Present: All the Justices
DAVID STEPHENS, JR.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 061228 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
June 8, 2007
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY
W. Allan Sharrett, Judge
This appeal challenges a circuit court order denying a
petition for change of name filed pursuant to Code § 8.01-217 by
an inmate in a correctional facility.
BACKGROUND
On November 23, 2005, David Stephens, Jr., an inmate at the
Greensville Correctional Center, filed a petition in the Circuit
Court of Greensville County to change his name pursuant to Code
§ 8.01-217. In the petition, Stephens stated under oath that he
sought to change his name to Yâ-sin ibn Dâwûd Stephens “for
religious purposes” and that Stephens was “practicing Islam and
the change of name is sought in furtherance of the exercise of
his religious freedom.” In accord with the requirements of Code
§ 8.01-217(B), the petition indicated that Stephens had not
previously changed his name and contained Stephens’ place of
residence, date and place of birth, felony conviction record,
parents’ names, and recited the fact that he was incarcerated.
The circuit court denied Stephens’ petition by order dated
February 15, 2006. The circuit court’s order stated that
“[u]pon review of the file, the [circuit court] finds the
proposed name does not appear to have any religious meaning or
significance contrary to its general and accepted meaning.
Accordingly, the [c]ourt denies the petition for name change.”
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Stephens asserts two arguments to support his contention
that the circuit court erred in denying his petition for change
of name. First, Stephens maintains that the circuit court
failed to comply with the statutory provisions set forth in Code
§ 8.01-217 governing the consideration of such petitions.
Second, Stephens maintains that the circuit court’s denial of
his petition infringed on his right to the free exercise of his
religion in violation of both the United States and Virginia
constitutions. Because we find the statutory issue to be
dispositive, we will not address the constitutional issue. See
Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 516, 352 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1987)
(“constitutional questions should not be decided if the record
permits final disposition of a cause on non-constitutional
grounds”).
Code § 8.01-217 sets forth the process governing the
filing, consideration, and disposition of petitions for change
of name. Code § 8.01-217 provides, in relevant part:
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A. Any person desiring to change his own name . . .
may apply therefor to the circuit court of the
county or city in which the person whose name is
to be changed resides, or if no place of abode
exists, such person may apply to any circuit
court which shall consider such application if
it finds that good cause exists therefor under
the circumstances alleged. Applications of
probationers and incarcerated persons may be
accepted if the court finds that good cause
exists for such application. An incarcerated
person may apply to the circuit court of the
county or city in which such person is
incarcerated . . . .
B. Every application shall be under oath and shall
include the place of residence of the applicant,
the names of both parents, including the maiden
name of his mother, the date and place of birth
of the applicant, the applicant’s felony
conviction record, if any, whether the applicant
is presently incarcerated or a probationer with
any court, and if the applicant has previously
changed his name, his former name or names.
C. On any such application and hearing, if such be
demanded, the court . . . shall, unless the
evidence shows that the change of name is sought
for a fraudulent purpose or would otherwise
infringe upon the rights of others . . . order a
change of name.
(Emphasis added.)
Stephens’ petition is an “application[]” for change of name
by an “incarcerated person[].” Therefore, it is subject to the
provision in Code § 8.01-217(A) whereby such a petition “may be
accepted if the [circuit] court finds that good cause exists”
for the proposed name change. Furthermore, Stephens’ petition,
like all applications for change of name, is subject to the
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provision in Code § 8.01-217(C) mandating a circuit court to
order a requested change of name “unless the evidence shows that
the change of name is sought for a fraudulent purpose or would
otherwise infringe upon the rights of others.”
Here, the circuit court order denying Stephens’ petition
did not specifically reference a finding with regard to “good
cause” under Code § 8.01-217(A), nor did it reference a finding
with regard to the “fraudulent purpose or . . . infringe upon
the rights of others” provision of Code § 8.01-217(C). Instead,
the circuit court denied the petition upon finding that “the
proposed name does not appear to have any religious meaning or
significance contrary to its general and accepted meaning.”
This finding does not comport with the provisions of either of
the pertinent subsections of Code § 8.01-217.
The Commonwealth appropriately concedes that the circuit
court’s denial of Stephens’ petition was in error. Nonetheless,
the parties disagree as to the proper disposition of this
appeal.
Stephens asserts that the circuit court “accepted” his
petition, as the term is used in Code § 8.01-217(A), by
reviewing the file and considering the petition on its merits.
Reasoning that Code § 8.01-217(A) requires a finding of good
cause prior to acceptance of a petition for a name change by an
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incarcerated person, Stephens asserts that the circuit court’s
acceptance of his petition necessarily reflects that it
determined good cause to exist. Accordingly, Stephens maintains
that the circuit court must have denied the petition under Code
§ 8.01-217(C) and the circuit court erred in that regard because
Code § 8.01-217(C) does not authorize a circuit court to deny a
petition due to a proposed name’s perceived lack of “religious
meaning or significance.” Because the record contains no
evidence that his change of name was sought for a fraudulent
purpose or would infringe on the rights of others as specified
in Code § 8.01-217(C), Stephens asserts that this subsection of
Code § 8.01-217 requires that the petition be granted. Thus,
Stephens maintains that the proper disposition of this appeal is
a remand directing the circuit court to grant Stephens’
petition.
In response, the Commonwealth asserts that the circuit
court did not make a determination pursuant to Code § 8.01-
217(A) as to whether good cause existed for the requested name
change by an incarcerated person and the circuit court’s initial
error was in failing to make such a determination. Thus, the
Commonwealth maintains that this Court should remand for a
determination of whether good cause exists for Stephens’ name
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change and, if good cause is found to exist, for further
proceedings to be conducted under Code § 8.01-217(C).
Upon the limited record before us, the nature of the
inquiry by which the circuit court determined that the “proposed
name change does not appear to have any religious meaning or
significance contrary to its general and accepted meaning” and
the factual basis for that determination is difficult to
discern. However, implicit in the circuit court’s denial of
Stephens’ petition was a finding of lack of good cause for the
requested change of name under Code § 8.01-217(A).
Code § 8.01-217(A) does not define what constitutes good
cause for an application for change of name. Certainly, the
inclusion of a good cause requirement in this subsection for
applications for change of name filed by incarcerated persons
contemplates a different determination than the one under the
requirements of subsection (C) of the statute. And we are of
opinion that the good cause requirement reflects a legislative
intent to invest circuit courts with discretion regarding the
summary disposition of, for example, frivolous applications.
However, to be a proper exercise of discretion to determine
under subsection (A) that an application lacks good cause, a
circuit court’s determination to that effect must be supported
by evidence in the record.
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In this case, the facts contained in the record are limited
to those asserted in Stephens’ petition. The petition was filed
under oath and complied with all of the other requirements set
forth in Code § 8.01-217(B). The facts stated in the petition
did not in any way suggest that the name change was sought with
frivolous intentions. To the contrary, the petition
unequivocally asserted that Stephens sought to change his name
for “religious purposes” in furtherance of his faith in the
Islamic religion. Accordingly, based on the record before us,
the circuit court’s implicit denial of Stephens’ petition for
lack of good cause was clearly an abuse of discretion requiring
reversal and remand without further consideration of the good
cause issue by the circuit court.
Turning to the posture of the case on remand, since there
is no basis for the denial of Stephens’ petition for lack of
good cause under Code § 8.01-217(A) and the circuit court
apparently did not consider Stephens’ petition under Code
§ 8.01-217(C), the circuit court should resume its review and
consideration of the petition in accord with the requirements of
Code § 8.01-217(C).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s
judgment denying Stephens’ application for change of name and
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remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with the
principles stated herein.
Reversed and remanded.
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