COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Koontz *
PERRY SHAWN TURNER
v. Record No. 1808-93-3 OPINION BY
JUDGE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA AUGUST 29, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY
George E. Honts, III, Judge
Thomas M. Simons for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General (James S.
Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Perry Shawn Turner (Turner) appeals his bench trial
conviction under Code § 18.2-460(C) for attempting to obstruct a
law-enforcement officer in the discharge of his duty relating to
a criminal drug offense. Turner asserts that because the
Commonwealth failed to prove the underlying felony as a predicate
element of Code § 18.2-460(C), the Commonwealth could not convict
him of obstructing a police officer who was executing an arrest
warrant charging Turner with a violation of the underlying
felony. Turner also asserts that the Commonwealth failed to
disprove as a reasonable alternative hypothesis to guilt that
when he pointed his gun at the arresting officer, he did so in an
effort to turn the gun over to the officer rather than to
obstruct him. For the following reasons, we affirm Turner's
conviction.
*
Justice Koontz prepared and the Court adopted the opinion
in this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme
Court of Virginia.
Several Virginia state troopers went to a motel in
Rockbridge County to execute a warrant for the arrest of Perry
Shawn Turner on a charge of violating Code § 18.2-248(A), selling
a controlled substance, namely cocaine. Trooper Robert P.
Chappell, Jr. (Chappell), wearing blue jeans and a white hooded
sweatshirt, knocked on the door of the motel room Turner occupied
while the other officers waited about twenty yards away. The
door, which was chained, opened slightly. Chappell said his name
was "Dirk" and asked for "Shawn." The male who answered the door
said, "just a minute," and closed the door. About sixty seconds
later, the door opened and the same male emerged. Chappell
immediately recognized him as Turner. Holding his police badge
in his left hand, Chappell identified himself as "State Police"
and informed Turner that he had an arrest warrant for him on a
charge of selling cocaine.
Standing about two feet away, Turner removed a handgun from
his waistband and pointed it at Chappell's chest. Chappell
pushed Turner's armed hand away and pinned Turner's body against
the wall, telling Turner three times to drop his weapon. Turner
pushed back against Chappell and did not release his gun.
Another officer disarmed Turner while Chappell held him. Turner
was arrested and charged with selling cocaine in violation of
Code § 18.2-248(A) and obstructing justice in violation of Code
§ 18.2-460(C). The Commonwealth subsequently elected not to
proceed on the Code § 18.2-248(A) violation.
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Under familiar principles, penal statutes must be strictly
construed against the Commonwealth. Stevenson v. City of Falls
Church, 243 Va. 434, 436, 416 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1992). However,
"we construe a statute to promote the end for which it was
enacted, if such an interpretation can reasonably be made from
the language used." Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840,
847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1994).
Code § 18.2-460(C) reads in pertinent part:
If any person by threats of bodily harm or
force knowingly attempts to intimidate or
impede . . . any law-enforcement officer,
lawfully engaged in the discharge of his duty
. . . relating to a violation of or
conspiracy to violate § 18.2-248 or
§ 18.2-248.1(a)(3), (b) or (c) he shall be
guilty of a Class 5 felony.
Turner contends that because the drug charge against him was
not prosecuted, his conviction for obstructing justice is "based
solely on an arrest warrant, not on a 'violation' of the drug
statute" because "[t]he underlying felony no longer exists to
trigger its collateral felony." Turner ignores, however, that
§ 18.2-460(C) requires only that the law enforcement activity
"relat[e] to a violation of . . . § 18.2-248." (Emphasis added.)
The attempt to thwart Trooper Chappell's execution of the arrest
warrant, which specifically charged Turner with selling cocaine,
was an effort by Turner to impede the lawful discharge of a
police officer's duty "relating to a violation of . . .
§ 18.2-248." (Emphasis added.)
We hold that in order to convict an accused of obstructing
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justice under Code § 18.2-460(C) the Commonwealth need not prove
the underlying offenses codified in Code §§ 18.2-248 or
18.2-248.1(a)(3), (b) or (c). A conviction under Code
§ 18.2-460(C) will be sustained where the Commonwealth proves
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused (1) intended to
intimidate or impede by threats of bodily harm or force a
law-enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his or her
duty, and (2) knew or should have known that the law-enforcement
officer was engaged in lawful activity "relating to a violation
of or conspiracy to violate § 18.2-248 or § 18.2-248.1(a)(3), (b)
or (c)."
Turner's conviction for obstruction need not be based on
proof that he committed the underlying felony. It is sufficient
that the Commonwealth proved that the lawful activity of Trooper
Chappell related to an offense specified in Code § 18.2-460(C).
Holding otherwise would unduly restrict the intended purpose of
Code § 18.2-460 of punishing those who interfere with the
administration of justice and law enforcement.
Turner's view suggests that successful efforts to destroy
evidence or intimidate witnesses in order to prevent a drug
conviction also would eliminate the possibility of a conviction
for obstructing justice. Providing incentive for someone to
frustrate law-enforcement efforts and allowing someone who
obstructs justice to go unpunished solely because the
Commonwealth cannot prove the underlying drug offense, perhaps as
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a consequence of the obstructor's endeavors, are absurd results
that the legislature did not intend. See Shull v. Commonwealth,
16 Va. App. 667, 669, 431 S.E.2d 924, 925 (1993)("Nor should a
statute be construed so that it leads to absurd results.")
(citation omitted), aff'd, 247 Va. 161, 440 S.E.2d 133 (1994).
Code §§ 18.2-460(A) and (B) apply to the obstruction of
justice in civil as well as in criminal proceedings other than
for the drug crimes specified in subsection (C). Thus, neither
subsection (A) nor subsection (B) requires a conviction for an
underlying offense as an element of the alleged obstruction of
justice. We interpret subsection (C) as evincing legislative
intent to make the punishment for obstructing justice as to
certain drug offenses more severe than for obstructing justice
generally.
"On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth,
4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The record
shows that Turner drew a gun on an arresting officer and resisted
efforts by police to disarm him. The trial court rejected
Turner's explanation that he was attempting to turn over his gun
rather than obstruct the officer. The evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth is sufficient to establish that
Turner intended "to impede or intimidate" Trooper Chappell in the
lawful discharge of his duty. The record also shows that Turner
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knew that the charge specified in the warrant for his arrest was
for selling cocaine.
Having proved Turner's intent to obstruct and his knowledge
that the arrest "relat[ed] to a violation of . . . § 18.2-248,"
the Commonwealth satisfied its burden. Therefore, we affirm the
conviction.
Affirmed.
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