IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
DECEMBER 1996 SESSION
May 7, 1997
Cecil W. Crowson
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) NO. 01-C-01-9603-CR-00081 Clerk
Appellate Court
)
Appellant, ) DAVIDSON COUNTY
)
V. ) HON. SETH W. NORMAN, JUDGE
)
JUDONE A. LEE ) (Possession of Cocaine and
) Forfeiture)
)
& )
)
WILLIAM C. WATERS, )
)
Appellees. )
FOR THE APPELLEES FOR THE APPELLANT
Glenn R. Funk John Knox Walkup
222 Second Avenue, North, Ste. 340-M Attorney General and Reporter
Nashville, Tennessee 37201 450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
for Judone A. Lee
William David Bridgers
Virginia Lee Story Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 1608 450 James Robertson Parkway
Franklin, Tennessee 37065-1608 Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
for William C. Waters Victor S. Johnson, III
District Attorney General
Washington Square, Ste 500
222 Second Avenue, South
Nashville, Tennessee 37201
John Zimmerman
Assistant District Attorney General
Washington Square, Ste 500
222 Second Avenue, South
Nashville, Tennessee 37201
OPINION FILED:______
REVERSED
William M. Barker, Judge
Opinion
The State of Tennessee appeals as of right the Davidson County Criminal
Court’s dismissal of the Appellees’ indictments for possession of cocaine with intent to
sell or deliver. The trial court found that the Appellees’ protection against former
jeopardy had been violated in that the Appellees had already been punished for their
crimes by the State’s seizure of two vehicles used in the drug sale. The State argues
on appeal that the civil forfeiture of the Appellees’ vehicles does not amount to
punishment pursuant to the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and the
Tennessee Constitutions. We agree and reverse the trial court.
On May 23, 1994, undercover officers bought $ 9,000.00 worth of cocaine from
the Appellees and one other person. It is undisputed that the Appellees used one
1978 Cadillac belonging to Appellee Waters and one 1984 Ford Probe belonging to
Appellee Lee to facilitate the drug sale. The following day the State filed a notice of
seizure for the two vehicles with the Tennessee Department of Safety, pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated, section 53-11-201. Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-11-201
(Supp. 1996).
On May 16, 1995, the Appellees were indicted for possession of cocaine with
intent to sell or deliver. In June and July the Appellees filed motions to dismiss the
indictments on double jeopardy grounds alleging that criminal prosecution would
amount to double jeopardy since they had already been punished by the civil
forfeiture.1 After a hearing, the Davidson County Criminal Court granted both motions
and dismissed the indictments. The State now appeals.
The State argues that civil forfeiture followed by criminal prosecution in
connection with the same criminal activity does not place the Appellees in double
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The Department of Safety later returned Appellee Lee’s car in return for a $100 donation to the
Metropolitan Nashville Police Department Drug Enforcement Fund. Appellee Lee now contends that the
fact that he was forced to make the donation amounts to punishment in violation of the protection
against d ouble jeo pardy. App ellee Lee’s donation has no effect on the outco me o f this opinion .
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jeopardy. The State is correct.
The double jeopardy provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and
Tennessee were designed to make sure that no person would be prosecuted twice or
receive multiple punishment for the same offense. See United States v. Dixon, 509
U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2856, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993); State v. Harris, 919
S.W.2d 323, 327 (Tenn. 1996). Since the trial court’s dismissal of the indictments at
issue, the United States Supreme Court has held that a civil forfeiture in connection
with a criminal indictment does not amount to double jeopardy under the United States
Constitution. United States V. Ursery, __ U.S.__, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549
(1996). This Court has applied the results of the Ursery decision to the double
jeopardy provision of the Tennessee Constitution and held that a civil forfeiture
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated, section 53-11-201, does not prohibit the
State from bringing criminal charges against drug offenders whose property has been
forfeited to the State. See State of Tennessee v. James C. Bradely and Mickey Eller,
C.C.A. No. 03C01-9510-CC-00318 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Sept 4, 1996); State
of Tennessee v. Charles David Wagner, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9511-CC-00346 (Tenn.
Crim. App., Knoxville, Sept. 18, 1996); State of Tennessee v. Grapel Simpson and
Linda Sue Simpson Horton, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9508-CC-00240 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
Jackson, Sept. 30, 1996). Pursuant to these decisions we conclude that criminal
prosecutions for possession of cocaine in addition to the civil forfeiture of the
Appellees’ vehicles do not place the Appellees at risk of double jeopardy.
Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of the indictments is reversed and this case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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__________________________
WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUDGE
CONCUR:
__________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
__________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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