Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Smit

Present: Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and
Millette, JJ. and Russell, S.J.

VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 082305 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
February 25, 2010
DEMERST B. SMIT, COMMISSIONER
OF THE VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
MOTOR VEHICLES, ET AL.

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

In a prior appeal, this Court reversed a decision of the

Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles

(“DMV”) finding that, during the period of October 1997

through March 1998, Volkswagen of America, Inc. (“Volkswagen”)

violated Code § 46.2-1569(7) when it failed to supply certain

high-demand models of vehicles imported by Volkswagen for

distribution to its franchise dealers in the United States to

Miller Auto Sales, Inc. (“Miller Auto”), a Volkswagen

franchise dealer in Winchester. Volkswagen of America, Inc.

v. Smit, 266 Va. 444, 453-54, 587 S.E.2d 526, 531-32 (2003)

(hereinafter, “Volkswagen II”). That appeal arose from a

judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which had

affirmed an order of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond

upholding the Commissioner’s decision. Volkswagen of America,

Inc. v. Quillian, 39 Va. App. 35, 69, 569 S.E.2d 744, 761

(2002) (hereinafter, “Volkswagen I”). In reversing the

judgment of the Court of Appeals, we held that the
Commissioner had erroneously interpreted Code § 46.2-1569(7)

and consequently improperly focused on the business judgment

of Volkswagen, rather than limiting the inquiry to the

relevant factors prescribed by the statute. Volkswagen II,

266 Va. at 453-54, 587 S.E.2d at 531-32. We also vacated that

portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision in Volkswagen I that

addressed Volkswagen’s challenge to Code § 46.2-1569(7)

alleging both that the statute violates principles of the

dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and

is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process

Clauses of the United States and Virginia Constitutions. Id.

at 454, 587 S.E.2d at 532 (citing the established principle of

constitutional law that a court will not rule upon the

constitutionality of a statute unless such a determination is

absolutely necessary to decide the merits of the case); see

Klarfeld v. Salsbury, 233 Va. 277, 286, 355 S.E.2d 319, 324

(1987).

Following the remand to the DMV and further proceedings

before the Commissioner, Volkswagen was again found to have

violated Code § 46.2-1569(7). This decision was appealed

again through the circuit court and the Court of Appeals, with

Volkswagen renewing its constitutional challenges to the

statute, as well as contesting the Commissioner’s decision on

the merits. Upon appeal from the decision of the circuit

2
court, the Court of Appeals, Volkswagen of America, Inc. v.

Smit, 52 Va. App. 751, 799, 667 S.E.2d 817, 841 (2008)

(hereinafter, “Volkswagen III”), affirmed the Commissioner’s

decision. In doing so, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

circuit court’s holding that Code § 46.2-1569(7) was neither

void for vagueness nor violative of dormant Commerce Clause

principles. Id. at 795, 799, 667 S.E.2d at 839, 841.

Volkswagen appealed the judgment of the Court of Appeals

by petition to this Court, challenging both the decision

upholding the Commissioner’s finding that its actions violated

Code § 46.2-1569(7) and the determination that the statute was

not constitutionally infirm. By an order dated April 14,

2009, we awarded Volkswagen this appeal limited to the dormant

Commerce Clause and due process issues.

BACKGROUND

Because we have previously given extensive recitation to

the factual and procedural background of this case in

Volkswagen II, 266 Va. at 447-51, 587 S.E.2d at 528-30, and

the issues in this appeal address only the Commerce Clause and

due process challenges to the statute at issue, we will limit

our recitation of the facts to those necessary to resolve the

appeal upon the issues presented.

As relevant to the time at which its dispute with Miller

Auto arose, Volkswagen imported vehicles from Volkswagen AG,

3
its German parent corporation, and distributed them to

approximately 600 franchise dealers in the United States,

including its dealers in Virginia. For vehicle models for

which demand exceeded supply, Volkswagen used a national

allocation procedure to distribute vehicles to its dealers

based on a mathematical algorithm to determine a “Dealer

Allocation Percentage” designed to deliver vehicles where they

were most likely to be sold and where they were most needed

because of low inventory. Volkswagen’s “Area Executives” were

given the authority to adjust the algorithm’s results for each

dealer within the executive’s geographic region based on

various factors, including a dealer’s customer satisfaction

survey scores, local market conditions, and minimum stocking

requirements of the dealer’s franchise agreement.

Miller Auto was the lowest volume dealer among

Volkswagen’s dealers in its dealer sales district, which

included seven Volkswagen dealers in northern Virginia as well

as four dealers in Maryland and one in Washington, D.C.

During 1997, for example, Miller Auto sold 47 new Volkswagens

of all models, while during the same period the two largest

Volkswagen dealers in Virginia each sold over 1000 new

Volkswagens of all models. Miller Auto, which had franchise

agreements for several other automobile lines, concedes that

4
sales of all models supplied by Volkswagen accounted for only

approximately ten percent of its sales volume.

In the period immediately preceding the dispute between

Volkswagen and Miller Auto, the supply of all the models in

Volkswagen’s line of vehicles available for distribution to

dealers generally exceeded demand and, thus, it was not

necessary for Volkswagen to use the dealer allocation

percentage to determine how many vehicles a particular dealer

was entitled to receive. However, in the fall of 1997,

Volkswagen introduced a new 1998 model of the Passat and in

early 1998 introduced the New Beetle model. Because demand

for these vehicles initially far exceeded supply, Volkswagen

used the national allocation procedure to determine how many

of these vehicles its dealers were entitled to receive.

It is not disputed that during the period of October 1997

to March 1998 Volkswagen imported 18,454 Passats, and during

the period of February to March 1998 Volkswagen imported 5,637

New Beetles. Miller Auto requested delivery from Volkswagen

of one or more 1998 Passats and New Beetles during those

respective timeframes, but received no shipments of either

vehicle until after March 1998. 1 While it is also not disputed

1
Miller Auto received delivery of one Passat in December
1997, apparently by transfer from another dealer, and it was
not clear whether this vehicle was a 1998 or earlier model.
5
by Miller Auto that the demand for Passats and New Beetles

during the relevant timeframes exceeded the available supply,

there is no conclusive evidence in the record as to actual

level of national dealership demand, either as to the number

of dealers requesting delivery of the two vehicle models or of

the total number of vehicles requested by all dealers.

On February 9, 1998, John C. Miller, Vice President of

Miller Auto, advised Volkswagen by letter that Miller Auto was

dissatisfied with the manner in which new vehicles were being

allocated to it. Miller expressly stated his belief that

Volkswagen’s allocation procedure violated Code § 46.2-

1569(7). Miller sent a copy of this letter to the DMV.

As relevant to Miller’s compliant, Code § 46.2-1569(7)

provides that:

Notwithstanding the terms of any franchise
agreement, it shall be unlawful for any [motor
vehicle] manufacturer, factory branch, distributor,
or distributor branch, or any field representative,
officer, agent, or their representatives:

. . . .

7. To fail to ship monthly to any dealer, if
ordered by the dealer, the number of new vehicles of

In any case, the delivery of this one vehicle was not germane
to the Commissioner’s ultimate determination that Volkswagen
had violated Code § 46.2-1569(7), nor is it relevant to our
resolution of the issues raised in this appeal, since the
Commissioner determined that this vehicle was not delivered by
Volkswagen.

6
 each make, series, and model needed by the dealer to
receive a percentage of total new vehicle sales of
each make, series, and model equitably related to
the total new vehicle production or importation
currently being achieved nationally by each make,
series, and model covered under the franchise.

(Emphasis added.) 2

After mediation of the dispute between Miller Auto and

Volkswagen pursuant to Code § 46.2-1572.2 proved fruitless,

the Commissioner instituted formal proceedings against

Volkswagen. As indicated above, those proceedings resulted in

a determination by the Commissioner that Volkswagen had

violated Code § 46.2-1569(7), but that this Court overturned

that determination in Volkswagen II.

Upon remand, the record was not substantially enlarged as

to any relevant factor. The Commissioner again determined,

based upon his interpretation of what level of distribution of

the two vehicle models at issue would be “equitably related to

the total new vehicle production or importation currently

being achieved nationally,” that Volkswagen had violated Code

§ 46.2-1569(7) with respect to its dealings with Miller Auto.

Specifically, the Commissioner found that regardless of the

2
Nearly identical language to that in Code § 46.2-1569(7)
also appears in Code § 46.2-1976(9), relating to distribution
of motor homes and travel trailers, Code § 46.2-1992.69(9),
relating to distribution of other types of trailers, and Code
§ 46.2-1993.67(9), relating to the distribution of
motorcycles.
7
methodology used to allocate vehicles among dealers, the

“allocation[] of zero vehicles [to a dealer] of a certain

make, series, or model for one or more months would not be

equitable.” The Commissioner expressly limited his finding to

the facts of this case where the requested vehicle was a new

model and “where no meaningful history of dealer or national

sales exist for the new vehicle.” However, the Commissioner

concluded that there was no specific statutory sanction

provided for such violation and, that in any case, given the

length of time since the violation, and because Volkswagen was

no longer using the relevant allocation procedures and “there

was no evidence presented at the hearing to indicate that

Volkswagen was currently in violation of any of the provisions

contained within Title 46.2,” the Commissioner determined that

no sanction against Volkswagen was warranted.

Both the circuit court and subsequently the Court of

Appeals in Volkswagen III gave a thorough analysis of the

Commerce Clause and due process challenges to the application

of Code § 46.2-1569(7) raised by Volkswagen in appealing the

Commissioner’s determination. Because this Court will review

these questions of law de novo, it is not necessary to recount

here the analysis that each court used to determine that the

statute was not unconstitutional. See Appalachian Voices v.

State Corp. Comm’n, 277 Va. 509, 516, 675 S.E.2d 458, 461

8
(2009)(constitutional arguments are questions of law that this

Court reviews de novo).

DISCUSSION

Our review of Volkswagen’s challenge to the application

of Code § 46.2-1569(7) in this case begins with the well

established principle that duly enacted laws are presumed to

be constitutional. Tanner v. City of Virginia Beach, 277 Va.

432, 438, 674 S.E.2d 848, 852 (2009). “We are required to

resolve any reasonable doubt concerning the constitutionality

of a law in favor of its validity. Thus, if a statute or

ordinance can be construed reasonably in a manner that will

render its terms definite and sufficient, such an

interpretation is required.” Id. at 438-39, 674 S.E.2d at 852

(citations omitted). “Nevertheless, construing statutes to

cure constitutional deficiencies is allowed only when such

construction is reasonable. A statute cannot be rewritten to

bring it within constitutional requirements.” Jaynes v.

Commonwealth, 276 Va. 443, 464, 666 S.E.2d 303, 314 (2008)

(citation omitted).

Because our jurisprudence favors upholding the

constitutionality of properly enacted laws, we have recognized

that it is possible for a statute or ordinance to be facially

valid, and yet unconstitutional as applied in a particular

case. See, e.g., Cochran v. Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning

9
Appeals, 267 Va. 756, 764, 594 S.E.2d 571, 576 (2004); see

also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)(“a

statute . . . may be held constitutionally invalid as applied

. . . although its general validity as a measure enacted in

the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond question”).

“The 'usual judicial practice' is to address an as-applied

challenge before a facial challenge because it generally will

be more ‘efficien[t],’ because this sequencing decreases the

odds that facial attacks will be addressed ‘unnecessarily’ and

because this approach avoids encouraging ‘gratuitous wholesale

attacks upon state and federal laws.’ ” Connection Distrib.

Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 327-28 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S.

469, 484-85 (1989); see also Mahan v. National Conservative

Political Action Committee, 227 Va. 330, 340, 315 S.E.2d 829,

835 (1984) (upholding declaratory judgment that facially valid

statute was nonetheless unconstitutional as applied).

“ ‘[V]agueness challenges to statutes not threatening

First Amendment interests are examined in light of the facts

of the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as-applied

basis.’ ” Motley v. Virginia State Bar, 260 Va. 243, 247, 536

10
S.E.2d 97, 99 (2000) (quoting Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S.

356, 361 (1988)). As we observed in Volkswagen II, a court

should not declare a statute to be wholly unconstitutional

“unless such a determination is absolutely necessary to decide

the merits of the case.” 266 Va. at 454, 587 S.E.2d at 532.

Thus, Volkswagen’s due process challenge does not require us

to determine whether Code § 46.2-1569(7) is facially invalid

if we determine that the statute is constitutionally infirm as

applied on the facts of this case. Accordingly, we will first

consider Volkswagen’s assertion that Code § 46.2-1569(7) as

applied by the Commissioner in this case violated due process

because the statute is impermissibly vague in that the statute

failed to provide adequate notice to Volkswagen as to what

conduct it prohibits.

In Tanner, we explained that “[t]he constitutional

prohibition against vagueness derives from the requirement of

fair notice embodied in the Due Process Clause[s]” of the

United States and Virginia Constitutions. 277 Va. at 439, 674

S.E.2d at 852. Due process requires that a statute be

sufficiently precise and definite to give fair warning to

those who are subject to it what the statute prohibits and

what is expected of them by the state. Id. “The

constitutional prohibition against vagueness also protects

11
citizens from the arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of

laws.” Id.

Thus, there are two, independent ways in which a statute

can be impermissibly vague. “First, if it fails to provide

people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to

understand what conduct it prohibits. Second, if it

authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory

enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); see

Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,

455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982); Greenville Women's Clinic v. S.C.

Dep't of Health, 317 F.3d 357, 366 (4th Cir. 2002). A vague

statute violates the “important values” of fair notice to

citizens and the prevention of arbitrary enforcement.

Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 498.

“[A]n ordinance that lacks meticulous specificity

nevertheless may survive a vagueness challenge if the

ordinance as a whole makes clear what is prohibited.” Tanner,

277 Va. at 439, 674 S.E.2d at 852. “Because legislative

bodies are ‘[c]ondemned to the use of words,’ courts cannot

require ‘mathematical certainty’ in the drafting of

legislation.” Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408

U.S. 104, 110 (1972)). Accordingly, a statute may survive a

vagueness challenge if the language used by the legislature

12
makes clear what the statute prohibits and what is required in

order to comply with the law. Id.

Volkswagen contends that the language of Code § 46.2-

1569(7) as applied by the Commissioner in this case is

impermissibly vague because neither the statute nor any formal

or informal administrative action provided Volkswagen with

fair notice that it was prohibited from failing to deliver at

least one vehicle of any model requested by a franchise dealer

in any given month based solely on a mathematical

determination that the number of vehicles it imported during

that month equaled or exceeded the total number of its dealers

eligible to make such a request. In the absence of any clear

guidance within the statute or through regulation or guidance

provided by the Commissioner, Volkswagen contends that the

determination of compliance with the statute in any given case

would depend solely on an arbitrary determination by the

Commissioner of what is “equitable” after the fact.

Volkswagen notes that Code § 46.2-203 empowers the

Commissioner to adopt “reasonable administrative regulations

necessary to carry out the laws administered by the [DMV],”

but that no regulations have been promulgated by the

Commissioner to provide guidance to manufacturers and

distributors as to the proper determination of the equitable

relationship between total production and importation and the

13
right of an individual dealer to request delivery of a

specific make and model of a vehicle. Nor has the

Commissioner provided any “guidance documents” on the

application of the statute as permitted under Code § 2.2-4001

et seq.

On the specific facts of this case, Volkswagen contends

that nothing in Code § 46.2-1569(7), as interpreted by the

Commissioner, provides a manufacturer or distributor with

notice that it was prohibited from failing to supply every

dealer who requested delivery of a particular newly introduced

model of a vehicle with at least one vehicle in any month that

the national production or importation of that model equaled

or exceeded the total number of dealers requesting delivery of

one or more vehicles, without regard to any other factor.

Noting that the Commissioner expressly limited this finding to

newly introduced models, declining to express any opinion on

how the statute would apply “where there is reliable data

regarding sales histories for particular vehicles,” Volkswagen

contends that the Commissioner created an arbitrary standard

for the “equitable” delivery of new vehicle models that could

not have been gleaned from the language of the statute and,

thus, Volkswagen was without notice that its failure to supply

Miller Auto with a least one of each of the requested vehicles

14
in any given month would render it in violation of Code

§ 46.2-1569(7).

There is nothing inherently vague in a statutory

requirement that an act be performed “equitably.” Indeed,

such a standard has been enacted by the General Assembly to

address a variety of circumstances in order to effectively

accomplish the purpose of a particular statute. 3

3
See, e.g., Code § 2.2-219(D) (directing the Secretary of
Natural Resources to “equitably allocate” credits for nutrient
reductions in water quality control plans); Code § 2.2-
4605(A)(1)(d) (requiring the Treasury Board to equitably
apportion gains and losses among participants in local
government investment pools); Code § 15.2-1636.19 (empowering
the Compensation Board to equitably determine disputes
concerning compensation of deputies and allocation of funds
arising from a change in constitutional officers); Code
§ 19.2-386.14(C) (permitting the Criminal Justice Services

15
Board to equitably distribute forfeited property to eligible
participating agencies); Code § 20-49.8(A) (permitting a court
to equitably apportion unpaid expenses of a paternity
proceeding); Code § 23-30.42(j) (authorizing the Virginia
College Building Authority to equitably apportion expenses for
its operation among participating institutions); Code § 32.1-
299(A)(2) (requiring distribution of cadavers donated for
scientific study equitably among health education
institutions).
16
 And, as the Commissioner correctly asserts on brief in

this appeal, we have recognized that “a statute is not fatally

indefinite because questions may arise as to its

applicability, or opinions may differ with respect to what

falls within its terms, or because it is difficult to

enforce.” Fallon Florist, Inc. v. City of Roanoke, 190 Va.

564, 590, 58 S.E.2d 316, 329 (1950).

Nonetheless, we agree with Volkswagen that, as applied by

the Commissioner in this case, the requirement of Code § 46.2-

1569(7) that Miller Auto was to receive delivery of 1998

Passats and New Beetles in a volume “equitably related to the

total new vehicle production or importation currently being

achieved nationally” is impermissibly vague. Neither the

statute nor any administrative regulation or guidance

promulgated by the Commissioner provided Volkswagen with

notice that if the number of vehicles available in a given

month was equal to or greater than the number of dealers

making requests, it was prohibited from failing to deliver to

Miller Auto at least one of each model of vehicle requested

without regard to any other factors that might impact the

determination of the number of vehicles the dealer would

otherwise be entitled to receive.

A statute, ordinance, or regulation which delegates

discretionary authority to an administrative officer to
determine its application does not satisfy due process if it

lacks standards which are sufficiently clear to guide the

officer, and inform those subject to his jurisdiction, of how

that discretion is to be exercised. See, e.g., Chapel v.

Commonwealth, 197 Va. 406, 415, 89 S.E.2d 337, 343 (1955); cf.

City of Waynesboro v. Keiser, 213 Va. 229, 233-34, 191 S.E.2d

196, 199 (1972) (holding that a statute permitting a court to

adjust property tax assessments “in its discretion” was “vague

and overbroad [because it] provides no guidelines or standards

for decision”). In Chapel, we held that the Dry Cleaners Act

impermissibly delegated discretionary authority to the State

Dry Cleaners Board “without fixing any standard or test to

guide and control the exercise of such discretion.” 197 Va.

at 415, 89 S.E.2d at 343. As we said in Chapel:

“It is a fundamental principle of our system of
government that the rights of men are to be
determined by the law itself, and not by the let or
leave of administrative officers or bureaus. This
principle ought not to be surrendered for
convenience or in effect nullified for the sake of
expediency. It is the prerogative and function of
the legislative branch of the government, whether
State or municipal, to determine and declare what
the law shall be, and the legislative branch of the
government may not divest itself of this function or
delegate it to executive or administrative
officers.”

197 Va. at 410, 89 S.E.2d at 340 (quoting Thompson v. Smith,

155 Va. 367, 379, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (1930)).

18
 We have recognized that the legislature may delegate

discretion to an administrative officer to determine the

specifics of how a statute is to be enforced, but “ ‘[t]he

legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the

legal principles which are to control in given cases.’ ”

Thompson, 155 Va. at 381, 154 S.E. at 584 (quoting Mutual Film

Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230, 239

(1915)). Of course, the legislature is not required to delve

into the minutiae of the standards to be applied in every

case, but may delegate to the administrative body rulemaking

authority to set specific procedures for applying the general

standards established by the laws the body is charged with

enforcing “so long as the rules it adopts are not inconsistent

with the authority of the statutes that govern it or with

principles of due process.” Judicial Inquiry & Review

Commission v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97, 115, 630 S.E.2d 485, 494

(2006); see also Sargent Elec. Co. v. Woodall, 228 Va. 419,

424, 323 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1984). In short, the requirement of

fair notice contained in due process is not satisfied if the

public cannot determine what the law prohibits or the standard

to which they must conform from either the language of the

statute or a properly promulgated regulation or other official

guidance provided prior to the statute being enforced, but

rather only after the fact from the result of an arbitrary

19
exercise of discretion by the administrative official charged

with enforcing the statute.

In this case, the Commissioner stated that he used “basic

mathematics to analyze whether an allocation of zero vehicles

would satisfy the statutory requirement” to “equitably”

allocate newly introduced models of vehicles to determine

whether a manufacturer or distributor is in compliance with

the provisions of Code § 46.2-1569(7). As an example, the

Commissioner noted “that in December of 1997, for instance,

sufficient numbers of Passats were imported into the U.S. to

allow each U.S. dealer to receive allocations or shipments of

approximately 8 Passats.” The Commissioner concluded that the

this “[s]imple division” supported his conclusion that Code

§ 46.2-1569(7) prohibited Volkswagen from failing to ship at

least one Passat to Miller Auto from that month’s

importations.

However, the issue before this Court is not whether

“simple mathematics” demonstrates that Volkswagen could have

shipped at least one of each model to Miller Auto, but rather

whether Code § 46.2-1569(7) provided Volkswagen with adequate

notice that the statute prohibited Volkswagen from failing to

ship at least one of each model to Miller Auto if it were

otherwise capable of doing so. When viewed in this light, the

Commissioner’s use of “basic mathematics” is clearly not a

20
standard that is prescribed by the language of the statute.

Nor is it a standard clearly enunciated in a regulation or

other form of guidance promulgated by the Commissioner.

Accordingly, under the facts of this case, we conclude that

during the period of October 1997 through March 1998

Volkswagen could not reasonably have understood from the

language of the statute that its failure to ship any newly

introduced Passats and New Beetles to Miller Auto would

violate Code § 46.2-1569(7), but learned this only after the

fact from the result of an arbitrary exercise of discretion by

the administrative official charged with enforcing the

statute.

In the absence of fair notice from the language of the

statute or that the Commissioner would interpret the statute

as prohibiting it from not shipping at least one of each

requested vehicle model to Miller Auto in any month that it

was capable of doing so, Volkswagen was denied its right to

due process. Thus, we hold that Code § 46.2-1569(7) is

impermissibly vague as applied in this case, and the

Commissioner’s finding that Volkswagen was in violation of

that statute must be set aside.

As in Volkswagen II, we conclude that because the merits

of Volkswagen’s appeal can be decided on the narrower basis of

an “as applied” challenge to the statute under due process, it

21
is not necessary to consider Volkswagen’s facial challenge to

the statute based on either vagueness or dormant Commerce

Clause principles. 266 Va. at 454, 587 S.E.2d at 532.

Therefore, we again will vacate that portion of the Court of

Appeals’ judgment holding that Code § 46.2-1569(7) does not

violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

See id.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we will vacate that portion of the

Court of Appeals’ judgment addressing the Commerce Clause

issue, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming

the Commissioner’s finding that Volkswagen violated Code

§ 46.2-1569(7), and enter final judgment here for Volkswagen.

Reversed in part,
vacated in part,
and final judgment.

JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS and SENIOR JUSTICE
RUSSELL join, dissenting.

Today, the majority holds that "Code § 46.2-1569(7) [(the

Statute)] is impermissibly vague as applied in this case."

That holding, in my view, is based on a flawed analysis that

flows from the majority's asking the wrong question. The

majority repeatedly inquires whether the Statute, or any

administrative regulation or guidance promulgated by the

Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles

22
(Commissioner), provided Volkswagen of America, Inc.

(Volkswagen)

with notice that if the number of vehicles
available in a given month was equal to or
greater than the number of dealers making
requests, it was prohibited from failing to
deliver to Miller Auto at least one of each
model of vehicle requested without regard to
any other factors that might impact the
determination of the number of vehicles the
dealer would otherwise be entitled to receive.

The appropriate question for an as-applied analysis,

however, is whether the provisions of Code § 46.2-1569(7) gave

Volkswagen fair warning that shipping zero Passats and zero

New Beetles to Miller Auto Sales, Inc. (Miller Auto) during

the period in question was not "equitably related" to the

18,454 Passats and the 5,637 New Beetles Volkswagen imported

for distribution among 600 franchise dealers. Code § 46.2-

1569(7). Focusing on whether Volkswagen was "otherwise

capable of" shipping at least one Passat and one New Beetle to

Miller Auto during the months in question, the majority

purports to conduct an as-applied analysis; however, it fails

to do so because it never examines the Statute in light of the

facts of this case. By asking the wrong question, the

23
majority, in my view, reaches the wrong answer. Thus, I

respectfully dissent. 1

I. VAGUENESS CHALLENGE

As this Court has stated, "duly enacted laws are presumed

to be constitutional" and "any reasonable doubt concerning the

constitutionality of a law" should be resolved "in favor of

its validity." Tanner v. City of Virginia Beach, 277 Va. 432,

438, 674 S.E.2d 848, 852 (2009). There is even greater

deference for duly enacted economic regulations, which are

subject to "a less strict vagueness test because [their]

subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses

. . . can be expected to consult relevant legislation in

advance of action." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,

Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). In addition,

"the regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the

meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to

an administrative process." Id. There is also a "greater

tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal

penalties because the consequences of imprecision are

qualitatively less severe." Id. at 498-99. For these

1
Unlike the majority, I must address not only
Volkswagen's claim that the Statute is impermissibly vague
under the Due Process Clause but also its assertion that the
Statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause. I will address
the issues in that order.

24
reasons, a due process vagueness challenge to an economic

regulation is " 'examined in light of the facts of the case at

hand; the statute is judged on an as-applied basis.' " Motley

v. Virginia State Bar, 260 Va. 243, 247, 536 S.E.2d 97, 99

(2000) (quoting Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361

(1988)).

In Hoffman, the Supreme Court of the United States

explained:

"One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies
may not successfully challenge it for
vagueness." . . . [T]o sustain such a
challenge, the complainant must prove that the
enactment is vague "'not in the sense that it
requires a person to conform his conduct to an
imprecise but comprehensive normative standard,
but rather in the sense that no standard of
conduct is specified at all.' Such a provision
simply has no core."

Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.

733, 756 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974))

(internal citations omitted).

There are two independent ways in which a statute may be

impermissibly vague. "First, if it fails to provide people of

ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand

what conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even

encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Hill v.

Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); accord Hoffman, 455 U.S.

at 498; Greenville Women's Clinic v. Commissioner, South

25
Carolina Dep't of Health, 317 F.3d 357, 366 (4th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 732). 2 Thus, a vague statute

violates the "important values" of fair notice to citizens and

the prevention of arbitrary enforcement. Hoffman, 455 U.S. at

498.

"[A]n ordinance that lacks meticulous specificity

nevertheless may survive a vagueness challenge if the

ordinance as a whole makes clear what is prohibited." Tanner,

277 Va. at 439, 674 S.E.2d at 852; see also Hoffman, 455 U.S.

at 503 (determining whether a "business regulation" afforded

"fair warning of what is proscribed"); Ford Motor Co. v. Texas

Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 509 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Ford

knew . . . it was prohibited from selling automobiles and it

had fair notice that its conduct may violate [the statute.]");

Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753, 757-58 (9th

Cir. 1985) ("[V]agueness analysis still applies to [economic]

regulation [and 't]he principal inquiry is whether the law

affords fair warning of what is proscribed.' ") (citation

omitted); United States v. Sun & Sand Imp., Ltd., 725 F.2d

184, 187 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that a statute dealing with

2
This standard for judging vagueness applies irrespective
of the type of enactment being challenged. Compare Hill, 530
U.S. at 732 (applying the test of fair warning and arbitrary
enforcement to a speech regulation) with Hoffman, 455 U.S. at

26
economic activity is vague if "it gives no warning to the

challenger that his conduct is prohibited"); Trans Union Corp.

v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 245 F.3d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

(same); Irvine v. 233 Skydeck, LLC, 597 F. Supp. 2d 799, 802

(N.D. Ill. 2009) (same); Secretary, Vermont Agency of Natural

Res. v. Irish, 738 A.2d 571, 575-76 (Vt. 1999) (same).

In asking whether the Statute gave fair notice to

Volkswagen as to what conduct was prohibited, the majority

purports to conduct an as-applied analysis. But, in my view,

the majority actually fails to examine the Statute " 'in light

of the facts of the case at hand.' " Motley, 260 Va. at 247

(quoting Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361). Because both vehicles at

issue in this case were newly introduced models, meaning no

dealer and/or national sales data was available for either

vehicle, there are two determinative questions in judging the

Statute on an as-applied basis as to whether it gave

Volkswagen fair notice of what conduct was prohibited. The

majority never answers these questions. Did the Statute give

fair warning that shipping zero vehicles to Miller Auto was

not equitably related to the 18,454 Passats and 5,637 New

Beetles Volkswagen imported for distribution to 600 dealers

such that Volkswagen's conduct was prohibited? And, as

498 (applying the same test to an "economic regulation,"

27
applied in this case, did the Statute authorize arbitrary or

discriminatory enforcement by the Commissioner?

The question is not whether Volkswagen knew it was

prohibited from sending Miller zero Passats and zero New

Beetles simply because it had imported enough to send each of

its dealers at least one of both models. If Volkswagen's

conduct in sending zero vehicles in the limited circumstances

before the Court was " 'clearly proscribed[, it] cannot

complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct

of others.' " Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 125, 613

S.E.2d 570, 577 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hicks, 267 Va.

573, 580-81, 596 S.E.2d 74, 78 (2004)); see United States v.

Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). 3 Volkswagen must show that, as

applied to the facts of this case, the Statute specified " 'no

standard of conduct . . . at all.' " Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 495

n.7 (quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 578).

Although there are few facts in this case relevant to

whether Code § 46.2-1569(7) is vague as applied, three facts

are decisive to the vagueness challenge before us: the number

though "less strict[ly]").
3
For these reasons, the multiple hypotheticals that
Volkswagen presents in its brief are immaterial to the
question at hand. See Shivaee, 270 Va. at 125, 613 S.E.2d at
577 (noting that a court should examine a complainant's
conduct before analyzing hypothetical applications of the law
at issue).

28
of 1998 Passats and New Beetles Volkswagen imported nationally

during the months at issue, the number of such vehicles

shipped to Miller Auto during the relevant period, and the

number of Volkswagen dealers in the United States at that

time. From October 1997 to March 1998, Volkswagen imported

18,454 Passats and gave Miller Auto zero. In February and

March 1998, Volkswagen imported 5,637 New Beetles and sent

Miller Auto zero. Volkswagen had 600 franchise dealers in the

United States during that time frame.

Although the majority mentions these facts, it does not

actually incorporate them into its purported as-applied

analysis. By repeatedly focusing on whether the Statute gave

notice to Volkswagen that it was prohibited from failing to

ship at least one vehicle of each model to Miller Auto "if it

were otherwise capable of doing so" or "without regard to any

other factors," the majority uses a legal test that the

Statute does not contain. For the majority to apply that

test, it constructs a hypothetical situation instead of

examining the actual facts of this case. The majority's

hypothetical, unlike the facts in this case, considers only

whether Volkswagen imported enough Passats and New Beetles

during the relevant months to give its 600 dealers at least

one vehicle of each model. Given the number of Passats and

New Beetles imported during the period in question, Volkswagen

29
was clearly "otherwise capable of" shipping one Passat and one

Beetle to each of the 600 dealers. But, such is not the

appropriate question under the terms of the Statute.

The Statute, in relevant part, states:

Notwithstanding the terms of any franchise
agreement, it shall be unlawful for any manufacturer
[or] distributor [t]o fail to ship monthly to any
dealer, if ordered by the dealer, the number of new
vehicles of each make, series, and model needed by
the dealer to receive a percentage of total new
vehicle sales of each make, series and model
equitably related to the total new vehicle
production or importation currently being achieved
nationally by each make, series, and model covered
under the franchise.

Code § 46.2-1569(7). Pursuant to the statutory terms,

Volkswagen was thus required to ship, if ordered, the number

of 1998 Passats and New Beetles needed by Miller Auto to

receive a percentage of new vehicle sales of such vehicles

that was "equitably related" to the total number of 1998

Passats and New Beetles that Volkswagen imported nationally.

"Equitable" means "fair to all concerned . . . : without

prejudice, favor, or rigor entailing undue hardship."

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 769 (1993). The

requirement to do something "equitably" "simply directs and

requires that [the required act be done] in such manner as

will be just to the parties concerned, under all of the

circumstances of the particular case." Painter v. Painter,

30
320 A.2d 484, 490 (N.J. 1974). The notion of equity is one

"understood by lawyer and litigant alike." Id.

General principles of fairness and reasonableness are

common in legislation, including legislation regarding vehicle

allocation systems. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 320.64(18)-

(19) (forbidding allocation system that is "unfair,

inequitable, [or] unreasonably discriminatory . . . after

considering the equities"); Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 15-

208(a),(c) (allocation must be "in reasonable quantities and

within a reasonable time"); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93B, § 4(c)(3)

(same); Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.1574(1)(c) (same); Ohio Rev.

Code Ann. § 4517.59(F) (franchisor cannot "unfairly change or

amend" allotment of vehicles); Okla. Stat. Tit. 47,

§ 565(A)(9)(c) (manufacturer must not "unreasonably fail[] or

refuse[] to offer" vehicles to dealers); S.C. Stat. § 56-15-40

(3)(a) (allocation must be "in reasonable quantities and

within a reasonable time"); Utah Code Ann. § 13-14-201(1)(i)

(allocation system must be "fair, reasonable, and equitable");

Wash. Rev. Code § 46.96.185(1)(e) (allocation must be "in

reasonable quantities and within a reasonable time").

As the majority concedes, "[t]here is nothing inherently

vague in a statutory requirement that an act be performed

31
'equitably.' " 4 Volkswagen, however, maintains, and the

majority essentially agrees, that the legality of a

manufacturer's or distributor's conduct "hinges solely and

completely on one's view of what is 'equitable.' " In

criticizing the Commissioner for using "basic mathematics" to

determine whether Volkswagen's allocation of zero Passats and

zero New Beetles to Miller Auto was "equitably related" to the

number of such vehicles imported nationally, the majority

states that "the issue before this Court is not whether

'simple mathematics' demonstrates that Volkswagen could have

shipped at least one of each model to Miller Auto." I agree

with that statement; the issue is clearly not whether

4
Indeed, the General Assembly has incorporated an
equitable standard in a variety of statutes. See, e.g., Code
§ 10.1-707(A)(iii) (requiring the Board of Conservation and
Recreation to "determine the equitable allocation of funds
among participating localities"); Code § 2.2-702(3) (requiring
the Department for the Aging to "assure the equitable
statewide distribution of [programmatic] resources"); Code
§ 2.2-2618(7) (empowering the Commonwealth Attorneys Services
Council to "establish an equitable distribution plan for the
allocation of any funds from public or private sources"); Code
§ 22.1-147 (directing the Board of Education to "provide for
an equitable distribution" of certain funds); Code § 32.1-
299(A)(2) (requiring the State Health Commissioner to
distribute cadavers "equitably to the several colleges and
schools of this Commonwealth"). While the majority recognizes
the presence of the term "equitable" or "equitably" in various
statutes, it fails to explain why the term is
unconstitutionally vague as used in Code § 46.2-1569(7) but
not elsewhere. Without such an explanation, these and other
such statutes will likely be challenged for vagueness under
the Due Process Clause.

32
Volkswagen "could have shipped" one Passat and one New Beetle

to Miller Auto. (Emphasis added.) The Statute does not

require a determination as to how many vehicles Volkswagen

could have shipped. Instead, Code § 46.2-1569(7) requires the

consideration of what allocation of new vehicles is equitable

in relation to the number of produced or imported vehicles

nationally.

Using this statutorily required mathematical ratio, an

as-applied analysis of whether the Statute is impermissibly

vague hinges on the number of vehicles produced or imported in

a given case vis-à-vis the number of dealers nationally. For

example, determining whether shipping zero vehicles of a

particular model was an equitable allotment of that model if

Volkswagen had imported only 700 of such vehicles would be

more difficult if 600 dealers ordered the particular vehicle.

But, the meaning of "equitabl[e]" is much clearer where, as in

this case, a manufacturer imported many thousands more

vehicles of a particular model than it has dealers.

Similarly, it would be a different case entirely if Volkswagen

had provided any 1998 Passats and New Beetles to Miller Auto

and the question was whether that number was equitably related

to the number imported nationally. But, in this case, where

Volkswagen had 600 dealers and imported over 18,000 vehicles

of one model and over 5,000 of another, it is obvious that

33
zero is not equitably related to the "total new vehicle . . .

importation . . . nationally" of such models. Sending zero of

18,454, and sending zero of 5,637 is not "fair" or "without

prejudice [or] favor." Thus, "as a whole," the Statute

"[made] clear what [was] prohibited" in light of the facts of

this case. Tanner, 277 Va. at 439, 674 S.E.2d at 852. After

conceding that "[t]here is nothing inherently vague in a

statutory requirement that an act be performed equitably," the

majority does not explain why this Statute and its specific

requirement that two numbers be "equitably related" is

impermissibly vague.

For the same reasons that the Statute makes clear what

was prohibited in this case, it also satisfies the second

aspect of the vagueness test: it does not authorize or

encourage discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement. During the

relevant months, Volkswagen imported several thousand more

1998 Passats and New Beetles than it had dealers and elected

to send Miller Auto none of those vehicles. Under such

circumstances, the Commissioner's decision to enforce the

Statute was not arbitrary or discriminatory. Since Volkswagen

is presumed to know the law, Magruder v. Commonwealth, 275 Va.

283, 304, 657 S.E.2d 113, 124 (2008), and certainly knew the

number of Passats and New Beetles it had imported, its

argument that the Commissioner's enforcement of the Statute

34
was arbitrary is without merit. In addition, because

Volkswagen's conduct was clearly proscribed by the Statute, it

cannot complain of discriminatory enforcement in regard to the

conduct of others. See Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 495; Shivaee, 270

Va. at 125, 613 S.E.2d at 577.

The majority, however, cites Chapel v. Commonwealth, 197

Va. 406, 89 S.E.2d 337 (1955), and City of Waynesboro v.

Keiser, 213 Va. 229, 191 S.E.2d 196 (1972), in support of its

conclusion that the Statute gives the Commissioner too much

discretionary enforcement authority. In my view, those cases

are not dispositive; neither actually involved a due process

vagueness challenge and both cases pre-dated the Hoffman

decision, which made clear that an individual "who engages in

some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the

vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."

455 U.S. at 495.

Despite that admonition, the majority, departing from an

as-applied analysis, concludes:

[T]he requirement of fair notice contained in
due process is not satisfied if the public
cannot determine what the law prohibits or the
standard to which they must conform from either
the language of the statute or a properly
promulgated regulation or other official
guidance provided prior to the statute being
enforced, but rather only after the fact from
the result of an arbitrary exercise of
discretion by the administrative official
charged with enforcing the statute.

35
 While that conclusion may be a correct statement of law

generally, whether the "public" can determine the standard is

not the question we must answer in this appeal. Instead, the

question is whether Volkswagen, on the facts before us, had

fair notice of what conduct was prohibited. It did, and the

Commissioner did not act arbitrarily in applying the Statute

to that conduct.

Nonetheless, Volkswagen argues, and the majority agrees,

that a manufacturer or distributor cannot comply with the

requirements of Code § 46.2-1569(7) without guidance in the

form of regulations. 5 Without such regulations, Volkswagen

maintains, manufacturers and distributors are left with the

Statute alone, which does not address the multiple factors

that affect a decision regarding the allotment of new vehicles

of each make, series, and model. But, it is precisely because

there are many factors affecting an allotment decision that

the General Assembly opted for "'flexibility and reasonable

breadth, rather than meticulous specificity'" that would come

with attempting to list every factor to consider. Grayned v.

City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (quoting Esteban v.

Central Missouri State Coll., 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir.

5
Code § 46.2-203 authorizes the Commissioner to "adopt
reasonable administrative regulations necessary to carry out
the laws administered by the Department [of Motor Vehicles]."

36
1969)). The Statute is "not fatally indefinite because

questions may arise as to its applicability, or opinions may

differ with respect to what falls within its terms, or because

it is difficult to enforce." Fallon Florist, Inc. v. City of

Roanoke, 190 Va. 564, 590, 58 S.E.2d 316, 329 (1950).

Volkswagen simply cannot argue that Code § 46.2-1569(7)

specifies " 'no standard of conduct . . . at all' " when

viewed in light of the facts of this case. 6 Hoffman, 455 U.S.

at 495 n.7 (quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 578).

Finally, I believe the majority does not consider the

Commissioner's narrowing construction of the Statute. See

Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,

552 U.S. 442, ___, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1190 (2008) (noting

importance of "accord[ing] a law a limiting construction to

avoid constitutional questions"). The Commissioner stated in

the August 1, 2005 hearing decision:

By using basic mathematics to analyze whether
an allocation of zero vehicles would satisfy
the statutory requirement that a manufacturer
ship to a dealer the number of new vehicles of
each make, series, and model needed by the
dealer to receive a percentage of total new
vehicle sales of each make, series, and model
equitably related to the total new vehicle
production or importation currently being

6
We should not assume that the Commissioner will not
promulgate "administrative regulations that will sufficiently
narrow potentially vague or arbitrary interpretations" of the
statute. Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 504.
37
 achieved nationally by each make, series, and
model covered under the franchise, I find that
such an allocation would generally not satisfy
the statutory requirement in months where, as
in this case, the national importation numbers
exceed the number of dealers nationally, and
particularly where, as in this case, the
vehicles are newly introduced makes, series or
models. An allocation of zero vehicles,
assuming a dealer has no such vehicles in
inventory, translates to zero sales and zero
sales, expressed as a percentage of new vehicle
sales, would be zero percent. It is my opinion
that shipping a number of vehicles that will
enable a dealer to achieve or receive zero
percent of the sales of a vehicle is generally
not equitably related to national importation.
I would note that I am limiting this finding,
that a shipment of zero vehicles will not allow
a dealer to achieve a percentage of vehicle
sales equitably related to national
importations, to newly introduced makes, series
and models of vehicles, such as the Passats and
Beetles in this case, where no meaningful
history of dealer or national sales exist for
the new vehicle. I decline to comment on
whether this analysis or finding would stand in
situations where there is reliable data
regarding the sales histories for particular
vehicles nationally and by individual dealers.

In conclusion, it remains unclear to me how the majority

can conduct an as-applied analysis by focusing on whether

Volkswagen was "otherwise capable of" shipping at least one

Passat and one New Beetle to Miller Auto during the relevant

months without considering the "total new vehicle . . .

importation" of 1998 Passats and New Beetles "achieved

nationally" by Volkswagen in relation to the number of dealers

and without asking, based on those numbers, whether the

38
Statute gave Volkswagen fair notice that failing to ship any

such vehicles to Miller Auto was proscribed. Code § 46.2-

1569(7). In essence, the majority rewrites the Statute it

analyzes. It ignores the mathematical equitable relationship

required by the terms of Code § 46.2-1569(7), and instead

constructs its own legal test and then applies that test to a

hypothetical situation. 7

For these reasons, I conclude Code § 46.2-1569(7), as

applied to the facts of this case, is not impermissibly vague

under the Due Process Clause.

II. COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE

Having concluded that the Statute is not impermissibly

vague as applied, I now turn to Volkswagen's remaining

assignment of error: that the Court of Appeals erred by

failing to hold that Code § 46.2-1569(7) "violates the dormant

Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution."

The power vested in the Congress of the United States to

regulate interstate commerce, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.

3, has long been understood to restrict, but not entirely

7
While the majority does not rely on it for its
conclusion, Volkswagen argues that Miller Auto's failure to
obtain repair equipment for the 1998 Passats was a relevant
factor in determining the Statute's validity. That factor, if
relevant, does not alter my conclusion given the facts of this
case.

39
remove, the States' power "to make laws governing matters of

local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect

interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it."

Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (citing

Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852);

Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245

(1829)); see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-36

(1989) (noting the "Constitution's special concern both with

the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by

state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the

autonomy of the individual States within their respective

spheres"). However, under "[t]he doctrine of the dormant

Commerce Clause," 8 the States are prohibited "from engaging in

economic protectionism," Appalachian Voices v. State Corp.

Comm'n, 277 Va. 509, 517, 675 S.E.2d 458, 461 (2009), i.e.,

" 'regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic

8
The "dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause is a
"corollary rule" that has developed in the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. Appalachian Voices v. State
Corp. Comm'n, 277 Va. 509, 516, 675 S.E.2d 458, 461 (2009).
"Although the Constitution does not in terms limit the power
of States to regulate commerce, [the Supreme Court of the
United States has] long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an
implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of
a conflicting federal statute." United Haulers Ass'n v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338
(2007); accord Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553
U.S. 328, ___, 128 S.Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008).

40
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.' " Wyoming

v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (citation omitted). The

dormant Commerce Clause thus prevents "state taxes and

regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the

national marketplace," Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429,

437 (1980), and "protects markets and participants in

markets." General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300

(1997).

The United States Supreme Court has constructed a "two-

tiered approach" for evaluating whether a state economic

regulation conforms to the Commerce Clause's negative command.

Healy, 491 U.S. at 337 n.14. The first tier is known as the

"discrimination tier," and the second tier is generally

referred to as the "undue burden tier." Yamaha Motor Corp. v.

Jim's Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560, 567 (4th Cir. 2005).

Because "there is no clear line separating the category of

state regulation" subject to the discrimination test and the

category subject to the undue burden test, Brown-Forman

Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,

579 (1986), a state statute must satisfy the conditions of

both tiers of analysis to withstand scrutiny. See C & A

Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994);

Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300 n.12. Under either tier, or test, the

burden to show a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause

41
rests on the party challenging the validity of a state

statute. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979);

Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2008).

Under the discrimination test, a state statute is

generally struck down "without further inquiry," when the

"statute directly regulates or discriminates against

interstate commerce,[] when its effect is to favor in-state

economic interests over out-of-state interests," Brown-Forman,

476 U.S. at 579, or when "the practical effect of the

regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the

State," Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. The discrimination test,

therefore, applies a "virtually per se rule of invalidity."

Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).

However, a state statute that clearly discriminates

against interstate commerce will not be struck down if the

discrimination is " 'demonstrably justified by a valid factor

unrelated to economic protectionism.' " Wyoming, 502 U.S. at

454. In other words,

once a state law is shown to discriminate against
interstate commerce "either on its face or in
practical effect," the burden falls on the State to
demonstrate both that the statute "serves a
legitimate local purpose," and that this purpose
could not be served as well by available
nondiscriminatory means.

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (quoting Hughes v.

Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)); accord Department of

42
Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, ___, 128 S.Ct.

1801, 1808 (2008). And, the "practical effect" of the

challenged statute must not be considered in isolation but in

conjunction "with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other

States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or

every, State adopted similar legislation." Healy, 491 U.S. at

336. "[T]he Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent

legislation arising from the projection of one state

regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State."

Id. at 336-37. The prohibition against discrimination applies

even where only a minimal portion of interstate commerce is

discriminated against: "The volume of commerce affected

measures only the extent of the discrimination; it is of no

relevance to the determination whether a State has

discriminated against interstate commerce." Wyoming, 502 U.S.

at 455.

If a statute is found not to discriminate either on its

face or in its practical effect, it must then be examined

under the second tier, the "undue burden" test of Pike v.

Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970):

Where the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and
its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question

43
 becomes one of degree[;] the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.

Id. at 142 (internal citation omitted). A court must

defer to the state legislative body when evaluating whether a

statute has " 'a legitimate local purpose' " and " 'putative

local benefits,' " but must more closely examine the statute's

burdens. Yamaha, 401 F.3d at 569 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at

142). "State laws frequently survive this Pike scrutiny."

Davis, 553 U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1808.

Volkswagen does not contend that the Statute either

facially discriminates against interstate commerce or favors

in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests.

Instead, Volkswagen asserts that the Statute is per se invalid

because it has the practical effect of controlling commercial

conduct outside the Commonwealth, and if other States adopted

similar legislation, "commercial gridlock" would result.

Alternatively, Volkswagen contends the Statute unduly burdens

interstate commerce under the Pike test.

Volkswagen argues that the Statute requires an automobile

manufacturer or distributor to compare the number of vehicles

shipped into Virginia with the number of vehicles imported

nationally and that a distributor would violate the Statute if

it decreased the number of vehicles shipped to Virginia

44
without making similar changes nationally. In Volkswagen's

words: "[I]f the distributor desires to decrease the number of

vehicles that it ships to its Virginia dealers, then it must

decrease the number of vehicles that it imports nationally

and, correspondingly, the number of vehicles that it ships to

dealers located both in Virginia and in other states."

Volkswagen maintains that, because the number of vehicles it

imports into the United States annually is a fixed resource,

complying with the Statute has the "practical effect" of

forcing Volkswagen to "alter its conduct in other states . . .

to comply with the [Statute] by shipping vehicles to Virginia

dealers that otherwise would have gone to dealers in other

states."

Contrary to Volkswagen's argument, the Statute does not

require that Virginia dealers collectively receive a

percentage of new vehicles "equitably related to the total new

vehicle[s]" imported nationally. Instead, the Statute only

requires that each individual dealer be allocated sufficient

"new vehicles of each make, series and model needed by the

dealer to receive a percentage of total new vehicle sales

. . . equitably related to" the total new vehicles of such

make, series and model imported nationally. Therefore,

Volkswagen's claim that there must necessarily be a

45
redistribution of vehicles across state lines to satisfy Code

§ 46.2-1569(7) does not follow.

As the majority explains, Miller Auto, like the

approximately 600 Volkswagen franchise dealers in the United

States during the relevant period, obtained its stock of 1998

Passat and New Beetle vehicles, which were manufactured

abroad, on the basis of Volkswagen's national allocation

system. That system used a mathematical algorithm designed to

determine where particular vehicles were most needed and most

likely to be sold to the public. Miller Auto was located in a

sales area that included Volkswagen dealers in Northern

Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. 9 Seventeen

Volkswagen dealers operated throughout Virginia during the

period in question. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Smit, 266

Va. 444, 447, 587 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2003). At that time, a

dealer could not place an order for a particular vehicle but

received new vehicles solely pursuant to the allocation

system. An area executive had discretion to adjust the

algorithm's results for each dealer located within his/her

particular geographic sales area depending on several factors,

including local market conditions, the reported inventories of

9
During the relevant time, Miller Auto's sales area
included six other Volkswagen dealers in Northern Virginia,
four in Maryland, and one in the District of Columbia.

46
all dealers within the area, and the minimum stocking

requirements of a dealer's franchise agreement.

While the foregoing evidence suggests that allocations

conceivably could be made across state lines, the evidence

does not demonstrate, however, that Virginia's "equitable

relation" requirement did or will require Volkswagen to adjust

either its nationwide allocation of new vehicles to the

regional sales area that includes Virginia dealers, or its

area-wide allocation of automobiles within that sales area to

the detriment of dealers in Maryland and the District of

Columbia. The requirements of Code § 46.2-1569(7) do not

direct the particulars of any manufacturer or distributor's

vehicle allocation methodology. As the Court of Appeals

noted, "[n]othing in the [S]tatute . . . ties the number of

vehicles allocated to dealers in Virginia to the number of

vehicles allocated to dealers in other states[; n]or does the

[S]tatute otherwise regulate the number of vehicles a

distributor may allocate in any other state." Volkswagen of

America, Inc. v. Smit, 52 Va. App. 751, 791, 667 S.E.2d 817,

837 (2008). Instead, the Statute only prohibits the failure

to allocate sufficient vehicles "needed by the dealer to

receive a percentage of total new vehicle sales . . .

equitably related" to the total new vehicles imported

nationally. Code § 46.2-1569(7). Volkswagen presented no

47
evidence to support its assertion that the Statute "mandat[es]

that Volkswagen, and all other manufacturers design their

systems of allocating vehicles among their dealers nationwide

. . . to accommodate Virginia law."

Moreover, Volkswagen did not prove that it and/or other

distributors could not reallocate vehicles among Virginia

dealers to comply with the Statute instead of reallocating

across state lines, in this case, among Volkswagen dealers in

Virginia, whether located in Miller Auto's sales area or

another sales area in Virginia. Based on the record before

the Court in this appeal, these two alternatives, intrastate

or interstate reallocation, are equally probable, meaning

Volkswagen failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that the

Statute discriminates against interstate commerce. See Cherry

Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28, 37 (1st Cir.

2007) ("[T]he mere fact that a statutory regime [may have]

discriminatory potential is not enough to trigger strict

scrutiny under the dormant commerce clause."); Kleinsmith v.

Shurtleff, 571 F.3d 1033, 1040 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he party

claiming discrimination has the burden to put on evidence of a

discriminatory effect on commerce that is 'significantly

probative, not merely colorable.' ") (quoting Alliance of

Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 40 (1st Cir. 2005)).

48
 Without sufficient evidence to establish that the Statute

necessarily requires interstate reallocation of vehicles to

Virginia dealers, I am compelled to conclude that Code § 46.2-

1569(7) does not have "the practical effect of . . .

control[ling commercial] conduct beyond the boundaries of the

State." Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. Furthermore, any regulation

of intrastate allocation of vehicles that benefits and burdens

solely intrastate dealers does not violate the dormant

Commerce Clause. 10 See Grant's Dairy-Maine, LLC v.

Commissioner of Maine Dep't of Agric., Food & Rural Res., 232

F.3d 8, 22 (1st Cir. 2000) ("The dormant Commerce Clause does

not protect intrastate competition, but . . . safeguards

interstate markets from discriminatory regulation.").

Likewise, without evidence that the Statute has the practical

effect of controlling interstate commerce, I cannot guess as

to "what effect would arise if not one, but many or every,

State adopted similar legislation." Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.

Therefore, because Volkswagen had the burden to

demonstrate that the Statute has the practical effect of

controlling commercial conduct beyond the boundaries of

10
My conclusion should not be read as suggesting that
proof of interstate reallocation of vehicles would result
necessarily in a finding that the Statute violates the dormant
Commerce Clause, but merely that a determination of

49
Virginia and has not carried that burden, I reject

Volkswagen's claim that the Statute violates the dormant

Commerce Clause under the discrimination test. Cf. American

Trucking Ass'ns v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429,

434-37 (2005) (refusing to invalidate a tax challenged under

the dormant Commerce Clause in part because the challenger

failed to provide "convincing evidence showing that the tax

deters, or for that matter discriminates against, interstate

activities"); Kleinsmith, 571 F.3d at 1040-43 (rejecting a

claim that a state statute has the practical effect of

discriminating against interstate commerce because the party

claiming discrimination failed to carry his burden of

"put[ting] on evidence of a discriminatory effect . . . that

is ‘significantly probative, not merely colorable' " and "how

the [statute had] alter[ed] the competitive balance between

[in-state and out-of-state competitors]") (citation omitted);

Cherry Hill Vineyard, 505 F.3d at 36 ("[A] plaintiff bringing

a dormant commerce clause challenge based exclusively on the

allegedly discriminatory effect of a statutory scheme is

required to submit some probative evidence of adverse

impact."); Yamaha, 401 F.3d at 563, 568-69 (holding that a

Virginia statute allowing "any existing franchised dealer [of

discriminatory practical effect cannot be made on the record

50
motorcycles] to protest the establishment of a new dealership

for the same brand anywhere in the Commonwealth" did not have

the effect of "discriminat[ing] against interstate commerce"

because the challenging franchisor "did not produce any

evidence" that the statute's "probable effect" would be the

reallocation of motorcycles to Virginia dealers "to the

detriment of out-of-state dealers").

I now turn to the "undue burden" tier of analysis.

However, the noted failure of Volkswagen to demonstrate that

the Statute actually burdens interstate commerce, as opposed

to intrastate commerce, prevents me from concluding that the

"burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in

relation to the putative local benefits." Pike, 397 U.S. at

142.

It is impossible to tell whether a burden on
interstate commerce is "clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits" without
understanding the magnitude of both burdens and
benefits. Exact figures are not essential (no more
than estimates may be possible) and the evidence
need not be in the record if it is subject to
judicial notice, but it takes more than lawyers'
talk to condemn a statute under Pike. . . .
[W]hoever wants to upset the law bears the[]
burden[].

Baude, 538 F.3d at 612-13 (internal citations omitted).

in this appeal.
51
 My refusal to find an undue burden on interstate commerce

is buttressed by the significance of the unchallenged,

putative local benefits: the "promot[ion of] the interest of

the retail buyers of motor vehicles and [the] prevent[ion of]

unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or

practices." Code § 46.2-1501. Thus, I cannot conclude that

the Statute unduly burdens interstate commerce. See

Kleinsmith, 571 F.3d at 1043-44 (having concluded "in the

prior section of this opinion" that the challenger "has failed

to carry his burden of proving that the . . . statute is

discriminatory in practical effect," "we must reject" the

dormant Commerce Clause challenge, as the challenger "has not

produced evidence of any burden that the challenged law

imposes on interstate commerce").

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, I would hold that Code § 46.2-1569(7)

is not impermissibly vague as applied in the circumstances of

this case, and, I would reject Volkswagen's challenge under

the dormant Commerce Clause. Thus, I respectfully dissent and

would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

52