Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and
Agee, JJ., and Carrico, S.J.
CECILIA ANN WRIGHT
v. Record No. 030181 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
January 16, 2004
TROY D. ECKHARDT
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
A. Joseph Canada, Judge
In this appeal, we consider whether the doctrine of res
judicata bars giving full faith and credit to a judgment of
the Texas Court of Appeals.
The relevant facts are undisputed. Cecilia Ann Wright
and Troy D. Eckhardt were divorced in 1993. Pursuant to the
divorce decree entered by the District Court of Nueces County,
Texas, Wright was awarded a portion of Eckhardt's military
retirement benefits when he retired. In 1998, after Eckhardt
retired from active military service, Wright obtained a
clarifying order from the Texas court establishing the formula
for computing her share of Eckhardt's pension. Later that
same year, Wright came to Virginia, where Eckhardt resided,
and filed suit in the City of Virginia Beach General District
Court seeking a judgment against Eckhardt for unpaid amounts
due under the Texas decree. The general district court
entered judgment in favor of Wright for $3,331.44.
Eckhardt appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of
the City of Virginia Beach. Prior to a hearing on his appeal,
Eckhardt obtained a second clarifying order from the Texas
court. In that order, issued June 3, 1999, the Texas court
concluded that Wright was not entitled to payments based on
Eckhardt's military retirement because Eckhardt was still a
member of the Fleet Reserve and therefore not retired. At the
August 24, 1999 hearing of Eckhardt's de novo appeal from the
general district court, the Circuit Court of the City of
Virginia Beach entered judgment in favor of Eckhardt based on
the second clarifying order of the Texas court.
Wright did not appeal the August 24, 1999 order of the
Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach but did appeal the
June 3, 1999 second clarifying order of the Texas court to the
Texas Court of Appeals. * The Texas Court of Appeals entered
judgment on November 9, 2000 reversing the second clarifying
order and holding that Wright was entitled to payments based
on Eckhardt's military retirement.
In November 2001, Wright filed the instant action in the
Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach seeking $9,325.28
plus interest and attorney's fees based on the November 2000
judgment of the Texas Court of Appeals. The trial court
dismissed Wright's action, holding that the doctrine of res
*
Apparently, at the August 24, 1999 hearing the trial
court did not inquire whether the June 1993 order was a final
order, and neither Eckhardt nor Wright, who appeared pro se
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judicata as applied in Kessler v. Fauquier National Bank, 195
Va. 1095, 81 S.E.2d 440 (1954), precluded Wright's action
based on the Texas Court of Appeals' November 2000 order. We
awarded Wright an appeal.
DISCUSSION
Eckhardt asserts here as he did in the trial court that
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude
Wright from pursuing an action based on the November 2000
order of the Texas Court of Appeals. We disagree.
The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from
relitigating a cause of action when a valid final judgment has
been entered on the matter; a factual issue actually litigated
and essential to a final judgment may not be relitigated in a
subsequent proceeding under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. Scales v. Lewis, 261 Va. 379, 382, 541 S.E.2d 899,
901 (2001). The party seeking to apply either doctrine has
the burden of establishing that the claim or issue is
precluded by the prior judgment. Id.
Eckhardt asserts that the issue resolved in the August
24, 1999 order of the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia
Beach is the same issue that Wright is asserting in the
instant case. According to Eckhardt, the issue in both cases
via telephone, volunteered any information about an appeal of
the Texas order.
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was whether the retirement payments should be paid to Wright.
However, the Virginia courts were never asked to determine
whether Wright was entitled to retirement payments; the issue
in each Virginia case was whether a judgment of a foreign
jurisdiction should be given full faith and credit by a
Virginia court.
When considering questions of full faith and credit, the
Virginia court is not concerned with whether the foreign
judgment is legally correct. The Virginia court's inquiry
focuses on whether the foreign court had jurisdiction to enter
the judgment. Bloodworth v. Ellis, 221 Va. 18, 21-22, 267
S.E.2d 96, 98 (1980). The jurisdiction of the Texas courts to
enter the various orders was not challenged in either Virginia
proceeding. The issue resolved by the August 1999 order of
the Virginia court was whether full faith and credit should be
given to the second clarifying order of the Texas trial court.
The issue in the instant case is whether full faith and credit
should be given to the November 2000 judgment of the Texas
Court of Appeals. In the absence of an identity of claims or
issues, the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel
fail.
Finally, Kessler does not require a different result.
That case involved a claim by Oliver Kessler that he was the
surviving spouse of Rose Kessler and entitled to participate
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in the distribution of her estate, even though Rose Kessler
had obtained a divorce from him in Florida. In his first
suit, Kessler maintained that the Florida court did not have
jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree. After considering
evidence on the issue of jurisdiction, the Virginia trial
court held that the Florida court did have jurisdiction to
enter the divorce decree, and therefore Kessler was not Rose
Kessler's surviving spouse and not entitled to take from the
proceeds of her estate. Kessler, 195 Va. at 1098-99, 81
S.E.2d at 442.
Following that decision, Kessler instituted a suit in
Florida in which the Florida court declared the divorce decree
void for lack of jurisdiction. Kessler then filed a second
suit in Virginia, asking that the Virginia court give full
faith and credit to the Florida decree holding that the
divorce decree was void and allow him to participate in the
distribution of his wife's estate. The Virginia court
declined to do so. Id. at 1100-01, 81 S.E.2d at 442-43.
In affirming the trial court, we pointed out that, in the
first proceeding, the Virginia court was entitled to and did
address whether the Florida court had jurisdiction to enter
the divorce decree. Thus, the substantive issue of
jurisdiction was litigated and resolved by the Virginia court.
In his second Virginia proceeding, Kessler sought full faith
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and credit for a Florida decree that addressed the same
substantive issue already decided by the Virginia court:
whether the Florida court had jurisdiction to enter the
divorce decree. Concluding that consideration of full faith
and credit included applying the doctrine of res judicata to
matters of jurisdiction, we held that Kessler's second action
was barred because the Virginia court had decided the issue of
jurisdiction in the prior proceeding. Id. at 1101-02, 81
S.E.2d at 443.
Unlike Kessler, in the present litigation the issue of
jurisdiction has not been raised or addressed in either the
Virginia or Texas proceedings, and the order of the Virginia
court in the first proceeding did not resolve any issue
subsequently addressed by the Texas Court of Appeals. The
factual differences between Kessler and the instant case make
the decision in that case inapplicable here.
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand the case for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
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