Present: All the Justices
BOYD W. GARRETT, ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ESTATE OF JAMES HENRY BROWN
v. Record No. 951833 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
June 7, 1996
CHRISTINE T. MAJIED
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY
William W. Sweeney, Judge
James Henry Brown died intestate on March 7, 1993. On
August 20, 1993, Christine Trent Majied filed a bill of
complaint against Boyd W. Garrett, administrator of Brown's
estate (the Estate), alleging that she was Brown's daughter and
seeking a two-thirds share of Brown's estate under the
provisions of Code §§ 64.1-1 and -11. The Estate filed a
response denying that Brown was Christine's father and that she
was entitled to any portion of his estate. Christine filed a
"motion for paternity testing" requesting that the circuit
court issue an order directing the exhumation of Brown's body
so that the GeneLex Corporation could obtain tissue samples to
perform paternity analysis through DNA testing. The Estate
opposed the motion. Following an ore tenus hearing and
argument of counsel, the trial court entered an order granting
Christine's disinterment motion. We awarded the Estate an
appeal and will reverse the order of the trial court.
On appeal, the Estate asserts that the trial court erred
in ordering the disinterment of Brown's body because the
evidence was insufficient to support her contentions that Brown
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was her putative father and that the samples she sought to
obtain for genetic testing were reliable. Our disposition of
the case, however, does not require us to reach these
assignments of error. The record, briefs, and argument of
counsel show that the parties and the court assumed that the
trial court had jurisdiction to issue an exhumation order
pursuant to Subsection B of Code § 32.1-286. Whether this
subsection authorizes the trial court to order exhumation for
the purpose of paternity analysis is a question of subject
matter jurisdiction which can be raised sua sponte at any time.
Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 170, 387 S.E.2d 753, 756
(1990).
Examination of Code § 32.1-286 in its entirety shows that
Subsection B cannot be read apart from the rest of the statute.
The statute provides the grounds and procedures for the
issuing of an exhumation order under very specific
circumstances. 1 Subsection A authorizes exhumation only when
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Code Section 32.1-286 provides:
A. In any case of death described in subsection A of §
32.1-283, where the body is buried without investigation
by a medical examiner as to the cause and manner of death
or where sufficient cause develops for further
investigation after a body is buried, the Chief Medical
Examiner shall authorize such investigation and shall send
a copy of the report to the appropriate attorney for the
Commonwealth who shall communicate such report to a judge
of the appropriate circuit court. Such judge may order
that the body be exhumed and an autopsy performed thereon
by the Chief Medical Examiner or by an Assistant Chief
Medical Examiner. The pertinent facts disclosed by the
autopsy shall be communicated to the judge who ordered it.
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death was the result of one of the causes listed in Code
§ 32.1-283, such as trauma, injury, or violence or where the
death occurred under any suspicious, unnatural, or unusual
manner. Furthermore, Subsection A restricts exhumation under
this section to circumstances where the Chief Medical Examiner
authorizes investigation of the death. Subsection B provides
the procedural conditions for implementing Subsection A; it
does not create blanket statutory authority to order exhumation
regardless of the reason.
This construction is consistent with the legislative
history of the statute. Prior to 1979, the substance of
Subsection A was part of former Code § 32-31.19. 2 The relevant
provisions did not indicate who could or should file a motion
B. Any party in interest may petition the judge of
the circuit court exercising jurisdiction over the place
of interment and, upon proper showing of sufficient cause,
such judge may order the body exhumed.
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Former Code § 32-31.19 provided in pertinent part:
If, in any case of sudden, violent or suspicious
death, the body is buried without any inquiry by a medical
examiner as to the cause and manner of death, or without
any autopsy being held or performed, it shall be the duty
of the medical examiner, upon being advised of such fact,
to notify the attorney for the Commonwealth thereof, who
shall communicate the same to the judge of the circuit
court, and such judge may, by an order entered in the
common-law order book of his court, require that the body
be exhumed and an autopsy performed thereon by the Chief
Medical Examiner or by a pathologist or toxicologist
designated by him for the purpose, and the pertinent facts
disclosed by the autopsy shall be communicated to the
judge who ordered it, for such action thereon as he, or
the court of which he is judge, deems proper.
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for exhumation, whether the court where the death occurred or
where the interment occurred had jurisdiction to order
exhumation, or if notification of the absence of an autopsy
alone was sufficient to support an exhumation order.
When the section was recodified in 1979, Acts 1979, ch.
711, these issues were clarified by the addition of Subsection
B. It identified the circuit court of the place of interment
as the proper venue for implementing the exhumation authorized
in Subsection A, conferred standing on any interested party to
seek exhumation, and established a "proper showing of
sufficient cause" as the standard of proof required to support
the order of exhumation.
Based on the analysis set out above, we conclude that Code
§ 32.1-286 does not authorize an exhumation order for the
purpose of establishing paternity. Brown's death was not
alleged to have resulted from any cause listed in Code § 32.1-
283, and no medical examiner authorized further investigation
of the circumstances of Brown's death. Therefore, the trial
court was without subject matter jurisdiction to enter an
exhumation order based on Code § 32.1-286. No other ground was
asserted as a basis for the trial court's jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the trial court
and remand the case for further proceedings on the bill of
complaint.
Reversed and remanded.
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