IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
March 31, 2000
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
E1999-02096-COA-R3-CV
) SEVIER COUNTY
ROBERT BOWMAN, ET AL., ) 03A01-9904-CH-00126
)
Plaintiffs/Appellees, )
)
v. )
) HON. TELFORD E. FORGETY, JR.
GATLINBURG CONDO MANAGEMENT, ) JUDGE
INC., ET AL., )
)
Defendants/Appellants. )
)
)
) AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
)
C. DAN SCOTT and BARRY W. EUBANKS, Sevierville, for Appellants
ERIC J. MORRISON, Knoxville, for Appellees
O P I N I O N
Goddard, P.J.
This suit involves a determination of whether specific
areas within a condominium complex are units for occupancy or are
“common areas” available for use by all condominium owners.
Robert Bowman, et al., the Plaintiffs/Appellees,1 initiated an
action in the Sevier County Chancery Court against The Gatlinburg
Condo Management, Inc., et al., the Defendants/Appellants. The
Sevier County Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of
the Appellees.
The Appellants present for our consideration the sole
issue, which we restate, of whether the Trial Court erred in
granting summary judgment for the Appellees. Pursuant to Rule
13(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
Appellees raise the following additional issue, which we restate,
of whether the Trial Court erred in denying the Appellees’ Motion
to Strike the affidavits of James Jett and Charlie R. Johnson.
1
Approximately twenty-four owners of condominiums joined in this cause
of action.
2
The Appellees are owners of condominium units in the
Gatlinburg Chateau Condominiums, a multi-unit condominium project
located in Sevier County. Gatlinburg Chateau was created and
established by a master deed dated July 2, 1990.2 Gatlinburg
Chateau Development Company, Inc. was the developer of the
Gatlinburg Chateau condominium project. Around October 25, 1990,
the “C-Units” were conveyed by Gatlinburg Chateau Development
Company, Inc. to CC Café, Inc., which later conveyed them to
James Jett and Yvonne Jett, who have used them for commercial
purposes since their purchase. James Jett has paid monthly
homeowner’s dues and assessments on the C-units since becoming
the owner of those units. The office, which is designated as
area C-1, has been assessed separately for tax purposes, with
James Jett paying taxes on that parcel from 1992 through 1997.
2
The master deed had accompanying Exhibits A through F: A--the By-Laws
of the Gatlinburg Chateau Homeowner’s Association, Inc.; B--the Schedule of
Percentage Ownership in Common Elements; C--the Estimated Operating Budget
(Initial); D--is the Unit Owner’s Vote Assignment; E--the Articles of
Incorporation of Gatlinburg Chateau Homeowner’s Association Incorporated; and
F--the Legal Description of Submitted Property.
3
Area C-1, which is enclosed and located in a separate
building in the condominium project, has been used as a rental
office. Areas C-2 and C-3 are small storage areas. Area C-2,
which is located on the second floor, is in an enclosed area with
a door that opens onto the walkways which are common areas in the
condominium project. Area C-3, which is located on the third
floor, is also in an enclosed area with a door that opens onto
the walkways which are common areas in the condominium project.
The Appellants argue that the Trial Court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. The Trial
Court based its finding on several provisions from the
condominium documents. The Court noted that the condominium
documents did not specifically mention commercial units as a
separate class of property, and no where did the documents
designate areas C-1, C-2, and C-3 as commercial units.
4
The Trial Court noted that Article 3, Section 6
entitled Property Rights provides
that the condominium project consists of 54 residential
units in common areas. No other class of property is
created in the court’s view except the 54. Just what
the master deed says. There are 54 residential units
and there are common elements. Nothing else was
created.
In that connection, the Court notes that there are
specifically shown in the master deed, condominium
plat, and the condominium plans, in fact, 54
residential units or apartments and that these do not
include the areas “C1, C2, and C3.” Court can only
conclude that the only thing those areas can be, if
they are not residential units, if they are not one of
the 54 residential units, that the only thing they can
be is common elements because that is the only class of
property that was created.”
The Appellants argue that from the Master Deed and the
accompanying Exhibits, it is obvious that the C-Units were
designated separately from other units and from the common
elements in order to create separate commercial units. The
Appellants further contend that the language in the Master Deed
and the designations contained in the Exhibits to the Master
Deed indicate that the C-Units would be “units,” as defined in
5
the Master Deed, and that the C-Units would be used for
commercial purposes. The Appellants maintain that the Master
Deed recognized that some of the units would be used for
something other than residential purposes, which units C-1, C-2,
and C-3 are.
The Appellants further assert that the Master Deed
allows for unit designations by letter and number, such as C-1
or P8601 or 406. Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Master Deed
provides that “[f]or the purposes of unit designation, Each Unit
in the Condominium is identified by number, number and letter,
or letter and is delineated in the Exhibits hereto which are
made a part of this Declaration.” The Appellants argue that the
C-Units are the only areas of Gatlinburg Chateau that are
designated with a letter and number, as provided for in the
Master Deed in Article 1, paragraph 12 and in Article 3,
paragraph 1. They also contend that no provision in the Master
Deed provides for the designation of common elements by letter
6
and number, and no areas of the common elements are designated
by letter and number. Thus, the Appellants maintain that the
Master Deed provides that the C-Units are “Units,” which means a
condominium unit in the context of the Master Deed.
Finally, the Appellants contend that the Trial Court
erred in its judgment:
In reaching its conclusion that the C-Units are common
elements of Gatlinburg Chateau, the Trial Court
completely ignored the fact that Article 3, paragraph 1
of the Master Deed provides that each condominium unit
is identified by number, number and letter, or letter,
and that the C-Units are designated by a letter and
number. Based on the definitions contained in the
Master Deed for common elements and units, and based on
the fact that the C-Units are assigned a letter and a
number, a reasonable person would not conclude that the
C-Units are part of the common elements of Gatlinburg
Chateau. [emphasis in Appellants’ brief]
The Appellees, however, argue that the Trial Court
correctly held that the C-units are common elements of the
Gatlinburg Chateau. The Appellees agree with the Appellants’
assertion that the term “Unit” means a condominium unit.
7
However, the Appellees contend that the Appellants leap to the
conclusion that “such a designation automatically renders the C-
units a defined ‘Condominium Unit, Unit, or Apartment’ as
contemplated in the Master Deed.’” The Appellees dispute the
Appellants’ contention that the C-units are the only areas of
Gatlinburg Chateau that are specifically designated with a letter
and number, noting that four penthouse condominium units at
Gatlinburg Chateau are referenced in Exhibits B and D of the
Master Deed by letter and number.
The Appellees maintain that the Appellants’ “reference
to the C-units in the Exhibits to the Master Deed by letter and
number inescapably renders the C-units to be defined a
‘Condominium Unit, Unit or Apartment’ under the Master Deed is
pure sophistry because it fails to consider the qualities and
characteristics that make up a defined ‘Condominiums Unit, Unit,
or Apartment.’” They note that “the Master Deed is noticeably
silent [with] respect to any direct reference to any kind of C-
8
unit or the existence of such a type unit. The C-units are
listed in some of the Exhibits of the Master Deed.” Moreover,
the Appellees argue that the Appellants cannot show any provision
in the Master Deed or the Exhibits that show the C-units as being
equated with the residential units.
A Trial Court’s decision to grant a motion for summary
judgment is not entitled to a presumption of correctness on
appeal. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995).
This Court determines whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been met. Mason v.
Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tenn. 1997).
An evaluation of a summary judgment motion must address
these questions: “(1) whether a factual dispute exists; (2)
whether the disputed fact is material to the outcome of the case;
and (3) whether the disputed fact creates a genuine issue for
9
trial.” Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 214 (Tenn. 1993) (emphasis
in original). When considering a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences must be made in
the nonmoving party’s favor. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210.
In reviewing the master deed and all the accompanying
exhibits, we are of the opinion that the Trial Court properly
concluded that the areas in question are common elements. As the
Trial Court discussed in its memorandum opinion, the Master Deed
provides for condominium units as residences and for common
elements, nothing more. Also, the condominium unit vote
assignment does not include any assignment for votes to the areas
of C-1, C-2, or C-3. Furthermore, the Master Deed does not
provide for any “commercial units” as the Appellants argued.
Finally, Exhibit F, which contains the architectural drawing for
the condominium complex, shows that the areas designated as C-2
and C-3 were originally designated as a “mechanical room” and an
10
“electrical room,” respectively. Thus, such designations would
lead a reasonable person to conclude that areas C-2 and C-3 were
never intended to be considered for occupancy.
In light of the foregoing, we believe that there are no
genuine issues of material fact which must be determined by
trial. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, and the
cause is remanded for such further proceedings, if any as may be
necessary, consistent with this opinion. Having affirmed the
judgment of the Trial Court, we need not address the Appellees’
issue on appeal. Costs of appeal are adjudged against Gatlinburg
Condo Management, Inc.
________________________
Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
CONCUR:
11
__________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
__________________________
D. Michael Swiney, J.
12