COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Clements and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
JUMA AKILI WHITFIELD
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2359-99-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
OCTOBER 10, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
Dean W. Sword, Jr., Judge
Andrew G. Wiggin (Donald E. Lee, Jr. and
Associates, on briefs), for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Juma Akili Whitfield (defendant) was convicted in a bench
trial of "carjacking," a violation of Code § 18.2-58.1. On
appeal, he complains the court erroneously 1) failed to inquire
into a possible "conflict" between himself and his attorney, 2)
permitted the Commonwealth to introduce hearsay evidence, and 3)
convicted him upon insufficient evidence. Finding no error, we
affirm the trial court.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of the appeal. In accordance with well established
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
principles, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438,
443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987).
In the early morning hours of March 28, 1999, defendant and
his girlfriend, Arnae Mackey, approached Christopher Seeds
(Seeds), then operating his car at a stoplight in the City of
Portsmouth, and asked for a "ride" to a nearby "gas station."
Seeds "used to give [defendant] a ride to school," and acceded to
his request. After stopping at the station, the three proceeded
towards Seeds' home. In route, defendant "grabbed" Seeds from
behind, placed a "12 to 14 inch" knife to his throat and
instructed him to stop the car. After Mackey searched Seeds'
pockets at defendant's direction, defendant "pull[ed] [Seeds] out
the . . . door," "dragged" him to the rear of the vehicle, and
ordered him into the trunk. When Seeds pleaded with defendant "to
let [him] go," defendant "brought his arm down" and Seeds "took
off running." Defendant then entered the car and fled,
accompanied by Mackey.
During the pretrial colloquy between defendant and the court,
defendant confirmed that he was "ready for trial," but, without
explanation, declined to answer the inquiry, "are you satisfied
with the services of your attorney?" In response, the court
referenced defendant's prior motion for substitution of counsel
and related hearing several weeks earlier and expressly declined
to "go behind [the resulting] order" denying the requested
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relief. 1 Neither defendant nor his counsel then objected to the
trial court's ruling or otherwise pursued the issue. A transcript
of the previous hearing is not a part of the instant record.
Defendant first contends the court erroneously neglected to
inquire into the "conflict of interest" suggested by his
unwillingness to voice satisfaction with the services of his
attorney. However, absent a transcript of the earlier hearing, we
are unable to properly consider the issue, a deficiency
exacerbated by defendant's silence following the comments of the
trial court. It is the responsibility of the defendant to provide
this Court a record of the proceedings on appeal sufficient to
facilitate appellate review. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.
App. 630, 635, 432 S.E.2d 2, 6 (1993). Thus, on the record before
us, we are unable to find error in the trial court.
Defendant's reliance upon Carter v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App.
569, 400 S.E.2d 540 (1991), and Dowell v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App.
555, 351 S.E.2d 915 (1987), in support of a contrary result is
misplaced. Both Carter and Dowell instruct that "'a trial court
has a duty to conduct further inquiry to determine if an actual
conflict exists'" between an accused and counsel, once "'the
possibility of a conflict of interest is apparent,'" a "'probable
risk . . . brought to [the] court's attention.'" Carter, 11 Va.
1
The record does not reflect an order specifically
addressing the prior motion, but defendant acknowledges the
procedural history on brief.
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App. at 573, 400 S.E.2d at 543 (quoting Dowell, 3 Va. App. at 559,
561, 351 S.E.2d at 917, 918) (emphasis added). In distinct
contrast, the instant record reflects no "apparent" or "probable"
conflict of interest.
Defendant next complains the court erroneously admitted the
"hearsay testimony" of Detective David L. Lodge recounting a
statement given Lodge by Mackey. However, during the disputed
testimony, defense counsel complained only, "I'm going to further
object to this," without articulating a basis for the objection.
"It is the duty of a party . . . when he objects to evidence to
state the grounds of his objections, so that the trial judge may
understand the precise question . . . he is called upon to
decide." Simmons v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 445, 450, 371 S.E.2d
7, 10 (1988) (citation omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he Court of
Appeals will not consider an argument on appeal which was not
presented to the trial court." Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App.
299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998) (citing Rule 5A:18).
Finally, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the conviction. However, defendant concedes on brief
that "the weight of the evidence would be for a finding of guilt,"
if the record includes the testimony of Mackey's statements to
Detective Lodge. We agree and, having decided that such
statements are not erroneously in evidence, find the record
sufficient to support the conviction.
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Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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