COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Frank
THERESA TIBBITTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 2487-99-2 PER CURIAM
APRIL 11, 2000
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FOR HENRICO COUNTY
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
George F. Tidey, Judge
(John W. Parsons; Wood and Wood, P.C., on
brief), for appellant.
(George T. Elmore, Assistant County Attorney;
Jennifer C. Hollar, Guardian ad litem for the
minor child, on brief), for appellee.
Theresa Tibbitts (mother) appeals the decision of the circuit
court terminating her parental rights to Brandon Lee Tibbitts
(Brandon). Mother contends that the trial court erred when it
found that she failed, without good cause, to maintain contact
with or to provide or substantially plan for Brandon's future for
a period of six months following his placement in foster care,
notwithstanding the efforts by the Department of Social Services
for the County of Henrico (DSS) to strengthen the parent-child
relationship. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the
parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court.
See Rule 5A:27.
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development, 13 Va. App.
123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). "Code § 16.1-283 embodies
'the statutory scheme for the . . . termination of residual
parental rights in this Commonwealth' [which] . . . 'provides
detailed procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents
and their child,' balancing their interests while seeking to
preserve the family." Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456
S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) (citations omitted). "'In matters of a
child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in
making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's
best interests.'" Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463
(citation omitted). The trial judge's findings, "'when based on
evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Id. (citation
omitted).
Under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1), a parent's rights to a child
placed in foster care may be terminated if the trial court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the
child's best interests and that:
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The parent . . . [has], without good cause,
failed to maintain continuing contact with
and to provide or substantially plan for the
future of the child for a period of six
months after the child's placement in foster
care notwithstanding the reasonable and
appropriate efforts of social, medical,
mental health or other rehabilitative
agencies to communicate with the parent or
parents and to strengthen the parent-child
relationship. Proof that the parent . . .
[has] failed without good cause to
communicate on a continuing and planned
basis with the child for a period of six
months shall constitute prima facie evidence
of this condition . . . .
Code § 16.1-283(C)(1).
The record establishes that Brandon was taken into foster
care in January 1997 following a call to DSS that mother had
left Brandon in the care of another person, but failed to
retrieve him. At that time, mother was homeless.
DSS provided mother with numerous services designed to
address her underlying problems and strengthen the parent-child
bond, including transportation for visitation; coordinating
assistance from the Department of Rehabilitative Services (DRS)
for housing, job training and referrals, and financial
management; and referring mother to Child Support Enforcement.
Despite the assistance of DSS, mother was unable to remain in
stable housing or to maintain steady employment. She worked
only two months at a job obtained through DRS. Mother also
failed to attend monthly family therapy sessions.
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Mother obtained an apartment with the assistance of DSS in
March 1997 and was able to have increased visitation with
Brandon. Beginning in July 1997, however, mother fell behind on
her rent. She refused DSS's offer to pay $350 if she paid the
remaining balance of $50 herself. Mother did not pay rent in
August or September and left the apartment to move to one
charging higher rent.
In June 1997, mother cancelled a weekend visit with Brandon
because she was going to the beach. She cancelled another
weekend visit in August because she lacked money to buy food,
although she was working and receiving social security payments.
When DSS attempted to set up home-based services designed to
allow weekly visitation, mother failed to attend the meeting.
Mother became increasingly less conscientious in maintaining
weekly visitation, with the frequency dropping from three in
December 1997, to none in March 1998, and only two visits total
in May through July 1998.
The evidence demonstrated that, even with the assistance of
DSS, mother refused or was unable to maintain steady employment,
manage her finances, keep stable housing, or maintain consistent
visitation with Brandon. Mother moved multiple times between
March and August 1998, when she was homeless again.
When Brandon came into foster care at age three, he was
withdrawn and angry. After more than two years in foster care,
Brandon showed great progress. He was no longer as angry and
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was described as a loving child attached to his foster parents.
Evidence introduced by DSS indicated that separating Brandon
from his foster parents "'would create a tremendous amount of
anxiety for this young man and trigger a significant increase in
his angry acting out behavior.'"
Mother contends that her low level retardation and
depression constituted good cause for her failure to establish
either stable housing or employment or to maintain contact with
Brandon and to adequately plan for his future. The trial court
found that explanation inadequate. Despite extensive services,
mother made little substantive improvement in her ability to
maintain a stable lifestyle. She blamed any inconsistency in
her contact with Brandon on DSS, failing to acknowledge any
responsibility on her part. The record contains ample support
for the trial court's determination that DSS presented clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to meet the statutory
requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C)(1).
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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