Present: All the Justices
MARK L. EARLEY,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA
v. Record No. 981552 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
February 26, 1999
WILLIAM E. LANDSIDLE,
COMPTROLLER OF VIRGINIA
UPON A PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
This is an original petition for a writ of mandamus brought
by the Attorney General of Virginia, Mark L. Earley, under the
provisions of Code § 8.01-653. The issue before us is whether
to grant a motion to dismiss the Attorney General's motion to
join as parties Bruce F. Jamerson, Clerk, Virginia House of
Delegates, and Susan Clarke Schaar, Clerk, Senate of Virginia
(the Clerks). The Clerks assert in their motion to dismiss,
among other things, that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to consider the Attorney General's petition.
The Comptroller of Virginia, William E. Landsidle, notified
the Attorney General by letter dated July 1, 1998, that he
entertained doubt concerning the constitutionality of two
spending provisions enacted by the General Assembly as part of
the Commonwealth's 1998-2000 Biennial Budget (the 1998 Budget).
1998 Va. Acts of Assembly, ch. 464; 1998 Va. Acts of Assembly,
Special Session, ch. 1. The Comptroller questioned Item 1A6 of
the 1998 Budget, which increased the so-called "per diem" paid
to legislators for legislative activities involving the
discharge of their duties when the General Assembly is not in
session from $100 to $200. The Comptroller also questioned Item
1A8, which increased the legislators' monthly allowance for
office expenses and supplies from $750 to $1250.
The Comptroller stated that his doubt was based on Article
IV, § 5 of the Constitution of Virginia (the Constitution),
which provides that an increase in salary for a given legislator
shall not take effect until after the end of the legislative
term for which the legislator was elected. As directed by Code
§ 8.01-653, the Comptroller informed the Attorney General that
he would not make payments for these items at the new levels
authorized in the 1998 Budget until the constitutionality of
those items had been adjudicated by this Court. However, the
Comptroller stated that he would continue to make payments for
those items at the levels authorized before the 1998 Budget was
enacted.
In July 1998, the Attorney General filed with this Court
the present petition for writ of mandamus naming the Comptroller
as party defendant. The Attorney General asked this Court to
declare unconstitutional the increased payment levels authorized
in Items 1A6 and 1A8 of the 1998 Budget, which became effective
before the end of the present term of the members of the General
Assembly. The Attorney General requested that this Court direct
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the Comptroller to continue to make payment for these items at
the previously authorized levels until the next term of the
General Assembly begins in January 2000, and, thereafter, to
make payment at the increased levels fixed in the 1998 Budget.
The Attorney General later filed a motion to join the
Clerks as additional parties defendant. The Attorney General
alleged that the Clerks "have responsibilities in conjunction
with the payments called into question in this action, and
therefore, have a direct and substantial interest in the issues"
before the Court. The Clerks have moved to dismiss the Attorney
General's motion to join them as additional parties.
The Clerks assert that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the petition for a writ of mandamus because
Code § 8.01-653 requires the Attorney General to defend the
constitutionality of spending provisions challenged by the
Comptroller. The Clerks also contend that they are not proper
parties under Code § 8.01-653 because the statute only permits
joinder of additional parties defendant who stand in the same
position as the Comptroller and might be involved in
implementing the challenged spending provisions. The Clerks
argue that the Attorney General and the Comptroller essentially
are "two respondents in search of a petitioner," and that Code
§ 8.01-653 does not permit the joinder of additional parties to
furnish someone to oppose the Comptroller.
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In response, the Attorney General contends that § 8.01-653
is a remedial statute that must be construed liberally to
accomplish its purpose of permitting prompt judicial review of
"questionable" appropriations of public funds. The Attorney
General asserts that when he believes that a spending provision
is unconstitutional, he is obligated to challenge its
constitutionality by filing a petition for writ of mandamus
under Code § 8.01-653, and that he may seek the joinder of
additional defendants to argue in support of the challenged
provision. He argues that the present petition properly seeks
an affirmative order directing the Comptroller to make payments
under the challenged provisions after the next term of the
General Assembly convenes in January 2000. We disagree with the
Attorney General's arguments.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be used to
compel public officers to perform their ministerial duties.
Town of Front Royal v. Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park,
Corp., 248 Va. 581, 584, 449 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1994); Williams v.
Matthews, 248 Va. 277, 281, 448 S.E.2d 625, 627 (1994);
Morrissette v. McGinniss, 246 Va. 378, 382, 436 S.E.2d 433, 435
(1993). When a public official has failed to perform his
ministerial duty at a time required by law, mandamus will lie to
compel the discharge of such duty within a reasonable time after
issuance of the writ. Andrews v. Shepherd, 201 Va. 412, 416,
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111 S.E.2d 279, 282 (1959); Moore v. Pullem, 150 Va. 174, 198,
142 S.E. 415, 422 (1928).
Code § 8.01-653 authorizes this Court to consider a
petition for a writ of mandamus in the particular circumstances
detailed in the statute. Under basic rules of statutory
construction, we examine the statute in its entirety, rather
than by isolating particular words or phrases. Ragan v.
Woodcroft Village Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 325, 497 S.E.2d 740,
742 (1998); Buonocore v. C&P Tel. Co., 254 Va. 469, 472-73, 492
S.E.2d 439, 441 (1997). The legislature's intent must be
determined from the words used, unless a literal construction of
the statute would yield an absurd result. Ragan, 255 Va. at
325-26, 497 S.E.2d at 742; Abbott v. Willey, 253 Va. 88, 91, 479
S.E.2d 528, 530 (1997); Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc.,
240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990). Therefore, when
the language in a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts
are bound by the plain meaning of that language. Harrison &
Bates, Inc. v. Featherstone Assoc., 253 Va. 364, 368, 484 S.E.2d
883, 885 (1997); Wall v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 252 Va. 156,
159, 475 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1996); Carr v. Forst, 249 Va. 66, 69-
70, 453 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1995).
Code § 8.01-653 provides, in material part:
Whenever the Comptroller or the Treasurer of the
Commonwealth shall notify the Attorney General, in
writing, that they, or either of them, entertain such
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doubt respecting the proper construction or
interpretation of any act of the General Assembly
which appropriates or directs the payment of money out
of the treasury of the Commonwealth, or respecting the
constitutionality of any such act, that they, or
either of them, do not feel that it would be proper or
safe to pay such money until there has been a final
adjudication by the Supreme Court determining any and
all such questions, and that, for such reason, they
will not make payments pursuant to such act until such
adjudication has been made, the Attorney General may
file in such court a petition for a writ of mandamus
directing or requiring the Comptroller or Treasurer of
the Commonwealth, or both, to pay such money as
provided by any such act at such time in the future as
may be proper. . . .The Comptroller and the Treasurer
of the Commonwealth, or either of them, as the case
may be, shall be made a party or parties defendant to
any such petition and the court may, in its
discretion, cause such other officers or persons to be
made parties defendant as it may deem proper. . .
This statutory language is clear and unambiguous. It
authorizes the Attorney General, after being informed by the
Comptroller that he entertains doubt concerning the
constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly requiring
payment of money from the Commonwealth's treasury, to request a
writ of mandamus directing the Comptroller to pay money as
provided by that act. Here, however, the Attorney General
assumes the role of a party defendant by effectively asking us
to direct the Comptroller not to pay money under the challenged
items until the next session of the General Assembly in January
2000.
We agree with the Clerks that this request by the Attorney
General raises a question concerning the subject matter
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jurisdiction of this Court. Subject matter jurisdiction is the
authority granted to a court by constitution or by statute to
adjudicate a class of cases or controversies. Morrison v.
Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169, 387 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1990); see
Ringstaff v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 164 Va. 196, 199, 179
S.E. 66, 67 (1935). The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may
be raised at any time during a proceeding, even by this Court
sua sponte. Garrett v. Majied, 252 Va. 46, 48, 471 S.E.2d 479,
480 (1996); Morrison, 239 Va. at 170, 387 S.E.2d at 756; Thacker
v. Hubard, 122 Va. 379, 386, 94 S.E. 929, 930 (1918).
The present petition plainly exceeds the subject matter
jurisdiction granted to this Court by Code § 8.01-653. The
statute only permits the Attorney General to petition this Court
to seek payment of money that he believes the Comptroller is
improperly withholding. In the present case, the Attorney
General and the Comptroller agree that payment should not be
made on the challenged budget items at the amounts fixed in the
1998 Budget until the next session of the General Assembly
begins. Thus, there is no request before us to direct the
Comptroller to pay money under a contested budget item.
Code § 8.01-653 does not permit the Attorney General to
challenge the constitutionality of an act by adding parties in
the role of petitioners whom he expects will defend that act and
seek payment under it. As provided by the plain language of the
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statute, the only parties who may be joined in such a proceeding
are parties defendant.
We find no merit in the Attorney General's argument that he
has satisfied the requirements of Code § 8.01-653 because he has
asked us to direct the Comptroller to make payment pursuant to
Items 1A6 and 1A8 after the beginning of the next General
Assembly session in January 2000. The Comptroller has not
notified the Attorney General that he doubts the
constitutionality of making payment for these items after that
date. Article IV, § 5 of the Constitution, on which the
Comptroller's doubts are based, relates only to salary increases
for legislators during their current term of office. Thus, the
Attorney General's request that payment be made after the next
legislative term of office begins is not responsive to the
constitutional question posed by the Comptroller, and does not
satisfy the statutory requirement that the Attorney General seek
payment of money authorized by an act that the Comptroller
questions.
For these reasons, we will dismiss the Attorney General's
petition for a writ of mandamus.
Petition dismissed.
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