COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Humphreys
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
WARREN M. COUNCILL
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1053-01-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
MARCH 12, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG
AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY
Samuel Taylor Powell, III, Judge
H. Woodrow Crook for appellant.
Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
(Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Warren M. Councill (appellant) was convicted in a bench
trial of driving under the influence of alcohol, a misdemeanor,
in violation of Code § 18.2-266. On appeal, he contends the
trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the warrant.
Appellant claims the campus police officer had no jurisdiction
to arrest appellant on non-campus property. For the reasons
stated, we affirm appellant's conviction.
BACKGROUND
On the evening of October 6, 2000, J.R. Hazelwood, a campus
police officer for the College of William and Mary, was sitting
in his vehicle on Stadium Drive on the William and Mary campus.
He observed appellant leave a delicatessen across the street
from the campus and drive out of a lighted parking lot onto
Richmond Road without activating his headlights. Appellant then
drove north on Richmond Road, a public highway immediately
adjacent to the campus. The officer followed appellant down
Richmond Road.
When he realized his headlights were off, appellant turned
his headlights on and made a right turn off of Richmond Road.
He then stopped for Officer Hazelwood, who had activated his
emergency equipment. Appellant was never on the campus of
William and Mary.
Appellant filed a motion "to quash the warrant" and
"suppress the evidence resulting from an unlawful arrest,"
arguing the arrest was unlawful because it occurred outside the
jurisdiction of the campus police officer. The Commonwealth's
attorney and defense attorney stipulated that the campus police
officer's jurisdiction for a stop or arrest was controlled by
Code § 23-234(i).
The trial court denied the motion and convicted appellant
of driving under the influence. 1
ANALYSIS
Appellant contends Officer Hazelwood lacked the authority
to arrest him on a public highway immediately adjacent to the
1
The Written Statement of Facts, filed in this appeal
pursuant to Rule 5A:8(c), does not describe the stipulation upon
which the trial court based its finding of guilt.
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William and Mary campus, where the officer was employed, because
Code § 23-234(i) does not allow such arrests.
Code § 23-234 states, in part:
A campus police officer . . . may exercise
the powers and duties conferred by law upon
police officers of cities, towns, or
counties . . . (i) upon any property owned
or controlled by the relevant public or
private institution of higher education, or,
upon request, any property owned or
controlled by another public or private
institution of higher education and upon the
streets, sidewalks, and highways,
immediately adjacent thereto, (ii) pursuant
to a mutual aid agreement provided for in
§ 15.2-1727 between the governing board of a
public or private institution and such other
institution of higher education, public or
private, in the Commonwealth or adjacent
political subdivisions, (iii) in close
pursuit of a person as provided in
§ 19.2-77, and (iv) upon approval by the
appropriate circuit court of a petition for
concurrent jurisdiction in designated areas
with the police officers of the county,
city, or town in which the institution, its
satellite campuses, or other properties are
located.
(Emphasis added). The determinative issue is whether the phrase
highlighted above refers to "the relevant" institution's
property, i.e., the campus where the officer is employed, or the
property of "another" institution, i.e., a campus that does not
employ the officer, or both.
Appellant contends the highlighted phrase refers to only
property of "another" institution. This interpretation of the
statute limits a campus police officer's authority to the actual
grounds of his own campus and excludes from his jurisdiction the
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sidewalks, streets, or highways immediately adjacent to that
campus. However, this interpretation would extend a campus
officer's authority to streets, sidewalks, and highways adjacent
to "another" campus when his presence is requested at "another"
institution.
The Commonwealth argues this interpretation leads to an
absurd and illogical result -- the campus police officer would
have broader authority at another institution than at the
institution that employs him. We agree with the Commonwealth.
Even assuming appellant's argument that Code § 23-234 is
penal in nature and "must be strictly construed against the
Commonwealth," such a perspective would "not mean . . . that
[appellant] is entitled to a favorable result based upon an
unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute." Ansell
v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979).
See also Davis v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 27, 30, 353 S.E.2d
905, 906 (1987). "[A] statute should never be construed so that
it leads to absurd results." Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App.
836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992). Moreover, "words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their ordinary and
usually accepted meaning unless a different intention is fairly
manifest." Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447
S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994) (citing Huffman v. Kite, 198 Va. 196, 199,
93 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1956)). "Courts must give effect to
legislative intent, which must be gathered from the words used,
unless a literal construction would involve a manifest
absurdity." HCA Health Servs. of Virginia, Inc. v. Levin, 260
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Va. 215, 220, 530 S.E.2d 417, 420 (2000). See also Woolfolk, 18
Va. App. at 847, 447 S.E.2d at 533.
Prior to its 1992 amendment, Code § 23-234 read, in
pertinent part:
[A] campus police officer . . . may exercise
the powers and duties conferred by law upon
police officers of cities, towns, or
counties . . . (i) upon any property owned
or controlled by the institution for which
he was appointed and upon the streets,
sidewalks, and highways, immediately
adjacent thereto . . . .
Code § 23-234 (1991), amended by 1992 Va. Acts, ch. 187. The
1992 amendment expanded a campus officer's jurisdiction by
inserting the phrase "or upon request, any property owned or
controlled by another public or private institution of higher
education" into the original text and before the phrase, "and
upon the streets, sidewalks, and highways, immediately adjacent
thereto." 1992 Va. Acts ch. 187.
The original language clearly conferred upon campus police
the authority to arrest suspects on property immediately adjacent
to the campus of the employing institution. It is illogical to
assume the legislature, with its 1992 amendment, intended to
dilute this authority of campus police officers by removing their
jurisdiction over "streets, sidewalks, and highways, immediately
adjacent" to the relevant institution while conferring this
authority over property adjacent to "another" institution.
Nothing in the amendment suggests the General Assembly intended
to so restrict the authority of the campus police. In fact, the
amendment clearly suggests the legislature's intention was to
extend the authority of campus police.
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We conclude Code § 23-234(i) authorizes campus police
officers to exercise their powers on their own campus, on another
campus by invitation, and upon the streets, sidewalks, and
highways immediately adjacent to such campuses. The trial court
did not err in denying appellant's motion to quash the warrant.
We, therefore, affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
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