Medici v. Commonwealth

PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice

LAWRENCE P. MEDICI
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 991389 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
June 9, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

In this appeal, we determine whether the Court of Appeals

erred in ruling that the trial court correctly (1) refused to

strike for cause a prospective juror, (2) admitted into evidence

the defendant's prior rape convictions in the guilt/innocence

phase of his trial, and (3) refused to accept the defendant's

stipulation that he had prior rape convictions.

I

A grand jury of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County

indicted Lawrence P. Medici on four offenses. Count I of the

indictment charged that Medici "did rape [the victim], a second

or subsequent offense." Count II charged that Medici "did

engage in cunninlingus with [the victim], against her will, by

force, threat or intimidation, a second or subsequent offense."

Count III charged that Medici "did engage in fellatio with [the

victim], against her will, by force, threat or intimidation, a

second or subsequent offense." Count IV charged that Medici

"did attempt to engage in anal sodomy with [the victim], against

her will, by force, threat or intimidation."
 A jury found Medici guilty of each offense charged. The

jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment for each charge

set forth in Counts I, II, and III of the indictment and 10

years' imprisonment for the charge contained in Count IV of the

indictment. By order entered February 17, 1998, the trial court

sentenced Medici in accordance with the jury's verdict.

In an unpublished opinion dated May 25, 1999, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. Lawrence P. Medici

v. Commonwealth of Virginia, Record No. 0527-98-4. We awarded

Medici an appeal limited to the issues stated above. 1

II

A brief summary of the facts will suffice. The eighteen-

year-old victim, a drug addict, was acquainted with Medici as

her supplier of illicit drugs. On May 21, 1997, Medici left a

message on the victim's answering machine advising her that he

had "an amazing amount of cocaine" and that she should come over

to his house. The victim went to Medici's house the following

morning on her way to school. Medici escorted the victim to the

basement where she saw a mirror covered with white powder. As

the victim observed the powder, Medici ordered her to remove her

1
We also awarded an appeal on the issue whether the indictment
is defective. We will not consider Medici's contention that the
indictment is defective, however, because the issue was not
raised before the jury returned its verdict, as required by Rule
3A:9. Therefore, the issue was waived.

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clothing. The victim initially refused, but did remove her

clothing when she noticed that Medici was armed with a knife.

Thereafter, Medici forced the victim to engage in fellatio,

cunninlingus, and sexual intercourse, and he attempted to engage

the victim in anal sodomy. The victim immediately reported the

incident to her high school guidance counselor.

III

We first consider whether the trial court erred in refusing

to strike for cause a potential juror. During voir dire, Medici

sought to have Inga Bennett stricken for cause because Bennett's

husband had been murdered and the accused murderer was then

represented by Medici's counsel's employer, the Office of the

Public Defender. When questioned by counsel and the trial

court, Bennett unequivocally stated that those circumstances

would not affect her ability to judge the evidence fairly and

impartially. The trial court refused to strike Bennett for

cause, stating that "she was very adamant that she could be

objective in this case."

We considered a similar issue in Cantrell v. Crews, 259 Va.

47, 523 S.E.2d 502 (2000), decided after the decisions of the

trial court and the Court of Appeals in the present case. In

Cantrell, the issue was "whether the trial court erred in

refusing to strike for cause a prospective juror who, at the

time of trial, was a client of the law firm representing the

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plaintiff." Id. at 49, 523 S.E.2d at 503. The prospective

juror was, at the time, a plaintiff in a pending personal injury

action. In response to questioning, the prospective juror

assured the trial court that she could "ignore" her

representation by the plaintiff's law firm and "be totally fair

to both sides." Id. at 50, 523 S.E.2d at 503. The trial court

denied the defendants' motion to strike the prospective juror

for cause, concluding that she could ignore her personal

relationship and be fair. Id.

We held that the trial court abused its discretion in

refusing to strike the juror for cause and that the ruling

constituted reversible error. In so holding, we stated the

following:

Public confidence in the integrity of the process is
at stake. It cannot be promoted when a sitting juror
is, at the time of trial, a client of the law firm
representing one of the parties to the litigation as a
result of a similar occurrence.

This is true even though, as the record shows,
the juror states that the circumstances of her
representation would have no "bearing" on her judgment
as a juror and that she could "be totally fair to both
sides."

Id. at 51, 523 S.E.2d at 504.

It is true, as the Attorney General argues, that an

appellate court must give deference to a trial court's ruling

whether to exclude or retain a prospective juror and that the

ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly

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wrong and amounts to an abuse of discretion. Vinson v.

Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999). We

think, however, that the present case is controlled by our

decision in Cantrell. Here, the prospective juror's husband had

been murdered, and the accused murderer was represented by a

lawyer in the same Public Defender's Office that also served as

counsel for Medici. While we have no reason to question

Bennett's honesty and sincerity, we think that permitting her to

sit as a juror, in the circumstances of this case, would weaken

public confidence in the integrity of criminal trials.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion

in failing to strike Bennett as a juror and that the ruling

constitutes reversible error.

IV

We next consider whether Medici's prior convictions of rape

in California were improperly admitted into evidence during the

Commonwealth's case-in-chief. Medici makes three arguments in

support of this contention. 2

A

First, Medici argues that the admission of the evidence in

the guilt/innocence phase of his trial violated the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

2
We will consider Medici's other assignments of error because
the issues raised are likely to arise again upon retrial.

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As previously noted, Medici was charged in three counts of the

indictment with violating the rape and forcible sodomy statutes.

He was also charged with the violation of Code § 18.2-67.5:3,

which provides in subsection A as follows:

Any person convicted of more than one offense
specified in subsection B, when such offenses were not
part of a common act, transaction or scheme, and who
has been at liberty as defined in § 53.1-151 between
each conviction shall, upon conviction of the second
or subsequent such offense, be sentenced to life
imprisonment and shall not have all or any portion of
the sentence suspended, provided it is admitted, or
found by the jury or judge before whom he is tried,
that he has been previously convicted of at least one
of the specified offenses.

Medici asserts that, "because the Commonwealth currently

has a bifurcated system in place[,] . . . the prior conviction

should be introduced in the [penalty] phase of the trial."

Medici further assets that, "[t]o do otherwise would be to

violate a defendant's right to due process."

In Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 567-69 (1967), the

Supreme Court upheld a defendant's conviction despite the

admission into evidence in the guilt/innocence phase of the

trial of the defendant's prior conviction for the purposes of

sentence enhancement. More recently, in Marshall v. Lonberger,

459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983), the Supreme Court reaffirmed

Spencer and held that the accused's due process rights were not

violated by the admission of his prior conviction into evidence

in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Similarly, in Brown

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v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 56, 59, 307 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1983), we

ruled that "[d]ue process does not require that an accused be

given a bifurcated trial when he is charged under a statute

authorizing enhanced punishment for repeating offenders."

The Supreme Court also has stated that "a state rule of law

'does not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another

method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give

a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at bar.'"

Spencer, 385 U.S. at 564 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291

U.S. 97, 104 (1934)). The Court has further noted that "[a]

determination of the 'best' recidivist trial procedure

necessarily involves a consideration of a wide variety of

criteria . . . [and] is a far cry from a constitutional

determination that this method of handling the problem is

compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 567-68.

In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury

that Medici's prior convictions "should be considered . . . only

for proof . . . of a prior conviction, and not as proof that

[Medici] committed the offenses to which he is charged." We

presume that jurors followed a court's instruction, unless the

record plainly shows otherwise. See Spencer v. Commonwealth,

240 Va. 78, 95, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908

(1990). Here, nothing in the record suggests that the jury did

not follow the court's instruction.

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 We express no opinion whether the better policy would be to

introduce a prior conviction into evidence only during the

sentencing phase. We also do not decide whether a prior

conviction is an element of the offense charged. Medici's

assignment of error merely alleges that the admission into

evidence of his prior convictions in the guilt/innocence phase

of his trial violated his "right to due process." We reject

this contention and, for the reasons stated, hold that Medici's

due process rights were not violated.

B

Medici next contends that the trial court erred in

admitting into evidence his prior California rape convictions

because the California statute "allows a conviction for rape for

acts that do not constitute an offense under Code § 18.2-61,"

thereby rendering the Virginia and California statutes not

"substantially similar." We do not agree.

"Prior convictions," within the meaning of Code § 18.2-

67.5:3(C), include "adult convictions for felonies under the

laws of any state or the United States that are substantially

similar to those listed in subsection B." (Emphasis added.)

Subsection B of Code § 18.2-67.5:3 includes the crime of rape.

In 1985, Medici was convicted of rape in California, in

violation of California Penal Code § 261(2), which, at the time

8
of the offense and his conviction, read, in pertinent part, as

follows:

Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with
a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any
of the following circumstances:

. . . .

(2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will
by means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury on the person or another.

Code § 18.2-61(A)(i), under which Medici was charged in the

present case, provides the following:

If any person has sexual intercourse with a
complaining witness who is not his or her spouse . . .
against the complaining witness's will, by force,
threat or intimidation of or against the complaining
witness or another person, . . . he or she shall be
guilty of rape.

It is true that the California statute, when read in its

entirety, permits a rape conviction for acts that would not

necessarily constitute rape in Virginia. In making a comparison

regarding the similarity of the statutes, however, we need only

compare the Virginia rape statute with the subsection of the

California statute under which Medici was charged and convicted.

See Honaker v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 682, 684, 454 S.E.2d

29, 30 (1995).

Clearly, the language in subsection 2 of California Penal

Code § 261 is substantially similar to the language in Virginia

Code § 18.2-61(A)(i). Therefore, we hold that the trial court

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did not err in admitting into evidence Medici's convictions

under a substantially similar statute.

C

Medici also contends that the trial court erred in

admitting the California convictions into evidence because,

according to him, the conviction order was not properly

certified. The prior convictions order admitted in the present

case was marked on the back with a stamp reading, "Allen Slater,

Executive Officer and Clerk of the Superior Court of the State

of California, in and for the County of Orange." The order also

contained the seal of the Orange County Superior Court and was

signed by "Flor L. Perez," whose signature appears next to the

word, "Deputy."

Code § 8.01-389(A1) provides that "[t]he records of any

judicial proceeding and any other official record of any court

of another state or country, or of the United States, shall be

received as prima facie evidence provided that such records are

authenticated by the clerk of the court where preserved to be a

true record." We think the California order complies with the

requirements of Code § 8.01-389(A1), and, therefore, the trial

court properly admitted it into evidence.

V

Finally, we consider Medici's offer to stipulate. Medici

offered to stipulate his prior rape convictions in the

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sentencing phase of his trial if he were convicted of the

charged offenses. He contends on appeal that the trial court

erred in refusing to accept the stipulation. We have held,

however, that an accused "may not preclude the Commonwealth from

introducing otherwise admissible evidence by offering to

stipulate the facts which the evidence would show." Spencer,

240 Va. at 91, 393 S.E.2d at 617. We conclude, therefore, that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to

accept Medici's qualified stipulation offer.

VI

In sum, we hold that the trial court committed reversible

error in refusing to strike for cause prospective juror Bennett,

and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's

ruling. We further hold that the trial court did not err in

admitting into evidence Medici's California rape convictions and

in refusing to accept Medici's stipulation and that the Court of

Appeals did not err in affirming these rulings of the trial

court. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgments of the trial

court and the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court

of Appeals with direction that the case be remanded to the trial

court for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

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