COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Bumgardner
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
SAMMY D. SULEIMAN
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 3130-96-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
FEBRUARY 3, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Jane Marum Roush, Judge
William B. Reichhardt (Elizabeth D. Teare;
William B. Reichhardt & Associates; Surovell,
Jackson, Colten & Dugan, P.C., on briefs),
for appellant.
John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General;
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Sammy D. Suleiman (appellant), a juvenile, appeals the
sentence imposed by the circuit court after his conviction for
robbery. He contends the court did not sentence him in
accordance with the requirements of Code § 16.1-285.1, which
govern the sentencing of serious juvenile offenders. Finding no
error, we affirm.
This case is before us on an agreed statement of facts.
Appellant and two codefendants robbed a 7-11 store in Fairfax
County after evaluating various commercial establishments to
determine which to rob. One of appellant's codefendants went
into the store, brandished a handgun at the 7-11 cashier, and
demanded money. Appellant entered the store and told the cashier
to do as his codefendant instructed. Appellant then removed cash
and cigarettes from the countertop. Appellant and his
codefendants were arrested approximately five minutes after the
robbery as they attempted to flee from the 7-11. After his
arrest, appellant admitted that he had participated in the
robbery and stated that the robbery was his idea.
The Commonwealth filed a petition against appellant in the
juvenile and domestic relations district court on March 25, 1996,
alleging that he robbed a 7-11 store in Fairfax, Virginia, on
March 24, 1996. The Commonwealth sought to try appellant as an
adult, but the juvenile court declined to release its
jurisdiction over the case to the circuit court. Appellant
entered a plea of nolo contendere and filed an appeal to the
circuit court. At trial, contrary to his earlier admissions,
appellant maintained that he did not know that a robbery was in
progress as he entered the store. One of appellant's
codefendants testified that appellant was the "mastermind" behind
the robbery. The codefendant also testified that two weeks
earlier he and appellant had stolen the weapons used in the
robbery from a Walmart. A jury convicted appellant of robbery.
At a sentencing hearing on November 22, 1996, the trial
court received and reviewed a court report from the probation
office. In the court report, a probation officer recited details
of the robbery taken from the police report and stated that the
7-11 clerk had been in fear of being seriously injured or killed
during the robbery while "the defendants were making demands."
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The probation officer also reported that appellant had one prior
arrest for assault, which had been continued and dismissed
following a period of supervised probation and community service.
In an interview with probation officials, appellant denied the
assault.
Appellant's former probation officer reported "very minimal
concerns" with appellant and his family during appellant's period
of probation. The report described as generally good appellant's
family, neighborhood, and school experiences. The probation
officer explained that, although appellant "was in relatively
good standing" at his school, he had received three in-school
suspensions for disciplinary violations, such as skipping class
or disobeying teachers. The report described appellant as "being
very immature, impulsive, and easily influenced by other peers."
The probation officer concluded as follows:
It has become evident to this reporter that
Sammy David Suleiman has failed to accept
responsibility for his actions on the night
in question, and has continued to minimize
his involvement in this crime. Furthermore,
it is the feeling of this officer that Sammy
Suleiman does not understand the seriousness
of this type of criminal behavior, nor has he
shown an appropriate amount of remorse for
his actions.
The probation officer recommended that appellant be committed to
the Department of Juvenile Justice until his twenty-first
birthday.
In support of his argument that he was amenable to treatment
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through non-incarceration juvenile programs, appellant presented
the testimony of Dr. Christopher Lane, a clinical psychologist,
who testified that appellant was remorseful and amenable to
treatment as an outpatient. Dr. Lane testified that appellant's
five month incarceration would act as a deterrent to further
criminal activity and that further incarceration would not be
helpful and would interfere with appellant's ongoing treatment.
Appellant also presented testimony from his school guidance
counselor to establish that appellant had performed well in
school and could return to school if allowed by the court.
A petition signed by members of appellant's community was
introduced. The petition stated that the signatories had no
concern for the safety of the community if appellant were
released. Finally, appellant presented evidence that he had
responded well to electronic monitoring and probation and that he
had successfully held a job while on probation.
In sentencing appellant, the trial court stated as follows:
In consideration, the Court found that the
Defendant comes within the purview of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District
Court Law of the 1950 Code of Virginia, as
amended, pursuant to § 16.1-285.1. The Court
considered, among other factors, that the
juvenile is fourteen (14) years of age or
older and that the commitment under this
section is necessary to meet the
rehabilitative needs of the juvenile and
would best serve the interests of the
community; and that the felony offense is
punishable by a term of confinement of
greater than twenty years if the felony was
committed by an adult.
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The court remanded appellant to the Department of Juvenile
Justice for a period of four years and six months, not to exceed
his twenty-first birthday. The trial court denied appellant's
motion for reconsideration of his sentence in which he alleged
that the trial court had not made the required statutory
findings.
On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred when it
failed to determine that appellant was not a proper person to
receive treatment through juvenile programs other than
incarceration. Appellant also argues that no evidence supports
the trial court's determination, if in fact one was made.
The proper interpretation of Code § 16.1-285.1 is a question
of first impression for this Court. "Principles of statutory
construction mandate that we 'give effect to the legislative
intent.' While penal statutes must be strictly construed against
the Commonwealth, '[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of
a statute is always preferred to any curious, narrow or strained
construction . . . ." Newton v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 86,
89, 462 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1995).
Code § 16.1-285.1 provides that a serious juvenile offender
may be committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile
Justice for a period of seven years or until the juvenile's
twenty-first birthday, whichever occurs first. Generally, "when
the maximum punishment is prescribed by statute, 'and the
sentence [imposed] does not exceed that maximum, the sentence
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will not be overturned as being an abuse of discretion.'"
Valentine v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 334, 339, 443 S.E.2d 445,
448 (1994) (quoting Abdo v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 473, 479, 237
S.E.2d 900, 903 (1977)).
As appellant contends, however, Code § 16.1-285.1 requires
the trial court to make certain findings prior to sentencing a
juvenile as a serious offender. Code § 16.1-285.1(A) allows a
circuit court to commit a juvenile as a serious offender
[i]n the case of a juvenile fourteen years of
age or older who has been found guilty of an
offense which would be a felony if committed
by an adult, and . . . (iii) the felony
offense is punishable by a term of
confinement of greater than twenty years if
the felony was committed by an adult, . . .
and the circuit court . . . finds that
commitment under this section is necessary to
meet the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile
and would serve the best interests of the
community . . . .
Prior to committing the juvenile as a serious offender, the
court must consider the age of the juvenile, the "seriousness and
number of the present offenses," the "previous history of the
juvenile," and the "Department's estimated length of stay." Code
§ 16.1-285.1(B). In addition, the court's "commitment order must
be supported by a determination that the interests of the
juvenile and community require that the juvenile be placed under
legal restraint or discipline and that the juvenile is not a
proper person to receive treatment or rehabilitation through
other juvenile programs or facilities." Id.
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We find that the court's written findings in this case
satisfy the requirements of the statute and constitute evidence
that the court made the required determination that the appellant
"is not a proper person to receive treatment or rehabilitation
through other juvenile programs or facilities." Code
§ 16.1-285.1(B). 1
The findings in the court's order track the findings
required under Code § 16.1-285.1(A): appellant is fourteen years
of age or older, his commitment is necessary to meet his
rehabilitation needs and best serve the interests of the
community, and appellant's felony offense would be punishable by
incarceration for more than twenty years if committed by an
adult. While the court's order does not explicitly address the
question of whether appellant is a proper person to receive
treatment through other programs, it states that "commitment
under this section is necessary to meet the rehabilitative needs
of the juvenile." We find that this statement reflects the
court's implicit determination that appellant is not a proper
person for non-incarceration juvenile treatment. If commitment
1
To the extent appellant's argument encompasses a claimed
requirement that the court must make detailed findings in
writing, we disagree, provided the record discloses that all the
statutory factors have been considered and the required
determination has been made. While making the required
determination and findings in writing may agreeably be a sound
practice, it is apparent from the language of the statute that
Code § 16.1-285.1(B) does not require that the determination be
in written form.
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is "necessary" to meet appellant's rehabilitative needs, other,
less intrusive means of treatment will not fulfill his needs,
and, therefore, he is not a proper person for the "other
programs" to which the statute refers.
Appellant's second contention, that the evidence does not
support the court's findings, is fundamentally a question of the
sufficiency of the evidence. We are required to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Cotton
v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 596, 597, 459 S.E.2d 527, 528 (1995)
(en banc) (citing Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 99,
390 S.E.2d 491, 497 (1990) (en banc)). Furthermore, whether
appellant was a proper person to receive treatment or
rehabilitation through non-incarceration programs is a question
of fact, and we may not reverse a court's finding of fact unless
it "'is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Id.
(quoting Josephs, 10 Va. App. at 99, 390 S.E.2d at 497).
The evidence supports the court's findings of fact.
Appellant was convicted of robbery. The court heard evidence
that appellant was the "mastermind" behind the robbery and stole
the weapons used in the crime. These circumstances establish
that appellant was directly responsible for his crime.
The Commonwealth also presented substantial evidence that
appellant and his parents had not accepted responsibility for
appellant's acts. At trial, appellant denied his earlier
admission of guilt. In an interview with the probation office,
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he denied his earlier assault and did not show remorse for his
crime. The court received evidence that appellant's parents did
not hold him fully accountable for his crime but instead blamed
appellant's diabetes. While appellant presented a petition from
members of his community, the petition does not reflect that the
signatories were aware of the nature of appellant's crime. Dr.
Lane testified that appellant was remorseful, but the trial court
had the discretion to weigh conflicting testimony and conclude
that appellant did not appreciate the seriousness of his acts
and, thus, was not likely to benefit from treatment alternatives
short of incarceration. See Davison v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App.
496, 502, 445 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1994) (citing Bridgeman v.
Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 601-02
(1986)).
Finding that the court's order rested on a determination
that appellant was not a proper person for non-incarceration
juvenile programs and that its sentencing decision was not
plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence, we affirm the
conviction.
Affirmed.
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