COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Bumgardner
DAVID LEWIS GIBBS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1117-98-3 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
APRIL 6, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
James F. Ingram, Judge
(Lee Hendricks Turpin, on brief), for
appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General;
Richard B. Campbell, Assistant Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee
submitting on brief.
David Gibbs (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial of
perjury, in violation of Code § 18.2-434. 1 On appeal, he
contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt.
We disagree and affirm his conviction.
I.
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
1
The trial court convicted appellant of two counts of
perjury. We granted appellant's petition for appeal on only one
count, concerning appellant's statements about his operation of
a motor vehicle.
therefrom. See Juares v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156,
493 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997). So viewed, the evidence established
that on June 11, 1997, Detective Mark Hendrix observed appellant
driving a brown Chrysler Lebaron near Hughes Street and
Chatelaine Avenue in the City of Danville. 2 Appellant was
exceeding the speed limit, and his rear license plate was
improperly displayed on his vehicle. The officer saw only one
occupant in the vehicle, whom he later identified as appellant.
Hendrix activated his lights and followed appellant's car
through College Park and onto Highway 86. As appellant crossed
the state line into North Carolina, Hendrix turned off his
lights and returned to Danville. The officer later determined
that the owner of the vehicle was an individual named "David
Lewis Gibbs," who resided at 148 South Hunter Street. Hendrix
drove to that address and "[w]hen [he] first pulled up, the
Lebaron was setting [sic] there in the driveway . . . ."
Hendrix arrested appellant for driving on a suspended
license, eluding the police and possession of cocaine.
Appellant made the following statement to the police:
[Hendrix]: Okay. Ah, now I think this was
about a few minutes after twelve, . . .
[and] you were over at Chatelaine and
Edmonds Street. Is that right?
[Appellant]: Yes sir.
2
Hughes Street and Chatelaine Avenue run parallel to each
other and are both intersected by Edmonds Street.
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Appellant also admitted that he was driving a brown Chrysler
Lebaron that afternoon.
At his September 26, 1997 suppression hearing and trial for
the driving offense and possession of cocaine, appellant
testified under oath that he was not telling the truth when he
made the confession to Detective Hendrix on June 11, 1997.
Specifically, appellant testified as follows:
Q. Well, . . . how did the story work
itself out?
A. . . . I can still remember . . . how it
actually wound up happening was [Hendrix]
said, he asked me if I was over on Hughes,
or something like Chatelaine. I said, no
sir, no I wasn't. I didn't know what he was
talking about. Basically he said well
here's how it, [sic] he said you was over on
Hughes and Chatelaine, he says, and you know
you was making a buy, you know you was doing
this. I'm like sir, I don't know what
you're talking about. He kept on saying,
yeah you were. I said, yeah, sure,
whatever. So finally he said if I would say
a few things like I was over on Hughes and
Chatelaine making a buy . . . and I was
indeed driving. . . .
Q. So you're saying you weren't driving
either?
A. Yes sir, I am saying that. At that time
I was not driving.
Q. Your own wife said you arrived after her
in the brown Chrysler?
A. She said I arrived. She didn't say I
was driving now, did she?
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Q. Well, who was driving?
A. Sir, I said I wasn't driving at that
time.
Q. Who was driving the brown Chrysler when
you arrived over on South Hunter Street?
A. Well, at that time I think that's a
little irrelevant but, to the whole point of
. . . [.]
Q. It's perfectly relevant, Mr. Gibbs. Who
was driving?
A. I would have to say, when I got in the
yard, I was driving in the yard.
Q. Well, who was driving before you got to
the yard, Mr. Gibbs?
A. Sir, while I was being accused of being
over on Hughes and Chatelaine, I was nowhere
over there.
Q. Who was driving before you got to the
yard on Hunter Street, Mr. Gibbs?
A. Sir, I drove down Hunter Street.
Q. Alright. Where did you come from to get
to Hunter Street?
A. Sir, we was coming from Piney Forest,
basically. It was 29, I guess it's
considered as Piney, I call it . . .[.]
Q. So you never . . . ?
A. . . . Piney Forest.
Q. You never drove over on Edmonds Street?
A. I ain't gonna say I've never drove over
in my life, but I wasn't that day.
Q. That day? That day you didn't?
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A. That day I did not.
(Emphasis added).
At the trial for the perjury charge, Deputy Clerk Brenda
Burnett testified that she administered the oath to appellant on
September 26, 1997 for his suppression hearing. Additionally,
Detective Hendrix testified that on June 11, 1997, he observed
and followed a brown Chrysler Lebaron on Hughes Street and
Chatelaine Avenue. Hendrix also confirmed that the only
occupant in the vehicle was the driver, who was later identified
as appellant. Jody Adam Vaden, appellant's brother-in-law,
testified on appellant's behalf. According to Vaden, appellant
picked him up from the mall on June 11, 1997, and drove directly
to the residence on Hunter Street. Vaden stated that they were
driving in a "gray car" and that they did not drive on
Chatelaine Avenue or Edmonds Street. Following closing
arguments, the trial court convicted appellant of perjury.
II.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on
appeal, we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, and the reasonable
inferences fairly deducible from that evidence support each and
every element of the charged offense. See Moore v.
Commonwealth, 254 Va. 184, 186, 491 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1997); Derr
v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 424, 410 S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991).
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"In so doing, we must discard the evidence of the accused in
conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all
the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair
inferences that may be drawn therefrom." Watkins v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 349, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998).
We will not reverse the judgment of the trial court, sitting as
the finder of fact in a bench trial, unless it is plainly wrong
or without evidence to support it. See Martin v. Commonwealth,
4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987).
The perjury statute under which appellant was convicted
provides as follows:
If any person to whom an oath is lawfully
administered on any occasion willfully swear
falsely on such occasion touching any
material matter or thing, . . . he shall be
guilty of perjury, punishable as a Class 5
felony.
Code § 18.2-434. "In order to sustain a perjury conviction
under this statute, the Commonwealth ha[s] the burden of
proving: (1) that an oath was lawfully administered; (2) that
the defendant wilfully [sic] swore falsely; and (3) that the
facts to which he falsely swore were material to a proper matter
of inquiry." Mendez v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 97, 102, 255
S.E.2d 533, 535 (1979). The Commonwealth bears the burden of
proving each of these elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Holz v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 876, 880,
263 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1980).
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In the instant case, appellant concedes that his statements
concerning the operation of the motor vehicle were made
willingly, under oath and related to a material fact in issue.
However, appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to
establish that he knew the statements were false. We disagree.
"'[A] perjury conviction under Code § 18.2-434 requires
proof of falsity from the testimony of at least two witnesses or
other corroborating evidence of falsity in the event the case is
supported by the testimony of only one witness.'" Stewart v.
Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 117, 120, 468 S.E.2d 126, 127 (1996)
(quoting Keffer v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 545, 549, 404
S.E.2d 745, 747 (1991)). "[A]lthough the corroborating evidence
'must be of a strong character, and not merely corroborative in
slight particulars,' it need not be equal in weight to the
testimony of a second witness. Rather, the corroborating
evidence must confirm the single witness' testimony in a manner
strong enough 'to turn the scale and overcome the oath of the
[defendant] and the legal presumption of his innocence.'" Id.
(citations omitted) (alteration in original).
In the instant case, Detective Hendrix was the only witness
who testified that appellant was driving a brown Chrysler
Lebaron on June 11, 1997, on Hughes Street and Chatelaine
Avenue. Therefore, unless other evidence corroborates Hendrix's
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testimony that appellant testified falsely about not driving on
those two streets, appellant's perjury conviction cannot stand.
Sufficient evidence in the record corroborates Detective
Hendrix's testimony that appellant was driving on Hughes and
Chatelaine. First, appellant's confession to the police was an
admission that he was driving on that particular day in that
particular area of Danville. Appellant made the following
statement:
[Hendrix]: Okay. Ah, now I think this was
about a few minutes after twelve, . . .
[and] you were over at Chatelaine and
Edmonds Street. Is that right?
[Appellant]: Yes sir.
Although appellant later denied driving his vehicle on Hughes
and Chatelaine on the afternoon of his arrest and testified that
his confession was false, the fact finder was not required to
believe him nor give any weight to his testimony. See Marable
v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235
(1998) ("In its role of judging witness credibility, the fact
finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of
the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal
his guilt."). Thus, the trier of fact could conclude that
appellant's confession was, in fact, the truth.
Additionally, the "material and transparent deficiencies"
in appellant's testimony at the suppression hearing corroborates
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the officer's account of the events on June 11, 1997. Stewart,
22 Va. App. at 121, 468 S.E.2d at 128 (noting that the "material
and transparent deficiencies" in the defendant's testimony "turn
the scale" in favor of guilt). During cross-examination by the
Commonwealth's Attorney, appellant wove an inherently incredible
tale in his testimony about who was driving the Chrysler Lebaron
on Hughes and Chatelaine. 3 Appellant gave no plausible
explanation about who was driving the vehicle and the trier of
fact could conclude from appellant's responses that he was lying
to conceal his guilt. Cf. Stewart, 22 Va. App. at 121-22, 468
S.E.2d at 128 ("[Defendant's] lack of knowledge about the basic
details of the accident and ownership of the automobile he
claimed to have been driving, facts that he necessarily would
know or be able to explain, corroborate [the witness'] testimony
that [defendant] perjured himself.").
We recognize that "in a perjury prosecution, the
Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
not only that the statements made under oath by the accused were
false, but also that he knew they were false when made."
3
The Commonwealth's Attorney questioned appellant six times
about "who was driving" the vehicle on that particular day.
Appellant gave the following responses: "I said I wasn't
driving at that time."; "I think that's a little irrelevant
. . . ."; "[W]hen I got to the yard, I was driving in the
yard."; "I was nowhere over there."; "I ain't gonna say I've
never drove over [there] in my life, but I wasn't that day."
Nevertheless, appellant failed to answer the question by the
Commonwealth's Attorney.
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Waldrop v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 210, 215, 495 S.E.2d 822, 825
(1998). In the instant case, the trial court obviously accepted
the Commonwealth's evidence that appellant was, in fact, driving
his vehicle on Hughes and Chatelaine on the afternoon of his
arrest and later lied under oath when he disavowed his earlier
admissions. Consequently, the trial court concluded that
appellant, with knowledge of his whereabouts on June 11, 1997,
willfully swore falsely when he stated under oath that he was
not driving that day. The Commonwealth's evidence, including
the officer's eyewitness identification of appellant,
appellant's own earlier confession, and his evasive answers, was
competent, was not inherently incredible and was sufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of
perjury. Accordingly, appellant's conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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