Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee,
JJ., and Carrico, S.J.
TYRONE ORLANDO PEYTON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 032464 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
November 5, 2004
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals of
Virginia erred in determining that a trial court did not abuse
its discretion in revoking the suspended sentence of a defendant
who had been placed in an alternative sentencing program
pursuant to Code § 19.2-316.2, but was unable to complete the
program due to an unforeseen medical condition.
BACKGROUND
The material facts are not in dispute. On April 3, 2001,
Tyrone Orlando Peyton was convicted of possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248 in the
Circuit Court of Henrico County (the trial court). On July 12,
2001, the trial court sentenced Peyton to ten years in prison
and suspended seven years of that sentence. The trial court
further ordered that the Department of Corrections (the
Department) evaluate Peyton to determine his suitability for
participation in the Detention Center Incarceration Program
pursuant to Code § 19.2-316.2. Upon the favorable
recommendation of the Department and the determination by the
trial court that Peyton would benefit from the program, the
trial court suspended the balance of Peyton’s sentence and
placed him on probation conditioned upon his entry into and
successful completion of the program. On October 1, 2001, he
was transferred from local confinement to a designated
residential detention center maintained by the Department.
On January 11, 2002, Peyton began vomiting blood while at
the detention center and was taken to the hospital. At that
time, approximately one month remained for Peyton to complete
the requirements of the program. When Peyton returned from the
hospital, he continued to have abdominal pain. Peyton was
removed from the program by the Department on January 15, 2002
for “medical/psychological reasons.”
The trial court subsequently held a show cause hearing on
February 7, 2002 and determined that Peyton had violated the
terms and conditions of his suspended sentence by not completing
the program. Although the trial judge acknowledged that he did
not question the “sincerity” of Peyton’s desire to complete the
program, he stated that “I don’t think there’s anything I can
do” because the alternative sentencing program “didn’t work
out.” By order entered on February 11, 2002, the trial court
revoked the suspended sentence and imposed the original three
year active sentence, crediting Peyton with time served. By
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order entered on February 27, 2002, the trial court denied
Peyton’s motion to reconsider.
Peyton timely filed a petition for appeal in the Court of
Appeals in which he contended that the trial court abused its
discretion in revoking his suspended sentence because his
discharge from the detention center was not due to his willful
conduct or behavior. The Court of Appeals granted Peyton an
appeal.
In a decision by a divided three-judge panel, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Peyton v.
Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 356, 362, 585 S.E.2d 345, 348 (2003).
Initially, the majority of the panel noted that trial courts are
granted broad discretion by Code § 19.2-306 to revoke suspended
sentences and probation. It then further noted that, with
respect to the detention center program, Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(2)
requires a prospective participant to meet certain physical and
emotional requirements as a condition for acceptance and
participation in the program and that Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(4)
permits the trial judge to revoke all or part of a suspended
sentence upon a finding that a defendant has been removed from a
detention center program by the Department for “intractable
behavior” as such is defined in Code § 19.2-316.1. Id. at 358-
60, 585 S.E.2d at 346-47. Reasoning that the record supported
the conclusion that Peyton no longer met the physical and/or
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emotional requirements for participation in the detention center
program and, thus “did not have the ability to conform his
behavior to that necessary to complete the program,” the
majority of the panel held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it revoked Peyton’s suspended sentence. Id.
at 361, 585 S.E.2d at 347.
The dissenting judge initially noted that while broad, the
power of a trial court to revoke a suspended sentence is not
unlimited because “[b]y well established rules of decision the
cause deemed by the court to be sufficient for revoking a
suspension must be a reasonable cause.” Id. at 362, 585 S.E.2d
at 348 (Benton, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Reasoning that Peyton’s failure to complete the
detention program resulted from a medical inability to continue
in the program rather than from an unwillingness or refusal to
do so, the dissenting judge concluded that Peyton’s illness was
not a reasonable cause for revocation and, thus, the trial court
abused its discretion in revoking Peyton’s suspended sentence.
Id. at 364, 585 S.E.2d at 349.
We awarded Peyton an appeal from the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
DISCUSSION
Before considering the specific statutes applicable to the
facts of the present case, we briefly review the general
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statutory scheme relating to the suspension of sentence,
probation, and revocation that operates in conjunction with
those statutes. In essence, Code § 19.2-303 permits the trial
court, after conviction, to suspend all or part of a sentence
and to place the defendant on probation “under such conditions
as the court shall determine.” Code § 19.2-306 addresses the
trial court’s authority to respond to a violation of those
conditions by the defendant and permits it to revoke the
suspended sentence “for any cause the court deems sufficient”
that occurs within the probation period, within the period of
suspension, or, if neither is fixed, within the maximum period
for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced to
be imprisoned.
Statutes that permit the trial court to impose alternatives
to incarceration, such as probation or conditionally suspended
sentences, are highly remedial and should be liberally construed
to provide trial courts valuable tools for rehabilitation of
criminals. See, e.g., Grant v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 680, 684,
292 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1982); Dyke v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 478,
484, 69 S.E.2d 483, 486 (1952). Accordingly, we have held
consistently that “revocation of a suspended sentence lies in
the discretion of the trial court and that this discretion is
quite broad.” Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 326, 228
S.E.2d 555, 556 (1976). Nonetheless, we have required that
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“[t]he cause deemed by the court to be sufficient for revoking a
suspension must be a reasonable cause. . . . The discretion
required is a judicial discretion, the exercise of which
‘implies conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action.’ ”
Marshall v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 217, 220, 116 S.E.2d 270, 273
(1960) (quoting Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 367, 38
S.E.2d 479, 484 (1946)); see also Hamilton, 217 Va. at 327, 228
S.E.2d at 556; Griffin v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 349, 354, 136
S.E.2d 840, 844 (1964).
Consistent with the above described statutory scheme, the
General Assembly has enacted additional statutes providing
alternative sentencing sanctions to the trial courts in the form
of a state-wide community based system of programs established
and maintained by the Department. Code § 53.1-67.3. One such
program consists of residential detention centers designed “to
provide a highly structured, short-term period of incarceration
for individuals committed to the Department under the provisions
of § 19.2-316.2. The program shall include components for
military-style management and supervision, physical labor in
organized public works projects, counseling, remedial education,
substance abuse testing and treatment, and community re-entry
services.” Code § 53.1-67.8.
As pertinent to the present case, before a defendant who
otherwise would have been sentenced to incarceration for a
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nonviolent felony, such as the felony for which Peyton was
convicted, can be accepted into the Detention Center
Incarceration Program, Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(1) requires that he
undergo “evaluation and diagnosis by the Department to determine
suitability for participation in the Detention Center
Incarceration Program. The evaluation and diagnosis shall
include a complete physical and mental evaluation of the
defendant.” The statute further provides that upon receipt of a
favorable recommendation by the Department and a determination
by the trial court that the defendant will benefit from the
program and “is capable of returning to society as a productive
citizen,” the court “shall impose sentence, suspend the
sentence, and place the defendant on probation . . . . Such
probation shall be conditioned upon the defendant’s entry into
and successful completion of the Detention Center Incarceration
Program.” Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(3).
Consistent with the authority granted to the trial court
under Code § 19.2-306 to respond to a violation of the
conditions of a suspended sentence by the defendant, Code
§ 19.2-316.2(A)(4) provides that:
Upon the defendant’s (i) voluntary withdrawal
from the program, (ii) removal from the program by the
Department for intractable behavior as defined in
§ 19.2-316.1, or (iii) failure to comply with the
terms and conditions of probation, the court shall
cause the defendant to show cause why his probation
and suspension of sentence should not be revoked.
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Upon a finding that the defendant voluntarily withdrew
from the program, was removed from the program by the
Department for intractable behavior, or failed to
comply with the terms and conditions of probation, the
court may revoke all or part of the probation and
suspended sentence and commit the defendant as
otherwise provided in this chapter.
The Commonwealth does not contend, nor does the record
support, that Peyton voluntarily withdrew from the detention
center program. The Department, however, is permitted to remove
a defendant from this program for intractable behavior. In
pertinent part, Code § 19.2-316.1 defines “intractable behavior”
to mean “that behavior which, in the determination of the
Department of Corrections, . . . indicates an inmate’s
unwillingness or inability to conform his behavior to that
necessary to his successful completion of the program.” By
reference, this definition is incorporated into the provisions
of Code § 19.2-316.2(4). Stressing the term “inability,” the
Commonwealth contends that this definition of intractable
behavior does not require a finding of willfulness. Rather,
because the detention center program requires a defendant to
meet certain physical and mental requirements for acceptance
into the program, the Commonwealth contends that a defendant “is
expected to maintain that physical and emotional suitability for
the duration of the program.” Because the Department removed
Peyton from the program upon its determination that for
“medical/psychological reasons” he was unable to conform his
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behavior to that necessary for the successful completion of the
program, the Commonwealth maintains that the trial court had the
authority to revoke his suspended sentence, and the Court of
Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s judgment to do so.
We do not disagree with the Commonwealth’s basic premise
that a defendant, such as Peyton, who receives the benefit of
having his sentence suspended and being placed on probation
conditioned upon entering and completing an alternative
sentencing program, such as a detention center program, has a
responsibility to comply with the terms and conditions of his
suspended sentence. Moreover, we agree with the Court of
Appeals’ conclusion that neither the Department nor the trial
court was required to continue Peyton in the detention center
program when Peyton at no fault of his own was no longer
physically, or mentally, suited for the program. Peyton, 41 Va.
App. at 360, 585 S.E.2d at 347. However, Peyton’s removal from
the program under such circumstances does not resolve the
question whether the trial court abused its discretion by
revoking Peyton’s suspended sentence without considering
reasonable alternatives to imprisonment.
There is surely a distinction between the willful failure
of an inmate to comply with the requirements of the detention
center program and the conditions of his suspended sentence
permitting his participation in that program and the subsequent
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inability of the inmate to do so resulting from an unforeseen
medical condition. While in either case the inmate necessarily
will be subjected to a show cause hearing at which the trial
court has the discretion to revoke all or part of the inmate’s
suspended sentence, the proper exercise of that discretion in
the latter case requires the trial court to consider all the
circumstances, including recognition that the inmate’s removal
from the program was not the result of the inmate’s behavior or
conduct.
Here, the record shows that the trial court either merely
considered Peyton’s medical condition as satisfying the
definition of intractable behavior or presumed that it had no
option but to revoke Peyton’s suspended sentence because the
detention program “didn’t work out.” Clearly, however, the
trial court revoked Peyton’s suspended sentence without
considering reasonable alternatives to imprisonment even while
expressly finding that Peyton’s failure to complete the program
was caused by his medical condition and was contrary to his
desire to continue in the program. Under those circumstances,
the trial court’s action was an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred
in affirming the judgment of the trial court. We will reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we will remand the
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case to that Court with direction to remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with the view
expressed in this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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