COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Annunziata, Frank and Senior Judge Bray
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
SHERMAN L. WILSON, S/K/A
SHERMAN LEE WILSON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0229-02-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
APRIL 8, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK
Westbrook J. Parker, Judge
Timothy E. Miller, Public Defender (Kaaren K.
Jurack, Assistant Public Defender, on brief),
for appellant.
H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney
General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Sherman L. Wilson (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial
for driving after being declared an habitual offender, a second or
subsequent offense, in violation of Code § 46.2-357. On appeal,
he contends the Commonwealth failed to prove the requisite prior
conviction. We disagree and affirm the trial court.
BACKGROUND
In accordance with well established principles, "'we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
therefrom.'" Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492
S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted).
Viewed accordingly, the evidence established that Virginia
State Trooper J.S. Copenhaver effected a traffic stop of a
vehicle operated by defendant. A routine "run" of defendant's
"criminal . . . or traffic history" and "DMV transcript" by
Copenhaver disclosed that defendant had been previously
adjudicated an habitual offender and twice convicted of
operating a vehicle in violation of the related order.
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the DMV transcript,
which reported the prior convictions, and a certified copy of
the warrant charging one such offense, "driv[ing] a motor
vehicle . . . after having been found to be an habitual
offender," committed on October 19, 1999, in the City of
Chesapeake. The warrant clearly recites that defendant appeared
before the Chesapeake General District Court, accompanied by
counsel, and entered a plea of "guilty." However, the face of
the warrant fails to memorialize a finding of guilt by the judge
of the general district court, although defendant was sentenced
to sixty days in jail, with forty-five days suspended, together
with a fine.
Challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant
maintained that neither the warrant nor the DMV record proved
the predicate prior conviction for a violation of Code
§ 46.2-357. The trial court, however, noting defendant's plea
of guilty to the offense alleged in the warrant, "driv[ing] a
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motor vehicle . . . after having been found to be an habitual
offender," and a sentence consistent with such offense, found
the evidence sufficient to convict. Defendant now appeals to
this Court.
ANALYSIS
"A court speaks through its orders and those orders are
presumed to accurately reflect what transpired." McBride v.
Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 30, 35, 480 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1997).
Thus, when an accused collaterally attacks a prior conviction in
a subsequent trial, "the Commonwealth is entitled to a
presumption of regularity which attends the prior conviction
. . . '"till the contrary appears."'" Nicely v. Commonwealth,
25 Va. App. 579, 584, 490 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1997) (citation
omitted).
Code § 19.2-307 requires "a court not of record . . . to
memorialize its judgment by setting forth '[the] plea, [the
court's] verdict or findings and the adjudication and
sentence.'" McBride, 24 Va. App. at 34-35, 480 S.E.2d at 128
(citing Code § 19.2-307; see Bellinger v. Commonwealth, 23
Va. App. 471, 474, 477 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1996)). Accordingly, in
McBride, this Court reversed a conviction for a second violation
of Code § 18.2-266 based upon a warrant that "fail[ed] to state
that the court found [the accused] guilty" of the alleged prior
offense, a circumstance that rebutted the presumption of
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regularity and, absent "other evidence to indicate" the intent
of the district court, resulted in a failure of proof. Id. at
35, 480 S.E.2d at 128.
Significantly, however, unlike McBride, defendant entered a
plea of guilty to the warrant in issue.
"[A] voluntary and intelligent plea of
guilty by an accused is, in reality, a
self-supplied conviction authorizing
imposition of the punishment fixed by law."
A guilty plea "is an admission . . . of a
solemn character. . . . [I]t is competent
evidence against him. . . . [I]t is evidence
of each and every element needed to
constitute the offense admitted as a crime."
Rose v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 728, 735-36, 561 S.E.2d 46, 50
(2002) (citations omitted). Thus, defendant's plea constituted
an unequivocal admission of the crime, a "self-supplied
conviction." Moreover, the resulting sentence comported with
the prescribed punishment for the offense, providing additional
evidence of the conviction.
"While 'the most efficient way to prove the prior . . .
conviction is to offer in evidence an authenticated copy of the
prior order or conviction,' the prior conviction may be proven
by any competent evidence." McBride, 24 Va. App. at 33-34, 480
S.E.2d at 128 (citations omitted). Our review of the instant
record discloses such other "competent evidence" sufficient to
prove the previous conviction, notwithstanding the absence of a
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finding of guilt appearing on the warrant and the attendant
"presumption of regularity."
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
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