UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
No. 97-20008
Summary Calendar
__________________
Beatrice M. Thomas,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
Exxon Company U.S.A.,
Defendant-Appellee.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
(H-95-CV-939)
______________________________________________
August 1, 1997
Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:*
Beatrice M. Thomas brought suit against her employer, Exxon
Company U.S.A. (“Exxon”), for race discrimination, national origin
discrimination, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district
court granted Exxon’s motion for summary judgment on Thomas’s Title
VII claims because she did not file her action within the ninety-
day period prescribed by statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
A jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of Exxon on
Thomas’s § 1981 discrimination claim.1 Thomas appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Exxon on her Title
VII claims. In addition, Thomas argues that the district court
committed reversible error when it admitted certain evidence at
trial.
It is undisputed that the EEOC issued Thomas a notice of her
right to sue on December 20, 1994. The Commission sent the notice
by certified mail to the address that Thomas had previously
provided. On December 23, 1994, the receipt was signed by Thomas’s
eighteen-year-old daughter. Thomas actually received the notice on
December 28, 1994. Thomas filed suit on March 28, 1995, ninety-
five days after her daughter acknowledged receipt of the notice.
The language of Title VII provides that the ninety-day period
to bring a civil action begins to run from “the giving of such
notice,” rather than on the day that such notice is actually
received. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Espinoza v. Missouri Pac.
R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1249 (5th Cir. 1985). This court has
1
The district court granted Exxon’s motion for summary judgment
on Thomas’s § 1981 retaliation claim. Thomas does not challenge
that decision on appeal.
2
recognized that “ordinarily the purposes of the Act will be served
by commencement of the ninety-day period on the date that notice is
received at the address supplied to the EEOC by the claimant.”
Espinoza, 754 F.2d at 1249. Thus, the limitations period began to
run in this case when Thomas’s daughter acknowledged receipt of the
notice at the address Thomas provided to the EEOC. Thomas actually
received the notice eighty-five days before the ninety-day
limitations period expired. Although commencement of the ninety-
day period may be delayed pursuant to the doctrine of equitable
tolling, that doctrine is inapplicable in the instant case. See
id. at 1250-51; see also Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264,
267-68 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 196, 121
L.Ed.2d 139 (1992). Accordingly, Thomas’s failure to file her
Title VII claims within the ninety-day limitations period bars her
claims.
Thomas also argues that the district court erred by admitting
evidence at trial of allegations that she had damaged her computer
at work after learning that she had been terminated. We conclude,
however, that Thomas’s failure to timely and specifically object to
the introduction of this evidence precludes our review of the
propriety of its admission. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1); United
States v. Martinez, 962 F.2d 1161, 1166 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1992).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.
3
4