COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judge Bray, Senior Judges Duff and Overton
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
DENITA ANTOINETTE HALL
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0642-98-4 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
APRIL 13, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
John E. Kloch, Judge
Jonathan D. Westreich for appellant.
Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Denita Antoinette Hall (defendant) was convicted in a bench
trial for unlawfully wounding Sylvester Davis (Davis), a violation
of Code § 18.2-51. On appeal, defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, proving,
instead, self-defense as a matter of law. We disagree and affirm
the conviction.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of the appeal.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider
the record in “the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
granting to it all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom,”
Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418
(1987), discarding all conflicting evidence of the accused. See
Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 303, 429 S.E.2d 477, 479
(1993) (citation omitted). The credibility of witnesses, the
weight accorded testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from
proven facts are matters to be determined by the fact finder.
See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473,
476 (1989). The judgment of a trial court will be disturbed on
appeal only if plainly wrong or without support in the record.
See Code § 8.01-680.
Here, the evidence established that defendant and Davis had
engaged in a violent relationship for approximately twelve years,
during which they cohabited and produced five children. When
Commonwealth witness Warren Hinton arrived at their home during
the early afternoon of October 2, 1997, defendant was “arguing at
[Davis] about something.” Hinton watched as defendant “snatched a
burning cigarette . . . [and] beer . . . out of [Davis’] hand,”
and Davis “‘smushed’ (PHONETIC) her head.” Hinton “turned around
and left” but reentered the house “[a]bout a minute” later.
Upon returning, Hinton found defendant “hysterical,” armed
with a knife in her raised right hand, and facing Davis, then
holding a chair “at his abdomen section[,] . . . swinging it out.”
When Hinton heard defendant warn Davis “‘I told you what was going
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to happen the next time you hit me’ . . . [or] ‘put your hands on
me,’” Hinton “yelled . . . and asked why was they doing that.”
Davis “dropped” the chair, and defendant “stabbed him.”
At trial, Davis, testifying as a defense witness, recalled
that, while “he was trying to hit [defendant] with the chair,
. . . trying to hit her in the head,” defendant “had a knife . . .
[and] was defending herself.” He “dropped” the chair, “lung[ing]
at her forward . . . because [he] thought [he] could take the
knife from her[,] . . . [and] was stabbed.” However, during a
hospital interview with Detective William Scott immediately
following the incident, Davis stated that “him and [defendant] had
been arguing, and [defendant] went into the kitchen and came out
with a knife, and that’s when he grabbed the chair, and he held it
up in front of him to protect himself.”
Defendant testified that Davis had been drinking heavily and
“started screaming . . . about . . . the telephone bill.” An
argument ensued, and Davis “mudged (PHONETIC) and slapped
[defendant] in [her] face.” He then “pick[ed] up [a] metal chair,
. . . chased [defendant] down the hallway . . . towards the
kitchen,” and “swung [the chair], . . . hit[ting] the back of
[her] leg.” Defendant “picked . . . up” a steak knife, “to keep
[Davis] back.” Davis suddenly “dropped the chair,” and attacked
defendant “with his hands, proceeding to choke [her].” Defendant
recalled that she was “terrified” and “took the knife and . . .
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popped him in the chest.” When confronted with a prior
inconsistent statement, also given to Detective Scott, defendant
explained that she was “scared, . . . hysterical, . . . tried to
minimize what happened, . . . and . . . didn’t want to be blamed
for it.”
In convicting defendant of unlawful wounding, the trial judge
concluded that “the only totally credible witness is Mr. Hinton,
. . . [who] was motivated towards the Defendant, if anyone, . . .
was largely unimpeached . . ., and . . . [was] supported almost
totally by the physical evidence.” The court noted that “Mr.
Davis’ credibility is seriously questioned . . . [because] [h]e
was drunk when it happened, . . . changed his story a number of
times, and [testified] inconsistent[ly] with the physical
evidence[,] . . . [and] Mr. Hinton’s testimony.” Similarly, the
trial judge discounted defendant’s testimony, observing that she
“admitted telling lies” and had an “obvious interest in the case.”
It is well established that “a person who reasonably
apprehends bodily harm by another is privileged to exercise
reasonable force to repel the assault.” Diffendal v.
Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 417, 421, 382 S.E.2d 24, 25 (1989)
(citations omitted). However, such force “‘shall not, except in
extreme cases, endanger human life or do great bodily harm.’” Id.
at 421, 382 S.E.2d at 26 (citation omitted). “Self-defense is an
affirmative defense which the accused must prove by introducing
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sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about his guilt.”
Smith v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 68, 71, 435 S.E.2d 414, 416
(1993) (citation omitted). “Whether an accused proves
circumstances sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that he
acted in self-defense is a question of fact.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Here, the evidence disclosed that a violent argument erupted
between defendant and Davis after defendant “snatched” a cigarette
and beer from Davis’ hand, and Davis “smushed” defendant’s head.
Defendant armed herself with a knife and confronted Davis, warning
him, “‘I told you what was going to happen the next time you hit
me.’” Davis held a chair against his person to “protect himself”
from defendant, but she “popped” him in the chest when he lowered
it. Such circumstances support the trial court’s finding that
defendant stabbed Davis “with intent to maim, disfigure, disable
or kill him unlawfully,” unaided by the privilege of self-defense.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
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