Johnson v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bumgardner and Frank
Argued at Salem, Virginia

BARNEY JOHNSON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1462-00-3 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
DECEMBER 23, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RUSSELL COUNTY
Donald A. McGlothlin, Jr., Judge

David B. Hargett (Hargett & Watson, on brief), for appellant.

Josephine F. Whalen, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General; H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.

Barney Johnson (appellant) was convicted by a jury of two counts of distributing

morphine, in violation of Code § 18.2-248, and one count of conspiracy to distribute morphine,

in violation of Code § 18.2-256. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying a

cautionary instruction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. We find the

accomplice’s testimony was corroborated, thus we affirm the convictions.

BACKGROUND

Bonnie Gay Ray was a drug addict. In June of 1996, she had a conversation with

appellant, who told her “he had some morphine to get rid of.” Ray agreed to help appellant sell

the drugs. Appellant explained he wanted $35 per pill and instructed Ray to get the money from

buyers “up front.” He said she could charge “a little bit more” than $35 to make a profit for

herself.1 Appellant also explained that Ray should call him when she had a buyer. She then

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She charged $40 per pill.
could come to his house on Big A Mountain. If she had no vehicle, he would pick her up. They

agreed on three potential places for meetings. Once she called him and told him how many

“grapes” (the street slang for morphine pills) she needed, they would agree on a meeting place.

Appellant would say nothing when they met.

Ray explained at trial that, while she was getting the drugs from appellant, the buyer

would wait for her somewhere in town because appellant insisted that the buyer “wasn’t close

by” when they met. Ray frequently met appellant in front of the old Puff and Snuff store in

Honaker. This arrangement between them continued until Ray was incarcerated on August 25,

1999. She averaged about 50 sales per month.

Ray knew Steve Ball through their prior drug dealings. Ray testified that in the evening

on May 31, 1998, Steve and Judy Ball talked to her in her driveway and asked if she had any

“grapes” to sell. She told them that it was too late for her to obtain the drugs that night, asking

Steve to “get up with me the next day.” He asked her, “what about BJ’s,” referring to appellant.

Ray replied, “it’s too late of the night to go get any.”

The next morning, Ray and her daughter, Patricia, met Steve and Judy at “the old Puff

and Snuff.” While Ray was on the phone with appellant discussing a different drug transaction,

Patricia walked over to talk with the Balls, who indicated they still wanted morphine. Patricia

demanded the money “up front,” and Steve gave her cash for two morphine pills. Patricia then

walked over to her mother, who had finished her telephone conversation with appellant. Ray

said she needed a dime to call appellant again, and the Balls gave a dime to Patricia. Ray again

telephoned appellant to tell him that she needed additional pills. Appellant told her he would be

there in “a few minutes.” Ray then told the Balls to meet her at the post office. She and Patricia

waited for appellant at Puff and Snuff.

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 Appellant arrived in his blue S-10 pickup truck, picked up Ray and Patricia in front of the

old Puff and Snuff, and they drove off towards the Coastal Mart. Ray gave appellant $350, and

appellant gave her ten morphine pills. Appellant then drove Ray and her daughter to the Wicker

Manna parking lot, dropped them off, and left. Ray gave the morphine pills to the Balls, who

were waiting for her in front of the post office. Ray then saw appellant drive back in the

direction of Big A Mountain.

On the evening of June 3, 1998, the Balls again went to Ray’s home asking for morphine.

Ray replied she would have to make a telephone call and asked the Balls to drive her to a

telephone. The Balls drove her to the Wicker Manna where Ray called appellant. He did not

answer his telephone. Ray returned to the car, waited a few minutes, and called appellant again.

When he answered, she asked him for two morphine tablets. He said he would be there in fifteen

or twenty minutes and instructed her to wait at the Little General, a gas station/convenience

store. Ray went to that location with the Balls. Steve handed Ray a $100 bill and asked for two

morphine pills.

Ray waited for appellant while the Balls were “cruising back and forth.” Appellant

arrived at the Little General fifteen to twenty minutes after the call. He drove through the area

for pumping gas, picked up Ray, and then drove towards Big A Mountain. Again, appellant

drove the same blue pickup truck. They drove “all the way around until he brought [her] back

down in town.” Ray got out of the truck at the Little General store and watched appellant drive

off in the direction of Big A Mountain, towards his home.

Ray waited in front of a bank until the Balls arrived. She got into their car and was about

to hand Steve two morphine tablets in a napkin, when Steve asked her to put them in cellophane

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instead of the napkin, which she did. Ray also gave Steve $20 in change from his purchase. The

Balls then took her home.

Steve testified he was working as a confidential informant for the Russell County

Sheriff’s Department in the spring of 1998. He knew Ray because he had bought drugs from her

in the past. On the evening of May 31, 1998, under the supervision of Investigator Watson of the

Russell County Sheriff’s Department, he drove to Ray’s parents’ home. She walked to his car,

and Steve asked her whether she had any morphine. Ray indicated it was too late to get the drug,

and that “BJ,” referring to appellant, had already gone to bed.

The next day, Steve and his wife met Investigators Watson and Wolfe. The police

searched them, debriefed them, provided them with four $20 bills to purchase the drugs, and

gave them an audiocassette recorder to record the transaction. The Balls then left the staging

area with the two officers following them. They drove to the Puff and Snuff, where they saw

Ray using the telephone. Her daughter, Patricia, walked over to Steve’s window, asked if he was

“still looking,” and then asked for the money “up front.” Steve gave her four $20 bills for two

pills. Ray told him to drive to the post office parking lot. As he started to leave, Patricia said she

needed a dime to make a phone call, and Steve gave her the coin. Steve saw Ray make another

telephone call. He then drove to the post office.

Steve testified that, after they left the Puff and Snuff, he saw appellant drive up to the

Puff and Snuff in a dark blue S-10 Chevrolet pickup truck with a red door on the driver’s side.

He came south on Route 80 from the Big A Mountain area, picked up both women, and then

drove south towards the Coastal Mart. They returned and drove into the Wicker Manna parking

lot. The women got out, and appellant drove off in the direction of Big A Mountain. Ray and

Patricia then approached the Balls’ car. Ray handed Steve two morphine tablets, and he and his

wife left. The Balls drove to the staging location, where Steve gave the morphine, the cassette

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recorder, and the tape of the transaction to the police officers. The officers searched Steve, his

wife, and the car again.

On the evening of June 3, 1998, the Balls again met with Investigators Watson and Wolfe

at the same staging area and were again searched, as was their car. They were given a tape, a

cassette recorder, and a $100 bill. The Balls then drove to Ray’s home and told Ray that they

wanted two “grapes.” She said they would have to give her a ride into town to make a telephone

call. They drove Ray to a pay telephone at the old Puff and Snuff. She called appellant, but got

no answer. They then drove through town looking for appellant. They returned to Puff and

Snuff where Ray again telephoned appellant. This time he answered his telephone and told Ray

to wait fifteen or twenty minutes for him to arrive. Ray then asked the Balls to drop her off at

the Little General Store. Steve gave Ray the $100 bill.

Approximately ten or fifteen minutes later, the Balls saw appellant drive up in the same

blue pickup truck. He came from the direction of Big A Mountain. He circled around the gas

tanks, stopped, and Ray got into his truck. The Balls continued to drive around town. When

they saw Ray again, she was in the bank parking lot. The Balls stopped their car, and Ray got in.

She handed Steve two morphine pills wrapped in a napkin. Steve asked her to put them in a

cellophane pack, which she did, and Steve placed them in his pocket. Ray gave Steve $20, and

then the Balls drove her home. After that, the Balls returned to the staging area and gave the

officers the pills, the money, and the recording. The officers searched the Balls and their car

again, and they left.

The tape recordings made on June 1 and June 3 by Steve were played for the jury.

Lieutenant William Watson was a narcotics investigator for the Russell County Sheriff’s

Office. He testified that, in the spring of 1998, Steve Ball agreed to work as a confidential

informant with the sheriff’s office. On May 31, 1998, Lieutenant Watson and Officer Wolfe met

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the Balls at a staging area. After Officer Wolfe searched the Balls and their car, Watson gave

them a small recorder and money to buy drugs. The police then followed the Balls as they drove

to Ray’s parents’ home. The Balls returned to the staging area, having been unable to purchase

drugs.

The next day, Watson and Wolfe again met with the Balls at the same staging location.

After the same search procedure, they gave Steve four $20 bills and a cassette recorder. Watson

and Wolfe then followed the Balls as they drove to the Puff and Snuff. Watson saw Ray and

Patricia near a pay phone. He then saw Patricia approach the Balls’ car. The officers saw her

walk away from the car and back to Ray at the pay telephone. Patricia approached the Balls’ car

again. Watson then saw the Balls drive over to the post office parking lot while Ray and Patricia

remained near the pay phone.

A short time later, Watson saw a blue S-10 pickup truck with a red door, coming from the

direction of Big A Mountain, drive into the parking lot near the pay telephone. Appellant was

driving. Ray and Patricia got into the truck, and it drove away. A few minutes later, Watson

saw the truck and the same three occupants return and drive into the parking lot of the Wicker

Manna restaurant. Ray and her daughter exited appellant’s truck. He then drove back toward

Big A Mountain.

Watson then saw Ray approach the Balls’ vehicle. Ray reached inside the car window

“as if handing something to” Steve. Watson then saw Ray and Patricia walk back towards the

pay phone. The Balls left and returned to the staging area. Once there, Steve handed Watson

“some small tablets,” the cassette recorder, and the tape.

On the evening of June 3, 1998, Investigator Watson met with the Balls at the same

staging area. After the Balls and their vehicle were searched, Watson gave Steve a $100 bill and

a recording device. The Balls then drove to Ray’s residence as the officers followed them. The

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officers watched the Balls drive up the road to Ray’s residence. A few minutes later, Watson

saw them drive back past the officers and drive to the pay phone in front of the Puff and Snuff.

Ray exited the Balls’ car and made a telephone call. Watson saw Ray get back into the Balls’

car. The Balls and Ray drove towards Big A Mountain, but stopped in a parking lot near the

Little General. Ray exited the car. Watson saw the Balls driving back and forth through the

town after they left Ray in the parking lot.

Twenty-three minutes later, appellant arrived at the Little General store in the same blue

pickup truck. Ray entered appellant’s truck. Appellant then drove toward Big A Mountain.

About two minutes later, Watson saw the truck return. Appellant dropped Ray off and drove

back toward Big A Mountain. Ray then walked down the street just beyond the Little General.

The Balls approached her, and Ray got into their car.

The Balls’ car returned to the staging area, without Ray. The Balls and their vehicle were

searched. Steve handed Watson two morphine tablets and the cassette recorder.

Investigator Wolfe’s testimony was substantially the same as Officer Watson’s. Neither

officer observed appellant give drugs to Ray.

During his testimony at trial, appellant denied seeing Ray in June of 1998. He also

denied any agreement with Ray to sell drugs. He claimed Ray and her daughter were not in his

truck during June of 1998. He testified he was “set up” by the police, the Balls, and Ray. While

admitting he owned a 1991 S-10 blue pickup truck, he denied the truck had a red door in June of

1998.

At the conclusion of the evidence, appellant offered an instruction advising the jury to

consider Ray’s uncorroborated testimony with great care. The instruction further cautioned the

jury “as to the danger of convicting the defendant upon the uncorroborated testimony of an

accomplice.” After argument by counsel, the trial court refused the instruction, finding the

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testimony of the two police officers and Steve Ball provided sufficient corroboration of Ray’s

testimony.

ANALYSIS

The sole issue on appeal is whether the additional evidence at trial provided sufficient

corroboration of Ray’s testimony. If Ray’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated, then the

trial court did not err in refusing the cautionary instruction offered by appellant. Appellant

contends no evidence corroborated Ray’s testimony that appellant conspired with her to sell

morphine or that appellant gave the drugs to Ray. Essentially, appellant maintains no one saw

Ray receive the drugs from appellant, thus, no independent evidence of the offenses was offered.

In Dillard v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 820, 224 S.E.2d 137 (1976), Dillard argued the

trial court should have granted an instruction on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. He

claimed corroboration must constitute independent evidence, supporting the ultimate fact that the

accused committed the offense. The Supreme Court explained:

In Virginia, the jury, if satisfied of guilt, may convict an accused
upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Blount v.
Commonwealth, 213 Va. 807, 810, 195 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1973).
Where accomplice testimony is uncorroborated, however, it is the
duty of the court to warn the jury against the danger of convicting
upon such uncorroborated testimony. Jones v. Commonwealth,
111 Va. 862, 868, 69 S.E. 953, 955 (1911). This warning is
required because the source of accomplice testimony is tainted
with the temptation to exculpate oneself by laying the crime upon
another. Largin v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 318, 319, 208 S.E.2d
775, 776 (1974).

But where accomplice testimony is corroborated, it is not error to
refuse a cautionary instruction. Clinton v. Commonwealth, 204
Va. 275, 283, 130 S.E.2d 437, 443 (1963), rev’d on other grounds,
377 U.S. 158 (1964).

* * * * * * *

With the usual instruction, the test in determining whether it
should be granted is: does the evidence support the instruction?
Cautionary accomplice instructions, however, deal with a lack of

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 evidence, evidence of a corroborative nature. The test, therefore,
in determining whether a cautionary instruction should be granted
becomes this: is corroborative evidence lacking? If it is, the
instruction should be granted; if it is not lacking, the instruction
should be refused, because to warn a jury against accepting
uncorroborated testimony is to indicate that the court does not
consider the testimony corroborated.

Id. at 821-22, 224 S.E.2d at 138-39. The Court continued, explaining the standard for

determining whether other evidence at trial corroborated an accomplice’s testimony:

The defendant argues that we did adopt the rigid “ultimate fact”
standard in Jones v. Commonwealth, supra, 111 Va. 862, 869, 69
S.E. at 955, when we said, “[T]he corroboration or confirmation
must relate to some fact (or facts) which goes to establish the guilt
of the accused.” We believe this is the proper standard, but it is
not as rigid as the “ultimate fact” test. The corroborative evidence,
standing alone, need not be sufficient either to support a conviction
or to establish all the essential elements of an offense. If those
were the requirements, and the Commonwealth had at hand
independent evidence sufficient to satisfy them, then the need to
use accomplice testimony would not arise.

Id. at 823, 224 S.E.2d at 139-40 (emphasis in original).

The facts in the instant case are very similar to those in Crosby v. Commonwealth, 132

Va. 518, 110 S.E. 270 (1922). Crosby was charged with the illegal sale of liquor. Id. at 519, 110

S.E. at 271. The accomplice testified Crosby sold him the half-pint of whiskey that he possessed

when he was arrested, moments after the purchase, for the unlawful transportation of illegal

whiskey. Id. A police officer testified that he observed the accomplice enter Crosby’s house,

remain there for several minutes, and then walk down the street. Id. The officer also observed

Crosby looking out the window just prior to the accomplice entering the house. Id. No one saw

the accused sell the whiskey to the accomplice. The Supreme Court found the accomplice’s

testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the officer’s testimony. Id. at 520, 110 S.E. at 271.

Richards v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 1, 46 S.E.2d 1 (1948), is also instructive. Richards,

the owner of a restaurant, was charged with selling beer without a license. The accomplice

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testified he entered the restaurant and purchased eight bottles of beer from Richards. Id. at 2, 46

S.E.2d at 1. The accomplice then joined his companion, Mrs. Segar, in a cabin about thirty yards

from the restaurant, bringing with him two bottles of beer. Id. Mrs. Segar testified the

accomplice entered the restaurant without beer and “later he went from the restaurant to the

cabin with the bottles of beer in his possession.” Id. at 4, 46 S.E.2d at 2. Again, no evidence

corroborated the specific fact that Richards sold beer to the accomplice. The Supreme Court

found, “The occasion and the opportunity for the crime, as well as the possession of the beer,

were established by testimony other than that emanating from the alleged accomplice, hence the

accused was not convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of his accomplice.” Id.

Both Crosby and Richards illustrate that a trial court can refuse an instruction on

uncorroborated accomplice testimony even in the absence of direct evidence of the essential

element of an offense. Thus, we must determine whether the corroboration of the two police

officers and Ball “relate to some fact (or facts) which goes to establish the guilt of the accused.”

Dillard, 216 Va. at 823, 224 S.E.2d at 139-40 (emphasis omitted). Stated differently, does such

corroborative testimony “tend to connect the accused with the crime, sufficient to warrant the

jury in crediting the truth of the accomplice’s testimony.” Id. at 823, 224 S.E.2d at 140. Here,

we answer that question affirmatively.

First, we find the essential elements of the conspiracy charge were sufficiently

corroborated. The essential elements of conspiracy are clear:

Virginia case law is replete with judicial analysis of what elements
are necessary to constitute a conspiracy.

In order to convict the defendant of conspiring . . . to
distribute a controlled drug, the Commonwealth had to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an agreement existed
between the two men by some concerted action to
distribute the drugs.

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 Reed v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 593, 594, 194 S.E.2d 746 (1973).

* * * * * * *

Conspiracy is a crime that possesses both an actus reus and a mens
rea element. Conspiracy requires:

(1) an agreement between two or more persons, which
constitutes the act; and (2) an intent to thereby achieve a
certain objective which, under the common law definition,
is the doing of either an unlawful act or a lawful act by
unlawful means.

W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 461 (1972). “The
agreement is the essence of the conspiracy offense.” Zuniga v.
Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 523, 527-28, 375 S.E.2d 381, 384
(1988).

Fortune v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 643, 646-47, 406 S.E.2d 47, 48-49 (1991) (ellipsis in

original).

Investigator Watson and Steve Ball corroborated Ray’s testimony that a conspiracy to sell

drugs existed between her and appellant. When Steve made a purchase of morphine, he had to

pay “up front,” a condition that Ray testified was imposed by appellant. Both Watson and Steve

observed Ray making phone calls, and then appellant arriving to pick her up. Steve testified he

had to drive around until Ray came back with the morphine, the procedure Ray testified

appellant told her to follow. Ray would not sell the drug to Steve until she met with appellant.

Both men observed appellant with Ray immediately prior to the two drug transactions. This

evidence corroborated both that an agreement existed between at least two people and that those

two people intended to distribute morphine.

The evidence also corroborated the distribution charges. “Code § 18.2-248 prohibits and

makes unlawful the distribution of a controlled substance. See generally Andrews v.

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 179, 182, 217 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1975) (stating that to establish

distribution of a controlled substance, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant knew

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the nature and character of the materials he was charged with distributing).” Austin v.

Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 124, 129, 531 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2000). The evidence here was

sufficient to corroborate Ray’s testimony that appellant distributed controlled drugs.

The following facts regarding the June 1 sale were corroborated by evidence at trial: the

locations where the distribution occurred; the two phone calls; the amount of money paid “up

front”; appellant picking up Ray and delivering her back to Wicker Manna; the description of

appellant’s vehicle; Patricia’s participation; the tablets given to Steve were morphine; and the

direction of appellant’s travel. Essentially, the police and Steve corroborated all aspects of Ray’s

testimony, except for the “ultimate fact” that appellant actually handed the pills to Ray. The

same corroboration was provided regarding the June 3 sale: the two phone calls; the locations

where events occurred; the amount of money Steve gave to Ray “up front”; the fifteen to twenty

minutes appellant said it would take him to arrive; appellant’s travel route; the description of the

truck; appellant’s meeting with Ray; the type of drug; and the type of packaging.

We conclude the additional testimony and the tape recordings provided ample

corroboration of the statements in Ray’s testimony which “tended to connect” appellant to the

offenses charged. The trial court did not err in refusing to give the cautionary instruction on

uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

Affirmed.

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