COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
NANCY BRECKENRIDGE
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 2198-98-4 PER CURIUM
JUNE 8, 1999
CHARLES T. BRECKENRIDGE
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY
John W. Scott, Jr., Judge
(Nicholas A. Pappas, on briefs), for
appellant.
(William G. Dade, on brief), for appellee.
Nancy Breckenridge appeals the equitable distribution award
of the circuit court. She contends that the trial court erred in
(1) its classification of certain items of personal property; (2)
its valuation of certain items of marital property; and (3) its
division of the equity in the marital residence and the retirement
benefits of her husband, Charles T. Breckenridge. Upon reviewing
the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal
is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision
of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
"Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the
sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be set
aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support
*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
it." Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 S.E.2d
675, 678 (1990). "Unless it appears from the record that the
trial judge has not considered or has misapplied one of the
statutory mandates, this Court will not reverse on appeal."
Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 56, 378 S.E.2d 626, 630
(1989).
Classification of Property
The wife contends that the trial court erred by classifying
three guns as husband's separate property while classifying a
van she received from her family as marital property. We find
no error.
Husband acquired two guns during the marriage. The trial
court's memorandum opinion demonstrates that it considered some
portion of husband's gun collection to be marital property
because it was acquired during the marriage. The court then
awarded the entire collection to husband. We find no error in
the trial court's classification of the gun collection.
Wife challenges the trial court’s classification of the
1995 van as a marital asset. We find no indication that wife
raised this objection before the trial court. It is not
included in either the motion for reconsideration or the noted
exceptions to the trial court’s final decree. In the reply
brief, wife asserts that she raised this argument in detail in a
trial memorandum filed with the court. Wife also asserts that
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the memorandum was part of the record in this case. Our review
of the record before us discloses no trial memorandum in which
wife set out this objection. We also note that wife did not
cite the memorandum when indicating where the question presented
had been preserved. See Rule 5A:20(c). As neither the motion
for reconsideration nor the exceptions to the final decree
contain this objection, we find that, in the record before us,
it was not preserved for appeal. Therefore, we will not
consider this contention. See Rule 5A:18.
Valuation of Marital Property
The wife also contends that the trial court erred when it
valued husband's gun collection at $0 and accepted husband's
value for the parties' personal property. Although the wife
argued before the trial court that the gun valuation was
erroneous, counsel conceded that no evidence as to value was
presented. The trial court expressly noted that it could not
value the collection in the absence of any evidence. In light
of the fact that the parties failed to present evidence from
which the court could calculate a value for the gun collection,
we find no error in the trial court's decision to give the
collection no value.
The husband presented an exhibit setting out purported
values for items of property held by the parties. The basis for
the assigned value was included in the exhibit as well as
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described in the husband's testimony. The wife gave an
undifferentiated estimate that all items in her possession were
worth "maybe, five thousand dollars." "The burden is on the
parties to provide the trial court sufficient evidence from
which it can value their property." Bosserman v. Bosserman, 9
Va. App. 1, 5, 384 S.E.2d 104, 107 (1989). We cannot say, based
upon the evidence presented by the parties, that the trial
court's decision to accept the husband's valuation evidence was
clearly erroneous.
Division of Marital Property
The wife argues that the trial court erred when it ordered
the payment of $10,000 to the husband's mother from the proceeds
of the sale of the marital residence as repayment of a loan.
The husband testified that his mother provided the $10,000 down
payment towards the purchase of the marital residence. He
introduced into evidence the deeds of sale and of trust which
indicated that the parties financed only $130,500 of the total
purchase price of $145,000 when they purchased the marital
residence. The wife did not refute the husband's testimony that
his mother provided funds towards the down payment. While the
husband's mother testified that she made additional payments to
the parties after the purchase of the home, she also clearly
stated that the payments she made were not gifts. Evidence
supports the trial court's decision that there was a marital
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debt of $10,000 owed to the husband's mother. The statute
authorizes the trial court to direct the payment of this debt
from the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence. See
Code § 20-107.3(C). Therefore, we find no error.
As noted above, we find no error in the trial court's
decision to accept the valuation evidence presented by the
husband for the parties' personal property. The trial court
ruled that it would not award wife an interest in either the
husband's Thrift Savings Plan account or his FERS benefit, in
part due to the disposition of the personal property and because
of the husband's "relatively brief period of employment with the
Federal Government." Virginia's equitable distribution scheme
does not provide "a statutory presumption of equal
distribution." Papuchis v. Papuchis, 2 Va. App. 130, 132, 341
S.E.2d 829, 830 (1986). We find no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's division of the parties' property.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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