COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons
RONLYN LORAY BROWNE HICKS EATON
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 0868-99-3 PER CURIAM
JULY 20, 1999
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FOR THE COUNTY OF BEDFORD
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY
James W. Updike, Jr., Judge
(James J. Angel, on brief), for appellant.
(J. G. Overstreet, Bedford County Attorney,
on brief), for appellee.
Ronlyn Loray Browne Hicks Eaton (mother) appeals the decision
of the circuit court terminating her residual parental rights to
her twin daughters, Lilly C. Browne and Cheyene A. Browne. Mother
contends on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that the
Department of Social Services (DSS) presented sufficient evidence
to terminate mother's parental rights. Upon reviewing the record
and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without
merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial
court. See Rule 5A:27.
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
paramount consideration of a trial court is the child’s best
interests." Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Development,
13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991).
"In matters of a child's welfare, trial
courts are vested with broad discretion in
making the decisions necessary to guard and
to foster a child's best interests." The
trial court's judgment, "when based on
evidence heard ore tenus, will not be
disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or
without evidence to support it."
Id. (citations omitted). "Code § 16.1-283 embodies 'the
statutory scheme for the . . . termination of residual parental
rights in this Commonwealth' [which] . . . 'provides detailed
procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents and
their child,' balancing their interests while seeking to
preserve the family." Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456
S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) (citations omitted).
The trial court found that DSS presented sufficient
evidence under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) to terminate mother's
parental rights. Under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), the parental
rights of a child placed in foster care may be terminated if the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the
best interests of the child and that
[t]he parent . . . , without good cause,
[has] been unwilling or unable within a
reasonable period not to exceed twelve
months from the date the child was placed in
foster care to remedy substantially the
conditions which led to or required
continuation of the child's foster care
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placement, notwithstanding the reasonable
and appropriate efforts of social, medical,
mental health or other rehabilitative
agencies to such end. Proof that the parent
or parents, without good cause, have failed
or been unable to make substantial progress
towards elimination of the conditions which
led to or required continuation of the
child's foster care placement in accordance
with their obligations under and within the
time limits or goals set forth in a foster
care plan filed with the court or any other
plan jointly designed and agreed to by the
parent or parents and a public or private
social, medical, mental health or other
rehabilitative agency shall constitute prima
facie evidence of this condition. The court
shall take into consideration the prior
efforts of such agencies to rehabilitate the
parent or parents prior to the placement of
the child in foster care.
The twins were placed in foster care on February 6, 1997,
by mother's parents, who had custody of the twins while mother
was incarcerated. Upon mother's release on June 12, 1997, a
visitation schedule was established.
Despite many offers of assistance by DSS, including
substance abuse counseling and in-home services, mother failed
to remedy the underlying problems that led to the children's
foster care placement. Mother was required to complete a
substance abuse evaluation, due to evidence that she was a drug
abuser, but failed to undergo either the evaluation or
counseling. Two different in-home service providers terminated
service to mother due to her lack of cooperation. Moreover,
during the period of October 1997 through May 1998, mother
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indicated to DSS that she was prepared to sign a permanent
entrustment of the twins to DSS to allow adoption.
The evidence also showed that at the time the twins were
placed in foster care, they were developmentally delayed, behind
in speech and language, and were failing to thrive. One of the
twins had a high level of lead in her system. In visitations
with mother, the observers repeatedly noted that there was a
lack of emotional attachment between the children and mother.
Although DSS recommended frequent visitation so that the twins
could re-establish a bond with mother, mother's visitation with
the twins was sporadic. The evidence at trial indicated that
the twins were doing well in foster care and were no longer
developmentally delayed.
At trial, mother testified that she was employed and had
been drug-free for an extended period of time. Mother also
testified that she supported the custody petition filed by her
parents. The denial of that petition was not appealed.
Evidence in the record fully supports the findings of the
trial court that DSS presented clear and convincing evidence
sufficient under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) to terminate mother's
parental rights to the twins. The children were in foster care
for more than two years, while mother refused to cooperate with
the agencies seeking to assist her and demonstrated little
desire to work towards the return of the twins. "It is clearly
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not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period
of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be
capable of resuming his responsibilities." Kaywood v. Halifax
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d
492, 495 (1990).
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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