals.
Analysis
The County argues that the circuit court erred in stating
that this Court, in its prior opinion, found the County’s
assessment erroneous, when this Court only addressed the
County’s assessment methods. The County also asserts that the
circuit court erred in finding that the assessment was
erroneous, in reducing the assessment to $7 million, and in
allowing Sangree’s testimony on remand.
Code § 58.1-3984(A) provides that a taxpayer seeking to
set aside an assessment as erroneous has the burden of
establishing that the property was “valued at more than its
fair market value or that the assessment is not uniform in its
application, or that the assessment is otherwise invalid or
illegal.” Further, a taxing authority’s assessment of a
property’s fair market value is entitled to a presumption of
correctness which can be overcome by showing that the taxing
authority committed manifest error. Board of Supervisors v.
HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. 317, 329, 535 S.E.2d 163, 169
(2000). However, if the taxpayer establishes that the taxing
authority has committed manifest error, the assessment is not
entitled to a presumption of correctness and the taxpayer is
7
required to show only that the assessment was erroneous. See
id. at 330, 535 S.E.2d at 170.
In our prior opinion regarding this matter, we held that
the County’s assessment was not entitled to a presumption of
validity and that the taxpayer was only required to show that
the County’s assessment was erroneous, “not that the county
committed manifest error or disregarded controlling evidence in
making its assessment.” Keswick, 273 Va. at 140-41, 639 S.E.2d
at 250. Under those circumstances, the taxpayer can show an
assessment is erroneous if, as set out in Code § 58.1-3984(A),
the taxpayer establishes that the property is assessed at more
than its fair market value. We concluded that the circuit
court applied an incorrect standard of review. Id. at 141, 639
S.E.2d at 250. The case was remanded to allow the circuit
court to apply the correct standard of review in determining
whether the County’s assessment was erroneous. Id. That is
the posture in which this case was presented to the circuit
court following our remand.
While the circuit court erred in stating that this Court
had already determined that the County’s assessment was
erroneous, the circuit court nevertheless applied the correct
standard on remand when considering whether the County’s
assessment was erroneous. The circuit court, as recited in its
opinion letter, recognized that to prevail in this case, that
8
is, to establish that the assessment was erroneous, the
taxpayer had the burden of proof “to show that the property in
question is valued at more than its fair market value” pursuant
to Code § 58.1-3984(A). The circuit court specifically noted
that the taxpayer presented “evidence as to what it believes is
the fair market value of the property.” The circuit court
concluded that this evidence met the taxpayer’s proof burden.
Therefore, the determinative assignment of error argued by the
County is whether in applying the less stringent standard of
review mandated by this Court to be used on remand, the circuit
court erred in finding that the assessment was erroneous and
reducing the assessment to $7 million.
The County argues that the circuit court should have
accepted the County’s assessment, which was supported by
Romenesko’s appraisal. The taxpayer asserts that the circuit
court was correct in finding that the County’s assessment was
erroneous. The taxpayer argues that the circuit court, as the
fact finder, was entitled not to accept the expert testimony
presented to it and that the circuit court’s determination of
fair market value is supported by evidence presented at trial.
A taxpayer seeking relief from an allegedly erroneous
assessment has the burden to show that the assessment exceeds
fair market value. Code § 58.1-3984; see Shoosmith Bros. v.
County of Chesterfield, 268 Va. 241, 245, 601 S.E.2d 641, 643
9
(2004); Board of Supervisors v. HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. 317,
329-30, 535 S.E.2d 163, 169-70 (2000); Tidewater Psychiatric
Inst. v. City of Virginia Beach, 256 Va. 136, 140-41, 501
S.E.2d 761, 763 (1998). In this case, the taxpayer was
required to show that the County’s assessment exceeded fair
market value.
The parties’ expert valuations differed greatly. In cases
where the circuit court is presented with such conflicting
testimony, we “will defer to the circuit court’s judgment of
the weight and credibility to be given [the witness’]
testimony.” HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. at 332, 535 S.E.2d at
171. Keswick’s evidence concerning the value of the property
was sufficient to demonstrate that the County’s assessment
exceeded fair market value. Accordingly, we hold that there is
evidence to support the circuit court’s finding that the County
committed error in its assessment. See Arlington County Board
v. Ginsberg, 228 Va. 633, 641, 325 S.E.2d 348, 352 (1985).
Further, because the circuit court on remand properly
determined that the assessment was erroneous, it was empowered
to set the assessment pursuant to Code § 58.1-3987.
Code § 58.1-3987 states that a circuit court, when
considering the reduction or increase of an assessment, has
“all the powers and duties of the authority which made the
assessment complained of, as of the time when such assessment
10
was made, and all the powers and duties conferred by law upon
such authority between the time such assessment was made and
the time such application is heard.” We have interpreted this
Code section to mean that a circuit court may fix the
assessment in accordance with the evidence, as it retains all
the powers of the taxing authority. Ginsberg, 228 Va. at 640,
325 S.E.2d at 352.
After a circuit court has found an assessment erroneous,
it is “not bound by the values argued by the parties or those
fixed by witnesses.” Id. at 643, 325 S.E.2d at 353. Instead,
the circuit court may, pursuant to Code § 58.1-3987, “weigh the
evidence and establish a value accordingly” and where the
circuit court has “selected a value supported by the evidence,
it has acted within the statutory grant of authority.” Id. at
643, 325 S.E.2d at 354. We then review the circuit court’s
factual finding for clear error and we will not overturn the
circuit court’s ruling unless it was plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it. Board of Supervisors v. Donatelli &
Klein, Inc., 228 Va. 620, 627-28, 325 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1985).
The circuit court reviewed the evidence presented at trial
and allowed the parties to present new evidence on remand.
Instead of relying on the County’s expert testimony, or the
taxpayer’s rebuttal, the circuit court correctly stated that in
accordance with Code § 58.1-3987, it was empowered to “arrive
11
at its own assessment value of the property.” The circuit
court stated that it considered and relied on the evidence
presented to it in ruling that $7 million was the proper
assessment of the fair market value of the property. We hold
that the circuit court’s ruling as to the proper value for the
taxpayer’s property is not erroneous because it is not plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it.
The County also argues that the circuit court erred in
allowing the admission of Sangree’s testimony on remand. The
County argues that Sangree should not have been permitted to
testify because at that time he was not licensed by the
Commonwealth as a real estate appraiser as required under Code
§ 54.1-2011. The County also argues that even if Sangree’s
testimony was admissible, it was inherently unreliable. The
taxpayer argues that the circuit court, without objection,
previously in the same proceeding qualified Sangree as an
expert appraiser and accepted his expert testimony, and under
Code § 54.1-2010(B), the circuit court retains the ability to
allow that person to provide additional testimony. In
addition, the taxpayer argues that Sangree’s testimony on
remand was not an appraisal since he did not conduct an
analysis of the property, and thus Code § 54.1-2011 would not
prevent Sangree from providing such testimony.
12
The purpose of Sangree’s testimony on remand was to
challenge Romenesko’s testimony on remand. On remand,
Romenesko testified that the income approach resulted in an
appraised value for the Keswick Club real property of $9.9
million. Sangree’s testimony on remand was critical of
Romenesko’s assumptions and the methodology he used in
appraising the property using the income approach. Two other
witnesses also testified concerning the accuracy of the
assumptions Romenesko made in using the income approach.
However, Romenesko stated that as a result of the
inappropriateness of using the income approach in this
instance, he would discard the result he found using the income
approach in appraising the property, and he did so. Romenesko
testified that he still believed his initial appraisal was
correct, and he reasserted the correctness of his previous
valuation of $12.5 million, which was made at the initial
trial.
The circuit court relied upon the appraisals presented to
it to determine whether the County’s assessment was erroneous.
Romenesko did not change his appraisal on remand. Therefore,
it is clear that Sangree’s testimony on remand could not have
affected the result. Thus, to the extent the circuit court
erred in admitting Sangree’s testimony into evidence, such
error was harmless.
13
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will affirm the
circuit court’s ruling.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE KINSER, dissenting.
The County of Albemarle (the County) asserts in assignment
of error number one that "[t]he trial court erred in concluding
that this Court had already found the County's assessment
erroneous when this Court had faulted only the manner in which
the assessment method was chosen." With regard to this issue,
the majority holds that, despite "err[ing] in stating that this
Court had already determined that the County's assessment was
erroneous, the circuit court nevertheless applied the correct
standard on remand" from Keswick Club, L.P. v. County of
Albemarle (Keswick I), 273 Va. 128, 639 S.E.2d 243 (2007). I
do not agree and conclude instead that the circuit court failed
to determine, using the less stringent standard of review,
whether Keswick Club, L.P. (Keswick Club) proved that the
assessed value of its real property exceeded the property's
fair market value. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Before addressing our holding in Keswick I and the circuit
court's decision in this case, I must reiterate some well-
established principles. The Constitution of Virginia commands
that "[a]ll assessments of real estate . . . shall be at their
14
fair market value." Va. Const. art. X, § 2. "A taxing
authority's assessment is presumed to be correct, and a
taxpayer has the burden to rebut that presumption by
establishing that the real property in question is assessed at
more than fair market value or that the assessment is not
uniform in its application." West Creek Assocs., LLC v. County
of Goochland, 276 Va. 393, 409, 665 S.E.2d 834, 842-43 (2008)
(citing Code § 58.1-3984(A)) ("[E]ven if the assessor is unable
to come forward with evidence to prove the correctness of the
assessment[,] this does not impeach it since the taxpayer has
the burden of proving the assessment erroneous." (internal
quotation marks omitted)). To rebut the presumption of
correctness, "a taxpayer must show by a clear preponderance of
the evidence that the taxing authority committed manifest error
or totally disregarded controlling evidence in making the
assessment." West Creek, 276 Va. at 409, 665 S.E.2d at 843;
accord Tidewater Psychiatric Inst., Inc. v. City of Virginia
Beach, 256 Va. 136, 140-41, 501 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1998).
A taxpayer may demonstrate manifest error by proving that
the taxing authority employed an improper methodology in
arriving at a property's assessed value or by establishing "a
significant disparity between fair market value and assessed
value . . . 'so long as the assessment [does not] come[] within
the range of a reasonable difference of opinion, . . . when
15
considered in light of the presumption in its favor.'" West
Creek, 276 Va. at 414, 655 S.E.2d at 845 (quoting City of
Norfolk v. Synder, 161 Va. 288, 293, 170 S.E. 721, 723 (1933)).
When the taxpayer proves, as Keswick Club did in this case, see
Keswick I, 273 Va. at 137, 139-40, 639 S.E.2d at 248-50, use of
an improper methodology by establishing that the taxing
authority failed to "consider[] and properly reject[] other
methods of calculating" a property's fair market value,
Tidewater, 256 Va. at 142, 501 S.E.2d at 764; accord Board of
Supervisors v. HCA Health Servs. of Virginia, Inc., 260 Va.
317, 330, 535 S.E.2d 163, 169-70 (2000), the presumption of
validity is rebutted. Keswick I, 273 Va. at 140-41, 639 S.E.2d
at 250; see HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. at 330, 535 S.E.2d at
170. Then, the taxpayer needs to prove only that the assessed
value is erroneous, not "manifest[ly]" so, to be afforded
relief from an erroneous tax assessment. Keswick I, 273 Va. at
140-41, 639 S.E.2d at 250; see Code § 58.1-3984(A); HCA Health
Servs., 260 Va. at 330, 535 S.E.2d at 170.
In Keswick I, the issue was "whether the [C]ounty failed
to properly consider the income and sales approaches to
valuation before basing its assessment solely on the cost
approach." Keswick I, 273 Va. at 132, 140, 639 S.E.2d at 244,
250 (emphasis added). This Court held that the County's
"categorical application of the cost approach to the valuation
16
of all golf courses resulted in a failure by the [C]ounty to
consider and properly reject the income and sales approaches
before solely utilizing the cost approach in assessing the fair
market value" of Keswick Club's real property and, therefore,
the County's 2003 and 2004 assessments were "not entitled to a
presumption of validity." Id. at 140, 639 S.E.2d at 250. In
Keswick I, we did not decide whether the County assessed
Keswick Club's real property at more than its fair market
value, but only that the County's refusal to consider and
properly reject certain valuation methods rendered its assessed
value of the property no longer presumptively correct.
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case "so that the circuit
court [could] apply the proper and less stringent standard of
review," meaning the taxpayer only had "to show that the
[C]ounty's assessment was erroneous, not that the [C]ounty
committed manifest error or disregarded controlling evidence in
making its assessment." Id. at 141, 639 S.E.2d at 250.
Yet, as the majority acknowledges, the circuit court
mistakenly interpreted Keswick I's holding. After summarizing
the controlling law, the circuit court stated that Keswick Club
"seeks to show that the assessment was erroneous by proving
that the County used an improper methodology in setting the
assessment value." In a footnote, the court presumed that the
"methods of proving manifest error would also satisfy the
17
erroneousness standard." The circuit court next quoted this
Court's holding in Keswick I, i.e., that the County had failed
" 'to consider and properly reject the income and sales
approaches before solely utilizing the cost approach,' "
Keswick I, 273 Va. at 140, 639 S.E.2d at 250, and then
concluded that this Court, in Keswick I, held that "the
[County's] assessment was erroneous, on the ground that the
County used an improper methodology." (Emphasis omitted.)
After drawing that conclusion about the decision in
Keswick I, the circuit court summarized the evidence from the
initial hearing as well the evidence presented after this
Court's remand of the case. The circuit court stated:
[A]fter the remand and over Keswick [Club's]
objection, the [c]ourt gave the parties an
opportunity to produce additional evidence. The
only evidence the County presented at this time
was the testimony of Ivo Romenesko. The County
failed to show consideration and proper
rejection of the income and sales approaches,
instead reasserting its previous value, which
was based on the cost approach. Keswick [Club]
again presented evidence through Mr. Sangree,
who reached the same appraisal value as he did
at trial. Thus, the evidence before the [c]ourt
at present is substantially similar to the
evidence before the [c]ourt at trial.
The circuit court then held, "[b]ased on all the evidence
presented at trial and after remand," and "applying the less
stringent standard of review set forth by the Supreme Court,
. . . that Keswick [Club] ha[d] proven that the County's
18
assessment was erroneous." This conclusion, read in the
context of its prior discussion and mistaken understanding of
the Keswick I decision, demonstrates that the circuit court
concluded that the County once again "failed to show
consideration and proper rejection of the income and sales
approaches" and, for that reason, held the assessment
erroneous. But, the issue on remand was not whether the County
had used an improper methodology when it failed to consider and
properly reject the sales and income approaches before
assessing the fair market value of Keswick Club's real property
by using only the cost approach. We decided that issue in
Keswick I. 273 Va. at 140, 639 S.E.2d at 250. In doing so, we
did not, however, determine whether the County's assessment was
erroneous, but only that it no longer was entitled to the
presumption of validity. Because we did not decide that issue,
we remanded the case to the circuit court to review the facts
under the less stringent standard of review. Id. But, the
circuit court apparently believed that rebutting the
presumption of validity by showing a failure to consider and
properly reject certain valuation methods was ipso facto proof
of an erroneous assessment.
I recognize that, after it concluded the County's
assessment was erroneous, the circuit court then found that
"neither the County nor Keswick [Club had] arrived at a correct
19
figure." At that point in its analysis, however, the circuit
court, having decided the County's assessment was erroneous,
was setting the assessed value of Keswick Club's real property.
See Code § 58.1-3987; HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. at 329, 535
S.E.2d at 169 (stating that "[o]nce a trial court finds that a
taxing authority committed manifest error in determining an
assessment, the court is authorized to correct the assessment
based on the evidence"). It had before it the testimony of the
County's expert witness, Ivo H. Romenesko, and that of David J.
Sangree, the expert real estate appraiser who testified for
Keswick Club. As the majority notes, the circuit court
rejected both experts' testimony and set the assessed value
based on information furnished by an employee of Keswick Club
to the Board of Equalization. Because the circuit court
expressly rejected the evidence presented by Keswick Club, I
cannot accept the majority's conclusion that "Keswick [Club's]
evidence concerning the value of the property was sufficient to
demonstrate that the County's assessment exceeded fair market
value."
Furthermore, the majority's view that the circuit court
both misunderstood Keswick I's holding and properly evaluated
the evidence under the less stringent standard of review does
not square with the "mandate rule," a principle requiring a
trial court to follow the decision and mandate from an
20
appellate court. See Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 127,
590 S.E.2d 537, 549 (2004). The circuit court could not
conclude that this Court already had held the assessment
erroneous but nevertheless proceed to decide whether the
County's assessment exceeded fair market value and was
therefore erroneous without flouting what it perceived to be
this Court's mandate in Keswick I. Cf. id. at 127-28, 590
S.E.2d at 549-50 (" 'A trial court has no discretion to
disregard [a] lawful mandate.' ") (alteration in original)
(quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 33 Va. App. 250, 257-58, 532 S.E.2d 908,
912 (2000)). I am unwilling to ascribe such action to the
circuit court. Because the circuit court believed that this
Court already had held the County's assessment to be erroneous,
it necessarily also believed itself bound by judicial duty to
rule accordingly. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S.
161, 168 (1939) (noting the "indisputab[ility]" of the "general
proposition" that lower courts are "bound to carry the mandate
of the upper court into execution and [cannot] consider the
questions which the mandate laid to rest"). Therefore, the
circuit court cannot be presumed to have analyzed the evidence
under the less stringent standard of review to determine if the
assessment exceeded the fair market value of Keswick Club's
real property.
21
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would
reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand for further
proceedings in accordance with the holding in Keswick I.∗∗
∗∗
In light of my view, I do not need to address the
County's remaining assignments of error.
22