Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SAFECO INSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA ET AL. v.

BURR ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 06–84. Argued January 16, 2007 —Decided June 4, 2007*
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) requires notice to a consumer
subjected to “adverse action . . . based in whole or in part on any in
formation contained in a consumer [credit] report.” 15 U. S. C.
§1681m(a). As applied to insurance companies, “adverse action” is “a
denial or cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduction
or other adverse or unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or
amount of, any insurance, existing or applied for.” §1681a(k)(1)(B)(i).
FCRA provides a private right of action against businesses that use
consumer reports but fail to comply. A negligent violation entitles a
consumer to actual damages, §1681o(a), and a willful one entitles the
consumer to actual, statutory, and even punitive damages, §1681n(a).
Petitioners in No. 06–100 (GEICO) use an applicant’s credit score
to select the appropriate subsidiary insurance company and the par
ticular rate at which a policy may be issued. GEICO sends an ad
verse action notice only if a neutral credit score would have put the
applicant in a lower priced tier or company; the applicant is not oth
erwise told if he would have gotten better terms with a better credit
score. Respondent Edo’s credit score was taken into account when
GEICO issued him a policy, but GEICO sent no adverse action notice
because his company and tier placement would have been the same
with a neutral score. Edo filed a proposed class action, alleging will
ful violation of §1681m(a) and seeking statutory and punitive dam
ages under §1681n(a). The District Court granted GEICO summary
judgment, finding no adverse action because the premium would
——————
* Together with No. 06–100, GEICO General Insurance Co. et al. v.
Edo, also on certiorari to the same court.
2 SAFECO INS. CO. OF AMERICA v. BURR

Syllabus

have been the same had Edo’s credit history not been considered. Pe
titioners in No. 06–100 (Safeco) also rely on credit reports to set ini
tial insurance premiums. Respondents Burr and Massey—whom
Safeco offered higher than the best rates possible without sending
adverse action notices—joined a proposed class action, alleging will
ful violation of §1681m(a) and seeking statutory and punitive dam
ages under §1681n(a). The District Court granted Safeco summary
judgment on the ground that offering a single, initial rate for insur
ance cannot be “adverse action.” The Ninth Circuit reversed both
judgments. In GEICO’s case, it held that an adverse action occurs
whenever a consumer would have received a lower rate had his con
sumer report contained more favorable information. Since that
would have happened to Edo, GEICO’s failure to give notice was an
adverse action. The court also held that an insurer willfully fails to
comply with FCRA if it acts in reckless disregard of a consumer’s
FCRA rights, remanding for further proceedings on the reckless dis
regard issue. Relying on its decision in GEICO’s case, the Ninth Cir
cuit rejected the District Court’s position in the Safeco case and re
manded for further proceedings.
Held:
1. Willful failure covers a violation committed in reckless disregard
of the notice obligation. Where willfulness is a statutory condition of
civil liability, it is generally taken to cover not only knowing viola
tions of a standard, but reckless ones as well. See, e.g., McLaughlin
v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U. S. 128, 133. This construction reflects
common law usage. The standard civil usage thus counsels reading
§1681n(a)’s phrase “willfully fails to comply” as reaching reckless
FCRA violations, both on the interpretive assumption that Congress
knows how this Court construes statutes and expects it to run true to
form, see Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Industries, Inc., 508 U. S.
152, 159, and under the rule that a common law term in a statute
comes with a common law meaning, absent anything pointing an
other way, Beck v. Prupis, 529 U. S. 494, 500–501. Petitioners claim
that §1681n(a)’s drafting history points to a reading that liability at
taches only to knowing violations, but the text as finally adopted
points to the traditional understanding of willfulness in the civil
sphere. Their other textual and structural arguments are also un
persuasive. Pp. 6–10.
2. Initial rates charged for new insurance policies may be adverse
actions. Pp. 10–17.
(a) Reading the phrase “increase in any charge for . . . any insur
ance, existing or applied for,” §1681a(k)(1)(B)(i), to include a disad
vantageous rate even with no prior dealing fits with the ambitious
objective of FCRA’s statement of purpose, which uses expansive
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Syllabus

terms to describe the adverse effects of unfair and inaccurate credit
reporting and the responsibilities of consumer reporting agencies.
See §1681(a). These descriptions do nothing to suggest that remedies
for consumers disadvantaged by unsound credit ratings should be
denied to first-time victims, and the legislative histories of both
FCRA’s original enactment and a 1996 amendment reveal no reason
to confine attention to customers and businesses with prior dealings.
Finally, nothing about insurance contracts suggests that Congress
meant to differentiate applicants from existing customers when it set
the notice requirement; the newly insured who gets charged more ow
ing to an erroneous report is in the same boat with the renewal appli
cant. Pp. 10–13.
(b) An increased rate is not “based in whole or in part on” a credit
report under §1681m(a) unless the report was a necessary condition
of the increase. In common talk, “based on” indicates a but-for causal
relationship and thus a necessary logical condition. Though some
textual arguments point another way, it makes more sense to suspect
that Congress meant to require notice and prompt a consumer chal
lenge only when the consumer would gain something if the challenge
succeeded. Pp. 13–14.
(c) In determining whether a first-time rate is a disadvantageous
increase, the baseline is the rate that the applicant would have re
ceived had the company not taken his credit score into account (the
“neutral score” rate GEICO used in Edo’s case). That baseline com
ports with the understanding that §1681m(a) notice is required only
when the credit report’s effect on the initial rate is necessary to put
the consumer in a worse position than other relevant facts would
have decreed anyway. Congress was more likely concerned with the
practical question whether the consumer’s rate actually suffered
when his credit report was taken into account than the theoretical
question whether the consumer would have gotten a better rate with
the best possible credit score, the baseline suggested by the Govern
ment and respondent-plaintiffs. The Government’s objection to this
reading is rejected. Although the rate initially offered for new insur
ance is an “increase” calling for notice if it exceeds the neutral rate,
once a consumer has learned that his credit report led the insurer to
charge more, he need not be told with each renewal if his rate has not
changed. After initial dealing between the consumer and the insurer,
the baseline for “increase” is the previous rate or charge, not the
“neutral” baseline that applies at the start. Pp. 15–17.
3. GEICO did not violate the statute, and while Safeco might have,
it did not act recklessly. Pp. 18–21.
(a) Because the initial rate GEICO offered Edo was what he
would have received had his credit score not been taken into account,
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GEICO owed him no adverse action notice under §1681m(a). P. 18.
(b) Even if Safeco violated FCRA when it failed to give Burr and
Massey notice on the mistaken belief that §1681m(a) did not apply to
initial applications, the company was not reckless. The common law
has generally understood “recklessness” in the civil liability sphere as
conduct violating an objective standard: action entailing “an unjusti
fiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it
should be known.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 836. There be
ing no indication that Congress had something different in mind,
there is no reason to deviate from the common law understanding in
applying the statute. See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U. S., at 500–501.
Thus, a company does not act in reckless disregard of FCRA unless
the action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of the
statute, but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law
substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that
was merely careless. The negligence/recklessness line need not be
pinpointed here, for Safeco’s reading of the statute, albeit erroneous,
was not objectively unreasonable. Section 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i) is silent
on the point from which to measure “increase,” and Safeco’s reading
has a foundation in the statutory text and a sufficiently convincing
justification to have persuaded the District Court to adopt it and rule
in Safeco’s favor. Before these cases, no court of appeals had spoken
on the issue, and no authoritative guidance has yet come from the
Federal Trade Commission. Given this dearth of guidance and the
less-than-pellucid statutory text, Safeco’s reading was not objectively
unreasonable, and so falls well short of raising the “unjustifiably high
risk” of violating the statute necessary for reckless liability. Pp. 18–
21.
No. 06–84, 140 Fed. Appx. 746; No. 06–100, 435 F. 3d 1081, reversed
and remanded.

SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY and BREYER, JJ., joined, in which SCALIA, J., joined
as to all but footnotes 11 and 15, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined
as to all but Part III–A, and in which STEVENS and GINSBURG, JJ.,
joined as to Parts I, II, III–A, and IV–B. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which GINSBURG,
J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which
ALITO, J., joined.
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Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 06–84 and 06–100
_________________

SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
06–84 v.
CHARLES BURR ET AL.

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
06–100 v.
AJENE EDO
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 4, 2007]

JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.*
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA or Act) requires
notice to any consumer subjected to “adverse action . . .
based in whole or in part on any information contained in
a consumer [credit] report.” 15 U. S. C. §1681m(a). Any
one who “willfully fails” to provide notice is civilly liable to
the consumer. §1681n(a). The questions in these consoli
dated cases are whether willful failure covers a violation
committed in reckless disregard of the notice obligation,
and, if so, whether petitioners Safeco and GEICO commit
ted reckless violations. We hold that reckless action is
covered, that GEICO did not violate the statute, and that
——————
* JUSTICE SCALIA joins all but footnotes 11 and 15 of this opinion.
2 SAFECO INS. CO. OF AMERICA v. BURR

Opinion of the Court

while Safeco might have, it did not act recklessly.
I

A

Congress enacted FCRA in 1970 to ensure fair and
accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the bank
ing system, and protect consumer privacy. See 84 Stat.
1128, 15 U. S. C. §1681; TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S.
19, 23 (2001). The Act requires, among other things, that
“any person [who] takes any adverse action with respect to
any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any
information contained in a consumer report” must notify
the affected consumer.1 15 U. S. C. §1681m(a). The notice
must point out the adverse action, explain how to reach
the agency that reported on the consumer’s credit, and tell
the consumer that he can get a free copy of the report and
dispute its accuracy with the agency. Ibid. As it applies
to an insurance company, “adverse action” is “a denial or
cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduc
tion or other adverse or unfavorable change in the terms of
coverage or amount of, any insurance, existing or applied
for.” §1681a(k)(1)(B)(i).
FCRA provides a private right of action against busi
nesses that use consumer reports but fail to comply. If a
violation is negligent, the affected consumer is entitled to
actual damages. §1681o(a) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). If willful,
however, the consumer may have actual damages, or
statutory damages ranging from $100 to $1,000, and even
——————
1 So far as it matters here, the Act defines “consumer report” as “any

written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer
reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit
standing, [or] credit capacity . . . which is used or expected to be used or
collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in
establishing the consumer’s eligibility for . . . credit or insurance to be
used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U. S. C.
§1681a(d)(1) (footnote omitted). The scope of this definition is not at
issue.
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Opinion of the Court

punitive damages. §1681n(a) (2000 ed.).
B
Petitioner GEICO2writes auto insurance through four
subsidiaries: GEICO General, which sells “preferred”
policies at low rates to low-risk customers; Government
Employees, which also sells “preferred” policies, but only
to government employees; GEICO Indemnity, which sells
standard policies to moderate-risk customers; and GEICO
Casualty, which sells nonstandard policies at higher rates
to high-risk customers. Potential customers call a toll-free
number answered by an agent of the four affiliates, who
takes information and, with permission, gets the appli
cant’s credit score.3 This information goes into GEICO’s
computer system, which selects any appropriate company
and the particular rate at which a policy may be issued.
For some time after FCRA went into effect, GEICO sent
adverse action notices to all applicants who were not
offered “preferred” policies from GEICO General or Gov
ernment Employees. GEICO changed its practice, how
ever, after a method to “neutralize” an applicant’s credit
score was devised: the applicant’s company and tier
placement is compared with the company and tier place
ment he would have been assigned with a “neutral” credit
score, that is, one calculated without reliance on credit
history.4 Under this new scheme, it is only if using a
——————
2 The specific petitioners are subsidiary companies of the GEICO Cor
poration; for the sake of convenience, we call them “GEICO” collectively.
3 The Act defines a “credit score” as “a numerical value or a categori

zation derived from a statistical tool or modeling system used by a
person who makes or arranges a loan to predict the likelihood of certain
credit behaviors, including default.” 15 U. S. C. §1681g(f)(2)(A) (2000
ed., Supp. IV). Under its contract with its credit information providers,
GEICO learned credit scores and facts in the credit reports that signifi
cantly influenced the scores, but did not have access to the credit
reports themselves.
4 A number of States permit the use of such “neutral” credit scores to
4 SAFECO INS. CO. OF AMERICA v. BURR

Opinion of the Court

neutral credit score would have put the applicant in a
lower priced tier or company that GEICO sends an ad
verse action notice; the applicant is not otherwise told if he
would have gotten better terms with a better credit score.
Respondent Ajene Edo applied for auto insurance with
GEICO. After obtaining Edo’s credit score, GEICO offered
him a standard policy with GEICO Indemnity (at rates
higher than the most favorable), which he accepted. Be
cause Edo’s company and tier placement would have been
the same with a neutral score, GEICO did not give Edo an
adverse action notice. Edo later filed this proposed class
action against GEICO, alleging willful failure to give
notice in violation of §1681m(a); he claimed no actual
harm, but sought statutory and punitive damages under
§1681n(a). The District Court granted summary judgment
for GEICO, finding there was no adverse action when “the
premium charged to [Edo] . . . would have been the same
even if GEICO Indemnity did not consider information in
[his] consumer credit history.” Edo v. GEICO Casualty
Co., CV 02–678–BR, 2004 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 28522, *12
(D. Ore., Feb. 23, 2004), App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 06–
100, p. 46a.
Like GEICO, petitioner Safeco5 relies on credit reports
to set initial insurance premiums,6 as it did for respon
dents Charles Burr and Shannon Massey, who were of
fered higher rates than the best rates possible. Safeco
——————
ensure that consumers with thin or unidentifiable credit histories are
not treated disadvantageously. See, e.g., N. Y. Ins. Law Ann. §§2802(e),
(e)(1) (West 2006) (generally prohibiting an insurer from “consider[ing]
an absence of credit information,” but allowing it to do so if it “treats
the consumer as if the applicant or insured had neutral credit informa
tion, as defined by the insurer”).
5 Again, the actual petitioners are subsidiary companies, of Safeco Cor

poration in this case; for convenience, we call them “Safeco” collectively.
6 The parties do not dispute that the credit scores and credit reports

relied on by GEICO and Safeco are “consumer reports” under 15
U. S. C. §1681a(d)(1).
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Opinion of the Court

sent them no adverse action notices, and they later joined
a proposed class action against the company, alleging
willful violation of §1681m(a) and seeking statutory and
punitive damages under §1681n(a). The District Court
ordered summary judgment for Safeco, on the understand
ing that offering a single, initial rate for insurance cannot
be “adverse action.”
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
both judgments. In GEICO’s case, it held that whenever a
consumer “would have received a lower rate for his insur
ance had the information in his consumer report been
more favorable, an adverse action has been taken against
him.” Reynolds v. Hartford Financial Servs. Group, Inc.,
435 F. 3d 1081, 1093 (2006). Since a better credit score
would have placed Edo with GEICO General, not GEICO
Indemnity, the appeals court held that GEICO’s failure to
give notice was an adverse action.
The Ninth Circuit also held that an insurer “willfully”
fails to comply with FCRA if it acts with “reckless disre
gard” of a consumer’s rights under the Act. Id., at 1099.
It explained that a company would not be acting recklessly
if it “diligently and in good faith attempted to fulfill its
statutory obligations” and came to a “tenable, albeit erro
neous, interpretation of the statute.” Ibid. The court went
on to say that “a deliberate failure to determine the extent
of its obligations” would not ordinarily escape liability
under §1681n, any more than “reliance on creative lawyer
ing that provides indefensible answers.” Ibid. Because
the court believed that the enquiry into GEICO’s reckless
disregard might turn on undisclosed circumstances sur
rounding GEICO’s revision of its notification policy, the
Court of Appeals remanded the company’s case for further
proceedings.7
——————
7 Prior to issuing its final opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals

had issued, then withdrawn, two opinions in which it held that GEICO
6 SAFECO INS. CO. OF AMERICA v. BURR

Opinion of the Court

In the action against Safeco, the Court of Appeals re
jected the District Court’s position, relying on its reasoning
in GEICO’s case (where it had held that the notice re
quirement applies to a single statement of an initial charge
for a new policy). Spano v. Safeco Corp., 140 Fed. Appx.
746 (2005). The Court of Appeals also rejected Safeco’s
argument that its conduct was not willful, again citing the
GEICO case, and remanded for further proceedings.
We consolidated the two matters and granted certiorari
to resolve a conflict in the Circuits as to whether
§1681n(a) reaches reckless disregard of FCRA’s obliga
tions,8 and to clarify the notice requirement in §1681m(a).
548 U. S. ___ (2006). We now reverse in both cases.
II
GEICO and Safeco argue that liability under §1681n(a)
for “willfully fail[ing] to comply” with FCRA goes only to
acts known to violate the Act, not to reckless disregard of
statutory duty, but we think they are wrong. We have
said before that “willfully” is a “word of many meanings
whose construction is often dependent on the context in
which it appears,” Bryan v. United States, 524 U. S. 184,
191 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); and where
willfulness is a statutory condition of civil liability, we
have generally taken it to cover not only knowing viola
tions of a standard, but reckless ones as well, see
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U. S. 128, 132–133
(1988) (“willful,” as used in a limitation provision for
——————
had “willfully” violated FCRA as a matter of law. Reynolds v. Hartford
Financial Servs. Group, Inc., 416 F. 3d 1097 (CA9 2005); Reynolds v.
Hartford Financial Servs. Group, Inc., 426 F. 3d 1020 (CA9 2005).
8 Compare, e.g., Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F. 3d 220, 227

(CA3 1997) (adopting the “reckless disregard” standard), with Wantz v.
Experian Information Solutions, 386 F. 3d 829, 834 (CA7 2004) (con
struing “willfully” to require that a user “knowingly and intentionally
violate the Act”); Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F. 3d 357, 368 (CA8 2002)
(same).
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Opinion of the Court

actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act, covers claims
of reckless violation); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 125–126 (1985) (same, as to a
liquidated damages provision of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967); cf. United States v. Illinois
Central R. Co., 303 U. S. 239, 242–243 (1938) (“willfully,”
as used in a civil penalty provision, includes “ ‘conduct
marked by careless disregard whether or not one has the
right so to act’ ” (quoting United States v. Murdock, 290
U. S. 389, 395 (1933))). This construction reflects common
law usage, which treated actions in “reckless disregard” of
the law as “willful” violations. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs,
R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of
Torts §34, p. 212 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser and
Keeton) (“Although efforts have been made to distinguish”
the terms “willful,” “wanton,” and “reckless,” “such distinc
tions have consistently been ignored, and the three terms
have been treated as meaning the same thing, or at least
as coming out at the same legal exit”). The standard civil
usage thus counsels reading the phrase “willfully fails to
comply” in §1681n(a) as reaching reckless FCRA viola
tions,9 and this is so both on the interpretive assumption
——————
9 It is different in the criminal law. When the term “willful” or “will

fully” has been used in a criminal statute, we have regularly read the
modifier as limiting liability to knowing violations. See Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U. S. 135, 137 (1994); Bryan v. United States, 524
U. S. 184, 191–192 (1998); Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 200–
201 (1991). This reading of the term, however, is tailored to the crimi
nal law, where it is characteristically used to require a criminal intent
beyond the purpose otherwise required for guilt, Ratzlaf, supra, at 136–
137; or an additional “ ‘bad purpose,’ ” Bryan, supra, at 191; or specific
intent to violate a known legal duty created by highly technical stat
utes, Cheek, supra, at 200–201. Thus we have consistently held that a
defendant cannot harbor such criminal intent unless he “acted with
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.” Bryan, supra, at 193. Civil
use of the term, however, typically presents neither the textual nor the
substantive reasons for pegging the threshold of liability at knowledge
of wrongdoing. Cf. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 836–837 (1994)
8 SAFECO INS. CO. OF AMERICA v. BURR

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that Congress knows how we construe statutes and ex
pects us to run true to form, see Commissioner v. Keystone
Consol. Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 152, 159 (1993), and
under the general rule that a common law term in a stat
ute comes with a common law meaning, absent anything
pointing another way, Beck v. Prupis, 529 U. S. 494, 500–
501 (2000).
GEICO and Safeco argue that Congress did point to
something different in FCRA, by a drafting history of
§1681n(a) said to show that liability was supposed to
attach only to knowing violations. The original version of
the Senate bill that turned out as FCRA had two stan
dards of liability to victims: grossly negligent violation
(supporting actual damages) and willful violation (sup
porting actual, statutory, and punitive damages). S. 823,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., §1 (1969). GEICO and Safeco argue
that since a “gross negligence” standard is effectively the
same as a “reckless disregard” standard, the original bill’s
“willfulness” standard must have meant a level of culpa
bility higher than “reckless disregard,” or there would
have been no requirement to show a different state of
mind as a condition of the potentially much greater liabil
ity; thus, “willfully fails to comply” must have referred to a
knowing violation. Although the gross negligence stan
dard was reduced later in the legislative process to simple
negligence (as it now appears in §1681o), the provision for
willful liability remains unchanged and so must require
knowing action, just as it did originally in the draft of
§1681n.
Perhaps. But Congress may have scaled the standard
for actual damages down to simple negligence because it
thought gross negligence, being like reckless action, was
covered by willfulness. Because this alternative reading is
——————

(contrasting the different uses of the term “recklessness” in civil and

criminal contexts).

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Opinion of the Court

possible, any inference from the drafting sequence is
shaky, and certainly no match for the following clue in the
text as finally adopted, which points to the traditional
understanding of willfulness in the civil sphere.
The phrase in question appears in the preamble sen
tence of §1681n(a): “Any person who willfully fails to
comply with any requirement imposed under this sub
chapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that
consumer . . . .” Then come the details, in paragraphs
(1)(A) and (1)(B), spelling out two distinct measures of
damages chargeable against the willful violator. As a
general matter, the consumer may get either actual dam
ages or “damages of not less than $100 and not more than
$1,000.” §1681n(a)(1)(A). But where the offender is liable
“for obtaining a consumer report under false pretenses or
knowingly without a permissible purpose,” the statute sets
liability higher: “actual damages . . . or $1,000, whichever
is greater.” §1681n(a)(1)(B).
If the companies were right that “willfully” limits liabil
ity under §1681n(a) to knowing violations, the modifier
“knowingly” in §1681n(a)(1)(B) would be superfluous and
incongruous; it would have made no sense for Congress to
condition the higher damages under §1681n(a) on know
ingly obtaining a report without a permissible purpose if
the general threshold of any liability under the section
were knowing misconduct. If, on the other hand, “will
fully” covers both knowing and reckless disregard of the
law, knowing violations are sensibly understood as a more
serious subcategory of willful ones, and both the preamble
and the subsection have distinct jobs to do. See United
States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538–539 (1955) (“ ‘[G]ive
effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute’ ”
(quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152
(1883))).
The companies make other textual and structural ar
guments for their view, but none is persuasive. Safeco
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Opinion of the Court

thinks our reading would lead to the absurd result that
one could, with reckless disregard, knowingly obtain a
consumer report without a permissible purpose. But this
is not so; action falling within the knowing subcategory
does not simultaneously fall within the reckless alterna
tive. Then both GEICO and Safeco argue that the refer
ence to acting “knowingly and willfully” in FCRA’s crimi
nal enforcement provisions, §1681q and §1681r, indicates
that “willfully” cannot include recklessness. But we are
now on the criminal side of the law, where the paired
modifiers are often found, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §1001 (2000
ed. and Supp. IV) (false statements to federal investiga
tors); 20 U. S. C. §1097(a) (embezzlement of student loan
funds); 18 U. S. C. §1542 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV) (false
statements in a passport application). As we said before,
in the criminal law “willfully” typically narrows the oth
erwise sufficient intent, making the government prove
something extra, in contrast to its civil-law usage, giving a
plaintiff a choice of mental states to show in making a case
for liability, see n. 9, supra. The vocabulary of the crimi
nal side of FCRA is consequently beside the point in con
struing the civil side.
III

A

Before getting to the claims that the companies acted
recklessly, we have the antecedent question whether
either company violated the adverse action notice re
quirement at all. In both cases, respondent-plaintiffs’
claims are premised on initial rates charged for new in
surance policies, which are not “adverse” actions unless
quoting or charging a first-time premium is “an increase
in any charge for . . . any insurance, existing or applied
for.” 15 U. S. C. §1681a(k)(1)(B)(i).
In Safeco’s case, the District Court held that the initial
rate for a new insurance policy cannot be an “increase”
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 11

Opinion of the Court

because there is no prior dealing. The phrase “increase in
any charge for . . . insurance” is readily understood to
mean a change in treatment for an insured, which as
sumes a previous charge for comparison. See Webster’s
New International Dictionary 1260 (2d ed. 1957) (defining
“increase” as “[a]ddition or enlargement in size, extent,
quantity, number, intensity, value, substance, etc.; aug
mentation; growth; multiplication”). Since the District
Court understood “increase” to speak of change just as
much as of comparative size or quantity, it reasoned that
the statute’s “increase” never touches the initial rate offer,
where there is no change.
The Government takes the part of the Court of Appeals
in construing “increase” to reach a first-time rate. It says
that regular usage of the term is not as narrow as the
District Court thought: the point from which to measure
difference can just as easily be understood without refer
ring to prior individual dealing. The Government gives
the example of a gas station owner who charges more than
the posted price for gas to customers he doesn’t like; it
makes sense to say that the owner increases the price and
that the driver pays an increased price, even if he never
pulled in there for gas before. See Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 26.10 The Government implies, then,
that reading “increase” requires a choice, and the chosen
reading should be the broad one in order to conform to
what Congress had in mind.
We think the Government’s reading has the better fit
with the ambitious objective set out in the Act’s statement
——————
10 Since the posted price seems to be addressed to the world in gen

eral, one could argue that the increased gas price is not the initial
quote. But the same usage point can be made with the example of the
clothing model who gets a call from a ritzy store after posing for a
discount retailer. If she quotes a higher fee, it would be natural to say
that the uptown store will have to pay the “increase” to have her in its
ad.
12 SAFECO INS. CO. OF AMERICA v. BURR

Opinion of the Court

of purpose, which uses expansive terms to describe the
adverse effects of unfair and inaccurate credit reporting
and the responsibilities of consumer reporting agencies.
See §1681(a) (inaccurate reports “directly impair the
efficiency of the banking system”; unfair reporting meth
ods undermine public confidence “essential to the contin
ued functioning of the banking system”; need to “insure”
that reporting agencies “exercise their grave responsibili
ties” fairly, impartially, and with respect for privacy). The
descriptions of systemic problem and systemic need as
Congress saw them do nothing to suggest that remedies
for consumers placed at a disadvantage by unsound credit
ratings should be denied to first-time victims, and the
legislative histories of FCRA’s original enactment and of
the 1996 amendment reveal no reason to confine attention
to customers and businesses with prior dealings. Quite
the contrary.11 Finally, there is nothing about insurance
contracts to suggest that Congress might have meant to
differentiate applicants from existing customers when it
set the notice requirement; the newly insured who gets
charged more owing to an erroneous report is in the same
boat with the renewal applicant.12 We therefore hold that
——————
11 See S. Rep. No. 91–517, p. 7 (1969) (“Those who . . . charge a higher

rate for credit or insurance wholly or partly because of a consumer
report must, upon written request, so advise the consumer . . .”); S. Rep.
No. 103–209, p. 4 (1993) (adverse action notice is required “any time
the permissible use of a report results in an outcome adverse to the
interests of the consumer”); H. R. Rep. No. 103–486, p. 26 (1994)
(“[W]henever a consumer report is obtained for a permissible purpose
. . . , any action taken based on that report that is adverse to
the interests of the consumer triggers the adverse action notice
requirements”).
12 In fact, notice in the context of an initially offered rate may be of

greater significance than notice in the context of a renewal rate; if, for
instance, insurance is offered on the basis of a single, long-term guar
anteed rate, a consumer who is not given notice during the initial
application process may never have an opportunity to learn of any
adverse treatment.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 13

Opinion of the Court

the “increase” required for “adverse action,” 15 U. S. C.
§1681a(k)(1)(B)(i), speaks to a disadvantageous rate even
with no prior dealing; the term reaches initial rates for
new applicants.
B
Although offering the initial rate for new insurance can
be an “adverse action,” respondent-plaintiffs have another
hurdle to clear, for §1681m(a) calls for notice only when
the adverse action is “based in whole or in part on” a credit
report. GEICO argues that in order to have adverse ac
tion “based on” a credit report, consideration of the report
must be a necessary condition for the increased rate. The
Government and respondent-plaintiffs do not explicitly
take a position on this point.
To the extent there is any disagreement on the issue, we
accept GEICO’s reading. In common talk, the phrase
“based on” indicates a but-for causal relationship and thus
a necessary logical condition. Under this most natural
reading of §1681m(a), then, an increased rate is not “based
in whole or in part on” the credit report unless the report
was a necessary condition of the increase.
As before, there are textual arguments pointing another
way. The statute speaks in terms of basing the action “in
part” as well as wholly on the credit report, and this
phrasing could mean that adverse action is “based on” a
credit report whenever the report was considered in the
rate-setting process, even without being a necessary condi
tion for the rate increase. But there are good reasons to
think Congress preferred GEICO’s necessary-condition
reading.
If the statute has any claim to lucidity, not all “adverse
actions” require notice, only those “based . . . on” informa
tion in a credit report. Since the statute does not explicitly
call for notice when a business acts adversely merely after
consulting a report, conditioning the requirement on
14 SAFECO INS. CO. OF AMERICA v. BURR

Opinion of the Court

action “based . . . on” a report suggests that the duty to
report arises from some practical consequence of reading
the report, not merely some subsequent adverse occur
rence that would have happened anyway. If the credit
report has no identifiable effect on the rate, the consumer
has no immediately practical reason to worry about it
(unless he has the power to change every other fact that
stands between himself and the best possible deal); both
the company and the consumer are just where they would
have been if the company had never seen the report.13
And if examining reports that make no difference was
supposed to trigger a reporting requirement, it would be
hard to find any practical point in imposing the “based . . .
on” restriction. So it makes more sense to suspect that
Congress meant to require notice and prompt a challenge
by the consumer only when the consumer would gain
something if the challenge succeeded.14

——————
13 For instance, if a consumer’s driving record is so poor that no in

surer would give him anything but the highest possible rate regardless
of his credit report, whether or not an insurer happened to look at his
credit report should have no bearing on whether the consumer must
receive notice, since he has not been treated differently as a result of it.
14 The history of the Act provides further support for this reading.

The originally enacted version of the notice requirement stated: “When
ever . . . the charge for . . . insurance is increased either wholly or partly
because of information contained in a consumer report . . . , the user of
the consumer report shall so advise the consumer . . . .” 15 U. S. C.
§1681m(a) (1976 ed.). The “because of” language in the original statute
emphasized that the consumer report must actually have caused the
adverse action for the notice requirement to apply. When Congress
amended FCRA in 1996, it sought to define “adverse action” with
greater particularity, and thus split the notice provision into two
separate subsections. See 110 Stat. 3009–426 to 3009–427, 3009–443
to 3009–444. In the revised version of §1681m(a), the original “because
of” phrasing changed to “based on,” but there was no indication that
this change was meant to be a substantive alteration of the statute’s
scope.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 15

Opinion of the Court

C
To sum up, the difference required for an increase can
be understood without reference to prior dealing (allowing
a first-time applicant to sue), and considering the credit
report must be a necessary condition for the difference.
The remaining step in determining a duty to notify in
cases like these is identifying the benchmark for determin
ing whether a first-time rate is a disadvantageous in
crease. And in dealing with this issue, the pragmatic
reading of “based . . . on” as a condition necessary to make
a practical difference carries a helpful suggestion.
The Government and respondent-plaintiffs argue that
the baseline should be the rate that the applicant would
have received with the best possible credit score, while
GEICO contends it is what the applicant would have had
if the company had not taken his credit score into account
(the “neutral score” rate GEICO used in Edo’s case). We
think GEICO has the better position, primarily because its
“increase” baseline is more comfortable with the under
standing of causation just discussed, which requires notice
under §1681m(a) only when the effect of the credit report
on the initial rate offered is necessary to put the consumer
in a worse position than other relevant facts would have
decreed anyway. If Congress was this concerned with
practical consequences when it adopted a “based . . . on”
causation standard, it presumably thought in equally
practical terms when it spoke of an “increase” that must
be defined by a baseline to measure from. Congress was
therefore more likely concerned with the practical ques
tion whether the consumer’s rate actually suffered when
the company took his credit report into account than the
theoretical question whether the consumer would have
gotten a better rate with perfect credit.15
——————
15 While it might seem odd, under the current statutory structure, to

interpret the definition of “adverse action” (in §1681a(k)(1)(B)(i)) in
16 SAFECO INS. CO. OF AMERICA v. BURR

Opinion of the Court

The Government objects that this reading leaves a
loophole, since it keeps first-time applicants who actually
deserve better-than-neutral credit scores from getting
notice, even when errors in credit reports saddle them
with unfair rates. This is true; the neutral-score baseline
will leave some consumers without a notice that might
lead to discovering errors. But we do not know how often
these cases will occur, whereas we see a more demonstra
ble and serious disadvantage inhering in the Govern
ment’s position.
Since the best rates (the Government’s preferred base
line) presumably go only to a minority of consumers,
adopting the Government’s view would require insurers to
send slews of adverse action notices; every young appli
cant who had yet to establish a gilt-edged credit report, for
example, would get a notice that his charge had been
“increased” based on his credit report. We think that the
consequence of sending out notices on this scale would
undercut the obvious policy behind the notice require
ment, for notices as common as these would take on the
character of formalities, and formalities tend to be ig
nored. It would get around that new insurance usually
——————
conjunction with §1681m(a), which simply applies the notice require
ment to a particular subset of “adverse actions,” there are strong indica
tions that Congress intended these provisions to be construed in tan
dem. When FCRA was initially enacted, the link between the definition
of “adverse action” and the notice requirement was clear, since “adverse
action” was defined within §1681m(a). See 15 U. S. C. §1681m(a) (1976
ed.). Though Congress eventually split the provision into two parts
(with the definition of “adverse action” now located at §1681a(k)(1)(B)(i)),
the legislative history suggests that this change was not meant to alter
Congress’s intent to define “adverse action” in light of the notice re
quirement. See S. Rep. No. 103–209, at 4 (“The Committee bill . . .
defines an ‘adverse action’ as any action that is adverse to the interests
of the consumer and is based in whole or in part on a consumer report”);
H. R. Rep. No. 103–486, at 26 (“[A]ny action based on [a consumer]
report that is adverse to the interests of the consumer triggers the
adverse action notice requirements”).
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 17

Opinion of the Court

comes with an adverse action notice, owing to some legal
quirk, and instead of piquing an applicant’s interest about
the accuracy of his credit record, the commonplace notices
would mean just about nothing and go the way of junk
mail. Assuming that Congress meant a notice of adverse
action to get some attention, we think the cost of closing
the loophole would be too high.
While on the subject of hypernotification, we should add
a word on another point of practical significance. Al
though the rate initially offered for new insurance is an
“increase” calling for notice if it exceeds the neutral rate,
did Congress intend the same baseline to apply if the
quoted rate remains the same over a course of dealing,
being repeated at each renewal date?
We cannot believe so. Once a consumer has learned
that his credit report led the insurer to charge more, he
has no need to be told over again with each renewal if his
rate has not changed. For that matter, any other con
struction would probably stretch the word “increase” more
than it could bear. Once the gas station owner had
charged the customer the above-market price, it would be
strange to speak of the same price as an increase every
time the customer pulled in. Once buyer and seller have
begun a course of dealing, customary usage does demand a
change for “increase” to make sense.16 Thus, after initial
dealing between the consumer and the insurer, the base
line for “increase” is the previous rate or charge, not the
“neutral” baseline that applies at the start.
——————
16 Consider, too, a consumer who, at the initial application stage, had
a perfect credit score and thus obtained the best insurance rate, but, at
the renewal stage, was charged at a higher rate (but still lower than
the rate he would have received had his credit report not been taken
into account) solely because his credit score fell during the interim.
Although the consumer clearly suffered an “increase” in his insurance
rate that was “based on” his credit score, he would not be entitled to an
adverse action notice under the baseline used for initial applications.
18 SAFECO INS. CO. OF AMERICA v. BURR

Opinion of the Court

IV

A

In GEICO’s case, the initial rate offered to Edo was the
one he would have received if his credit score had not been
taken into account, and GEICO owed him no adverse
action notice under §1681m(a).17
B
Safeco did not give Burr and Massey any notice because
it thought §1681m(a) did not apply to initial applications,
a mistake that left the company in violation of the statute
if Burr and Massey received higher rates “based in whole
or in part” on their credit reports; if they did, Safeco would
be liable to them on a showing of reckless conduct (or
worse). The first issue we can forget, however, for al
though the record does not reliably indicate what rates
they would have obtained if their credit reports had not
been considered, it is clear enough that if Safeco did vio
late the statute, the company was not reckless in falling
down in its duty.
While “the term recklessness is not self-defining,” the
common law has generally understood it in the sphere of
civil liability as conduct violating an objective standard:
——————
17 We reject Edo’s alternative argument that GEICO’s offer of a stan

dard insurance policy with GEICO Indemnity was an “adverse action”
requiring notice because it amounted to a “denial” of insurance through
a lower cost, “preferred” policy with GEICO General. See
§1681a(k)(1)(B)(i) (defining “adverse action” to include a “denial . . . of
. . . insurance”). An applicant calling GEICO for insurance talks with a
sales representative who acts for all the GEICO companies. The record
has no indication that GEICO tells applicants about its corporate
structure, or that applicants request insurance from one of the several
companies or even know of their separate existence. The salesperson
takes information from the applicant and obtains his credit score, then
either denies any insurance or assigns him to one of the companies
willing to provide it; the other companies receive no application and
take no separate action. This way of accepting new business is clearly
outside the natural meaning of “denial” of insurance.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 19

Opinion of the Court

action entailing “an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is
either known or so obvious that it should be known.”18
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 836 (1994); see Prosser
and Keeton §34, at 213–214. The Restatement, for exam
ple, defines reckless disregard of a person’s physical safety
this way:
“The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the
safety of another if he does an act or intentionally
fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do,
knowing or having reason to know of facts which
would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that
his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical
harm to another, but also that such risk is substan
tially greater than that which is necessary to make
his conduct negligent.” Restatement (Second) of Torts
§500, p. 587 (1963–1964).
It is this high risk of harm, objectively assessed, that is
the essence of recklessness at common law. See Prosser
and Keeton §34, at 213 (recklessness requires “a known or
obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly prob
able that harm would follow”).
There being no indication that Congress had something
different in mind, we have no reason to deviate from the
common law understanding in applying the statute. See
Prupis, 529 U. S., at 500–501. Thus, a company subject to
FCRA does not act in reckless disregard of it unless the
action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of
the statute’s terms, but shows that the company ran a risk
of violating the law substantially greater than the risk
associated with a reading that was merely careless.
Here, there is no need to pinpoint the negli
gence/recklessness line, for Safeco’s reading of the statute,
——————
18 Unlike civil recklessness, criminal recklessness also requires sub

jective knowledge on the part of the offender. Brennan, 511 U. S., at
836–837; ALI, Model Penal Code §2.02(2)(c) (1985).
20 SAFECO INS. CO. OF AMERICA v. BURR

Opinion of the Court

albeit erroneous, was not objectively unreasonable. As we
said, §1681a(k)(1)(B)(i) is silent on the point from which to
measure “increase.” On the rationale that “increase”
presupposes prior dealing, Safeco took the definition as
excluding initial rate offers for new insurance, and so sent
no adverse action notices to Burr and Massey. While we
disagree with Safeco’s analysis, we recognize that its
reading has a foundation in the statutory text, see supra,
at 11, and a sufficiently convincing justification to have
persuaded the District Court to adopt it and rule in
Safeco’s favor.
This is not a case in which the business subject to the
Act had the benefit of guidance from the courts of appeals
or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that might have
warned it away from the view it took. Before these cases,
no court of appeals had spoken on the issue, and no au
thoritative guidance has yet come from the FTC19 (which
in any case has only enforcement responsibility, not sub
stantive rulemaking authority, for the provisions in ques
tion, see 15 U. S. C. §§1681s(a)(1), (e)). Cf. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202 (2001) (assessing, for qualified
immunity purposes, whether an action was reasonable in
light of legal rules that were “clearly established” at the
time). Given this dearth of guidance and the less-than
pellucid statutory text, Safeco’s reading was not objec
tively unreasonable, and so falls well short of raising the
“unjustifiably high risk” of violating the statute necessary
——————
19 Respondent-plaintiffs point to a letter, written by an FTC staff

member to an insurance company lawyer, that suggests that an “ad
verse action” occurs when “the applicant will have to pay more for
insurance at the inception of the policy than he or she would have been
charged if the consumer report had been more favorable.” Letter from
Hannah A. Stires to James M. Ball (Mar. 1, 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/ball.htm (as visited May 17, 2007,
and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). But the letter did not
canvas the issue, and it explicitly indicated that it was merely “an
informal staff opinion . . . not binding on the Commission.” Ibid.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 21

Opinion of the Court

for reckless liability.20
* * *
The Court of Appeals correctly held that reckless disre
gard of a requirement of FCRA would qualify as a willful
violation within the meaning of §1681n(a). But there was
no need for that court to remand the cases for factual
development. GEICO’s decision to issue no adverse action
notice to Edo was not a violation of §1681m(a), and
Safeco’s misreading of the statute was not reckless. The
judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore reversed
in both cases, which are remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

——————
20 Respondent-plaintiffs argue that evidence of subjective bad faith

must be taken into account in determining whether a company acted
knowingly or recklessly for purposes of §1681n(a). To the extent that
they argue that evidence of subjective bad faith can support a willful
ness finding even when the company’s reading of the statute is objec
tively reasonable, their argument is unsound. Where, as here, the
statutory text and relevant court and agency guidance allow for more
than one reasonable interpretation, it would defy history and current
thinking to treat a defendant who merely adopts one such interpreta
tion as a knowing or reckless violator. Congress could not have in
tended such a result for those who followed an interpretation that could
reasonably have found support in the courts, whatever their subjective
intent may have been.
Both Safeco and GEICO argue that good-faith reliance on legal
advice should render companies immune to claims raised under
§1681n(a). While we do not foreclose this possibility, we need not
address the issue here in light of our present holdings.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 06–84 and 06–100
_________________

SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
06–84 v.
CHARLES BURR ET AL.

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
06–100 v.
AJENE EDO
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 4, 2007]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
While I join the Court’s judgment and Parts I, II, III–A,
and IV–B of the Court’s opinion, I disagree with the rea
soning in Parts III–B and III–C, as well as with Part IV–
A, which relies on that reasoning.
An adverse action taken after reviewing a credit report
“is based in whole or in part on” that report within the
meaning of 15 U. S. C. §1681m(a). That is true even if the
company would have made the same decision without
looking at the report, because what the company actually
did is more relevant than what it might have done. I find
nothing in the statute making the examination of a credit
report a “necessary condition” of any resulting increase.
Ante, at 13. The more natural reading is that reviewing a
report is only a sufficient condition.
The Court’s contrary position leads to a serious anom
2 SAFECO INS. CO. OF AMERICA v. BURR

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

aly. As a matter of federal law, companies are free to
adopt whatever “neutral” credit scores they want. That
score need not (and probably will not) reflect the median
consumer credit score. More likely, it will reflect a com
pany’s assessment of the creditworthiness of a run-of-the
mill applicant who lacks a credit report. Because those
who have yet to develop a credit history are unlikely to be
good credit risks, “neutral” credit scores will in many cases
be quite low. Yet under the Court’s reasoning, only those
consumers with credit scores even lower than what may
already be a very low “neutral” score will ever receive
adverse action notices.1
While the Court acknowledges that “the neutral-score
baseline will leave some consumers without a notice that
might lead to discovering errors,” ante, at 16, it finds this
unobjectionable because Congress was likely uninterested
in “the theoretical question of whether the consumer
would have gotten a better rate with perfect credit.” Ante,
at 16.2 The Court’s decision, however, disserves not only
those consumers with “gilt-edged credit report[s],” ante, at
16, but also the much larger category of consumers with
better-than-“neutral” scores. I find it difficult to believe
——————
1 Stranger still, companies that automatically disqualify consumers

who lack credit reports will never need to send any adverse action
notices. After all, the Court’s baseline is “what the applicant would
have had if the company had not taken his credit score into account,”
ante, at 15, but from such companies, what the applicant “would have
had” is no insurance at all. An offer of insurance at any price, however
inflated by a poor and perhaps incorrect credit score, will therefore
never constitute an adverse action.
2 The Court also justifies its deviation from the statute’s text by rea

soning that frequent adverse action notices would be ignored. See ante,
at 16–17. To borrow a sentence from the Court’s opinion: “Perhaps.”
Ante, at 8. But rather than speculate about the likely effect of “hyper
notification,” ante, at 17, I would defer to the Solicitor General’s posi
tion, informed by the Federal Trade Commission’s expert judgment,
that consumers by and large benefit from adverse action notices,
however common. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27–29.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

that Congress could have intended for a company’s unre
strained adoption of a “neutral” score to keep many (if not
most) consumers from ever hearing that their credit re
ports are costing them money. In my view, the statute’s
text is amenable to a more sensible interpretation.
 Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

THOMAS, J., concurring in part

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 06–84 and 06–100
_________________

SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
06–84 v.
CHARLES BURR ET AL.

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
06–100 v.
AJENE EDO
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 4, 2007]

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins,
concurring in part.
I agree with the Court’s disposition and most of its
reasoning. Safeco did not send notices to new customers
because it took the position that the initial insurance rate
it offered a customer could not be an “increase in any
charge for . . . insurance” under 15 U. S. C.
§1681a(k)(1)(B)(i). The Court properly holds that regard
less of the merits of this interpretation, it is not an unrea
sonable one, and Safeco therefore did not act willfully.
Ante, at 18–21. I do not join Part III–A of the Court’s
opinion, however, because it resolves the merits of Safeco’s
interpretation of §1681a(k)(1)(B)(i)—an issue not neces
sary to the Court’s conclusion and not briefed or argued by
the parties.