Present: All the Justices
KENT JERMAINE JACKSON
v. Record Nos. 030749 & 030750 OPINION BY
JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
October 31, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Verbena M. Askew, Judge
In this appeal, we review the capital murder conviction
and death penalty imposed on Kent Jermaine Jackson, along with
his convictions of robbery, felony stabbing, and statutory
burglary.
FACTS
In accord with established principles of appellate
review, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the party prevailing below. Commonwealth v.
Bower, 264 Va. 41, 43, 563 S.E.2d 736, 737 (2002).
On April 18, 2000, the body of Beulah Mae Kaiser, 79
years of age, was found in her apartment. According to the
medical examiner, Mrs. Kaiser died from a combination of a
stab wound to her jugular vein, a fractured skull, and
asphyxia caused by blockage of her airway by her tongue. Any
one of these injuries could have been fatal. In addition to
these injuries, Mrs. Kaiser suffered two black eyes, a broken
nose, and multiple abrasions, lacerations, and bruises. She
had five stab wounds to her head and neck, including the wound
to her jugular vein. The medical examiner also testified that
Mrs. Kaiser had been anally sodomized with her walking cane
and that the cane then had been driven into her mouth with
such violence that it knocked out most of her teeth, tore her
tongue and forced it into her airway, fractured her jaw, and
penetrated the left side of her face.
When Mrs. Kaiser's body was found, her apartment was in
disarray. Personal items were strewn throughout the
apartment, blood spatters were on the surfaces of the
apartment, and the contents of Mrs. Kaiser's purse had been
dumped on the floor. The police were unable, however, to find
a weapon or any fingerprints of value.
The crime went unsolved for over 16 months until DNA
testing of saliva on a cigarette butt found in the apartment
implicated an individual named Cary Gaskins. An interview
with Gaskins led the police to Joseph M. Dorsett and Jackson,
who had been roommates in an apartment across the hall from
Mrs. Kaiser's apartment at the time of her death. Following
an interview with Dorsett, Newport News police arrested
Dorsett, charging him with Mrs. Kaiser's murder, and obtained
a warrant for Jackson's arrest.
Police arrested Jackson at a girlfriend's home in King
George County around 4:00 a.m. on August 29, 2001. During an
interview with Newport News police detectives at the King
2
George County jail that afternoon, Jackson confessed to the
murder of Mrs. Kaiser.
PROCEEDINGS
On January 14, 2002, Jackson was indicted by a Newport
News grand jury for the capital murder of Beulah Mae Kaiser in
the commission of a robbery or attempted robbery, robbery,
felony stabbing, statutory burglary, and object sexual
penetration, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-31, 18.2-58, 18.2-
53, 18.2-90, and 18.2-67.2, respectively.
Prior to trial, Jackson filed motions seeking a change of
venue, suppression of his confession, a bill of particulars,
and additional peremptory strikes. The trial court denied
these motions and rejected Jackson's arguments that Virginia's
capital murder statutes are unconstitutional. Following a
six-day trial, a jury convicted Jackson of all charges except
object sexual penetration. In a subsequent sentencing
proceeding, the jury found the aggravating factor of vileness
and fixed a sentence of death for the capital murder
conviction and fixed sentences totaling life imprisonment plus
25 years and a $100,000 fine for the remaining convictions.
During a post-verdict hearing, the trial court considered the
pre-sentence report, further evidence presented by Jackson,
and the arguments of counsel. In its final judgment, the
trial court imposed the sentences fixed by the jury.
3
We have consolidated the automatic review of Jackson's
death sentence with his appeal of the capital murder
conviction in Record No. 030749 and have given them priority
on the docket. Code §§ 17.1-313(A), (F), and (G). We have
also certified Jackson's appeal of his non-capital convictions
from the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Record No. 030750, and
have consolidated the two records for consideration.
ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED
Jackson raises fifteen assignments of error, four of
which contain arguments that this Court has rejected in
previous cases. Since Jackson presents no new arguments on
these questions, we adhere to our previous holdings and affirm
the rulings of the trial court:
(1) denying the defendant's motion for a bill of
particulars seeking a narrowing construction of the
vileness aggravator and identification of the evidence on
which the Commonwealth intended to rely when seeking the
death penalty. See Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81,
107, 580 S.E.2d 834, 849 (2003); Goins v. Commonwealth,
251 Va. 442, 454, 470 S.E.2d 114, 123 (1996); Strickler
v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 490, 404 S.E.2d 227, 233
(1991).
(2) refusing to declare Virginia's capital murder
statutes unconstitutional because (a) they do not
4
adequately instruct the jury on the weight it should
assign to aggravating and mitigating factors, Satcher v.
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 228, 421 S.E.2d 821, 826
(1992), (b) do not require aggravating factors to
outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt,
Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 403, 442 S.E.2d
678, 684 (1994), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
513 U.S. 922 (1994); (c) are unconstitutionally vague in
defining "vileness" and "future dangerousness," Id.; (d)
allow evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct in the
sentencing phase, Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 421 S.E.2d at
826; (e) constitute cruel and unusual punishment, Spencer
v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 280-81, 384 S.E.2d 775,
777-78 (1989), and are contrary to "evolving standards of
decency" under Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958),
Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 412 S.E.2d at 826; (f) do not
require the court to set aside the death penalty on
showing of good cause, Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va.
68, 76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675-76 (1994); (g) allow the
court to consider hearsay evidence in its post-sentencing
report, O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 701-02, 364
S.E.2d 491, 507-08 (1988); and (h) fail to provide
meaningful appellate review, Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 421
5
S.E.2d at 826. See generally Breard, 248 Va. at 75-76,
445 S.E.2d at 675.
(3) denying the defendant's motion for additional
peremptory challenges. See Green, 266 Va. at 107, 580
S.E.2d at 849; Spencer, 240 Va. at 84, 393 S.E.2d at 613;
Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 405, 384 S.E.2d
757, 767 (1989); O'Dell, 234 Va. at 690, 364 S.E.2d at
501.
(4) refusing the defendant's request to use a juror
questionnaire. See Green, 266 Va. at 95-96, 580 S.E.2d
at 842-43; Strickler, 241 Va. at 492-93, 404 S.E.2d at
234.
ISSUES NOT PRESERVED
A. Change of Venue
Jackson, in his second assignment of error, charges that
the trial court erroneously denied his motion for change of
venue. The Commonwealth argues that Jackson has waived this
assignment of error because he neither renewed the motion at
the time the jury was selected nor objected to the seating of
the panel.
In Green, we stated that when a change of venue motion is
taken under advisement or continued until the jury is
empaneled, it is incumbent on the party seeking a change of
venue to renew the motion or otherwise bring it to the court's
6
attention. Green, 266 Va. at 94-95, 580 S.E.2d at 842.
Failure to do so implies acquiescence in the jury panel and is
tantamount to waiver of the motion for change of venue. Id.
In this case, the trial court denied Jackson's motion for
a change of venue in a pre-trial hearing but stated that the
motion was "a continuing motion as we go through this
process." Jackson did not seek a ruling on this "continuing
motion," did not bring the matter to the trial court's
attention, and made no objection based on venue before the
trial court empaneled the jury. Accordingly, Jackson has
waived this assignment of error, and we will not address his
claims that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his
motion for a change of venue. Id.; Rule 5:25.
B. Admission of Photographs
Jackson's eighth assignment of error challenges the trial
court's refusal to limit the presentation of crime scene and
autopsy photographs of the decedent. Jackson argues here that
the gruesome content of the photographs served merely to shock
and inflame the jury, and, because Jackson had stipulated to
an autopsy report and diagrams indicating the manner of Mrs.
Kaiser's death, the fourteen photographs introduced by the
Commonwealth were cumulative and had no probative value. The
Commonwealth argues that Jackson has waived this claim because
7
he did not object to the admission of the photographs at
trial.
In a pre-trial motion, Jackson sought to limit the number
of photographs depicting the condition of the decedent that
could be introduced at trial, arguing that the photographs
were cumulative. The trial court agreed that it would not
admit cumulative evidence but denied Jackson's motion as
premature because the Commonwealth had not yet determined
which photographs it would introduce at trial. When the
Commonwealth introduced all fourteen photographs as evidence,
Jackson did not object. Jackson's failure to renew his
objection at that time precludes him from raising this issue
on appeal. Rule 5:25.
C. Trial Court's Proportionality Review
Jackson asserts that the trial court erred in not
examining whether the jury's verdict imposing the penalty of
death was based on passion or prejudice and whether the
punishment was disproportionate in this case pursuant to Code
§ 17.1-313. While we note that Code § 17.1-313 does not
require such a review by the trial court, Green, 266 Va. at
107, 580 S.E.2d at 849, Jackson neither asked the trial court
to conduct such a review nor addressed such review by the
trial court on brief or in oral argument in this Court.
8
Accordingly, Jackson has waived this assignment of error.
Rule 5:25.
PRE-TRIAL
A. Motion to Suppress
In his first assignment of error, Jackson asserts that
the trial court erred in failing to suppress the confession
Jackson made to the Newport News police officers while
detained in the King George County Jail. Jackson asserts that
the confession should have been suppressed because he did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights to
counsel and against self-incrimination and because the
confession itself was not given voluntarily.
Longstanding principles of federal constitutional law
require that a suspect be informed of his constitutional
rights to the assistance of counsel and against self-
incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
These rights can be waived by the suspect if the waiver is
made knowingly and intelligently. Id. at 475. The
Commonwealth bears the burden of showing a knowing and
intelligent waiver. Id. Whether the waiver was made
knowingly and intelligently is a question of fact that will
not be set aside on appeal unless plainly wrong. Harrison v.
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 581, 423 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1992).
9
At the suppression hearing, Detective Larry P. Rilee
testified that he informed Jackson of his Miranda rights when
he began questioning Jackson at the King George County Jail
around 2:50 p.m. on August 29 and that Jackson orally waived
those rights at that time. Detective Rilee began taping the
interrogation about 25 minutes later. The transcript of the
taped portion of the interrogation recites that Detective
Rilee stated, "We've advised you of your Miranda Rights, you
understood those is that correct?" Jackson responded, "That's
correct." Following this exchange, Jackson made a statement
confessing to the murder of Mrs. Kaiser.
Jackson asserts that because Detective Rilee did not use
a written waiver of rights form and did not repeat the
elements of the Miranda warning during the taped portion of
the interrogation, the record is insufficient to show that
Jackson intelligently and knowingly waived his Miranda rights.
We disagree.
A valid waiver of Miranda rights does not require the
waiver to be in writing. Harrison, 244 Va. at 583, 423 S.E.2d
at 163. Detective Rilee's testimony and the transcript of the
interrogation support the trial court's factual determination
that Jackson was informed of his Miranda rights and that he
knowingly and intelligently waived those rights.
10
Jackson also contends that his confession was not
voluntary because it was not the product of his free and
unconstrained will. Whether a confession was voluntary is a
legal question to be resolved by the court, considering all
the circumstances. Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 341,
468 S.E.2d 98, 108 (1996).
Jackson maintains that the officers conducting the
interrogation overbore his will. The police officers,
according to Jackson, applied psychological pressure and
engaged in trickery, and lied to him about the evidence
connecting him with Mrs. Kaiser's death. These actions along
with his conditions of confinement resulted in a confession
that, he argues, he did not voluntarily make. We disagree
with Jackson.
Jackson recites a number of factors that, he argues,
rendered his statement involuntary. Prior to and during his
interrogation, he was tired, hungry, and kept in a "freezing"
cell. According to his court-appointed expert psychologist,
Dr. Stephen C. Ganderson, the verbal performance component of
Jackson's IQ was below average although his overall IQ was in
the normal range. Jackson further maintains that he was told
that if he made a statement he could call his mother, and he
stated that the promise was the reason he gave the statement
confessing to the murder.
11
We agree with the trial court that neither the expert
testimony nor the adverse conditions Jackson alleged
constituted sufficient evidence that Jackson suffered from an
impaired ability to understand what he was doing or saying, or
that his ability to decide whether to give a statement of his
own free will was overcome. As noted by the trial court, the
degree of detail in Jackson's confession belies his assertion
that he only gave the statement to secure the right to
telephone his mother.
The interrogation methods used by the officers in this
case do not render this confession involuntary per se. Smith
v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 470, 248 S.E.2d 135, 144-45
(1978). Furthermore, the record shows that Jackson did not
cite police trickery or deceit as a ground for suppressing his
confession in the trial court. Jackson has not preserved that
argument for consideration here. Rule 5:25.
Based on our review of the record, we hold that Jackson
confessed voluntarily and that the trial court did not err in
concluding that Jackson knowingly and intelligently waived his
Miranda rights.
B. Polling Jurors
In a pre-trial motion, Jackson asked that, if the jury
imposed the death sentence based on the aggravating factor of
vileness, the jury be polled as to "which statutory element(s)
12
established vileness, specifying at the time of polling one or
more of torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery." To
that end, Jackson requested jury instructions and a verdict
form that required unanimity on one or more vileness elements.
Relying on Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999),
Jackson argues that when imposing the death sentence, due
process requires unanimity not only as to the aggravating
factor of vileness but also to one or more of its composite
elements.
This Court has rejected the proposition that the jury
must identify the element or elements of the vileness factor
upon which it based its decision. Clark v. Commonwealth, 220
Va. 201, 213, 257 S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979). The Supreme Court's
decision in Richardson does not require us to revisit our
decision in Clark.
Richardson involved a prosecution for engaging in a
continuing criminal enterprise. As relevant here, conviction
required proof that the defendant committed a specific federal
offense and that the offense was part of a "continuing series"
of offenses undertaken by the defendant in concert with five
or more other persons. The trial court instructed the jury
that it had to find unanimously that the defendant committed
at least three federal narcotics offenses but did not have to
agree as to the particular three offenses. The Supreme Court
13
reversed, holding that the several violations required for
conviction were an element of the offense and thus the jury
had to agree on the same three violations. Richardson, 526
U.S. at 819-20, 824.
The Supreme Court explained in Richardson that, for
example, the jury must unanimously find force as an element of
the crime of robbery, but whether the force is created by the
use of a gun or a knife is not an element of the crime and
therefore does not require jury unanimity. Id. at 817. In
this case, the element the jury was required to find
unanimously to impose the death sentence was the aggravating
factor of vileness, which requires the defendant's actions be
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman." Code
§ 19.2-264.2. Depravity of mind, aggravated battery, and
torture are not discrete elements of vileness that would
require separate proof but rather are "several possible sets
of underlying facts [that] make up [the] particular element."
Richardson, 526 U.S. at 817. Neither Clark nor Richardson,
therefore, requires juror unanimity on these points.
Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error.
GUILT PHASE
A. Juror Disqualification
Jackson charges that the trial court erred in not
striking Sandra Peiffer from the jury panel for cause.
14
Absent manifest error, we will not disturb the trial
court's judgment whether to strike a potential juror for
cause. Green, 266 Va. at 98, 580 S.E.2d at 844; Clagett v.
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 90, 472 S.E.2d 263, 269 (1996). The
law does not require that a juror be ignorant of all facts,
only that jurors be impartial. Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217
Va. 297, 300, 227 S.E.2d 734, 736 (1976).
During voir dire, Peiffer volunteered that she had read
newspaper accounts about the case and remembered that the
person charged with the crime had made some comments to the
newspaper earlier. Peiffer did not remember the name of the
person. She went on to say, however, that she had not formed
an opinion on the defendant's guilt and repeated that she
would decide the case based on the evidence produced at trial.
Because the person interviewed by the media was Dorsett
and not Jackson, Jackson maintained that Peiffer could not be
impartial and would taint the jury if she told them her
recollections of the newspaper account. The trial court
refused to strike Peiffer for cause, finding that the juror
was "very, very emphatic" about her ability to decide the case
solely on the law and on the evidence.
Peiffer's statements, taken as a whole, demonstrate that
she would be impartial in deciding the case. We find no error
in the trial court's decision not to strike Peiffer for cause.
15
B. Batson Challenge
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), the United
States Supreme Court held that excluding a potential juror
solely on the basis of the juror's race is purposeful
discrimination and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
In his tenth assignment of error, Jackson claims that the
trial court erred in rejecting his claim that the Commonwealth
violated the rule in Batson because the Commonwealth exercised
all five of its peremptory strikes against African-Americans.
When a defendant raises a challenge based on Batson, he
must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory strike was
made on racial grounds. At that point, the burden shifts to
the prosecution to produce race-neutral explanations for
striking the juror. The defendant may then provide reasons
why the prosecution's explanations were pretextual and the
strikes were discriminatory regardless of the prosecution's
stated explanations. Whether the defendant has carried his
burden of proving purposeful discrimination in the selection
of the jury is then a matter to be decided by the trial court.
The trial court's findings will be reversed only if they are
clearly erroneous. Buck v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 449, 450-51,
443 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1994).
16
In this case, the Commonwealth offered the following
explanations for the exercise of its peremptory strikes
against five African-Americans:
(1) The Commonwealth struck Charles Blanco because
he was previously represented by one of the defense
attorneys and would be more likely to believe that
attorney. Mr. Blanco also was concerned about the
impact of the trial on his responsibility to take
care of his children who had special needs.
(2) Amy Leggett was struck because she answered
that she did not believe in the death penalty and
even though she said she could apply it, "she would
have a very, very hard time in applying the laws and
evidence."
(3) Vento Carter, according to the Commonwealth,
changed his position throughout his voir dire,
stating initially he would impose a higher standard
of proof on the Commonwealth but then stating that
he could nevertheless listen to the instructions of
the court on the Commonwealth's burden. Carter also
changed his position with regard to the necessity of
the defendant testifying. The Commonwealth stated
it had no "faith" in Carter's final answers.
(4) The Commonwealth struck Geraldine Thomas
because she stated that she would have to have "no
doubt" as to the guilt of the defendant before
imposing the death penalty regardless of what the
court said.
(5) Christopher Sledge testified that he would hold
the Commonwealth to a higher standard even though he
supposed he could follow the court's instructions.
Sledge also stated that he "didn't like" the death
penalty.
17
The trial court concluded that these explanations were race-
neutral and rejected Jackson's Batson challenge. 1
On appellate review, the trial court's conclusion
regarding whether reasons given for the strikes are race-
neutral is entitled to great deference, and that determination
will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.
Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 186, 427 S.E.2d 379, 386
(1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 572 U.S. 1217
(1994).
The trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor and credibility of potential jurors during voir dire,
and the record supports the Commonwealth's characterization of
the statements made by the potential jurors in question.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial
court's ruling on Jackson's Batson challenge was not clearly
erroneous.
C. Question Regarding Failure to Cooperate
Jackson complains that the trial court improperly allowed
the Commonwealth to cross-examine his court-appointed DNA
expert, Shawn Weiss, regarding the witness' refusal to meet
with the Commonwealth's DNA expert.
1
Jackson did not assert that these answers were pre-
textual.
18
In his direct testimony, Weiss testified that he did not
conduct independent testing of the DNA samples but questioned
the Commonwealth's testing results in a number of areas.
During cross-examination, Weiss acknowledged that the
Commonwealth had attempted to set up a meeting between Weiss
and the Commonwealth's DNA experts to "talk about" and "look
at each other's calculations." The Commonwealth then asked
Weiss why he had not agreed to the meeting. Weiss replied
that he was "under the direction of the person that hired
[him]." The Commonwealth went on to ask if Weiss knew that
the Commonwealth had "just opened everything up, showed it, no
requests having been made." At this point Jackson objected,
saying that the Commonwealth's questioning implied that
"somehow we weren't following the rules." The trial court
overruled the objection.
Jackson argues here that the Commonwealth's questioning
misled the jury because it implied that Jackson did not adhere
to the rules of discovery. 2 The Commonwealth responds, that by
asking the reasons for Weiss' refusal to meet with the
Commonwealth's DNA experts, it was exploring Weiss'
credibility, potential bias and the basis of his opinions.
2
Jackson also asserts that the exchange violated his
constitutional rights of due process. He did not make this
argument in the trial court and we do not consider it here.
Rule 5:25.
19
Cross-examination of a witness to establish or explore
the bias of that witness based on a relationship to a party in
the case is proper. Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 465,
470 S.E.2d 114, 129 (1996). Furthermore, limitation of cross-
examination is within the trial court's discretion. Norfolk &
Western Railway Co. v. Sonney, 236 Va. 482, 488, 374 S.E.2d
71, 74 (1988). In this case Weiss' statement that he refused
to meet with the Commonwealth's DNA experts because of his
relationship to the defense could have reflected bias.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred in
overruling Jackson's objection to the Commonwealth's question.
D. Expert Testimony on False Confessions
Jackson argues in his fourteenth assignment of error that
the trial court incorrectly barred Jackson from asking his
expert witness, Dr. Steven C. Ganderson, "a hypothetical
question about false confessions." 3 While the trial court was
willing to permit Dr. Ganderson to testify generally regarding
circumstances that could lead to false confessions, it forbade
Dr. Ganderson from testifying about the truth or falsity of
Jackson's statement. We find no error in the trial court's
ruling.
3
Jackson does not isolate any specific question in his
brief.
20
The physical and psychological environment surrounding a
confession can be very relevant in determining whether a
confession is reliable, and expert witnesses may testify "to a
witness's or defendant's mental disorder and the hypothetical
effect of that disorder." Pritchett v. Commonwealth, 263 Va.
182, 187, 557 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2002). Expert witnesses may
not, however, render an opinion on the defendant's veracity or
reliability of a confession because whether a confession is
reliable is a matter in the jury's exclusive province. Id.
During voir dire, the trial court accepted Dr. Ganderson
as an expert on psychology and sexual-psychological issues.
Jackson elicited testimony from the doctor on the factors that
contribute to "transference," a phenomenon in which a subject
becomes more prone to suggestion and may say things which are
untrue in an attempt to gain approval from an authority
figure. Dr. Ganderson also testified about antecedents and
objective goals of a defendant that could affect the
reliability of a defendant's statements. While the trial
court permitted this questioning, it sustained the
Commonwealth's objection when Dr. Ganderson questioned the
veracity of Jackson's statement based on transference theory.
The trial court, relying on our decision in Pritchett, ruled
that Dr. Ganderson could testify regarding the circumstances
surrounding Jackson's confession but not about its truth:
21
Now, I still think in terms out of what he can't
say, that's a false confession. I think the jury
still has to make those kinds of conclusions. Those
are factual conclusions, but he can testify about
the surroundings and what he believes the impact has
on this defendant with his mental capacity as well
as the surroundings of the circumstances out of
which the confession was taken.
There is no error in this holding.
E. Negative Evidence of Reputation
Jackson asserts that the trial court erred in "preventing
Jackson from presenting certain so-called 'negative' evidence
of good character." Jackson refers specifically to the
testimony of two individuals he called as character witnesses.
Jackson asked the witnesses if they were aware of or had heard
that Jackson had a reputation in the community for being
violent. The Commonwealth objected, stating that before
asking a question of this sort, Jackson had to establish that
the witness was aware of Jackson's reputation in the
community. The trial court sustained the objections.
This assignment of error is without merit. Jackson was
not prohibited from presenting negative evidence of good
character. Negative evidence of good character is based on
the theory that a person has a good reputation if that
reputation has not been questioned. Zirkle v. Commonwealth,
189 Va. 862, 871-72, 55 S.E.2d 24, 29-30 (1949). It is
admissible, as is other reputation evidence, if the proper
22
foundation is established. See Barlow v. Commonwealth, 224
Va. 338, 340-41, 297 S.E.2d 645, 646 (1982). Thus, a witness
must be aware of the party's reputation in the community
before he may testify as to the lack of any reputation for a
particular characteristic.
Jackson did not establish that either witness had
knowledge of Jackson's reputation in the community before
asking the type of question recited above. Accordingly, the
trial court not only was correct in sustaining the
Commonwealth's objection to the questions, but nothing in the
record shows that Jackson was prevented from introducing
negative evidence of reputation. In fact, the record shows
that in at least one instance, Jackson proceeded to establish
that the witness had the requisite knowledge of Jackson's
reputation in the community and then testified that he never
"heard anything from anybody of [Jackson] doing any wrongdoing
to anybody." We find no error in the ruling of the trial
court.
F. Motion to Strike
Jackson asserts that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence. He argues that
the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions
because his confession was not reliable, the forensic testing
23
was inadequate, and no other evidence connected him to the
crime scene.
In reviewing the record to determine whether the evidence
was sufficient to support the convictions, we consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and
give the Commonwealth all inferences fairly deducible from
that evidence. Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 313-14,
541 S.E.2d 872, 878 (2001).
Jackson argues that his confession was not reliable for
two reasons: his will was overborne by the deception of the
officers and the confession was false. We have already held
that Jackson's will was not overborne, and, therefore, we
reject that argument as a basis for finding his confession
unreliable.
Jackson also bases his assertion that his confession was
false on the alleged deception of the officers during his
interrogation. Jackson does not offer, and we cannot find,
any rationale or evidence supporting the conclusion that the
tactics utilized by the officers during his interrogation
caused Jackson's confession to be false.
The forensic testing was inadequate, according to
Jackson, because the DNA testing of the blood mixture on the
toe of a sock found at the crime scene involved only eight
loci. Jackson's DNA loci matched six of the eight loci. The
24
standard procedure of the state laboratory is to test 13 or 16
loci. Shawn Weiss, Jackson's expert in DNA testing, testified
that, had 13 or 16 loci been tested, there was a "possibility"
that other suspects may have had more loci matches than
Jackson.
Jackson's criticism of the Commonwealth's forensic
testing does not change the fact that some of the loci matched
his DNA. Under these circumstances, as his own expert
testified, "Kent Jackson cannot be excluded as a minor
contributor."
Finally, the lack of other forensic evidence connecting
Jackson to the crime scene does not support the conclusion
that the evidence was insufficient to prove Jackson's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson's detailed confession,
corroborated by evidence of the injuries Mrs. Kaiser suffered,
was sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The trial court did not err in denying Jackson's
motion to strike. Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 133,
321 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1984).
STATUTORY REVIEW
Under Code § 17.1-313(C)(1), we must inquire whether
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor affected the
sentencing decision. Jackson contends that "numerous horrific
photographs of the decendant" inflamed the jury and improperly
25
influenced its sentencing decision. Jackson's argument is
not, and cannot be, that allowing the pictures to be seen by
the jury was error. As discussed above, he did not object to
their introduction during the guilt phase of the trial. Thus,
whether the pictures were properly or improperly admitted is
not the issue before us in this statutory review. We do
however, consider the potential impact these pictures may have
had on the decision to impose the death sentence. Emmett v.
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 364, 371, 569 S.E.2d 39, 44 (2002).
The pictures at issue, while gruesome, accurately
depicted the condition of the victim and were relevant to the
"motive, intent, method, malice, premeditation and the
atrociousness of the crime." Id. at 372, 569 S.E.2d at 45.
In this context, the jury was entitled to use the photographs
to make an informed decision on the defendant's guilt and the
appropriate sentence thereafter. The record contains ample
evidence supporting the imposition of the death sentence, and
nothing in the record suggests that passion or prejudice
played any part in that decision.
Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) requires us to determine whether
the sentence in this case is "excessive or disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant." Our examination seeks "to reach a
reasoned judgment regarding what cases justify the imposition
26
of the death penalty." Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390,
405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1999).
We have examined the capital murder cases where robbery
was the predicate offense and where the Commonwealth sought
the death penalty based on the aggravating factor of vileness.
Our review encompassed both cases where the jury fixed the
death penalty and where it fixed life imprisonment. Based on
that review, we find that defendant's sentence was not
excessive or disproportionate to sentences imposed in capital
murder cases similar to the instant case. See Bennett v.
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 374 S.E.2d 303 (1988) (defendant
bound, beat, and stabbed victim); Boggs v. Commonwealth, 229
Va. 501, 331 S.E.2d 407 (1985) (defendant beat his 87-year-old
neighbor with a piece of steel and then stabbed her); Bunch v.
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 304 S.E.2d 271 (1983)(defendant
shot his lover in the head, ransacked her house, and hung her
from a doorknob); LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 304
S.E.2d 644 (1983) (defendant beat victim and stabbed her with
a carving fork and ice pick); Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va.
66, 286 S.E.2d 162 (1982) (defendant strangled victim, cut her
throat, and inserted umbrellas into her anus and vagina post-
mortem); Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797
(1979) (defendant entered house with co-conspirators, robbed
victim, and then choked and beat her to death).
27
At oral argument, Jackson's counsel argued that the death
penalty should not be imposed in this case because Jackson
himself did not commit some of the more heinous acts involved
in the murder of Mrs. Kaiser, but rather primarily assumed the
role of a bystander and only stabbed Mrs. Kaiser with a knife.
Counsel asked this Court to set aside the death penalty and
impose a penalty of life pursuant to the provisions of Code
§ 17.1-313(D)(2).
We reject this request. Beulah Mae Kaiser suffered a
brutal, vicious, and painful death at Kent Jermaine Jackson's
hands. The record indicates that Jackson agreed to the plan
to enter Mrs. Kaiser's apartment and rob her and that he
kicked her and held her down while Dorsett punched, kicked,
and stabbed her. Jackson stabbed Mrs. Kaiser and he handed
Dorsett the cane that ultimately was shoved through her face.
For the above reasons we affirm the conviction for
capital murder and the imposition of the death penalty entered
in Case No. 030749 and affirm the non-capital convictions in
Case No. 030750.
Record No. 030749 - Affirmed.
Record No. 030750 - Affirmed.
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