COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Elder
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
WALTER X. SLAWSKI
OPINION
v. Record No. 0668-98-2 PER CURIAM
MAY 25, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
O/B/O PATRICIA SHEEHAN and
PATRICIA SHEEHAN SLAWSKI
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
George F. Tidey, Judge
John F. Ames for appellant.
Geoffrey Scott Darnell, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General;
Ashley L. Taylor, Jr., Deputy Attorney
General; Robert B. Cousins, Jr., Senior
Assistant Attorney General; Craig M. Burshem,
Regional Special Counsel, on brief), for
appellee Commonwealth of Virginia,
Department of Social Services, Division of
Child Support Enforcement, o/b/o Patricia
Sheehan Slawski.
Nancy L. Quinn (Barnes & Batzli, on brief),
for appellee Patricia Sheehan Slawski.
Walter X. Slawski appeals from the decision of the circuit
court registering for enforcement a foreign order, a 1980 New
Jersey divorce decree, under which he was obligated to pay child
support for his son and spousal support for his former wife,
Patricia Sheehan. Virginia's Department of Social Services,
Division of Child Support Enforcement (the Department), initially
sought to register the order on Sheehan's behalf in the juvenile
and domestic relations district court pursuant to the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). See Code §§ 20-88.32 to
20-88.82. On appeal to this Court, Slawski contends, inter alia,
that the circuit court, on its de novo review, erroneously
registered the order pursuant to UIFSA because various defenses
barred registration. 1 The Department moved to dismiss this appeal
on the ground that the circuit court order appealed from was not
final because the juvenile and domestic relations district court
had neither determined the amount of the support arrearages nor
ruled on an accompanying show cause action. We hold that the
circuit court erred in failing to determine the support arrearage.
Because the circuit court failed to determine the support
arrearage, which determination is essential to appellate review,
it did not properly confirm the registration of the foreign
support order. Therefore, we remand the case to the circuit court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Under UIFSA, a foreign order is registered when it and other
specified documents are filed with the registering tribunal. See
Code §§ 20-88.32 (defining "register"), 20-88.67, 20-88.68(A).
1
Slawski also contests the "appeal bond" of $300,000
ordered by the circuit court. Because the circuit court did not
calculate the arrearages, if any, due under the foreign order,
we conclude that no supersedeas bond is necessary and that
Slawski's filing of a $500 bond "for costs alone" is sufficient
to permit our review.
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The juvenile and domestic relations district court serves as a
registering tribunal in Virginia. See Code § 20-88.33. A
registered foreign order is enforceable only after it has been
confirmed. See Code § 20-88.68. An order is confirmed after the
court has issued notice to the non-registering party of the
registration and the amount of the alleged arrearages, if any, see
Code § 20-88.70(A), and has provided the non-registering party
with an opportunity for a hearing to contest the registration and
amount of arrearages. See Code §§ 20-88.70(B), 20-88.73.
If the non-registering party does not timely contest the
registration, both the registered order and the certified
statement of arrearages required to be filed with the order are
confirmed by operation of law. See Code §§ 20-88.67(A)(3),
20-88.70(B), 20-88.71(B), 20-88.73. If the non-registering party
timely contests the registration, the court must either vacate or
confirm the registration or grant other appropriate relief. See
Code §§ 20-88.71, 20-88.72. When registration is contested,
UIFSA's provisions require concomitant consideration of the
defenses that are raised, including challenges to the validity of
the order, enforcement, and calculation of arrearages. See Code
§§ 20-88.71, 20-88.72, 20-88.73; see also Cowan v. Moreno, 903
S.W.2d 119, 124 n.12 (Tex. App. 1995) (citing UIFSA as adopted by
Texas legislature). Thus, confirmation of the registration
necessarily includes a determination of the amount of the
arrearage, if any. See also UIFSA § 608 cmt. (amended 1996), 9
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U.L.A. 322, 395 (Supp. 1998) (noting that confirmation "validates
both the terms of the order and the asserted arrearages").
Although the circuit court ruled on Slawski's claimed
defenses to registration and ordered the foreign decree
"registered for enforcement," it did not calculate the arrearage
or enter an order confirming the registration, as required under
the statutory scheme. By failing to calculate the arrearage and
remanding that determination to the juvenile and domestic
relations district court, the circuit court deprived the parties
of the right on de novo appeal to have that determination made by
the circuit court. When a de novo appeal is taken to the circuit
court, the parties are entitled to have the case tried "as if it
had been originally instituted in that court." Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Tuttle, 208 Va. 28, 33, 155 S.E.2d 358, 361 (1967).
Instead, the circuit court ordered the matter remanded to the
district court for calculation of the arrearages, which deprived
Slawski of his right to de novo review in the circuit court. 2 See
Code § 16.1-113.
For these reasons, we hold that this matter is not fully
reviewable, and we remand to the circuit court for entry of an
2
No issue was raised by the Department in the circuit court
or in this Court challenging the de novo appeal from the
district court to the circuit court.
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order of confirmation, which necessarily includes a determination
of the amount of any arrearages. 3
Reversed and remanded.
3
We do not consider any other issues raised by appellant in
this appeal. Therefore, such issues remain fully reviewable in
any subsequent appeal pursuant to the rules of this Court.
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