COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Willis
Argued at Salem, Virginia
ERIC COOPER WALTON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0340-96-3 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON
MAY 27, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SALEM
G.O. Clemens, Judge
(John H. Kennett, Jr., on briefs), for
appellant.
Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Eric Cooper Walton appeals the suspension of his driver's
license for a period of six months pursuant to Code § 18.2-259.1,
following his conviction for possession of marijuana. Walton
asserts that suspension of his driver's license violates: (1) his
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the
Virginia Constitution; and (2) the United States Constitution's
Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment.
We hold that the suspension of Walton's license under Code
§ 18.2-259.1 rationally relates to the Commonwealth's proper
purposes of promoting public safety and deterring the use of
automobiles in the sale and transportation of illegal drugs. We
further hold that Walton failed to properly preserve for appeal
his argument that suspension of his license violates the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment,
and therefore, Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of this
question.
On September 2, 1995, Detective W.W. Young executed a search
warrant at Walton's mobile home. Young found a marijuana plant
growing in a flower bed outside of Walton's mobile home and
inside discovered marijuana, rolling papers and a hemostat.
Walton was convicted of possession of marijuana and was sentenced
to thirty days in jail with all but four days suspended, fined
$200 dollars, and had his license suspended for six months.
Code § 18.2-259.1 provides for the automatic suspension of a
person's driver's license for a period of six months upon the
person's conviction for a drug offense under Code §§ 18.2-247
through 18.2-264.1. Walton argues that his conviction for
possession of marijuana was unrelated to the operation of a motor
vehicle and therefore, that suspension of his license violates
his substantive due process rights under the United States and
Virginia Constitutions and constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
Due Process
The due process clauses of the Federal and Virginia
Constitutions provide that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1; Va. Const. art. I, § 11.
Acts of the General Assembly are presumed to be
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constitutional. Wayside Restaurant v. Virginia Beach, 215 Va.
231, 208 S.E.2d 51 (1974). "[A]n act of the legislature . . . is
not to be declared unconstitutional except where it is clearly
and plainly so. Courts uphold acts of the legislature when their
constitutionality is debatable, and the burden is upon the
assailing party to prove the claimed invalidity." Perry v. Board
of Funeral Directors, 203 Va. 161, 165, 123 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1961).
We hold that Walton has failed to meet this burden.
The right to operate a motor vehicle is a property interest
that may not be denied without due process of law. See Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). However, "[t]he operation of a
motor vehicle . . . is a conditional privilege, which may be
suspended or revoked under the police power." Commonwealth v.
Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 414, 4 S.E.2d 762, 767 (1939). As such, the
right to drive is not a fundamental right and consequently, laws
regulating that right need only withstand rational basis review
to be found constitutional. See id.; Quiller v. Bowman, 262 Ga.
769, 770-71, 425 S.E.2d 641, 642 (1993); Commonwealth v. Strunk,
400 Pa. Super. 25, 29, 582 A.2d 1326, 1327-28 (1990). Under
rational basis analysis, if the law in question has a "reasonable
relation to a proper purpose and [is] neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory," the requirements of due process are satisfied.
Duke v. County of Pulaski, 219 Va. 428, 438, 247 S.E.2d 824, 829
(1978); see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
The Commonwealth identified the purposes of Code
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§ 18.2-259.1 as "punishment of current drug offenders, deterrence
of future offenders, reduction of the distribution of illegal
drugs and protection of citizens on state roads." We conclude
that the desire to deter the use of illegal drugs and the
operation of motor vehicles by persons under the influence of
controlled substances constitute proper purposes which reasonably
relate to the statute's mandatory suspension of driver's
licenses. The suspension of a drug offender's license serves to
curtail transportation of illegal substances, sale of illegal
substances from vehicles, and the operation of motor vehicles by
persons under the influence of controlled substances.
The rational relationship between these purposes and Code
§ 18.2-259.1 exists even where the drug offense does not relate
to or involve the use of a motor vehicle. The legislature could
reasonably assume that a person who possesses illegal substances
would use those substances and could operate a motor vehicle
while under the influence of said substances. Likewise, the
legislature could reasonably conclude that a person who possesses
illegal substances would use a motor vehicle to transport those
substances. See Quiller, 262 Ga. at 771, 425 S.E.2d at 643; In
re Maricopa County, 160 Ariz. 90, 93, 770 P.2d 394, 397 (1989).
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Rule 5A:18 provides that "[n]o ruling of the trial court
. . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the
objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the
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time of the ruling . . . ." McQuinn v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App.
753, 755, 460 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1995) (en banc). Here, Walton's
sole argument at trial concerning the constitutional status of
Code § 18.2-259.1 was that it violated his substantive due
process rights under the United States and Virginia
Constitutions. On brief, Walton advances for the first time the
argument that the suspension of his license constitutes a
violation of the United States Constitution's Eighth Amendment
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Because
Walton failed to properly preserve this question, Rule 5A:18 bars
consideration of the matter on appeal.
Holding that the suspension of Walton's driver's license
pursuant to Code § 18.2-259.1 did not violate his substantive due
process rights and holding that Walton failed to properly
preserve his Eighth Amendment argument for appeal, we affirm.
Affirmed.
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