Present: All the Justices
JANICE E. RAGAN
v. Record No. 970905 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
February 27, 1998
WOODCROFT VILLAGE APARTMENTS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Randall G. Johnson, Judge
The dispositive issue before us is whether an appeal lies
to a circuit court from a general district court’s denial of a
motion for a new trial in an unlawful detainer proceeding.
In 1996, Janice E. Ragan leased an apartment in the City of
Richmond from Woodcroft Village Apartments (Woodcroft). When
Ragan failed to pay her rent due on July 1, 1996, Woodcroft sent
her a written notice, pursuant to Code § 55-225, to pay the rent
and related charges within five days or surrender possession of
the premises. On July 16, 1996, when Ragan still had not paid
the amount due, Woodcroft instituted an unlawful detainer
proceeding against her in the General District Court for the
City of Richmond, seeking accrued rent, costs, fees, and
possession of the leased premises.
Ten days later, prior to the return date on the unlawful
detainer summons, Ragan paid Woodcroft the sum of $247.50, the
entire amount due under the lease. Woodcroft accepted Ragan’s
payment with reservation, in order to preserve its right to seek
possession of the leased premises. See Code § 55-248.34.
When the parties appeared in the general district court on
the unlawful detainer summons, Woodcroft agreed that Ragan had
paid all amounts outstanding under the lease. The general
district court entered judgment awarding Woodcroft possession of
the leased premises. Ragan did not appeal from this judgment.
Ragan filed a motion in the general district court
requesting a new trial on the unlawful detainer summons. She
asserted that the unlawful detainer proceeding was barred by
Code § 55-243 1 because she had paid the amount due Woodcroft and
had not previously been served with an unlawful detainer summons
by Woodcroft in the twelve-month period before the present
unlawful detainer proceeding was instituted. The court denied
the motion on the ground that Ragan had failed to assert this
right at the hearing prior to the entry of final judgment.
1
Code § 55-243 provides, in relevant part:
A. If any party having right or claim to such lands shall, . .
. before the first court return date in an action of unlawful
detainer seeking possession of a residential dwelling based upon
a default in rent, pay or tender to the party entitled to such
rent, or to his attorney in the cause, or pay into court, all
the rent and arrears, along with any reasonable attorney’s fees
and late charges contracted for in a written rental agreement,
interest and costs, all further proceedings in the ejectment or
unlawful detainer shall cease. . . .
B. In cases of unlawful detainer, the tenant may invoke the
rights granted by this section no more than one time during any
twelve-month period of continuous residency in the rental
dwelling unit.
2
Ragan filed a notice of appeal to the circuit court from the
denial of her motion requesting a new trial.
The circuit court assumed, without deciding, that it had
jurisdiction to hear Ragan’s appeal from the general district
court’s denial of her motion requesting a new trial. The
circuit court then held that the general district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Ragan appealed to
this Court from the circuit court’s judgment.
In an assignment of cross-error, Woodcroft argues that the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider Ragan’s appeal
from the general district court’s denial of her motion
requesting a new trial. Woodcroft asserts that, in electing not
to appeal the adverse judgment in the unlawful detainer
proceeding, Ragan had no further right to be heard in the
circuit court. Woodcroft contends that neither Code § 8.01-129
nor Code § 16.1-106 permits an appeal from the denial of a
motion for a new trial in an unlawful detainer action.
In response, Ragan observes that Code § 16.1-106 provides,
in part, for an appeal from “any order entered or judgment
rendered in a court not of record in a civil case in which the
amount in controversy is of greater value than fifty dollars.”
She contends that the general district court’s order denying her
motion for a new trial is an “order” within the meaning of this
statutory language. We disagree with Ragan.
3
In resolving this issue, we consider the provisions of both
Code §§ 8.01-129 and 16.1-106 in the context of the statutory
framework of the appeal process. We accord each statute,
insofar as possible, a meaning that does not conflict with any
other statute. See First Va. Bank v. O’Leary, 251 Va. 308, 312,
467 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1996); Board of Supervisors v. Marshall,
215 Va. 756, 761, 214 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975).
Under fundamental rules of statutory construction, each
statute must be examined in its entirety, rather than by
isolating particular words or phrases. Buonocore v. C&P Tel.
Co., 254 Va. 469, 472-73, 492 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1997); First Va.
Bank, 251 Va. at 312, 467 S.E.2d at 777; Commonwealth Natural
Resources, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 529, 536, 248 S.E.2d
791, 795 (1978). The legislature’s intent must be determined
from the words used, unless a literal construction would yield
an absurd result. Abbott v. Willey, 253 Va. 88, 91, 479 S.E.2d
528, 530 (1997); Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240
Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990). Thus, when the
language employed in a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
courts are bound by the plain meaning of that language. Wall v.
Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 252 Va. 156, 159, 475 S.E.2d 803, 805
(1996); Carr v. Forst, 249 Va. 66, 69-70, 453 S.E.2d 274, 276
(1995).
4
The language of both statutes at issue is clear and
unambiguous. Code § 8.01-129 states, in relevant part, that
“[a]n appeal shall lie from the judgment of a general district
court, [in an unlawful detainer proceeding], to the circuit
court in the same manner and with like effect and upon like
security as appeals taken under the provisions of § 16.1-106 et
seq.” Code § 8.01-129 then states the requirements for
perfecting such an appeal and provides any party a right to a
jury trial in the circuit court. These provisions are
inapplicable to the present case, however, because Ragan did not
appeal from the judgment of the general district court awarding
Woodcroft possession of the leased premises, but appealed only
from the general district court’s denial of her motion for a new
trial. Therefore, we must consider the broader appeal
provisions of Code § 16.1-106 to determine whether Ragan had a
right of appeal from the denial of that motion for a new trial.
Code § 16.1-106, which provides for appeals from general
district courts in civil cases, states in relevant part:
From any order entered or judgment rendered in a court
not of record in a civil case in which the matter in
controversy is of greater value than fifty dollars . .
. or when the case involves the constitutionality or
validity of a statute of the Commonwealth, or of an
ordinance or bylaw of a municipal corporation, or of
the enforcement of rights and privileges conferred by
the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (§ 2.1-340 et
seq.), or of a protective order pursuant to § 19.2-
152.10, there shall be an appeal of right, if taken
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within ten days after such order or judgment, to a
court of record.[ 2 ]
This statute gives the parties a trial de novo in the
circuit court. See Code §§ 16.1-113 and –114.1. The purpose of
this two-tier trial system is to allow a party aggrieved by a
final judgment of the general district court to have the case
tried again by the circuit court as if the case originally had
been instituted there. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tuttle,
208 Va. 28, 32-33, 155 S.E.2d 358, 361 (1967). Such an appeal
is in effect a statutory grant of a new trial, in which the
perfected appeal annuls the judgment of the district court as
completely as if there had been no previous trial. See Gaskill
v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 486, 490, 144 S.E.2d 293, 296 (1965).
If the judgment of the general district court is reversed, the
circuit court is required to enter an order or judgment “as
ought to have been made or given by the judge of the court from
which the appeal was taken.” Code § 16.1-113.
This appeal process, by definition, excludes a trial de
novo of a motion for a new trial because such a motion does not
involve an adjudication of a case as if it originally had been
instituted in the circuit court. See Tuttle, 208 Va. at 32-33,
155 S.E.2d at 361. We also note that, when the General Assembly
2
This language reflects a 1997 amendment in which the only
substantive change is the addition allowing for an appeal from a
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intended to provide in Code § 16.1-106 for an appeal other than
from a final order, it did so expressly, in language allowing an
appeal from a protective order pursuant to Code § 19.2-152.10. 3
Thus, we conclude that, when Code § 16.1-106 refers to an appeal
from “any order entered or judgment rendered in a court not of
record in a civil case in which the matter in controversy is of
greater value than fifty dollars,” this language provides for an
appeal only from final orders or judgments.
The decision denying Ragan’s motion for a new trial was not
a final order or judgment because it did not dispose of the
merits of the unlawful detainer summons. A final order or
judgment is one that disposes of the whole subject of the case
and gives all relief contemplated. Burns v. Equitable Assocs.,
220 Va. 1020, 1028, 265 S.E.2d 737, 742 (1980); Daniels v. Truck
& Equip. Corp., 205 Va. 579, 585, 139 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1964). As
stated above, the final judgment in the unlawful detainer
proceeding was the judgment awarding Woodcroft possession of the
leased premises.
protective order awarded under Code § 19.2-152.10. That
language is not at issue in this appeal.
3
Because Ragan asserts a right of appeal solely under the
language in Code § 16.1-106 allowing an appeal from “any order
entered or judgment rendered in a court not of record in a civil
case in which the matter in controversy is of greater value than
fifty dollars,” we do not address the requirements for an appeal
under the balance of the statute.
7
Since the order denying Ragan’s motion for a new trial was
not a final order or judgment, Ragan’s argument would require us
to interpret the phrase “any order entered or judgment rendered”
as allowing an appeal from any order whatsoever. Such an
interpretation would allow the appeal of countless interlocutory
matters, including orders granting continuances, orders setting
trial dates, orders determining venue, and orders providing for
bills of particulars or the production of documents.
Manifestly, the legislature did not intend such a result.
Therefore, we hold that since Ragan did not appeal from a final
order or judgment of the general district court, the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to hear her appeal.
For these reasons, we will reverse and vacate the circuit
court’s judgment and reinstate the general district court’s
order denying Ragan’s motion for a new trial in the unlawful
detainer proceeding.
Reversed and final judgment.
CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO, with whom JUSTICE COMPTON joins,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority that there is no appeal
from an order of a district court denying a motion for a new
trial in an unlawful detainer case. Under Code § 16.1-97.1, a
litigant in a district court has a statutory right to move for a
new trial. Under Code § 16.1-106, there shall be an appeal of
8
right to a circuit court from any order entered or judgment
rendered in a court not of record in a civil case in which the
matter in controversy is of greater value than fifty dollars.
And under Code § 8.01-129, an appeal shall lie from the judgment
of a general district court in an unlawful detainer case to a
circuit court in the same manner and with like effect and upon
like security as an appeal taken pursuant to the provisions of
Code § 16.1-106.
Nothing in any of these Code sections precludes an appeal
from an order denying a motion for a new trial in an unlawful
detainer case. Indeed, Code § 16.1-106 provides that there
shall be an appeal of right from any order entered or judgment
rendered in a court not of record in a civil case in which the
matter in controversy is of greater value than fifty dollars.
This language is certainly broad enough to include an order
denying a motion for a new trial in an unlawful detainer case.
And I have no trouble in finding that a matter in controversy is
of greater value than fifty dollars when, as here, the matter
involves the right of possession to a subsidized apartment
renting for $154.00 per month.
Nor do I have the concern expressed by the majority that to
adopt my view would allow the appeal of countless interlocutory
matters, including orders granting continuances, orders setting
trial dates, orders determining venue, and orders providing for
9
bills of particulars or the production of documents. Since such
orders relate to matters of procedure, they are not of the
dispositive nature of an order denying a motion for a new trial
and not final in any sense of the word. Hence, they would not
be appealable. On the other hand, motions for new trials
generally relate to matters of substance, and orders denying
such motions possess the attributes of final orders in the sense
that they fully dispose of such substantive matters on the
merits.
Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court had
jurisdiction to hear Janice E. Ragan’s appeal from the order of
the general district court denying her motion for a new trial,
and I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand
the case for further proceedings consistent with the views
expressed in Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. Partnership, 255 Va. ___,
494 S.E.2d ___ (this day decided).
10