State v. Yeargan

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
(HEARD AT COOKEVILLE)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ( FOR PUBLICATION
(
Plaintiff-Appellee, ( Filed: November 24, 1997
(
(
v. ( Coffee Criminal
(
( Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Sr.,
WAYNE LEE YEARGAN, ( Judge
(
Defendant-Appellant.
FILED ( No. 01S01-9604-CC-00080

November 24, 1997
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
Cecil W. Crowson
John Knox Walkup Appellate Court Clerk Donald E. Dawson
Attorney General & Reporter Bruce, Weathers, Corley,
Nashville, Tennessee Dughman and Lyle
Nashville, Tennessee
Daryl J. Brand
Senior Counsel
Nashville, Tennessee

Clinton J. Morgan
Counsel for the State
Nashville, Nashville, Tennessee

Kimbra R. Spann
Assistant Attorney General
Nashville, Tennessee

C. Michael Layne
District Attorney General
Manchester, Tennessee

Kenneth Shelton
Assistant District Attorney General
Manchester, Tennessee

OPINION

AFFIRMED DROWOTA, J.
 The certified question of law1 presented in this appeal is whether the state

or federal constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated

when the motor vehicle which the defendant was operating was stopped by a city

police officer, who six months earlier, had arrested the defendant for driving under

the influence of an intoxicant and had been present in court when the defendant

was convicted of that offense and his driver’s license revoked for one year.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of

the defendant’s intoxication obtained during the stop, and the Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Because we conclude that the officer’s

decision to stop was based upon reasonable suspicion supported by specific and

articulable facts that the defendant was driving on a revoked license, the judgment

of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On Thursday, January 28, 1993, at approximately 2:20 p.m., Tullahoma

Police Officer Jason Ferrell observed the defendant, Wayne Lee Yeargan, driving

a pickup truck on a public street in Tullahoma. Previously, Officer Ferrell had

1
Rule 37(b)(2)(i), Tenn. R. Crim. P., provides in pertinent part as follows:
(b) An appeal lies from any order or judgment in a criminal
proceeding where the law provides for such appeal, and from any
judg me nt of c onvic tion: (2 ) Upo n a ple a of g uilty or n olo
contendere if: (i) Defendant entered into a plea agreement under
Rule 11(e) but explicitly reserved with the consent of the state and
of the cour t the rig ht to a ppe al a ce rtified ques tion o f law th at is
dispositive of the ca se. . . .

2
Ora l argu me nts w ere h eard in this c ase in Co oke ville, Pu tnam Cou nty, as part o f this
Court’s S .C.A.L.E .S. (Supreme Court Advancing Lega l Education for Students ) project.

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arrested the defendant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and had

been present in the general sessions court approximately six months earlier, on

July 2, 1992, when the defendant pleaded guilty to the offense and had his

driver’s license revoked for one year from the date of the judgment.3

When the officer began following the defendant's truck, Yeargan, according

to the officer's testimony, "sped up some, he wasn't going at a high rate of speed,

but he accelerated." In the officer's view, Yeargan "attempted to put some traffic

between us." The defendant then drove into the parking lot of Ruby’s Lounge, a

local bar. The officer followed and put on his blue lights. The defendant parked

and got out of his truck. The officer asked to see his driver’s license. Yeargan

produced a restricted license issued pursuant to a court order which permitted him

to drive “in Coffee County only as necessary to complete job tasks” between the

hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. The defendant’s employment was listed on the order

granting the restricted license as farming and "rental property owner." The officer

testified that when he asked Yeargan why he had driven to the bar, the defendant

replied that he “had come to the bar to meet a guy about a cow.” Based on his

observations and a field sobriety test, the officer concluded that the defendant was

under the influence of an intoxicant and arrested him for driving under the

influence and driving on a revoked license.

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the

3
The defendant was also fined $250 and sentenced to 11 months and 29 days in jail, which
was su spend ed upo n service of the 48 h our m andato ry period of inc arcera tion.

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stop, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to believe a crime

had been committed when he made the stop because the officer knew of the

procedure for obtaining a restricted license and had no reason to believe that the

defendant was operating outside the scope of his driving privilege. Testifying at

the suppression hearing, the police officer acknowledged that he was aware of the

availability of restricted licenses for driving offenders. However, the officer

testified it would have taken about 15 minutes for the police radio operator to

determine the status of the defendant’s license before the stop.

Upon consideration of the proof, the trial court denied the defendant’s

motion to suppress. Thereafter, the defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the

influence of an intoxicant, second offense,4 and driving a motor vehicle with a

revoked driver’s license,5 but reserved the right to appeal a certified question of

law challenging the constitutionality6 of the traffic stop leading to his arrest and

subsequent convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s

denial of the motion to suppress, finding that "a prudent officer could reasonably

have believed that the appellant was driving on a revoked license" and holding

that the officer had "probable cause to conduct an investigative stop." In reaching

that conclusion, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

4
Tenn. Code A nn. § 55-10-401 (1993).

5
Tenn. Code A nn. § 55-50-504 (1993).

6
We are aware that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-103(b) (Supp. 1996), provides that unless
probable cause exists, only members of the Tennessee highway patrol have the authority to stop a
motor vehicle for the sole purpose of examining or checking the operator license of the driver of the
vehicle. However, since the defendant did not reserve for appeal the statutory legality of the stop,
the e ffec t of tha t statu te is n ot at is sue in this a ppe al.

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1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293

(Tenn. 1992). Thereafter, we granted the defendant permission to appeal and for

the reasons that follow, now affirm the decision of the trial court and Court of

Criminal Appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court recently clarified the standard of review under which a trial

court’s findings of fact on suppression issues are to be reviewed:

Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value
of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are
matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact. The party
prevailing in the trial court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view
of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all
reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence. So long as the greater weight of the evidence supports
the trial court’s findings, those findings shall be upheld. In other
words, a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be
upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. We also note
that this standard of review is consistent with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d),
which provides that in civil cases, findings of fact by a trial court are
presumed correct “unless the preponderance of the evidence is
otherwise.” Hereafter, the proper standard to be applied in reviewing
suppression issues is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The application of the law to the

facts found by the trial court, however, is a question of law which this Court

reviews de novo. Beare Co. v. Tennessee Dept. of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 906,

907 (Tenn. 1993). We apply these standards to resolve the issue in this appeal.

REASONABLE SUSPICION

In this Court, the defendant contends that the investigatory stop was

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unconstitutional because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion, supported

by specific and articulable facts, to believe that the defendant was violating the

law. In support of his claim, the defendant argues that even though the officer

knew the defendant’s license had been revoked six months earlier, the officer was

also aware of the availability of restricted licenses, and therefore, had no reason

to believe the defendant was violating the law by operating an automobile. The

State responds that given the totality of the information known to the officer, the

stop was based upon reasonable suspicion. The State also maintains that the

officer was not required to check the status of the defendant’s license before

initiating the stop.

We begin our analysis of this issue with the text of the Fourth Amendment 7

to the United States Constitution which provides:

Unreasonable searches and seizures. - The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

Similarly, Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee guarantees

that the people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable
searches and seizures; and that general warrants,
whereby an officer may be commanded to search

7
The F ourth Am endm ent is app licable to the s tates throu gh the F ourteen th Am endm ent.
Map p v. O hio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1 081 (1961).

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 suspected places, without evidence of the fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not
named, whose offences are not particularly described
and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty
and ought not to be granted.

The purpose of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under

the Fourth Amendment is to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals

against arbitrary invasions of government officials.” Camara v. Municipal Court,

387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). “[A]rticle I,

section 7 is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment.” State v.

Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997), quoting Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn.

6, 13, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (1968).

Consequently, under both the federal and state constitutions, a warrantless

search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result

thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or

seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the

warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct.

2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 229-30

(Tenn. 1996).

Though it was a temporary detention for a limited purpose, the stop of the

defendant’s vehicle in this case, without question, constitutes a seizure and

implicates the protection of both the state and federal constitutions. Whren v.

United States, ___ U.S. ____,___, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, ___ L.Ed.2d ___

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(1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d

660 (1979); See also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S. Ct. 675,

679, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 n. 3, 101 S. Ct.

42, 44 n. 3, 66 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (When an officer turns on his blue lights, he or

she has clearly initiated a stop). Because it was not conducted pursuant to a

warrant, the investigatory stop was presumptively unreasonable. However, the

lower courts appropriately denied the defendant’s motion to suppress because the

seizure in this case was conducted pursuant to a narrowly defined exception to

the warrant requirement.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889

(1968), the United States Supreme Court applied a balancing test8 to determine

whether the law enforcement practice of “stop and frisk” violated the proscriptions

of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In that case, a police

officer became suspicious of two men who separately and repeatedly walked up

and down a street peering into a store window. After each trek, the men talked to

a third man up the street. The officer, after observing this conduct for a short

8
The balancing test was first applied in Cama ra v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S . 523, 87 S .Ct.
1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). In his concurring opinion, Justice Reid maintains that courts must
engage in “detailed balancing” on a case-by-case basis to determine the constitutionality of an
investigatory stop. That statement indicates a misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of the
balancing test. The balancing test is not a matter for case-by-case application, but rather “a
technique for establishing the quantum of evidence needed for certain distinct kinds of official
action.” Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search & Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment , § 9.1(d),
p.13 (3d ed. W est 199 6); See e.g. Chandler v. Miller, _ U.S. _, _, 117 S.Ct.1295,1301, 137 L.Ed.2d
513 (19 97); Whren , ___ U.S. at __ , 116 S.Ct . at 17 76. W hile ca se-b y-cas e bala ncin g “m ight w ell
be a stimulating exercise in the rarefied atmosphere of an appellate court or law school classroom,
it is clearly asking too muc h to expect policemen to m ake on-the-spot judgm ents in this way or,
indeed, to require trial jud ges to re view police condu ct in this fash ion.” Lafav e, § 9.1(d) , p. 13.
Unlike Justice Reid, we decline to adopt that approach, which is both contrary to well-established
law and unworkable in practice.

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time, followed the suspects, stopped and frisked them, and discovered that two of

them were carrying pistols. Charged with the crime of carrying a concealed

weapon, Terry moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that the stop and

frisk was unconstitutional. Balancing the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment privacy interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental

interests, the Court in Terry determined that the law enforcement practice of a

brief investigatory stop is constitutionally permissible if the officer has a

reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal

offense has been or is about to be committed.9 Id.

Eleven years later in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court concluded that the

same standard applied in the context of investigatory automobile stops. In that

case a police officer on a “roving patrol” aimed at detecting unlicensed drivers

made a suspicionless stop of an automobile. The purpose of the stop was to

9
In his conc urrin g opin ion, J ustic e Re id con clud es th at the stop in this c ase was invalid
under Terry, but constitutionally sound because based upon probable cause. It is well-settled that
“the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obv ious ly less d em and ing th an th at for prob able
cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S . 1, 7-8, 109 S.Ct. 158 1, 1585, 1 04 L.Ed .2d 1 (19 89).
Therefore, Justice Reid’s conclusion is legally inconsistent and is a result of his erroneous holding
that a constitutionally valid investigatory stop requires not only reasonable suspicion, but also
“exigent circumstances .” Contrary to Justice Reid’s concurring opinion, neither Terry nor its
progeny articulate a second “exigent circumstances” requirement. Indeed, the phrase, “exigent
circumstances” is itself a term of art which denotes an independent exception to the warrant
requirem ent of the F ourth Am endm ent. The cases cited by Jus tice Reid d o not sup port his ho lding.
In State v. Pully , 863 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. 1993), the police officer initiated the investigatory stop upon
an anonymous informant’s tip that a person was driving through a neighborhood threatening
residents with a gun. To justify police action under Tennessee law an informant’s tip must be
reliable, whic h require s a sho wing of b oth the info rma nt’s credib ility and basis of know ledge. State
v. Jac um in, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989). This Court in Pully simply held that when a threat
of impending violence is involved the legal test of reliability of an anonymous informant’s tip need
not be strictly enforced. Since the stop in this case was not initiated as a result of an anonymous
inform ant’s tip, Pully is inapplicab le and do es not s upport J ustice R eid’s con clusion tha t Terry
articulated an “exigent circumstances” requirement. Moreover, Justice Reid’s assertion that our
holding “would allow the detention and at least a patdown search of any person suspected of
possessing illegal drugs or other contraband” is erroneous . A frisk is warranted under Terry only if
the police officer has a reasonable suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts that the
suspe ct is arm ed. Id., 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883.

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check the driver’s license and registration. The officer stopped Prouse’s

automobile because he “saw the car in the area and wasn’t answering any

complaints. . . .” Id., 440 U.S. at 651, 99 S.Ct. at 1394. When the officer

approached the car, he smelled marijuana and thereafter seized the marijuana,

which was in plain view on the floor of the car. In concluding that the

suspicionless, random stop was unconstitutional, the Prouse court described the

balancing test as follows:

The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the
Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of
‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by
government officials, including law enforcement
agents, in order to safeguard the privacy and security
of individuals against arbitrary invasions. Thus, the
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice
is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interest against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests. Implemented in this
manner, the reasonableness standard usually
requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which an
intrusion is based be capable of measurement against
an objective standard, whether this be probable cause
or a less stringent test. [footnote citing Terry] In those
situations in which the balance of interests precludes
insistence upon some quantum of individualized
suspicion, other safeguards are generally relied upon
to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation
of privacy is not subject to the discretion of the official
in the field.

Id., 440 U.S. at 653-54, 99 S.Ct. at 1396 (emphasis added)(internal citations and

quotations omitted). Utilizing that test, the Prouse Court held “that except in those

situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a

motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the

vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping

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an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his license and the

registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”

Id., 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401 (emphasis added). Prouse, therefore,

stands for the proposition that investigatory stops based upon reasonable

suspicion that a driver is unlicensed are constitutionally permissible.10 See also

Chandler v. Miller, __ U.S. __, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1298, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997)(The

Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures

“generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent individualized

suspicion.”); See also Griffin v. State, 604 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tenn. 1980); State v.

McCullough, 906 S.W.2d 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Likewise, in Watkins, this Court upheld the constitutionality of an

investigatory stop of a motor vehicle and the ensuing search, where the stop was

based upon reasonable suspicion. Id., 827 S.W.2d at 294. In that case, the

officer initiating the stop had personal knowledge that a capias had been issued

for the defendant’s arrest. Other officers also had informed the arresting officers

that the defendant often drove a black Cadillac inscribed with the words, “The

Duke.” When the officers observed a car matching that description, they “decided

10
Justice Reid maintains that our interpretation is inconsistent with the language of Prouse.
He quotes the following sentence from that case: “We hold only that persons in automobiles on
public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with the
unbridled discretion of police officers.” In fact, that language supports our interpretation. The stop
in Prouse was completely random and not based upon any level of individualized suspicion. The
police officer’s discretion was unbridled. It was the absence of reasonable suspicion which
invalidated th e stop, no t the abse nce of e xigent circ ums tances . See also Hu ghes v. S tate, 588
S.W.2d 296 (Tenn. 1979) However, where, as here, an investigatory stop is initiated upon a
reasonable suspicion that a driver is unlicensed, the police officer is not exercising unbridled
disc retion , and the s top is cons titution al.

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to stop the vehicle and investigate the identity of the driver.” Id., 827 S.W.2d at

295. After stopping the car, asking for a driver’s license, and learning that the

defendant had none, the officers called in by radio to verify the continuing viability

of the capias. Id. The capias was verified and the officers arrested the defendant

and searched the vehicle. Considering the totality of the circumstances this Court

refused to suppress the evidence discovered during the search, holding that the

initial stop was constitutionally valid because it was based upon reasonable

suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, “that the defendant was the

driver of the vehicle and that he was the person wanted on the outstanding

capias.” Id., 827 S.W.2d at 295.

In so holding, we observed that a court must consider the totality of the

circumstances when evaluating whether a police officer’s reasonable suspicion is

supported by specific and articulable facts. Id., 827 S.W.2d at 294; United State v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

Circumstances relevant to that evaluation include, but are not limited to, the

officer’s personal objective observations, information obtained from other police

officers or agencies, information obtained from citizens, and the pattern of

operation of certain offenders. A court must also consider the rational inferences

and deductions that a trained officer may draw from the facts and circumstances

known to him. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d at 294; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at

695; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.

The officer, of course, must be able to articulate
something more than an inchoate and unparticularized

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 suspicion or hunch. The Fourth Amendment requires
some minimal level of objective justification for making
the stop. That level of suspicion is considerably less
than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the
evidence. We have held that probable cause means a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found and the level of suspicion required for a
Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for
probable cause.

Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (emphasis added)(internal citations

and quotations omitted).

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard
than probable cause not only in the sense that
reasonable suspicion can be established with
information that is different in quantity or content than
that required to establish probable cause, but also in
the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable than that required to
show probable cause.

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301

(1990); State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tenn. 1993); Cf. Peters v. New York,

392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968)(companion case to Terry in

which the Court held it was unnecessary to discuss reasonable suspicion since

the officer had probable cause for the arrest).

Moreover, the availability of other less intrusive investigatory techniques is

not relevant to the constitutional validity of an officer’s decision to initiate the

investigatory stop, if an investigatory stop is based upon specific and articulable

facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion. Indeed, the United States Supreme

Court in Sokolow expressly rejected the notion that law enforcement officials are

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obligated to use the least intrusive means to verify or dispel their suspicions. “The

reasonableness of the officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the

availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.” Id., 490 U.S. at 11, 109

S.Ct. at 1581. 11 In Watkins, this Court implicitly rejected that argument by

upholding the stop even though the police officers did not verify the capias until

after the automobile was stopped and the defendant identified.

Considering the totality of the circumstances of this case in light of the well-

settled principles of law set forth above, we conclude that the officer’s decision to

initiate the investigatory stop was based upon reasonable suspicion, supported by

specific and articulable facts, that the defendant was driving on a revoked license.

The officer had previously arrested Yeargan, so he was acquainted with the

defendant and could identify the defendant by sight. In addition, the officer had

personal knowledge that Yeargan’s driver’s license had been revoked for a period

of one year, and that only six months had passed since the revocation. When the

officer observed Yeargan driving the automobile, therefore, he had a reasonable

suspicion based upon articulable and specific facts that Yeargan was committing

a criminal offense, driving on a revoked license. Prouse, supra; McCullough,

supra; Roberson v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Co., 56 Tenn. App. 729,

412 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tenn. App. 1966) (police officer who arrests a man for

drunk driving and testifies at trial against the man who was convicted and whose

11
Jus tice R eid’s a sse rtion th at the availa bility of le ss int rusiv e inve stiga tory m ean s sh ould
be con sidered by courts e valuating th e cons titutionality of investiga tory stops is directly contra ry to
Sokolow.

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license was revoked for one year, may arrest him when he observes the man

driving the following day). Contrary to the defendant’s assertions, the officer had

no constitutional obligation to verify the status of the defendant’s license before

making the stop. Indeed, the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques

does not vitiate the constitutional validity of a stop which is supported by

reasonable suspicion.

CONCLUSION

In his concurring opinion Justice Reid contends that the investigatory stop

in this case was invalid because it was not supported by exigent circumstances as

well as reasonable suspicion. Rather than embarking on a path fraught with

unknown consequences, we adhere to the well-settled principle of law, that to be

constitutionally valid under either the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 7, a

brief investigatory stop simply must be based upon reasonable suspicion which is

supported by specific and articulable facts. Because the investigatory stop in this

case was based upon reasonable suspicion, it was valid under both the federal

and state constitutions. Accordingly, the lower courts properly refused to

suppress the evidence of intoxication derived from field sobriety tests and the

officer’s personal observation of the defendant after the stop. The judgment of the

Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s

motion to suppress is affirmed.

______________________________
FRANK F. DROWOTA III,

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 JUSTICE

Concur:
Anderson, C.J.,
Birch, J, and O’Brien, Sp.J..

Separate Opinion Concurring in Results
Reid, J.

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