Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and
Kinser, JJ., and Compton, S.J.
ERIC LIN HARRIS OPINION BY
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON
v. Record No. 000589 January 12, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this criminal appeal involving a conviction for dealing
in narcotics, the sole question is whether the Court of Appeals
of Virginia erred in determining that the prosecution
sufficiently established the chain of custody of the drugs in
question.
Indicted in the Circuit Court of the City of Hampton for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of
Code § 18.2-248, and for possession of a firearm while in
possession of cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(B),
defendant Eric Lin Harris was convicted of the offenses in a
bench trial in February 1999. During trial, the court overruled
defendant's objection to receipt in evidence of the certificate
of analysis of the cocaine. In admitting the certificate, the
trial judge ruled, contrary to defendant's contention, that the
prosecution properly established the chain of custody of the
drugs.
In April 1999, the court sentenced defendant to a suspended
term of five years on the possession with intent to distribute
charge and to three years' imprisonment on the firearm charge.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions
in an unpublished opinion. Harris v. Commonwealth, Record No.
0909-99-1 (March 7, 2000). We awarded defendant an appeal to
consider the chain of custody issue.
The facts relevant to the issue presented are undisputed.
In September 1998, Hampton police officer Jimmie Wideman
observed defendant operating a motor vehicle in excess of the
speed limit in a school zone. Following a traffic stop, the
officer recovered from defendant's person a loaded pistol, a bag
containing what was later found to be cocaine, and $1,730 in
currency.
After leaving the scene of the arrest, Wideman took the
recovered items to the Hampton Police Station. According to the
officer's testimony, the items were assigned "the appropriate
case and identification numbers," the numbers were placed on
tags, the tags were affixed to the items, and the items placed
in an "evidence envelope." The "suspected cocaine" was assigned
"item number five."
Wideman then placed on "Item 5" identifying marks, which
included the case number; defendant's name; the officer's name;
and the time, date, and location of recovery. After sealing the
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envelope with tape, upon which the officer placed his initials,
he handed the envelope "directly" to B. Ronnie Staton, a
property and evidence custodian at the police department.
Upon receipt of the sealed evidence bag from Wideman at
"the counter" of the property and evidence division office,
Staton placed his name and the date ("9-21-98") on the bag, put
it in an evidence locker, and locked it. No other person had
access to the locker, Staton possessing the only two keys.
Three days later, on September 24, 1998, Staton delivered
Item 5 to a person at the Tidewater Laboratory of the
Commonwealth's Division of Forensic Science in Norfolk, and
"tagged it in" under a specific "forensic lab number" assigned
to the item.
At trial, Wideman testified that the evidence bag and
contents were "in substantially the same condition as when"
initially deposited with Staton, except that the forensic tape
had been removed from the bag. Staton likewise identified the
bag and contents at trial as the same as handed to him by
Wideman and, in turn, delivered to the forensic laboratory.
Over defendant's objection, the trial court received in
evidence the "Certificate of Analysis" relating to "Item 5."
The certificate is dated November 9, 1998, refers to the police
case number and to the "Lab" number, names the defendant as the
"Suspect," shows the "Date Received: 09/24/98," states "Evidence
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Submitted By: B. R. Staton," and describes Item 5 as "Sealed
Packaging containing off-white chunky solid material." The
certificate shows the results of the analysis to be "Cocaine
. . . 12.963 grams of solid material."
A forensic scientist signed the certificate, stating "that
I performed the above analysis or examination as an employee of
and in a laboratory operated by the Division of Forensic
Science, and that the above is an accurate record of the results
of that analysis or examination."
Code § 19.2-187.01 authorizes a trial court to receive a
certificate of analysis as evidence of the chain of custody of
the material tested. As pertinent here, the statute provides
that a "report of analysis duly attested by the person
performing such analysis or examination in any laboratory
operated by . . . the Division of Forensic Science or any of its
regional laboratories . . . shall be prima facie evidence in a
criminal . . . proceeding as to the custody of the material
described therein from the time such material is received by an
authorized agent of such laboratory until such material is
released subsequent to such analysis or examination. . . ."
These provisions relate, of course, to the custody of the
contraband while it is in the testing laboratory. The statute
"relieves the Commonwealth of having to present testimony
regarding the chain of custody of an analyzed or examined
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substance, provided certain safeguards are met." Dunn v.
Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 217, 220, 456 S.E.2d 135, 136 (1995).
The defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the
prosecution failed to prove the cocaine seized by Wideman and
held by Staton was received by an "authorized agent" of the
laboratory, as required by the foregoing statute. Consequently,
the defendant argues, because the chain of custody of the
cocaine was not established, the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the trial court's action in receiving the certificate,
and both charges should be dismissed. We disagree.
Under the uncontradicted evidence, the trial court clearly
was entitled to infer that Staton delivered Item 5 to an
"authorized agent" of the laboratory, as required by statute.
Stated differently, the prosecution established, prima facie,
that the contraband was received by such an agent; there is no
hint that it was received, for example, by some mere non-
employee bystander who happened to be loitering on the
laboratory's premises.
At the moment Staton handed Item 5 to the person at the
laboratory, the bag immediately was assigned a specific
"forensic lab number." Certainly, this is an act one would
expect to be performed by an authorized agent of the laboratory.
And, reasonably to be inferred from the evidence is the fact
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that the number was assigned by the person receiving the
material from Staton.
This same forensic number appears on the certificate in
question along with the police department case number, the
defendant's name, and the date of receipt of the material.
These facts support the conclusion that the examiner analyzed
the same material received by the person to whom Staton
delivered it. Moreover, this latter conclusion is buttressed by
the examiner's attestation on the certificate that she, in fact,
analyzed the substance in Item 5.
Accordingly, we hold that the Commonwealth complied with
the statute and established, prima facie, that the material in
question was received by an authorized agent of the laboratory.
Parenthetically, we note that defendant had the opportunity to
rebut this prima facie showing, but failed to do so. See Code
§ 19.2-187.1 (accused has right to call as adverse witness, at
cost of Commonwealth, person performing analysis "or involved in
the chain of custody").
Consequently, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be
Affirmed.
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