FILED
December 10, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
_________________________________________________
JOHN WAYNE SLATE, SR., et al., ) C.A. No. M1998-00434-COA-R3-CV
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
) Davidson Circuit No. 98C1717
)
vs. ) The Hon. Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
) Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al., )
)
Defendants-Appellees. ) AFFIRMED
John Wayne Slate, Sr., Pro Se for Appellant
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor
General; Martha A. Tarleton, Senior Counsel Civil Rights and Claims Division for
State of Tennessee, Chancellor Kilcrease; Judges Todd, Cantrell and Koch; Cecil
Crowson, Jr.
John L. Kennedy; Amber St. John of Nashville, for Appellee, Bonnyman
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
INMAN, Senior Judge
This matter is appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the
Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.
Page 1
A prisoner alleges a violation of his civil rights as a result of the assessment
and collection of court costs from him. He initiated the case at bar by filing a
complaint in the Davidson County Circuit Court, alleging that both the Davidson
County Chancery Court and the Tennessee Court of Appeals erred in taxing costs
against him upon disposition of earlier cases heard by both courts. The Davidson
County Circuit Court dismissed the cause, and the appellant perfected an appeal to
this Court. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Plaintiff, John Wayne Slate (“Slate”) is an inmate in the custody of the
Tennessee Department of Correction. In a prior and unrelated case, Slate v. State
of Tenn. Parole Bd., No. 01A01-9710-CH-00540 (Tenn. App. Dec. 17, 1997), the
Middle Section of this Court dismissed Slate’s appeal for his failure to file a brief as
required by Rule 29 T.R.A.P. The order of dismissal entered by Judges Todd,
Cantrell and Koch taxed the costs of the appeal to the appellant Slate. The State of
Tennessee, through the Appellate Court Clerk, thereupon undertook efforts to
collect the costs.
On June 24, 1998, Slate filed the present action in the Davidson County
Circuit Court on behalf of himself and his three children, Shane Wayne Slate, Roy
Slate and John Slate, Jr. Named as defendants were the State of Tennessee,
Chancellor Irvin Kilcrease, Jr.; Judge Henry F. Todd; Judge Ben H. Cantrell; Judge
William C. Koch, Jr.; Clerk and Master Claudia Bonnyman; and Appellate Court
Clerk Cecil Crowson, Jr. Slate alleged that the defendants had violated his civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a result of their efforts to collect court costs from
him. Exhibited to his complaint were Inmate Trust Fund Transaction Statements
which showed deductions from Slate’s inmate trust fund account between February
Page 2
12, 1998 and June 15, 1998. He attached to the complaint a copy of the Bill of
Costs issued to him by the Clerk and Master on June 12, 1998, in regard to
Davidson County Chancery Court Cause No. 96-1921-I for $122.00, together with
two writs of execution issued by the Appellate Court Clerk in the amounts of
$608.50 and $181.75 and four Statements for Appellate Court Costs issued by this
Court in regard to Cause Nos. 01A01-9710-CH-00540, 01A01-9704-CH-00155,
03A01-9711-CH-00541, and 03A01-9708-CV-00369. Examination of the various
docket numbers indicates that the appellant claims to be aggrieved by the courts’
efforts to collect costs in a number of separate cases.
On August 27, 1998, the Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss on behalf
of the State of Tennessee, Chancellor Kilcrease, Judge Todd, Judge Cantrell, Judge
Koch and Appellate Clerk Crowson. By order entered October 30, 1998, the
Davidson County Circuit Court dismissed Slate’s claims against the aforementioned
defendants. Slate filed a notice of appeal on November 9, 1998. On March 2, 1999,
Claudia Bonnyman filed a motion to dismiss the remainder of the complaint. Slate
did not respond. The trial court entered an order on June 14, 1999, dismissing the
remainder of Slate’s claims.
Under Rule 4(d) T.R.A.P., a prematurely filed notice of appeal is considered
effective upon entry of the final judgment in the trial court. Therefore, the notice of
appeal filed by Slate on November 9, 1998, was effective on June 14, 1999, the date
the trial court entered the final order in this cause.
The cause is properly before this Court for adjudication. Under Rule 13(d)
T.R.A.P., our review is de novo upon the record, with no presumption of the
correctness of the trial court’s ruling.
Page 3
The doctrine of judicial immunity affords judges, acting within their judicial
capacities, absolute immunity from civil liability. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that this doctrine extends to suits brought against judges for
constitutional violations. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218
(1967), the United States Supreme Court held that judges sued under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 have absolute immunity for acts committed within their judicial capacities. The
Court stated:
It is a judge’s duty to decide all cases within his discretion
that are brought before him, including controversial cases
that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His
errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have
to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with
litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a
burden on judges would contribute not to principled and
fearless decision-making but to intimidation.
We do not believe that this settled principle of law was
abolished by § 1983...The legislative record gives no clear
indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all
common-law immunities. Id. at 554.
The immunity rule applies equally to judges in both the federal and state
courts. In Harris v. Witt, 552 S.W.2d 85 (Tenn. 1977), the Tennessee Supreme
Court stated:
It is generally recognized that a judge is immune from civil
liability for bona fide acts done within the exercise of his
judicial function while acting within the limits of his
jurisdiction.
Id. at 85. (Emphasis Added).
That same conclusion has been reached by this Court in Graham v. Dodson,
830 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). See also, Heath v. Cornelius, 511
S.W.2d 683 (Tenn. 1974).
It must, therefore, be determined whether the judge was acting within a “
Page 4
judicial” capacity. In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, reh’g
denied 436 U.S. 951, 98 S.Ct. 2862 (1978), the Supreme Court defined “judicial” as
follows:
The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors
determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one
relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a
function normally preformed by a judge, and to the
expectation of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the
judge in his judicial capacity.
435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1107.
In the case at bar, Slate’s complaint against Chancellor Kilcrease, Judge
Cantrell, Judge Koch and Judge Todd is essentially that the aforementioned judges,
acting within their judicial capacities, dismissed his case and taxed court costs to
him. This is precisely the type of conduct that the doctrine of judicial immunity is
designed to preclude. Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s
determination that the Chancellor and Court of Appeals Judges are immune from
civil liability for their action.
Likewise, we find that Clerk and Master Bonnyman and Appellate Clerk
Crowson are also immune from civil liability for their acts in collecting court costs
from Slate. The doctrine of judicial immunity has been extended in Tennessee and
other jurisdictions to persons other than judges. Miller v. Niblack, 942 S.W.2d
533, 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
Courts have long recognized the “danger that disappointed litigants, blocked
by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent
their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts...” Scruggs v.
Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 377 (7 th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.956, 110 S.Ct. 371
(1989). Therefore, courts have held that where auxiliary court personnel, such as
Page 5
court clerks, perform functions integral to the judicial process or act pursuant to a
judge’s or court’s order, they are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7 th Cir. 1992);
Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853, 856 (8 th Cir. 1988)(clerks enjoy absolute
immunity for acts they are required to do at a judge’s discretion); Smith v.
Rosenbaum, 460 F.2d 1019 (3 rd Cir. 1972).
The claims against Bonnyman arose out of her actions to enforce the
Chancery Court’s order regarding the taxing of costs against Slate in Davidson
County Chancery Cause No. 96-1921-I. Similarly, the claims against Crowson arose
out of his efforts to collect costs taxed against Slate in various orders entered by the
Court of Appeals. We find that under the authorities cited above, Bonnyman and
Crowson were performing acts integral to the judicial process and pursuant to orders
entered by the Chancery Court and Court of Appeals, respectively. We find that
Bonnyman and Crowson are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from civil
liability. The trial court was correct in dismissing the claims against both Bonnyman
and Crowson.
Slate also named the State of Tennessee as a defendant in this cause. The
State of Tennessee enjoys sovereign immunity, and suits against it may only be
brought in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may direct. Tenn.
Const. art. I, § 17. T.C.A. § 20-13-102(a) provides:
(a) No court in the state shall have any power, jurisdiction,
or authority to entertain any suit against the state, or against
any officer of the state acting by authority of the state, with
a view to reach the state, its treasury funds, or property,
and all such suits shall be dismissed as to the state or such
officers, on motion, plea, or demurrer of the law officer of
the state, or counsel employed for the state.
Page 6
In addition to suing the State of Tennessee, Slate sued defendants Kilcrease,
Todd, Cantrell, Koch, Crowson and Bonnyman in their official capacities.
Chancellor Kilcrease and Judges Todd, Cantrell and Koch are state officers by
operation of T.C.A. § 16-11-101 et seq. and T.C.A. § 16-4-101 et seq., respectively.
Likewise, Appellate Court Clerk Crowson is also a state officer by operation of
T.C.A. § 16-4-106, as is Clerk and Master Bonnyman, by operation of T.C.A.
18-5-101 et seq. In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct.
2304 (1989), the United States Supreme Court stated:
Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit
against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a
suit against the official but rather is a suit against the
official’s office. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471,
105 S.Ct. 873, 877, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985). As such, it is
no different from a suit against the state itself.
491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court also properly dismissed Slate’s claims
against the State of Tennessee and the individual defendants in their official
capacities. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of the appeal
are assessed to the appellant.
All of the Judges of the Court of Appeals having recused themselves from a
consideration of this case, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee,
pursuant to his statutory authority, designated the undersigned Senior Judges of
Tennessee to hear this case.
_______________________________
John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Page 7
_______________________________
William H. Inman, Senior Judge
_____________________________________
James L. Weatherford, Senior Judge
Page 8