Indiana v. Edwards

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

INDIANA v. EDWARDS

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

No. 07–208. Argued March 26, 2008—Decided June 19, 2008
After Indiana charged respondent Edwards with attempted murder
and other crimes for a shooting during his attempt to steal a pair of
shoes, his mental condition became the subject of three competency
proceedings and two self-representation requests, mostly before the
same trial judge. Referring to the lengthy record of psychiatric re-
ports, the trial court noted that Edwards suffered from schizophrenia
and concluded that, although it appeared he was competent to stand
trial, he was not competent to defend himself at trial. The court
therefore denied Edwards’ self-representation request. He was rep-
resented by appointed counsel at trial and convicted on two counts.
Indiana’s intermediate appellate court ordered a new trial, agreeing
with Edwards that the trial court’s refusal to permit him to represent
himself deprived him of his constitutional right of self-representation
under the Sixth Amendment and Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806.
Although finding that the record provided substantial support for the
trial court’s ruling, the Indiana Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed
the intermediate appellate court on the ground that Faretta and
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U. S. 389, required the State to allow Edwards
to represent himself.
Held: The Constitution does not forbid States from insisting upon rep-
resentation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial but
who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not
competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. Pp. 4–13.
(a) This Court’s precedents frame the question presented, but they
do not answer it. Dusky v. United States, 362 U. S. 402, and Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U. S. 162, 171, set forth the Constitution’s “mental
competence” standard forbidding the trial of an individual lacking a
rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and sufficient
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
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Syllabus

understanding. But those cases did not consider the issue presented
here, namely, the relation of that “mental competence” standard to
the self-representation right. Similarly the Court’s foundational
“self-representation” case, Faretta, supra—which held that the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments include a “constitutional right to pro-
ceed without counsel when” a criminal defendant “voluntarily and in-
telligently elects to do so,” 422 U. S., at 807—does not answer the
question as to the scope of the self-representation right. Finally, al-
though Godinez, supra, presents a question closer to the one at issue
in that it focused upon a borderline-competent defendant who had
asked a state trial court to permit him to represent himself and to
change his pleas from not guilty to guilty, Godinez provides no an-
swer here because that defendant’s ability to conduct a defense at
trial was expressly not at issue in that case, see 509 U. S., at 399–
400, and because the case’s constitutional holding that a State may
permit a gray-area defendant to represent himself does not tell a
State whether it may deny such a defendant the right to represent
himself at his trial. Pp. 4–8.
(b) Several considerations taken together lead the Court to con-
clude that the Constitution permits a State to limit a defendant’s
self-representation right by insisting upon trial counsel when the de-
fendant lacks the mental competency to conduct his trial defense
unless represented. First, the Court’s precedent, while not answering
the question, points slightly in that direction. By setting forth a
standard that focuses directly upon a defendant’s ability to consult
with his lawyer, Dusky and Drope assume representation by counsel
and emphasize counsel’s importance, thus suggesting (though not
holding) that choosing to forgo trial counsel presents a very different
set of circumstances than the mental competency determination for a
defendant to stand trial. Also, Faretta rested its self-representation
conclusion in part on pre-existing state cases that are consistent
with, and at least two of which expressly adopt, a competency limita-
tion on the self-representation right. See 422 U. S., at 813, and n. 9.
Second, the nature of mental illness—which is not a unitary concept,
but varies in degree, can vary over time, and interferes with an indi-
vidual’s functioning at different times in different ways—cautions
against using a single competency standard to decide both whether a
defendant who is represented can proceed to trial and whether a de-
fendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself.
Third, a self-representation right at trial will not “affirm the dignity”
of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense
without the assistance of counsel, see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S.
168, 176–177, and may undercut the most basic of the Constitution’s
criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial. The trial judge—
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Syllabus

particularly one such as the judge in this case, who presided over one
of Edwards’ competency hearings and his two trials—will often prove
best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored
to the particular defendant’s individualized circumstances. Pp. 8–12.
(c) Indiana’s proposed standard, which would deny a criminal de-
fendant the right to represent himself at trial if he cannot communi-
cate coherently with the court or a jury, is rejected because this Court
is uncertain as to how that standard would work in practice. The
Court also declines Indiana’s request to overrule Faretta because to-
day’s opinion may well remedy the unfair trial concerns previously
leveled against the case. Pp. 12–13.
866 N. E. 2d 252, vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ.,
joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J.,
joined.
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 07–208
_________________

INDIANA, PETITIONER v. AHMAD EDWARDS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
INDIANA
[June 19, 2008]

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case focuses upon a criminal defendant whom a
state court found mentally competent to stand trial if
represented by counsel but not mentally competent to
conduct that trial himself. We must decide whether in
these circumstances the Constitution forbids a State from
insisting that the defendant proceed to trial with counsel,
the State thereby denying the defendant the right to
represent himself. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 6; Faretta v.
California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975). We conclude that the
Constitution does not forbid a State so to insist.
I
In July 1999 Ahmad Edwards, the respondent, tried to
steal a pair of shoes from an Indiana department store.
After he was discovered, he drew a gun, fired at a store
security officer, and wounded a bystander. He was caught
and then charged with attempted murder, battery with a
deadly weapon, criminal recklessness, and theft. His
mental condition subsequently became the subject of three
competency proceedings and two self-representation re-
quests, mostly before the same trial judge:
1. First Competency Hearing: August 2000. Five
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Opinion of the Court

months after Edwards’ arrest, his court-appointed counsel
asked for a psychiatric evaluation. After hearing psychia-
trist and neuropsychologist witnesses (in February 2000
and again in August 2000), the court found Edwards
incompetent to stand trial, App. 365a, and committed him
to Logansport State Hospital for evaluation and treat-
ment, see id., at 48a–53a.
2. Second Competency Hearing: March 2002. Seven
months after his commitment, doctors found that Ed-
wards’ condition had improved to the point where he could
stand trial. Id., at 63a–64a. Several months later, how-
ever, but still before trial, Edwards’ counsel asked for
another psychiatric evaluation. In March 2002, the judge
held a competency hearing, considered additional psychi-
atric evidence, and (in April) found that Edwards, while
“suffer[ing] from mental illness,” was “competent to assist
his attorneys in his defense and stand trial for the charged
crimes.” Id., at 114a.
3. Third Competency Hearing: April 2003. Seven
months later but still before trial, Edwards’ counsel
sought yet another psychiatric evaluation of his client.
And, in April 2003, the court held yet another competency
hearing. Edwards’ counsel presented further psychiatric
and neuropsychological evidence showing that Edwards
was suffering from serious thinking difficulties and delu-
sions. A testifying psychiatrist reported that Edwards
could understand the charges against him, but he was
“unable to cooperate with his attorney in his defense
because of his schizophrenic illness”; “[h]is delusions and
his marked difficulties in thinking make it impossible for
him to cooperate with his attorney.” Id., at 164a. In
November 2003, the court concluded that Edwards was
not then competent to stand trial and ordered his recom-
mitment to the state hospital. Id., at 206a–211a.
4. First Self-Representation Request and First Trial:
June 2005. About eight months after his commitment, the
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Opinion of the Court

hospital reported that Edwards’ condition had again im-
proved to the point that he had again become competent to
stand trial. Id., at 228a–236a. And almost one year after
that Edwards’ trial began. Just before trial, Edwards
asked to represent himself. Id., at 509a, 520a. He also
asked for a continuance, which, he said, he needed in
order to proceed pro se. Id., at 519a–520a. The court
refused the continuance. Id., at 520a. Edwards then
proceeded to trial represented by counsel. The jury con-
victed him of criminal recklessness and theft but failed to
reach a verdict on the charges of attempted murder and
battery.
5. Second Self-Representation Request and Second
Trial: December 2005. The State decided to retry Edwards
on the attempted murder and battery charges. Just before
the retrial, Edwards again asked the court to permit him
to represent himself. Id., at 279a–282a. Referring to the
lengthy record of psychiatric reports, the trial court noted
that Edwards still suffered from schizophrenia and con-
cluded that “[w]ith these findings, he’s competent to stand
trial but I’m not going to find he’s competent to defend
himself.” Id., at 527a. The court denied Edwards’ self-
representation request. Edwards was represented by
appointed counsel at his retrial. The jury convicted Ed-
wards on both of the remaining counts.
Edwards subsequently appealed to Indiana’s intermedi-
ate appellate court. He argued that the trial court’s re-
fusal to permit him to represent himself at his retrial
deprived him of his constitutional right of self-
representation. U. S. Const., Amdt. 6; Faretta, supra. The
court agreed and ordered a new trial. The matter then
went to the Indiana Supreme Court. That court found
that “[t]he record in this case presents a substantial basis
to agree with the trial court,” 866 N. E. 2d 252, 260 (2007),
but it nonetheless affirmed the intermediate appellate
court on the belief that this Court’s precedents, namely,
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Faretta, 422 U. S. 806, and Godinez v. Moran, 509 U. S.
389 (1993), required the State to allow Edwards to repre-
sent himself. At Indiana’s request, we agreed to consider
whether the Constitution required the trial court to allow
Edwards to represent himself at trial.
II
Our examination of this Court’s precedents convinces us
that those precedents frame the question presented, but
they do not answer it. The two cases that set forth the
Constitution’s “mental competence” standard, Dusky v.
United States, 362 U. S. 402 (1960) (per curiam), and
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162 (1975), specify that the
Constitution does not permit trial of an individual who
lacks “mental competency.” Dusky defines the competency
standard as including both (1) “whether” the defendant
has “a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him” and (2) whether the defendant
“has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” 362
U. S., at 402 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted). Drope repeats that standard, stating that it “has
long been accepted that a person whose mental condition
is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the na-
ture and object of the proceedings against him, to consult
with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may
not be subjected to a trial.” 420 U. S., at 171 (emphasis
added). Neither case considered the mental competency
issue presented here, namely, the relation of the mental
competence standard to the right of self-representation.
The Court’s foundational “self-representation” case,
Faretta, held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
include a “constitutional right to proceed without counsel
when” a criminal defendant “voluntarily and intelligently
elects to do so.” 422 U. S., at 807 (emphasis in original).
The Court implied that right from: (1) a “nearly universal
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Opinion of the Court

conviction,” made manifest in state law, that “forcing a
lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his
basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so,”
id., at 817–818; (2) Sixth Amendment language granting
rights to the “accused;” (3) Sixth Amendment structure
indicating that the rights it sets forth, related to the “fair
administration of American justice,” are “persona[l]” to the
accused, id., at 818–821; (4) the absence of historical
examples of forced representation, id., at 821–832; and (5)
“ ‘respect for the individual,’ ” id., at 834 (quoting Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 350–351 (1970) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel “must
be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is
the lifeblood of the law’ ”)).
Faretta does not answer the question before us both
because it did not consider the problem of mental compe-
tency (cf. 422 U. S., at 835 (Faretta was “literate, compe-
tent, and understanding”)), and because Faretta itself and
later cases have made clear that the right of self-
representation is not absolute. See Martinez v. Court of
Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U. S. 152, 163
(2000) (no right of self-representation on direct appeal in a
criminal case); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S. 168, 178–
179 (1984) (appointment of standby counsel over self-
represented defendant’s objection is permissible); Faretta,
422 U. S., at 835, n. 46 (no right “to abuse the dignity of
the courtroom”); ibid. (no right to avoid compliance with
“relevant rules of procedural and substantive law”); id., at
834, n. 46 (no right to “engag[e] in serious and obstruction-
ist misconduct,” referring to Illinois v. Allen, supra). The
question here concerns a mental-illness-related limitation
on the scope of the self-representation right.
The sole case in which this Court considered mental
competence and self-representation together, Godinez,
supra, presents a question closer to that at issue here.
The case focused upon a borderline-competent criminal
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defendant who had asked a state trial court to permit him
to represent himself and to change his pleas from not
guilty to guilty. The state trial court had found that the
defendant met Dusky’s mental competence standard, that
he “knowingly and intelligently” waived his right to assis-
tance of counsel, and that he “freely and voluntarily” chose
to plead guilty. 509 U. S., at 393 (internal quotation
marks omitted). And the state trial court had conse-
quently granted the defendant’s self-representation and
change-of-plea requests. See id., at 392–393. A federal
appeals court, however, had vacated the defendant’s guilty
pleas on the ground that the Constitution required the
trial court to ask a further question, namely, whether the
defendant was competent to waive his constitutional right
to counsel. See id., at 393–394. Competence to make that
latter decision, the appeals court said, required the defen-
dant to satisfy a higher mental competency standard than
the standard set forth in Dusky. See 509 U. S., at 393–
394. Dusky’s more general standard sought only to deter-
mine whether a defendant represented by counsel was
competent to stand trial, not whether he was competent to
waive his right to counsel. 509 U. S., at 394–395.
This Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, “reject[ed]
the notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the
right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is
higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard.”
Id., at 398. The decision to plead guilty, we said, “is no
more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a
[represented] defendant may be called upon to make
during the course of a trial.” Ibid. Hence “there is no
reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel re-
quires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning
than the decision to waive other constitutional rights.”
Id., at 399. And even assuming that self-representation
might pose special trial-related difficulties, “the compe-
tence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his
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Opinion of the Court

right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not
the competence to represent himself.” Ibid. (emphasis in
original). For this reason, we concluded, “the defendant’s
‘technical legal knowledge’ is ‘not relevant’ to the determi-
nation.” Id., at 400 (quoting Faretta, supra, at 836).
We concede that Godinez bears certain similarities with
the present case. Both involve mental competence and
self-representation. Both involve a defendant who wants
to represent himself. Both involve a mental condition that
falls in a gray area between Dusky’s minimal constitu-
tional requirement that measures a defendant’s ability to
stand trial and a somewhat higher standard that meas-
ures mental fitness for another legal purpose.
We nonetheless conclude that Godinez does not answer
the question before us now. In part that is because the
Court of Appeals higher standard at issue in Godinez
differs in a critical way from the higher standard at issue
here. In Godinez, the higher standard sought to measure
the defendant’s ability to proceed on his own to enter a
guilty plea; here the higher standard seeks to measure the
defendant’s ability to conduct trial proceedings. To put
the matter more specifically, the Godinez defendant
sought only to change his pleas to guilty, he did not seek
to conduct trial proceedings, and his ability to conduct a
defense at trial was expressly not at issue. Thus we em-
phasized in Godinez that we needed to consider only the
defendant’s “competence to waive the right.” 509 U. S., at
399 (emphasis in original). And we further emphasized
that we need not consider the defendant’s “technical legal
knowledge” about how to proceed at trial. Id., at 400
(internal quotation marks omitted). We found our holding
consistent with this Court’s earlier statement in Massey v.
Moore, 348 U. S. 105, 108 (1954), that “[o]ne might not be
insane in the sense of being incapable of standing trial and
yet lack the capacity to stand trial without benefit of
counsel.” See Godinez, supra, at 399–400, n. 10 (quoting
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Opinion of the Court

Massey and noting that it dealt with “a question that is
quite different from the question presented” in Godinez).
In this case, the very matters that we did not consider in
Godinez are directly before us.
For another thing, Godinez involved a State that sought
to permit a gray-area defendant to represent himself.
Godinez’s constitutional holding is that a State may do so.
But that holding simply does not tell a State whether it
may deny a gray-area defendant the right to represent
himself—the matter at issue here. One might argue that
Godinez’s grant (to a State) of permission to allow a gray-
area defendant self-representation must implicitly include
permission to deny self-representation. Cf. 509 U. S., at
402 (“States are free to adopt competency standards that
are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation”). Yet one
could more forcefully argue that Godinez simply did not
consider whether the Constitution requires self-
representation by gray-area defendants even in circum-
stances where the State seeks to disallow it (the question
here). The upshot is that, in our view, the question before
us is an open one.
III
We now turn to the question presented. We assume
that a criminal defendant has sufficient mental compe-
tence to stand trial (i.e., the defendant meets Dusky’s
standard) and that the defendant insists on representing
himself during that trial. We ask whether the Constitu-
tion permits a State to limit that defendant’s self-
representation right by insisting upon representation by
counsel at trial—on the ground that the defendant lacks
the mental capacity to conduct his trial defense unless
represented.
Several considerations taken together lead us to con-
clude that the answer to this question is yes. First, the
Court’s precedent, while not answering the question,
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Opinion of the Court

points slightly in the direction of our affirmative answer.
Godinez, as we have just said, simply leaves the question
open. But the Court’s “mental competency” cases set forth
a standard that focuses directly upon a defendant’s “pre-
sent ability to consult with his lawyer,” Dusky, 362 U. S.,
at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted); a “capacity . . .
to consult with counsel,” and an ability “to assist [counsel]
in preparing his defense,” Drope, 420 U. S., at 171. See
ibid. (“It has long been accepted that a person whose
mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to
understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in pre-
paring his defense may not be subjected to a trial” (em-
phasis added)). These standards assume representation
by counsel and emphasize the importance of counsel.
They thus suggest (though do not hold) that an instance in
which a defendant who would choose to forgo counsel at
trial presents a very different set of circumstances, which
in our view, calls for a different standard.
At the same time Faretta, the foundational self-
representation case, rested its conclusion in part upon pre-
existing state law set forth in cases all of which are consis-
tent with, and at least two of which expressly adopt, a
competency limitation on the self-representation right.
See 422 U. S., at 813, and n. 9 (citing 16 state-court deci-
sions and two secondary sources). See, e.g., Cappetta v.
State, 204 So. 2d 913, 917–918 (Fla. App. 1967), rev’d on
other grounds, 216 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1968), cited in Faretta,
supra, at 813, n. 9 (assuring a “mentally competent” de-
fendant the right “to conduct his own defense” provided
that “no unusual circumstances exist” such as, e.g., “men-
tal derangement” that “would . . . depriv[e]” the defendant
“of a fair trial if allowed to conduct his own defense,” 204
So. 2d, at 917–918); id., at 918 (noting that “whether
unusual circumstances are evident is a matter resting in
the sound discretion granted to the trial judge”); Allen v.
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Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 558, 562–563, 87 N. E. 2d 192,
195 (1949) (noting “the assignment of counsel” was “neces-
sary” where there was some “special circumstance” such
as when the criminal defendant was “mentally defective”).
Second, the nature of the problem before us cautions
against the use of a single mental competency standard for
deciding both (1) whether a defendant who is represented
by counsel can proceed to trial and (2) whether a defen-
dant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent
himself. Mental illness itself is not a unitary concept. It
varies in degree. It can vary over time. It interferes with
an individual’s functioning at different times in different
ways. The history of this case (set forth in Part I, supra)
illustrates the complexity of the problem. In certain in-
stances an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky’s
mental competence standard, for he will be able to work
with counsel at trial, yet at the same time he may be
unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his
own defense without the help of counsel. See, e.g., N.
Poythress, R. Bonnie, J. Monahan, R. Otto, & S. Hoge,
Adjudicative Competence: The MacArthur Studies 103
(2002) (“Within each domain of adjudicative competence
(competence to assist counsel; decisional competence) the
data indicate that understanding, reasoning, and appre-
ciation [of the charges against a defendant] are separable
and somewhat independent aspects of functional legal
ability”). See also McKaskle, 465 U. S., at 174 (describing
trial tasks as including organization of defense, making
motions, arguing points of law, participating in voir dire,
questioning witnesses, and addressing the court and jury).
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) tells us
(without dispute) in its amicus brief filed in support of
neither party that “[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in
sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expres-
sive abilities, anxiety, and other common symptoms of
severe mental illnesses can impair the defendant’s ability
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to play the significantly expanded role required for self-
representation even if he can play the lesser role of repre-
sented defendant.” Brief for APA et al. as Amici Curiae 26.
Motions and other documents that the defendant prepared
in this case (one of which we include in the Appendix,
infra) suggest to a layperson the common sense of this
general conclusion.
Third, in our view, a right of self-representation at trial
will not “affirm the dignity” of a defendant who lacks the
mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assis-
tance of counsel. McKaskle, supra, at 176–177 (“Dignity”
and “autonomy” of individual underlie self-representation
right). To the contrary, given that defendant’s uncertain
mental state, the spectacle that could well result from his
self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove
humiliating as ennobling. Moreover, insofar as a defen-
dant’s lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or
sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context
undercuts the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal
law objectives, providing a fair trial. As Justice Brennan
put it, “[t]he Constitution would protect none of us if it
prevented the courts from acting to preserve the very
processes that the Constitution itself prescribes.” Allen,
397 U. S., at 350 (concurring opinion). See Martinez, 528
U. S., at 162 (“Even at the trial level . . . the government’s
interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial
at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as
his own lawyer”). See also Sell v. United States, 539 U. S.
166, 180 (2003) (“[T]he Government has a concomitant,
constitutionally essential interest in assuring that the
defendant’s trial is a fair one”).
Further, proceedings must not only be fair, they must
“appear fair to all who observe them.” Wheat v. United
States, 486 U. S. 153, 160 (1988). An amicus brief reports
one psychiatrist’s reaction to having observed a patient (a
patient who had satisfied Dusky) try to conduct his own
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defense: “[H]ow in the world can our legal system allow an
insane man to defend himself?” Brief for Ohio et al. as
Amici Curiae 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). See
Massey, 348 U. S., at 108 (“No trial can be fair that leaves
the defense to a man who is insane, unaided by counsel,
and who by reason of his mental condition stands helpless
and alone before the court”). The application of Dusky’s
basic mental competence standard can help in part to
avoid this result. But given the different capacities
needed to proceed to trial without counsel, there is little
reason to believe that Dusky alone is sufficient. At the
same time, the trial judge, particularly one such as the
trial judge in this case, who presided over one of Edwards’
competency hearings and his two trials, will often prove
best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity deci-
sions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a
particular defendant.
We consequently conclude that the Constitution permits
judges to take realistic account of the particular defen-
dant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant
who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally
competent to do so. That is to say, the Constitution per-
mits States to insist upon representation by counsel for
those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but
who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point
where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings
by themselves.
IV
Indiana has also asked us to adopt, as a measure of a
defendant’s ability to conduct a trial, a more specific stan-
dard that would “deny a criminal defendant the right to
represent himself at trial where the defendant cannot
communicate coherently with the court or a jury.” Brief
for Petitioner 20 (emphasis deleted). We are sufficiently
uncertain, however, as to how that particular standard
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would work in practice to refrain from endorsing it as a
federal constitutional standard here. We need not now,
and we do not, adopt it.
Indiana has also asked us to overrule Faretta. We
decline to do so. We recognize that judges have sometimes
expressed concern that Faretta, contrary to its intent, has
led to trials that are unfair. See Martinez, supra, at 164
(BREYER, J., concurring) (noting practical concerns of trial
judges). But recent empirical research suggests that such
instances are not common. See, e.g., Hashimoto, Defend-
ing the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at
the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N. C. L. Rev. 423, 427,
447, 428 (2007) (noting that of the small number of defen-
dants who chose to proceed pro se—“roughly 0.3% to 0.5%”
of the total, state felony defendants in particular “appear
to have achieved higher felony acquittal rates than their
represented counterparts in that they were less likely to
have been convicted of felonies”). At the same time, in-
stances in which the trial’s fairness is in doubt may well
be concentrated in the 20 percent or so of self-
representation cases where the mental competence of the
defendant is also at issue. See id., at 428 (about 20 per-
cent of federal pro se felony defendants ordered to undergo
competency evaluations). If so, today’s opinion, assuring
trial judges the authority to deal appropriately with cases
in the latter category, may well alleviate those fair trial
concerns.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Indiana is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
14 INDIANA v. EDWARDS

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

APPENDIX
Excerpt from respondent’s filing entitled “ ‘Defendant’s
Version of the Instant Offense,’ ” which he had attached to
his presentence investigation report:
“ ‘The appointed motion of permissive intervention
filed therein the court superior on, 6–26–01 caused a
stay of action and apon it’s expiration or thereafter
three years the plan to establish a youth program to
and for the coordination of aspects of law enforcement
to prevent and reduce crime amoung young people in
Indiana became a diplomatic act as under the Safe
Streets Act of 1967, “A omnibuc considerate agent: I
membered clients within the public and others that
at/production of the courts actions showcased causes.
The costs of the stay (Trial Rule 60) has a derivative
property that is: my knowledged events as not unex-
pended to contract the membered clients is the com-
mission of finding a facilitie for this plan or project to
become organization of administrative recommenda-
tions conditioned by governors.’ ” 866 N. E. 2d, at 258,
n. 4 (alterations omitted).
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

SCALIA, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 07–208
_________________

INDIANA, PETITIONER v. AHMAD EDWARDS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
INDIANA
[June 19, 2008]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,
dissenting.
The Constitution guarantees a defendant who know-
ingly and voluntarily waives the right to counsel the right
to proceed pro se at his trial. Faretta v. California, 422
U. S. 806 (1975). A mentally ill defendant who knowingly
and voluntarily elects to proceed pro se instead of through
counsel receives a fair trial that comports with the Four-
teenth Amendment. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U. S. 389
(1993). The Court today concludes that a State may none-
theless strip a mentally ill defendant of the right to repre-
sent himself when that would be fairer. In my view the
Constitution does not permit a State to substitute its own
perception of fairness for the defendant’s right to make his
own case before the jury—a specific right long understood
as essential to a fair trial.
I
Ahmad Edwards suffers from schizophrenia, an illness
that has manifested itself in different ways over time,
depending on how and whether Edwards was treated as
well as on other factors that appear harder to identify. In
the years between 2000 and 2003—years in which Ed-
wards was apparently not treated with the antipsychotic
medications and other drugs that are commonly pre-
scribed for his illness—Edwards was repeatedly declared
2 INDIANA v. EDWARDS

SCALIA, J., dissenting

incompetent to stand trial. Even during this period, how-
ever, his mental state seems to have fluctuated. For
instance, one psychiatrist in March 2001 described Ed-
wards in a competency report as “free of psychosis, depres-
sion, mania, and confusion,” “alert, oriented, [and] appro-
priate,” apparently “able to think clearly” and apparently
“psychiatrically normal.” App. 61a.
Edwards seems to have been treated with antipsychotic
medication for the first time in 2004. He was found com-
petent to stand trial the same year. The psychiatrist
making the recommendation described Edwards’ thought
processes as “coherent” and wrote that he “communi-
cate[d] very well,” that his speech was “easy to under-
stand,” that he displayed “good communications skills,
cooperative attitude, average intelligence, and good cogni-
tive functioning,” that he could “appraise the roles of the
participants in the courtroom proceedings,” and that he
had the capacity to challenge prosecution witnesses realis-
tically and to testify relevantly. Id., at 232a–235a (report
of Dr. Robert Sena).
Over the course of what became two separate criminal
trials, Edwards sought to act as his own lawyer. He filed a
number of incoherent written pleadings with the judge on
which the Court places emphasis, but he also filed several
intelligible pleadings, such as a motion to dismiss counsel,
a motion to dismiss charges under the Indiana speedy trial
provision, and a motion seeking a trial transcript.
Edwards made arguments in the courtroom that were
more coherent than his written pleadings. In seeking to
represent himself at his first trial, Edwards complained in
detail that the attorney representing him had not spent
adequate time preparing and was not sharing legal mate-
rials for use in his defense. The trial judge concluded that
Edwards had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to counsel and proceeded to quiz Edwards about matters of
state law. Edwards correctly answered questions about
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

SCALIA, J., dissenting

the meaning of voir dire and how it operated, and de-
scribed the basic framework for admitting videotape evi-
dence to trial, though he was unable to answer other
questions, including questions about the topics covered by
state evidentiary rules that the judge identified only by
number. He persisted in his request to represent himself,
but the judge denied the request because Edwards ac-
knowledged he would need a continuance. Represented by
counsel, he was convicted of criminal recklessness and
theft, but the jury deadlocked on charges of attempted
murder and battery.
At his second trial, Edwards again asked the judge to be
allowed to proceed pro se. He explained that he and his
attorney disagreed about which defense to present to the
attempted murder charge. Edwards’ counsel favored lack
of intent to kill; Edwards, self-defense. As the defendant
put it: “My objection is me and my attorney actually had
discussed a defense, I think prosecution had mentioned
that, and we are in disagreement with it. He has a de-
fense and I have a defense that I would like to represent
or present to the Judge.” Id., at 523a.
The court again rejected Edwards’ request to proceed
pro se, and this time it did not have the justification that
Edwards had sought a continuance. The court did not
dispute that Edwards knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to counsel, but stated it was “going to carve out a
third exception” to the right of self-representation, and—
without explaining precisely what abilities Edwards
lacked—stated Edwards was “competent to stand trial but
I’m not going to find he’s competent to defend himself.”
Id., at 527a. Edwards sought—by a request through
counsel and by raising an objection in open court—to
address the judge on the matter, but the judge refused,
stating that the issue had already been decided. Edwards’
court-appointed attorney pursued the defense the attorney
judged best—lack of intent, not self-defense—and Ed-
4 INDIANA v. EDWARDS

SCALIA, J., dissenting

wards was convicted of both attempted murder and bat-
tery. The Supreme Court of Indiana held that he was
entitled to a new trial because he had been denied the
right to represent himself. The State of Indiana sought
certiorari, which we granted. 552 U. S. ___ (2007).
II
A
The Constitution guarantees to every criminal defen-
dant the “right to proceed without counsel when he volun-
tarily and intelligently elects to do so.” Faretta, 422 U. S.,
at 807. The right reflects “a nearly universal conviction,
on the part of our people as well as our courts, that forcing
a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his
basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so.”
Id., at 817. Faretta’s discussion of the history of the right,
id., at 821–833, includes the observation that “[i]n the long
history of British criminal jurisprudence, there was only
one tribunal that ever adopted a practice of forcing counsel
upon an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding.
The tribunal was the Star Chamber,” id., at 821. Faretta
described the right to proceed pro se as a premise of the
Sixth Amendment, which confers the tools for a defense on
the “accused,” and describes the role of the attorney as one
of “assistance.” The right of self-representation could also
be seen as a part of the traditional meaning of the Due
Process Clause. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal.,
Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U. S. 152, 165 (2000) (SCALIA,
J., concurring in judgment). Whichever provision provides
its source, it means that a State simply may not force a
lawyer upon a criminal defendant who wishes to conduct
his own defense. Faretta, 422 U. S., at 807.
Exercising the right of self-representation requires
waiving the right to counsel. A defendant may represent
himself only when he “ ‘knowingly and intelligently’ ”
waives the lawyer’s assistance that is guaranteed by the
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

SCALIA, J., dissenting

Sixth Amendment. Id., at 835. He must “be made aware
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,”
and the record must “establish that ‘he knows what he is
doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” Ibid. (quot-
ing Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269,
279 (1942)). This limitation may be relevant to many
mentally ill defendants, but there is no dispute that Ed-
wards was not one of them. Edwards was warned exten-
sively of the risks of proceeding pro se. The trial judge
found that Edwards had “knowingly and voluntarily”
waived his right to counsel at his first trial, App. 512a,
and at his second trial the judge denied him the right to
represent himself only by “carv[ing] out” a new “exception”
to the right beyond the standard of knowing and voluntary
waiver, id., at 527a.
When a defendant appreciates the risks of forgoing
counsel and chooses to do so voluntarily, the Constitution
protects his ability to present his own defense even when
that harms his case. In fact waiving counsel “usually”
does so. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S. 168, 177, n. 8
(1984); see also Faretta, 422 U. S., at 834. We have none-
theless said that the defendant’s “choice must be honored
out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood
of the law.’ ” Ibid. What the Constitution requires is not
that a State’s case be subject to the most rigorous adver-
sarial testing possible—after all, it permits a defendant to
eliminate all adversarial testing by pleading guilty. What
the Constitution requires is that a defendant be given the
right to challenge the State’s case against him using the
arguments he sees fit.
In Godinez, 509 U. S. 389, we held that the Due Process
Clause posed no barrier to permitting a defendant who
suffered from mental illness both to waive his right to
counsel and to plead guilty, so long as he was competent to
stand trial and knowingly and voluntarily waived trial
and the counsel right. Id., at 391, 400. It was “never the
6 INDIANA v. EDWARDS

SCALIA, J., dissenting

rule at common law” that a defendant could be competent
to stand trial and yet incompetent to either exercise or
give up some of the rights provided for his defense. Id., at
404 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). We rejected the invitation to craft a higher
competency standard for waiving counsel than for stand-
ing trial. That proposal, we said, was built on the “flawed
premise” that a defendant’s “competence to represent
himself” was the relevant measure: “[T]he competence
that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right
to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the
competence to represent himself.” Id., at 399. We
grounded this on Faretta’s candid acknowledgment that
the Sixth Amendment protected the defendant’s right to
conduct a defense to his disadvantage. 509 U. S. at 399–
400.
B
The Court is correct that this case presents a variation
on Godinez: It presents the question not whether another
constitutional requirement (in Godinez, the proposed
higher degree of competence required for a waiver) limits
a defendant’s constitutional right to elect self-
representation, but whether a State’s view of fairness (or
of other values) permits it to strip the defendant of this
right. But that makes the question before us an easier
one. While one constitutional requirement must yield to
another in case of conflict, nothing permits a State, be-
cause of its view of what is fair, to deny a constitutional
protection. Although “the purpose of the rights set forth in
[the Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a fair trial,” it “does
not follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as the
trial is, on the whole, fair.” United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U. S. 140, 145 (2006). Thus, although the
Confrontation Clause aims to produce fairness by ensuring
the reliability of testimony, States may not provide for
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 7

SCALIA, J., dissenting

unconfronted testimony to be used at trial so long as it is
reliable. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 61 (2004).
We have rejected an approach to individual liberties that
“ ‘abstracts from the right to its purposes, and then elimi-
nates the right.’ ” Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, at 145 (quoting
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U. S. 836, 862 (1990) (SCALIA, J.,
dissenting)).
Until today, the right of self-representation has been
accorded the same respect as other constitutional guaran-
tees. The only circumstance in which we have permitted
the State to deprive a defendant of this trial right is the
one under which we have allowed the State to deny other
such rights: when it is necessary to enable the trial to
proceed in an orderly fashion. That overriding necessity,
we have said, justifies forfeiture of even the Sixth
Amendment right to be present at trial—if, after being
threatened with removal, a defendant “insists on conduct-
ing himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and
disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried
on with him in the courtroom.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S.
337, 343 (1970). A pro se defendant may not “abuse the
dignity of the courtroom,” nor may he fail to “comply with
relevant rules of procedural and substantive law,” and a
court may “terminate” the self-representation of a defen-
dant who “deliberately engages in serious and obstruction-
ist misconduct.” Faretta, supra, at 834–835, n. 46. This
ground for terminating self-representation is unavailable
here, however, because Edwards was not even allowed to
begin to represent himself, and because he was respectful
and compliant and did not provide a basis to conclude a
trial could not have gone forward had he been allowed to
press his own claims.
Beyond this circumstance, we have never constrained
the ability of a defendant to retain “actual control over the
case he chooses to present to the jury”—what we have
termed “the core of the Faretta right.” Wiggins, supra, at
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SCALIA, J., dissenting

178. Thus, while Faretta recognized that the right of self-
representation does not bar the court from appointing
standby counsel, we explained in Wiggins that “[t]he pro se
defendant must be allowed to control the organization and
content of his own defense, to make motions, to argue
points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question wit-
nesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropri-
ate points in the trial.” 465 U. S., at 174. Furthermore,
because “multiple voices ‘for the defense’ ” could “confuse
the message the defendant wishes to convey,” id., at 177, a
standby attorney’s participation would be barred when it
would “destroy the jury’s perception that the defendant is
representing himself,” id., at 178.
As I have explained, I would not adopt an approach to
the right of self-representation that we have squarely
rejected for other rights—allowing courts to disregard the
right when doing so serves the purposes for which the
right was intended. But if I were to adopt such an ap-
proach, I would remain in dissent, because I believe the
Court’s assessment of the purposes of the right of self-
representation is inaccurate to boot. While there is little
doubt that preserving individual “ ‘dignity’ ” (to which the
Court refers), ante, at 11, is paramount among those
purposes, there is equally little doubt that the loss of
“dignity” the right is designed to prevent is not the defen-
dant’s making a fool of himself by presenting an amateur-
ish or even incoherent defense. Rather, the dignity at
issue is the supreme human dignity of being master of
one’s fate rather than a ward of the State—the dignity of
individual choice. Faretta explained that the Sixth
Amendment’s counsel clause should not be invoked to
impair “ ‘the exercise of [the defendant’s] free choice’ ” to
dispense with the right, 422 U. S., at 815 (quoting Adams,
317 U. S., at 280); for “whatever else may be said of those
who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt
that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice,”
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 9

SCALIA, J., dissenting

422 U. S., at 833–834. Nine years later, when we wrote in
Wiggins that the self-representation right served the
“dignity and autonomy of the accused,” 465 U. S., at 177,
we explained in no uncertain terms that this meant ac-
cording every defendant the right to his say in court. In
particular, we said that individual dignity and autonomy
barred standby counsel from participating in a manner
that would “destroy the jury’s perception that the de-
fendant is representing himself,” and meant that “the pro
se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the
case he chooses to present to the jury.” Id., at 178. In
sum, if the Court is to honor the particular conception of
“dignity” that underlies the self-representation right, it
should respect the autonomy of the individual by honoring
his choices knowingly and voluntarily made.
A further purpose that the Court finds is advanced by
denial of the right of self-representation is the purpose of
assuring that trials “appear fair to all who observe them.”
Ante, at 11. To my knowledge we have never denied a
defendant a right simply on the ground that it would make
his trial appear less “fair” to outside observers, and I
would not inaugurate that principle here. But were I to do
so, I would not apply it to deny a defendant the right to
represent himself when he knowingly and voluntarily
waives counsel. When Edwards stood to say that “I have a
defense that I would like to represent or present to the
Judge,” App. 523a, it seems to me the epitome of both
actual and apparent unfairness for the judge to say, I have
heard “your desire to proceed by yourself and I’ve denied
your request, so your attorney will speak for you from now
on,” id., at 530a.
III
It may be that the Court permits a State to deprive
mentally ill defendants of a historic component of a fair
trial because it is suspicious of the constitutional footing of
10 INDIANA v. EDWARDS

SCALIA, J., dissenting

the right of self-representation itself. The right is not
explicitly set forth in the text of the Sixth Amendment,
and some Members of this Court have expressed skepti-
cism about Faretta’s holding. See Martinez, supra, at 156–
158 (questioning relevance of historical evidence underly-
ing Faretta’s holding); 528 U. S., at 164 (BREYER, J., con-
curring) (noting “judges closer to the firing line have some-
times expressed dismay about the practical consequences”
of the right of self-representation).
While the Sixth Amendment makes no mention of the
right to forgo counsel, it provides the defendant, and not
his lawyer, the right to call witnesses in his defense and to
confront witnesses against him, and counsel is permitted
to assist in “his defence” (emphasis added). Our trial
system, however, allows the attorney representing a de-
fendant “full authority to manage the conduct of the
trial”—an authority without which “[t]he adversary proc-
ess could not function effectively.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U. S. 400, 418 (1988); see also Florida v. Nixon, 543 U. S.
175, 187 (2004). We have held that “the client must accept
the consequences of the lawyer’s decision to forgo cross-
examination, to decide not to put certain witnesses on the
stand, or to decide not to disclose the identity of certain
witnesses in advance of trial.” Taylor, supra, at 418.
Thus, in order for the defendant’s right to call his own
witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses, and to put on a
defense to be anything more than “a tenuous and unac-
ceptable legal fiction,” a defendant must have consented to
the representation of counsel. Faretta, supra, at 821.
Otherwise, “the defense presented is not the defense guar-
anteed him by the Constitution, for in a very real sense, it
is not his defense.” Ibid.
The facts of this case illustrate this point with the ut-
most clarity. Edwards wished to take a self-defense case
to the jury. His counsel preferred a defense that focused
on lack of intent. Having been denied the right to conduct
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 11

SCALIA, J., dissenting

his own defense, Edwards was convicted without having
had the opportunity to present to the jury the grounds he
believed supported his innocence. I do not doubt that he
likely would have been convicted anyway. But to hold that
a defendant may be deprived of the right to make legal
arguments for acquittal simply because a state-selected
agent has made different arguments on his behalf is, as
Justice Frankfurter wrote in Adams, supra, at 280, to
“imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitu-
tion.” In singling out mentally ill defendants for this
treatment, the Court’s opinion does not even have the
questionable virtue of being politically correct. At a time
when all society is trying to mainstream the mentally
impaired, the Court permits them to be deprived of a basic
constitutional right—for their own good.
Today’s holding is extraordinarily vague. The Court
does not accept Indiana’s position that self-representation
can be denied “ ‘where the defendant cannot communicate
coherently with the court or a jury,’ ” ante, at 12. It does
not even hold that Edwards was properly denied his right
to represent himself. It holds only that lack of mental
competence can under some circumstances form a basis for
denying the right to proceed pro se, ante, at 1. We will
presumably give some meaning to this holding in the
future, but the indeterminacy makes a bad holding worse.
Once the right of self-representation for the mentally ill is
a sometime thing, trial judges will have every incentive to
make their lives easier—to avoid the painful necessity of
deciphering occasional pleadings of the sort contained in
the Appendix to today’s opinion—by appointing knowl-
edgeable and literate counsel.
Because I think a defendant who is competent to stand
trial, and who is capable of knowing and voluntary waiver
of assistance of counsel, has a constitutional right to con-
duct his own defense, I respectfully dissent.