Bowles v. Russell

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BOWLES v. RUSSELL, WARDEN

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 06–5306. Argued March 26, 2007—Decided June 14, 2007
Having failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the Federal District
Court’s denial of habeas relief, petitioner Bowles moved to reopen the
filing period pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6),
which allows a district court to grant a 14-day extension under cer
tain conditions, see 28 U. S. C. §2107(c). The District Court granted
Bowles’ motion but inexplicably gave him 17 days to file his notice of
appeal. He filed within the 17 days allowed by the District Court, but
after the 14-day period allowed by Rule 4(a)(6) and §2107(c). The
Sixth Circuit held that the notice was untimely and that it therefore
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case under this Court’s precedent.
Held: Bowles’ untimely notice of appeal—though filed in reliance upon
the District Court’s order—deprived the Sixth Circuit of jurisdiction.
Pp. 2–10.
(a) The taking of an appeal in a civil case within the time pre
scribed by statute is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Griggs v. Provi
dent Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 61 (per curiam). There is
a significant distinction between time limitations set forth in a stat
ute such as §2107, which limit a court’s jurisdiction, see, e.g., Kon
trick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 453, and those based on court rules,
which do not, see, e.g., id., at 454. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S.
500, 505, and Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 314, distin
guished. Because Congress decides, within constitutional bounds,
whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine
when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them. See
United States v. Curry, 6 How. 106, 113. And when an “appeal has
not been prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time limited
by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”
Id., at 113. The resolution of this case follows naturally from this
2 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

Syllabus

reasoning. Because Congress specifically limited the amount of time
by which district courts can extend the notice-of-appeal period in
§2107(c), Bowles’ failure to file in accordance with the statute de
prived the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction. And because Bowles’ er
ror is one of jurisdictional magnitude, he cannot rely on forfeiture or
waiver to excuse his lack of compliance. Pp. 4–8.
(b) Bowles’ reliance on the “unique circumstances” doctrine, rooted
in Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S.
215 (per curiam) and applied in Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384 (per
curiam), is rejected. Because this Court has no authority to create
equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the doc
trine is illegitimate. Harris Truck Lines and Thompson are overruled
to the extent they purport to authorize an exception to a jurisdic
tional rule. Pp. 8–9.
432 F. 3d 668, affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ.,
joined.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 06–5306
_________________

KEITH BOWLES, PETITIONER v. HARRY RUSSELL,

WARDEN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 14, 2007]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, a District Court purported to extend a
party’s time for filing an appeal beyond the period allowed
by statute. We must decide whether the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed after the
statutory period but within the period allowed by the
District Court’s order. We have long and repeatedly held
that the time limits for filing a notice of appeal are juris
dictional in nature. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner’s
untimely notice—even though filed in reliance upon a
District Court’s order—deprived the Court of Appeals of
jurisdiction.
I
In 1999, an Ohio jury convicted petitioner Keith Bowles
of murder for his involvement in the beating death of Ollie
Gipson. The jury sentenced Bowles to 15 years to life
imprisonment. Bowles unsuccessfully challenged his
conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
Bowles then filed a federal habeas corpus application on
September 5, 2002. On September 9, 2003, the District
Court denied Bowles habeas relief. After the entry of final
2 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

Opinion of the Court

judgment, Bowles had 30 days to file a notice of appeal.
Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A); 28 U. S. C. §2107(a). He
failed to do so. On December 12, 2003, Bowles moved to
reopen the period during which he could file his notice of
appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6), which allows district
courts to extend the filing period for 14 days from the day
the district court grants the order to reopen, provided
certain conditions are met. See §2107(c).
On February 10, 2004, the District Court granted
Bowles’ motion. But rather than extending the time pe
riod by 14 days, as Rule 4(a)(6) and §2107(c) allow, the
District Court inexplicably gave Bowles 17 days—until
February 27—to file his notice of appeal. Bowles filed his
notice on February 26—within the 17 days allowed by the
District Court’s order, but after the 14-day period allowed
by Rule 4(a)(6) and §2107(c).
On appeal, respondent Russell argued that Bowles’
notice was untimely and that the Court of Appeals there
fore lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court of
Appeals agreed. It first recognized that this Court has
consistently held the requirement of filing a timely notice
of appeal is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” 432 F. 3d 668,
673 (CA6 2005) (citing Browder v. Director, Dept. of Cor
rections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 264 (1978)). The court also
noted that courts of appeals have uniformly held that Rule
4(a)(6)’s 180-day period for filing a motion to reopen is also
mandatory and not susceptible to equitable modification.
432 F. 3d, at 673 (collecting cases). Concluding that “the
fourteen-day period in Rule 4(a)(6) should be treated as
strictly as the 180-day period in that same Rule,” id., at
676, the Court of Appeals held that it was without juris
diction. We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. ___ (2006), and
now affirm.
II
According to 28 U. S. C. §2107(a), parties must file
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Opinion of the Court

notices of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the judg
ment being appealed. District courts have limited author
ity to grant an extension of the 30-day time period. Rele
vant to this case, if certain conditions are met, district
courts have the statutory authority to grant motions to
reopen the time for filing an appeal for 14 additional days.
§2107(c). Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce
dure carries §2107 into practice. In accord with §2107(c),
Rule 4(a)(6) describes the district court’s authority to
reopen and extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
after the lapse of the usual 30 days:
“(6) Reopening the Time to File an Appeal.
“The district court may reopen the time to file an
appeal for a period of 14 days after the date when its
order to reopen is entered, but only if all the following
conditions are satisfied:
“(A) the motion is filed within 180 days after the
judgment or order is entered or within 7 days after
the moving party receives notice of the entry, which
ever is earlier;
“(B) the court finds that the moving party was enti
tled to notice of the entry of the judgment or order
sought to be appealed but did not receive the notice
from the district court or any party within 21 days af
ter entry; and
“(C) the court finds that no party would be preju
diced.” (Emphasis added.)1
It is undisputed that the District Court’s order in this
case purported to reopen the filing period for more than 14
days. Thus, the question before us is whether the Court of
Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed
——————
1 The Rule was amended, effective December 1, 2005, to require that

notice be pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 77(d). The substance is
otherwise unchanged.
4 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

Opinion of the Court

outside the 14-day window allowed by §2107(c) but within
the longer period granted by the District Court.
A
This Court has long held that the taking of an appeal
within the prescribed time is “mandatory and jurisdic
tional.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459
U. S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted);2 accord, Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236,
247 (1998); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S.
312, 314–315 (1988); Browder, supra, at 264. Indeed, even
prior to the creation of the circuit courts of appeals, this
Court regarded statutory limitations on the timing of
appeals as limitations on its own jurisdiction. See Scar
borough v. Pargoud, 108 U. S. 567, 568 (1883) (“[T]he writ
of error in this case was not brought within the time lim
ited by law, and we have consequently no jurisdiction”);
United States v. Curry, 6 How. 106, 113 (1848) (“[A]s this
appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed,
within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be
——————
2 Griggs and several other of this Court’s decisions ultimately rely on

United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 229 (1960), for the proposition
that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. As the
dissent notes, we have recently questioned Robinson’s use of the term
“jurisdictional.” Post, at 2 (opinion of SOUTER, J.) Even in our cases
criticizing Robinson, however, we have noted the jurisdictional signifi
cance of the fact that a time limit is set forth in a statute, see infra, at
5–6, and have even pointed to §2107 as a statute deserving of jurisdic
tional treatment. Infra, at 6. Additionally, because we rely on those
cases in reaching today’s holding, the dissent’s rhetoric claiming that
we are ignoring their reasoning is unfounded.
Regardless of this Court’s past careless use of terminology, it is
indisputable that time limits for filing a notice of appeal have been
treated as jurisdictional in American law for well over a century.
Consequently, the dissent’s approach would require the repudiation of a
century’s worth of precedent and practice in American courts. Given
the choice between calling into question some dicta in our recent
opinions and effectively overruling a century’s worth of practice, we
think the former option is the only prudent course.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

Opinion of the Court

dismissed for want of jurisdiction”). Reflecting the consis
tency of this Court’s holdings, the courts of appeals rou
tinely and uniformly dismiss untimely appeals for lack of
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Atkins v. Medical Dept. of Augusta
Cty. Jail, No. 06–7792, 2007 WL 1048810 (CA4, Apr. 4,
2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also 15A C. Wright,
A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
§3901, p. 6 (2d ed. 1992) (“The rule is well settled that
failure to file a timely notice of appeal defeats the jurisdic
tion of a court of appeals”). In fact, the author of today’s
dissent recently reiterated that “[t]he accepted fact is that
some time limits are jurisdictional even though expressed
in a separate statutory section from jurisdictional grants,
see, e.g., . . . §2107 (providing that notice of appeal in civil
cases must be filed ‘within thirty days after the entry of
such judgment’).” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S.
149, 160, n. 6 (2003) (majority opinion of SOUTER, J.,
joined by STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., inter
alios) (citation omitted).
Although several of our recent decisions have under
taken to clarify the distinction between claims-processing
rules and jurisdictional rules, none of them calls into
question our longstanding treatment of statutory time
limits for taking an appeal as jurisdictional. Indeed, those
decisions have also recognized the jurisdictional signifi
cance of the fact that a time limitation is set forth in a
statute. In Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443 (2004), we held
that failure to comply with the time requirement in Fed
eral Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004 did not affect a
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Critical to our analysis
was the fact that “[n]o statute . . . specifies a time limit for
filing a complaint objecting to the debtor’s discharge.” 540
U. S., at 448. Rather, the filing deadlines in the Bank
ruptcy Rules are “ ‘procedural rules adopted by the Court
for the orderly transaction of its business’ ” that are “ ‘not
jurisdictional.’ ” Id., at 454 (quoting Schacht v. United
6 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

Opinion of the Court

States, 398 U. S. 58, 64 (1970)). Because “[o]nly Congress
may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction,” 540 U. S., at 452 (citing U. S. Const., Art. III,
§1), it was improper for courts to use “the term ‘jurisdic
tional’ to describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of
court,” 540 U. S., at 454. See also Eberhart v. United
States, 546 U. S. 12 (2005) (per curiam). As a point of
contrast, we noted that §2107 contains the type of statu
tory time constraints that would limit a court’s jurisdic
tion. 540 U. S., at 453, and n. 8.3 Nor do Arbaugh v. Y &
H Corp., 546 U. S. 500 (2006), or Scarborough v. Principi,
541 U. S. 401 (2004), aid petitioner. In Arbaugh, the
statutory limitation was an employee-numerosity re
quirement, not a time limit. 546 U. S., at 505. Scarbor
ough, which addressed the availability of attorney’s fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act, concerned “a mode
of relief . . . ancillary to the judgment of a court” that
already had plenary jurisdiction. 541 U. S., at 413.
This Court’s treatment of its certiorari jurisdiction also
demonstrates the jurisdictional distinction between court-
promulgated rules and limits enacted by Congress. Ac
cording to our Rules, a petition for a writ of certiorari
must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the judgment
sought to be reviewed. See this Court’s Rule 13.1. That
90-day period applies to both civil and criminal cases. But
the 90-day period for civil cases derives from both this
Court’s Rule 13.1 and 28 U. S. C. §2101(c). We have re
peatedly held that this statute-based filing period for civil
——————
3 At
least one federal court of appeals has noted that Kontrick and
Eberhart “called . . . into question” the “longstanding assumption” that
the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement.
United States v. Sadler, 480 F. 3d 932, 935 (CA9 2007). That court
nonetheless found that “[t]he distinction between jurisdictional rules
and inflexible but not jurisdictional timeliness rules drawn by Eberhart
and Kontrick turns largely on whether the timeliness requirement is or
is not grounded in a statute.” Id., at 936.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

Opinion of the Court

cases is jurisdictional. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n
v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U. S. 88, 90 (1994).
Indeed, this Court’s Rule 13.2 cites §2101(c) in directing
the Clerk not to file any petition “that is jurisdictionally
out of time.” (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, we
have treated the rule-based time limit for criminal cases
differently, stating that it may be waived because “[t]he
procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly
transaction of its business are not jurisdictional and can
be relaxed by the Court in the exercise of its discre
tion . . . .” Schacht, supra, at 64.4
Jurisdictional treatment of statutory time limits makes
good sense. Within constitutional bounds, Congress de
cides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to
consider. Because Congress decides whether federal
courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when,
and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them.
See Curry, 6 How., at 113. Put another way, the notion of
“ ‘subject-matter’ ” jurisdiction obviously extends to
“ ‘classes of cases . . . falling within a court’s adjudicatory
authority,’ ” Eberhart, supra, at 16 (quoting Kontrick,
supra, at 455), but it is no less “jurisdictional” when Con
——————
4 The dissent minimizes this argument, stating that the Court under

stood §2101(c) as jurisdictional “in the days when we used the term
imprecisely.” Post, at 4, n. 4. The dissent’s apathy is surprising be
cause if our treatment of our own jurisdiction is simply a relic of the old
days, it is a relic with severe consequences. Just a few months ago, the
Clerk, pursuant to this Court’s Rule 13.2, refused to accept a petition
for certiorari submitted by Ryan Heath Dickson because it had been
filed one day late. In the letter sent to Dickson’s counsel, the Clerk
explained that “[w]hen the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari
in a civil case . . . has expired, the Court no longer has the power to
review the petition.” Letter from William K. Suter, Clerk of Court, to
Ronald T. Spriggs (Dec. 28, 2006). Dickson was executed on April 26,
2007, without any Member of this Court having even seen his petition
for certiorari. The rejected certiorari petition was Dickson’s first in this
Court, and one can only speculate as to whether denial of that petition
would have been a foregone conclusion.
8 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

Opinion of the Court

gress forbids federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise
legitimate “class of cases” after a certain period has
elapsed from final judgment.
The resolution of this case follows naturally from this
reasoning. Like the initial 30-day period for filing a notice
of appeal, the limit on how long a district court may re
open that period is set forth in a statute, 28 U. S. C.
§2107(c). Because Congress specifically limited the
amount of time by which district courts can extend the
notice-of-appeal period in §2107(c), that limitation is more
than a simple “claim-processing rule.” As we have long
held, when an “appeal has not been prosecuted in the
manner directed, within the time limited by the acts of
Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”
Curry, supra, at 113. Bowles’ failure to file his notice of
appeal in accordance with the statute therefore deprived
the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction. And because Bowles’
error is one of jurisdictional magnitude, he cannot rely on
forfeiture or waiver to excuse his lack of compliance with
the statute’s time limitations. See Arbaugh, supra, at
513–514.
B
Bowles contends that we should excuse his untimely
filing because he satisfies the “unique circumstances”
doctrine, which has its roots in Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215 (1962) (per cu
riam). There, pursuant to then-Rule 73(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a District Court entertained a
timely motion to extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal. The District Court found the moving party had
established a showing of “excusable neglect,” as required
by the Rule, and granted the motion. The Court of Ap
peals reversed the finding of excusable neglect and, ac
cordingly, held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction
to grant the extension. Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

Opinion of the Court

Meat Packers, Inc., 303 F. 2d 609, 611–612 (CA7 1962).
This Court reversed, noting “the obvious great hardship to
a party who relies upon the trial judge’s finding of ‘excus
able neglect.’ ” 371 U. S., at 217.
Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of
appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.
Because this Court has no authority to create equitable
exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the
“unique circumstances” doctrine is illegitimate. Given
that this Court has applied Harris Truck Lines only once
in the last half century, Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384
(1964) (per curiam), several courts have rightly questioned
its continuing validity. See, e.g., Panhorst v. United
States, 241 F. 3d 367, 371 (CA4 2001) (doubting “the con
tinued viability of the unique circumstances doctrine”).
See also Houston v. Lack, 487 U. S. 266, 282 (1988)
(SCALIA, J., dissenting) (“Our later cases . . . effectively
repudiate the Harris Truck Lines approach . . .”). See also
Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U. S. 169, 170 (1989)
(referring to “the so-called ‘unique circumstances’ excep
tion” to the timely appeal requirement). We see no com
pelling reason to resurrect the doctrine from its 40-year
slumber. Accordingly, we reject Bowles’ reliance on the
doctrine, and we overrule Harris Truck Lines and Thomp
son to the extent they purport to authorize an exception to
a jurisdictional rule.
C
If rigorous rules like the one applied today are thought
to be inequitable, Congress may authorize courts to prom
ulgate rules that excuse compliance with the statutory
time limits. Even narrow rules to this effect would give
rise to litigation testing their reach and would no doubt
detract from the clarity of the rule. However, congres
sionally authorized rulemaking would likely lead to less
litigation than court-created exceptions without authoriza
tion. And in all events, for the reasons discussed above,
10 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

Opinion of the Court

we lack present authority to make the exception petitioner
seeks.
III
The Court of Appeals correctly held that it lacked juris
diction to consider Bowles’ appeal. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

SOUTER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 06–5306
_________________

KEITH BOWLES, PETITIONER v. HARRY RUSSELL,

WARDEN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 14, 2007]

JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE
GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.
The District Court told petitioner Keith Bowles that his
notice of appeal was due on February 27, 2004. He filed a
notice of appeal on February 26, only to be told that he
was too late because his deadline had actually been Feb
ruary 24. It is intolerable for the judicial system to treat
people this way, and there is not even a technical justifica
tion for condoning this bait and switch. I respectfully
dissent.
I
“ ‘Jurisdiction,’ ” we have warned several times in the
last decade, “ ‘is a word of many, too many, meanings.’ ”
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83,
90 (1998) (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F. 3d 661,
663, n. 2 (CADC 1996)); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443,
454 (2004) (quoting Steel Co.); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U. S. 500, 510 (2006) (quoting Steel Co.); Rockwell Int’l
Corp. v. United States, 549 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op.,
at 9) (quoting Steel Co.). This variety of meaning has
insidiously tempted courts, this one included, to engage in
“less than meticulous,” Kontrick, supra, at 454, sometimes
even “profligate . . . use of the term,” Arbaugh, supra, at
510.
2 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

In recent years, however, we have tried to clean up our
language, and until today we have been avoiding the
erroneous jurisdictional conclusions that flow from indis
criminate use of the ambiguous word. Thus, although we
used to call the sort of time limit at issue here “mandatory
and jurisdictional,” United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S.
220, 229 (1960), we have recently and repeatedly corrected
that designation as a misuse of the “jurisdiction” label.
Arbaugh, supra, at 510 (citing Robinson as an example of
improper use of the term “jurisdiction”); Eberhart v.
United States, 546 U. S. 12, 17–18 (2005) (per curiam)
(same); Kontrick, supra, at 454 (same).
But one would never guess this from reading the Court’s
opinion in this case, which suddenly restores Robinson’s
indiscriminate use of the “mandatory and jurisdictional”
label to good law in the face of three unanimous repudia
tions of Robinson’s error. See ante, at 4. This is puzzling,
the more so because our recent (and, I repeat, unanimous)
efforts to confine jurisdictional rulings to jurisdiction
proper were obviously sound, and the majority makes no
attempt to show they were not.1
The stakes are high in treating time limits as jurisdic
tional. While a mandatory but nonjurisdictional limit is
enforceable at the insistence of a party claiming its benefit
or by a judge concerned with moving the docket, it may be
waived or mitigated in exercising reasonable equitable
——————
1 The
Court thinks my fellow dissenters and I are forgetful of an opin
ion I wrote and the others joined in 2003, which referred to the 30-day
rule of 28 U. S. C. §2107(a) as a jurisdictional time limit. See ante, at 5
(quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S. 149, 160, n. 6 (2003)).
But that reference in Barnhart was a perfect example of the confusion
of the mandatory and the jurisdictional that the entire Court has spent
the past four years repudiating in Arbaugh, Eberhart, and Kontrick.
My fellow dissenters and I believe that the Court was right to correct
its course; the majority, however, will not even admit that we deliber
ately changed course, let alone explain why it is now changing course
again.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

SOUTER, J., dissenting

discretion. But if a limit is taken to be jurisdictional,
waiver becomes impossible, meritorious excuse irrelevant
(unless the statute so provides), and sua sponte considera
tion in the courts of appeals mandatory, see Arbaugh,
supra, at 514.2 As the Court recognizes, ante, at 5–6, this
is no way to regard time limits set out in a court rule
rather than a statute, see Kontrick, supra, at 452 (“Only
Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction”). But neither is jurisdictional treat
ment automatic when a time limit is statutory, as it is in
this case. Generally speaking, limits on the reach of fed
eral statutes, even nontemporal ones, are only jurisdic
tional if Congress says so: “when Congress does not rank a
statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in charac
ter.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 516. Thus, we have held “that
time prescriptions, however emphatic, ‘are not properly
typed “jurisdictional,” ’ ” id., at 510 (quoting Scarborough
v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 414 (2004)), absent some juris
dictional designation by Congress. Congress put no juris
dictional tag on the time limit here.3
——————
2 The requirement that courts of appeals raise jurisdictional issues

sua sponte reveals further ill effects of today’s decision. Under §2107(c),
“[t]he district court may . . . extend the time for appeal upon a showing
of excusable neglect or good cause.” By the Court’s logic, if a district
court grants such an extension, the extension’s propriety is subject to
mandatory sua sponte review in the court of appeals, even if the exten
sion was unopposed throughout, and upon finding error the court of
appeals must dismiss the appeal. I see no more justification for such a
rule than reason to suspect Congress meant to create it.
3 The majority answers that a footnote of our unanimous opinion in

Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443 (2004), used §2107(a) as an illustration
of a jurisdictional time limit. Ante, at 6 (“[W]e noted that §2107 con
tains the type of statutory time constraints that would limit a court’s
jurisdiction. 540 U. S., at 453, and n. 8”). What the majority overlooks,
however, are the post-Kontrick cases showing that §2107(a) can no
longer be seen as an example of a jurisdictional time limit. The juris
dictional character of the 30- (or 60)-day time limit for filing notices of
4 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

The doctrinal underpinning of this recently repeated
view was set out in Kontrick: “the label ‘jurisdictional’ [is
appropriate] not for claim-processing rules, but only for
prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject
matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)
falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.” 540 U. S.,
at 455. A filing deadline is the paradigm of a claim-
processing rule, not of a delineation of cases that federal
courts may hear, and so it falls outside the class of limita
tions on subject matter jurisdiction unless Congress says
otherwise.4
——————
appeal under the present §2107(a) was first pronounced by this Court
in Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257 (1978).
But in that respect Browder was undercut by Eberhart v. United States,
546 U. S. 12 (2005) (per curiam), decided after Kontrick. Eberhart cited
Browder (along with several of the other cases on which the Court now
relies) as an example of the basic error of confusing mandatory time
limits with jurisdictional limitations, a confusion for which United
States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220 (1960), was responsible. Compare
ante, at 4 (citing Browder, Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.,
459 U. S. 56 (1982) (per curiam), and Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S.
236 (1998)), with Eberhart, supra, at 17–18 (citing those cases as
examples of the confusion caused by Robinson’s imprecise language).
Eberhart was followed four months later by Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U. S. 500 (2006), which summarized the body of recent decisions in
which the Court “clarified that time prescriptions, however emphatic,
are not properly typed jurisdictional,” id., at 510 (internal quotation
marks omitted). This unanimous statement of all Members of the
Court participating in the case eliminated the option of continuing to
accept §2107(a) as jurisdictional and it precludes treating the 14-day
period of §2107(c) as a limit on jurisdiction.
4 The Court points out that we have affixed a “jurisdiction” label to

the time limit contained in §2101(c) for petitions for writ of certiorari in
civil cases. Ante, at 6–7 (citing Federal Election Comm’n v. NRA
Political Victory Fund, 513 U. S. 88, 90 (1994); this Court’s Rule 13.2).
Of course, we initially did so in the days when we used the term impre
cisely. The status of §2101(c) is not before the Court in this case, so I
express no opinion on whether there are sufficient reasons to treat it as
jurisdictional. The Court’s observation that jurisdictional treatment
has had severe consequences in that context, ante, at 7, n. 4, does
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

SOUTER, J., dissenting

The time limit at issue here, far from defining the set of
cases that may be adjudicated, is much more like a statute
of limitations, which provides an affirmative defense, see
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c), and is not jurisdictional, Day v.
McDonough, 547 U. S. 198, 205 (2006). Statutes of limita
tions may thus be waived, id., at 207–208, or excused by
rules, such as equitable tolling, that alleviate hardship
and unfairness, see Irwin v. Department of Veterans Af
fairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95–96 (1990).
Consistent with the traditional view of statutes of limi
tations, and the carefully limited concept of jurisdiction
explained in Arbaugh, Eberhart, and Kontrick, an excep
tion to the time limit in 28 U. S. C. §2107(c) should be
available when there is a good justification for one, for
reasons we recognized years ago. In Harris Truck Lines,
Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215, 217 (1962)
(per curiam), and Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384, 387
(1964) (per curiam), we found that “unique circumstances”
excused failures to comply with the time limit. In fact,
much like this case, Harris and Thompson involved dis
trict court errors that misled litigants into believing they
had more time to file notices of appeal than a statute
actually provided. Thus, even back when we thoughtlessly
called time limits jurisdictional, we did not actually treat
them as beyond exemption to the point of shrugging at the
inequity of penalizing a party for relying on what a federal
judge had said to him. Since we did not dishonor reason
able reliance on a judge’s official word back in the days
when we uncritically had a jurisdictional reason to be
unfair, it is unsupportable to dishonor it now, after re
peatedly disavowing any such jurisdictional justification

——————

nothing to support an argument that jurisdictional treatment is sound,

but instead merely shows that the certiorari rule, too, should be recon

sidered in light of our recent clarifications of what sorts of rules should

be treated as jurisdictional.

6 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

that would apply to the 14-day time limit of §2107(c).
The majority avoids clashing with Harris and Thompson
by overruling them on the ground of their “slumber,” ante,
at 9, and inconsistency with a time-limit-as-jurisdictional
rule.5 But eliminating those precedents underscores what
has become the principal question of this case: why does
today’s majority refuse to come to terms with the steady
stream of unanimous statements from this Court in the
past four years, culminating in Arbaugh’s summary a year
ago? The majority begs this question by refusing to con
front what we have said: “in recent decisions, we have
clarified that time prescriptions, however emphatic, ‘are
not properly typed “jurisdictional.” ’ ” Arbaugh, 546 U. S.,
at 510 (quoting Scarborough, 541 U. S., at 414). This
statement of the Court, and those preceding it for which it
stands as a summation, cannot be dismissed as “some
dicta,” ante, at 4, n. 2, and cannot be ignored on the
ground that some of them were made in cases where the
challenged restriction was not a time limit, see ante, at 6.
By its refusal to come to grips with our considered state
ments of law the majority leaves the Court incoherent.
In ruling that Bowles cannot depend on the word of a
District Court Judge, the Court demonstrates that no one
may depend on the recent, repeated, and unanimous
statements of all participating Justices of this Court. Yet
more incongruously, all of these pronouncements by the
Court, along with two of our cases,6 are jettisoned in a

——————
5 With no apparent sense of irony, the Court finds that “ ‘[o]ur later

cases . . . effectively repudiate the Harris Truck Lines approach.’ ” Ante,
at 9 (quoting Houston v. Lack, 487 U. S. 266, 282 (1988) (SCALIA, J.,
dissenting); omission in original). Of course, those “later cases” were
Browder and Griggs, see Houston, supra, at 282, which have them
selves been repudiated, not just “effectively” but explicitly, in Eberhart.
See n. 3, supra.
6 Three, if we include Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U. S. 203 (1964) (per

curiam).
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

SOUTER, J., dissenting

ruling for which the leading justification is stare decisis,
see ante, at 4 (“This Court has long held . . .”).
II
We have the authority to recognize an equitable excep
tion to the 14-day limit, and we should do that here, as it
certainly seems reasonable to rely on an order from a
federal judge.7 Bowles, though, does not have to convince
us as a matter of first impression that his reliance was
justified, for we only have to look as far as Thompson to
know that he ought to prevail. There, the would-be appel
lant, Thompson, had filed post-trial motions 12 days after
the District Court’s final order. Although the rules said
they should have been filed within 10, Fed. Rules Civ.
Proc. 52(b) and 59(b) (1964), the trial court nonetheless
had “specifically declared that the ‘motion for a new trial’
was made ‘in ample time.’ ” Thompson, 375 U. S., at 385.
Thompson relied on that statement in filing a notice of
appeal within 60 days of the denial of the post-trial mo
tions but not within 60 days of entry of the original judg
ment. Only timely post-trial motions affected the 60-day
time limit for filing a notice of appeal, Rule 73(a) (1964), so
the Court of Appeals held the appeal untimely. We va
cated because Thompson “relied on the statement of the
District Court and filed the appeal within the assumedly
new deadline but beyond the old deadline.” Id., at 387.
Thompson should control. In that case, and this one,
the untimely filing of a notice of appeal resulted from
reliance on an error by a district court, an error that
caused no evident prejudice to the other party. Actually,
there is one difference between Thompson and this case:
——————
7 As a member of the Federal Judiciary, I cannot help but think that

reliance on our orders is reasonable. See O. Holmes, Natural Law, in
Collected Legal Papers 311 (1920). I would also rest better knowing
that my innocent errors will not jeopardize anyone’s rights unless
absolutely necessary.
8 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

Thompson filed his post-trial motions late and the District
Court was mistaken when it said they were timely; here,
the District Court made the error out of the blue, not on
top of any mistake by Bowles, who then filed his notice of
appeal by the specific date the District Court had declared
timely. If anything, this distinction ought to work in
Bowles’s favor. Why should we have rewarded Thompson,
who introduced the error, but now punish Bowles, who
merely trusted the District Court’s statement?8
Under Thompson, it would be no answer to say that
Bowles’s trust was unreasonable because the 14-day limit
was clear and counsel should have checked the judge’s
arithmetic. The 10-day limit on post-trial motions was no
less pellucid in Thompson, which came out the other way.
And what is more, counsel here could not have uncovered
the court’s error simply by counting off the days on a
calendar. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6)
allows a party to file a notice of appeal within 14 days of
“the date when [the district court’s] order to reopen is
entered.” See also 28 U. S. C. §2107(c)(2) (allowing re
opening for “14 days from the date of entry”). The District
Court’s order was dated February 10, 2004, which reveals
——————
8 Nothing in Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U. S. 169 (1989),

requires such a strange rule. In Osterneck, we described the “unique
circumstances” doctrine as applicable “only where a party has per
formed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for
filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer
that this act has been properly done.” Id., at 179. But the point we
were making was that Thompson could not excuse a lawyer’s original
mistake in a case in which a judge had not assured him that his act had
been timely; the Court of Appeals in Osterneck had found that no court
provided a specific assurance, and we agreed. I see no reason to take
Osterneck’s language out of context to buttress a fundamentally unfair
resolution of an issue the Osterneck Court did not have in front of it.
Cf. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 515 (1993) (“[W]e
think it generally undesirable, where holdings of the Court are not at
issue, to dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as though
they were the United States Code”).
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

SOUTER, J., dissenting

the date the judge signed it but not necessarily the date on
which the order was entered. Bowles’s lawyer therefore
could not tell from reading the order, which he received by
mail, whether it was entered the day it was signed. Nor is
the possibility of delayed entry merely theoretical: the
District Court’s original judgment in this case, dated July
10, 2003, was not entered until July 28. See App. 11
(District Court docket). According to Bowles’s lawyer,
electronic access to the docket was unavailable at the
time, so to learn when the order was actually entered he
would have had to call or go to the courthouse and check.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 56–57. Surely this is more than eq
uity demands, and unless every statement by a federal
court is to be tagged with the warning “Beware of the
Judge,” Bowles’s lawyer had no obligation to go behind the
terms of the order he received.
I have to admit that Bowles’s counsel probably did not
think the order might have been entered on a different day
from the day it was signed. He probably just trusted that
the date given was correct, and there was nothing unrea
sonable in so trusting. The other side let the order pass
without objection, either not caring enough to make a fuss
or not even noticing the discrepancy; the mistake of a few
days was probably not enough to ring the alarm bell to
send either lawyer to his copy of the federal rules and then
off to the courthouse to check the docket.9 This would be a
different case if the year were wrong on the District

——————
9 At first glance it may seem unreasonable for counsel to wait until

the penultimate day under the judge’s order, filing a notice of appeal
being so easy that counsel should not have needed the extra time. But
as Bowles’s lawyer pointed out at oral argument, filing the notice of
appeal starts the clock for filing the record, see Fed. Rule App.
Proc. 6(b)(2)(B), which in turn starts the clock for filing a brief, see Rule
31(a)(1), for which counsel might reasonably want as much time as
possible. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. A good lawyer plans ahead, and
Bowles had a good lawyer.
10 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

Court’s order, or if opposing counsel had flagged the error.
But on the actual facts, it was reasonable to rely on a
facially plausible date provided by a federal judge.
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand for consideration of the merits.