Logan v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

LOGAN v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 06–6911. Argued October 30, 2007—Decided December 4, 2007
Under federal law, the maximum prison term for a felon convicted of
possessing a firearm is ordinarily 10 years. See 18 U. S. C.
§924(a)(2). If the offender’s prior criminal record includes at least
three convictions for “violent felon[ies,]” however, the Armed Career
Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) mandates a minimum term of 15 years.
See §924(e)(1). Congress defined the term “violent felony” to include
specified crimes “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year,” §924(e)(2)(B), but also provided that a state-law misde
meanor may qualify as a “violent felony” if the offense is punishable
by a term of more than two years, §921(a)(20)(B). Congress amended
§921(a)(20) in 1986 to exclude from qualification for enhanced sen
tencing “any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for
which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights [i.e., rights
to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury] restored.”
Petitioner Logan pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a
firearm and received a 15-year sentence, the mandatory minimum
under ACCA. In imposing this sentence, the court took account of
three Wisconsin misdemeanor battery convictions, each of them pun
ishable by a 3-year maximum sentence, and none of them revoking
any of Logan’s civil rights. Logan challenged his sentence on the
ground that his state-court convictions fell within §921(a)(20)’s “civil
rights restored” exemption from ACCA’s reach. Rights retained,
Logan argued, should be treated the same as rights revoked but later
restored. The District Court disagreed, holding that the exemption
applies only to defendants whose civil rights were both lost and re
stored, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Held: The exemption contained in §921(a)(20) does not cover the case of
an offender who retained civil rights at all times, and whose legal
2 LOGAN v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

status, postconviction, remained in all respects unaltered by any
state dispensation. Pp. 6–13.
(a) The ordinary meaning of the word “restored”—giving back
something that has been taken away—does not include retention of
something never lost. Moreover, the context in which “restored” ap
pears in §921(a)(20) counsels adherence to the word’s ordinary mean
ing. In §921(a)(20), the words “civil rights restored” appear in the
company of “expunged,” “set aside,” and “pardoned.” Each of those
terms describes a measure by which the government relieves an of
fender of some or all of the consequences of his conviction. In con
trast, a defendant who retains rights is simply left alone. He receives
no status-altering dispensation, no token of forgiveness from the gov
ernment. Pp. 6–7.
(b) Logan’s dominant argument against a plain-meaning approach
is not persuasive. He relies on the harsh result a literal reading
could yield: Unless retention of rights is treated as legally equivalent
to restoration of rights, he maintains, less serious offenders will be
subject to ACCA’s enhanced penalties while more serious offenders in
the same State, who have had civil rights restored, may escape
heightened punishment. Logan urges that this result is not merely
anomalous; it is absurd, particularly in States where restoration of
civil rights occurs automatically upon release from prison. Pp. 7–8.
Logan’s harsh or absurd consequences argument overlooks
§921(a)(20)’s “unless” clause, under which an offender gains no ex
emption from ACCA’s application through an expungement, set
aside, pardon, or restoration of civil rights if the dispensation “ex
pressly provides that the [offender] may not ship, transport, possess,
or receive firearms.” Many States that restore felons’ civil rights (or
accord another measure of forgiveness) nonetheless impose or retain
firearms disabilities. Further, Wisconsin no longer punishes misde
meanors by more than two years’ imprisonment, and thus no longer
has any misdemeanors that qualify as ACCA predicates. Pp. 8–9.
The resolution Logan proposes, in any event, would correct one po
tential anomaly while creating others. Under Logan’s proposed con
struction, all crimes, including first-degree murder, would be treated
as crimes for which “civil rights [have been] restored” in a State that
does not revoke any offender’s civil rights, while less serious crimes
committed elsewhere would not. Accepting Logan’s argument would
also undercut §921(a)(20)(B), which subjects to ACCA state misde
meanor convictions punishable by more than two years’ imprison
ment. Because misdemeanors generally entail no revocation of civil
rights, reading the word “restored” to include “retained” would yield
this curiosity: An offender would fall within ACCA’s reach if his three
prior offenses carried potential prison terms of over two years, but
 Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Syllabus

would be released from ACCA’s grip by virtue of his retention of civil
rights. This Court is disinclined to say that what Congress imposed
with one hand (exposure to ACCA) it withdrew with the other (ex
emption from ACCA). Even assuming that when Congress revised
§921(a)(20) in 1986, it labored under the misapprehension that all
misdemeanants and felons at least temporarily forfeit civil rights,
and indulging the further assumption that courts may repair such a
congressional oversight or mistake, this Court is not equipped to say
what statutory alteration, if any, Congress would have made had its
attention trained on offenders who retained civil rights; nor can the
Court recast §921(a)(20) in Congress’ stead. Pp. 9–11.
Section 922(g)(9)—which was adopted 10 years after §921(a)(20)
was given its current shape and which outlaws possession of a fire
arm by anyone “convicted . . . of a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio
lence”—cautions against any assumption that Congress did not mean
to deny the §921(a)(20) exemption to offenders who retained their
civil rights. Tailored to §922(g)(9), Congress adopted a definitional
provision, §921(a)(33)(B)(ii), corresponding to §921(a)(20), which
specifies expungement, set aside, pardon, or restoration of rights as
dispensations that can cancel lingering effects of a conviction. That
provision also demonstrates that the words “civil rights restored” do
not cover a person whose civil rights were never taken away. It pro
vides for restoration of civil rights as a qualifying dispensation only
“if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil
rights” in the first place. Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) also rebuts Logan’s
absurdity argument. Statutory terms may be interpreted against
their literal meaning where the words could not conceivably have
been intended to apply to the case at hand. See, e.g., Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 511. In §921(a)(33)(B)(ii), how
ever, Congress explicitly distinguished between “restored” and “re
tained,” thereby making it more than conceivable that the Legisla
ture, albeit an earlier one, meant to do the same in §921(a)(20).
Pp. 11–13.
453 F. 3d 804, affirmed.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
 Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 06–6911
_________________

JAMES D. LOGAN, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[December 4, 2007]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner James D. Logan pleaded guilty in a United
States District Court to being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). Logan’s
record as a recidivist, which included three relevant state
convictions, led the District Court to impose a 15-year
prison term, the minimum sentence mandated by the
Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), 18 U. S. C.
§924(e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V). For ACCA sentence-
enhancement purposes, a prior conviction may be disre
garded if the conviction “has been expunged, or set aside,”
or the offender “has been pardoned or has had civil rights
restored.” §921(a)(20) (2000 ed.). None of Logan’s prior
convictions have been expunged or set aside. Nor has he
been pardoned for any past crime. And, bearing impor
tantly on the instant petition, the three state-court convic
tions that triggered Logan’s ACCA-enhanced sentence
occasioned no loss of civil rights.
Challenging his enhanced sentence, Logan presents this
question: Does the “civil rights restored” exemption con
tained in §921(a)(20) encompass, and therefore remove
from ACCA’s reach, state-court convictions that at no time
2 LOGAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

deprived the offender of civil rights? We hold that the
§921(a)(20) exemption provision does not cover the case of
an offender who retained civil rights at all times, and
whose legal status, postconviction, remained in all re
spects unaltered by any state dispensation.
Section 921(a)(20) sets out postconviction events—
expungement, set aside, pardon, or restoration of civil
rights—that extend to an offender a measure of forgive
ness, relieving him from some or all of the consequences of
his conviction. Congress might have broadened the
§921(a)(20) exemption provision to cover convictions at
tended by no loss of civil rights. The national lawmakers,
however, did not do so. Section 921(a)(20)’s failure to
exempt convictions that do not revoke civil rights produces
anomalies. But so does the extension of the §921(a)(20)
exemption that Logan advances. We are not equipped to
say what statutory alteration, if any, Congress would have
made had its attention trained on offenders who retained
civil rights; nor can we recast §921(a)(20) in Congress’
stead.
I
Federal law generally prohibits the possession of a
firearm by a person convicted of “a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U. S. C.
§922(g)(1). Ordinarily, the maximum felon-in-possession
sentence is 10 years. See §924(a)(2). If the offender’s
prior criminal record includes at least three convictions for
“violent felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s],” however,
the maximum sentence increases to life, and ACCA man
dates a minimum term of 15 years. §924(e)(1) (2000 ed.,
Supp. V).
Congress defined the term “violent felony” to include
specified crimes “punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year.” §924(e)(2)(B) (2000 ed.). An offense
classified by a State as a misdemeanor, however, may
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Opinion of the Court

qualify as a “violent felony” for ACCA-enhancement pur
poses (or as a predicate for a felon-in-possession conviction
under §922(g)) only if the offense is punishable by more
than two years in prison. §921(a)(20)(B).
In Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U. S. 103
(1983), we held that a State’s expungement of a conviction
did not nullify the conviction for purposes of the firearms
disabilities Congress placed in §§922(g)(1) and (h)(1). In
so ruling, we noted that our decision would ensure greater
uniformity in federal sentences. See id., at 119–120.
Provisions for expungement “var[ied] widely from State to
State,” we observed, id., at 120, and yielded “nothing less
than a national patchwork,” id., at 122.
In the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act (FOPA), 100
Stat. 449 (1986), Congress amended §921(a)(20) in re
sponse to Dickerson’s holding that, for purposes of federal
firearms disabilities, state law did not determine the
present impact of a prior conviction. The amended provi
sion excludes from qualification as a “crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” (or a misde
meanor under state law punishable by more than two
years in prison):
“Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside
or for which a person has been pardoned or has had
civil rights restored . . . unless such pardon, expunge
ment, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides
that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or
receive firearms.” 18 U. S. C. §921(a)(20).1

——————
1 The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, 100 Stat. 449, included a

“safety valve” provision under which persons subject to federal firearms
disabilities, including persons whose civil rights have not been restored,
may apply to the Attorney General for relief from the disabilities. See
18 U. S. C. §925(c) (2000 ed., Supp. V). The relief provision has been
rendered inoperative, however, for Congress has repeatedly barred the
Attorney General from using appropriated funds “to investigate or act
4 LOGAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

While §921(a)(20) does not define the term “civil rights,”
courts have held, and petitioner agrees, that the civil
rights relevant under the above-quoted provision are the
rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury. See Brief
for Petitioner 13, n. 10; cf. Caron v. United States, 524
U. S. 308, 316 (1998).
II
On May 31, 2005, police officers responded to a domestic
disturbance complaint made by Logan’s girlfriend,
Asenath Wilson. App. 9, 12. Wilson told the officers,
among other things, that she had seen Logan with a gun
and that he usually kept it in the car. Ibid. Logan, who
was with Wilson when the police arrived, consented to a
search of his car. Id., at 11. In a hidden compartment
behind the glove box, the officers found a 9-millimeter
handgun. Id., at 9–10, 12.
Logan pleaded guilty to the federal offense of possession
of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. Id.,
at 12. (In 1991, he had been convicted in an Illinois court
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Id., at 9–
10, 12.) The United States District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin sentenced Logan to imprisonment for
15 years, the mandatory minimum under ACCA. In im
posing that enhanced sentence, the District Court took
account of Logan’s three Wisconsin misdemeanor battery
convictions, each punishable by a maximum sentence of
three years’ imprisonment. Id., at 16–18.2
——————
upon [relief] applications.” United States v. Bean, 537 U. S. 71, 74–75
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The bar on funding was
renewed every year from 1992 through 2006. See id., at 75, n. 3 (1992
through 2002); Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, 117 Stat.
433; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, 118 Stat. 53; Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2005, 118 Stat. 2859; Science, State, Justice,
Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, 119 Stat.
2290.
2 Under Wisconsin law, misdemeanor battery is ordinarily punishable
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Opinion of the Court

Both in the District Court and on appeal, Logan argued
that his Wisconsin misdemeanor convictions did not qual
ify as ACCA predicate offenses because they caused no
loss of his civil rights. Rights retained, he urged, are
functionally equivalent to rights revoked but later re
stored. If the exemption contained in §921(a)(20) covered
the three state-court misdemeanor convictions, Logan’s
maximum sentence, in lieu of the 15-year mandatory
minimum under ACCA, would have been 10 years, see
§924(a)(2), and the United States Sentencing Guidelines
would have indicated a sentence range of 37 to 46 months,
see Brief for Petitioner 5. The District Court rejected
Logan’s argument, holding that the §921(a)(20) exemption
provision “applies only to defendants whose civil rights
were both lost and restored pursuant to state statutes.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 11. Accordingly, the court sentenced
Logan to imprisonment for 15 years. Id., at 12.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, concluding that “an offender whose civil
rights have been neither diminished nor returned is not a
person who ‘has had civil rights restored.’ ” 453 F. 3d 804,
805 (2006). Logan’s argument for treating retained rights
——————
by a maximum term of nine months. See Wis. Stat. §940.19(1) (2005);
§939.51(3). Logan was exposed to a three-year maximum term for each
offense, however, because he was convicted as a “repeater” or “habitual”
criminal. See App. 16–17; Wis. Stat. §939.62 (1999–2000).
Postdating Logan’s battery convictions, Wisconsin prospectively
reduced the maximum term for “repeater” misdemeanors to two years.
See 2001 Wis. Act 109, §562 (Jan. 2002 special session) (amending Wis.
Stat. §939.62). Misdemeanors committed in Wisconsin after this
reduction no longer qualify as “violent felonies” under 18 U. S. C.
§921(a)(20).
Logan has never argued that his Wisconsin convictions should not
count as ACCA predicates because they were punishable by more than
two years’ imprisonment solely because of his status as a recidivist
offender. We express no opinion on this matter. Cf. United States v.
Rodriguez, 464 F. 3d 1072 (CA9 2006), cert. granted, 551 U. S. ___
(2007).
6 LOGAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

the same way as restored rights, the appeals court ob
served, “go[es] in the teeth of [§921(a)(20)’s] text.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. ___ (2007), to resolve a
split among the Circuits as to whether §921(a)(20)’s excep
tion for “civil rights restored” should be interpreted to
include civil rights retained at all times. Compare 453
F. 3d, at 809 (case below) (“civil rights restored” does not
include civil rights never revoked), and McGrath v. United
States, 60 F. 3d 1005 (CA2 1995) (same), with United
States v. Indelicato, 97 F. 3d 627, 631 (CA1 1996) (“civil
rights restored” includes civil rights never lost).
III
Logan pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of §922(g)(1), and received a manda
tory minimum 15-year sentence because he had at least
three prior convictions for “violent felon[ies].” §924(e)(1)
(2000 ed., Supp. V). He acknowledges his convictions in
Wisconsin for three battery offenses that facially qualify
as violent felonies under §921(a)(20)(B) (2000 ed.). See
Brief for Petitioner 4–5. Thus the sole matter in dispute is
whether Logan fits within the exemption from an ACCA-
enhanced sentence for convictions “expunged, or set aside”
or offenders who “ha[ve] been pardoned or ha[ve] had civil
rights restored.” §921(a)(20). None of Logan’s battery
convictions have been expunged, set aside, or pardoned.
See 453 F. 3d, at 809. Under Wisconsin law, felons lose
but can regain their civil rights and can gain the removal
of firearms disabilities. See Wis. Stat. §6.03(1)(b) (Supp.
2006); Wis. Const., Art. XIII, §3(2); Wis. Stat. §756.02
(2001); §973.176(1) (2007). Persons convicted of misde
meanors, however, even if they are repeat offenders, gen
erally retain their civil rights and are not subject to fire
arms disabilities.
With this background in view, we turn to the proper
interpretation of the §921(a)(20) exemption from ACCA
 Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

Opinion of the Court

enhanced sentencing for offenders who have had their
“civil rights restored.” Logan’s misdemeanor convictions,
we reiterate, did not result in any loss of the rights to vote,
hold public office, or serve on juries. Should he nonethe
less be ranked with offenders whose rights were termi
nated but later restored? The ordinary meaning of the
word “restored” affords Logan no aid. In line with diction
ary definitions,3 the Court of Appeals stated: “The word
‘restore’ means to give back something that had been
taken away.” 453 F. 3d, at 805. Accord McGrath, 60
F. 3d, at 1007 (“The ‘restoration’ of a thing never lost or
diminished is a definitional impossibility.”); cf. Indelicato,
97 F. 3d, at 629 (“Clearly the ordinary reading of the word
‘restored’ supports the government.”).
The context in which the word “restored” appears in
§921(a)(20) counsels adherence to the word’s ordinary
meaning. Words in a list are generally known by the
company they keep. E.g., Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S.
26, 36 (1990); Beecham v. United States, 511 U. S. 368,
371 (1994). In §921(a)(20), the words “civil rights re
stored” appear in the company of the words “expunged,”
“set aside,” and “pardoned.” Each term describes a meas
ure by which the government relieves an offender of some
or all of the consequences of his conviction. In contrast, a
defendant who retains rights is simply left alone. He
receives no status-altering dispensation, no token of for
giveness from the government.
Opposing a plain-meaning approach to the language
Congress enacted, Logan relies dominantly on the harsh
——————
3 See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1936 (1993)

(defining “restore” to mean “give back (as something lost or taken
away)”); American Heritage Dictionary 1486 (4th ed. 2000) (defining
“restore” to mean “bring back into existence or use; reestablish”); 13
Oxford English Dictionary 755 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “restore” to mean
“give back, [or] make return or restitution of (anything previously taken
away or lost)”).
8 LOGAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

results a literal reading could yield: Unless retention of
rights is treated as legally equivalent to restoration of
rights, less serious offenders will be subject to ACCA’s
enhanced penalties while more serious offenders in the
same State, who have had civil rights restored, may es
cape heightened punishment. E.g., Reply Brief 8
(“[I]ndividuals who have committed more serious crimes
than Petitioner may nonetheless have their rights re
stored, whereas misdemeanants who never lost their
rights must suffer enhanced sentencing.”). Logan urges
that this result—treating those who never lost their civil
rights more harshly than those who lost, then regained,
those rights—is not merely anomalous; it rises to the level
of the absurd, particularly in States where restoration of
civil rights is automatic and occurs immediately upon
release from prison. See Caron, 524 U. S., at 313 (auto
matic restoration of rights qualifies for §921(a)(20)’s
exemption).
Logan’s argument, we note, overlooks §921(a)(20)’s
“unless” clause. Under that provision, an offender gains
no exemption from ACCA’s application through an ex
pungement, set aside, pardon, or restoration of civil rights
if the dispensation “expressly provides that the [offender]
may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.”
Many States that restore felons’ civil rights (or accord
another measure of forgiveness) nonetheless impose or
retain firearms disabilities. See Brief for United States 30
(citing, inter alia, La. Stat. Ann. §14:95.1(C) (West Supp.
2007), under which felons’ firearms disabilities are lifted
only after 10 years and only if no further felony convic
tions intervene).4 We further note that Wisconsin has
——————
4 Courts have divided on the question whether §921(a)(20)’s “unless”

clause is triggered whenever state law provides for the continuation of
firearm proscriptions, or only when the State provides individual notice
to the offender of the firearms disabilities. Compare, e.g., United States
v. Cassidy, 899 F. 2d 543, 549 (CA6 1990) (courts must look to “the
 Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

Opinion of the Court

addressed, and prospectively eliminated, the anomaly
Logan asserts he encountered: Wisconsin no longer pun
ishes misdemeanors by more than two years of imprison
ment, and thus no longer has any misdemeanors that
qualify as ACCA predicates. See supra, at 4–5, n. 2.
One can demur to Logan’s argument that a literal read
ing of §921(a)(20) could produce anomalous results, for the
resolution he proposes—reading into the exemption con
victions under which civil rights are retained—would
correct one potential anomaly while creating others. See
McGrath, 60 F. 3d, at 1009. Under Logan’s proposed
construction, the most dangerous recidivists in a State
that does not revoke any offender’s civil rights could fall
within §921(a)(20)’s exemption. For example, Maine does
not deprive any offenders of their civil rights. See Lodging
for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
et al. as Amici Curiae (NACDL Lodging), App. 1, pp. 23–
24. As Logan would have us read §921(a)(20), all Maine
crimes, including first-degree murder, would be treated as
crimes for which “civil rights [have been] restored,” while
less serious crimes committed elsewhere would not.
In McGrath, the Second Circuit incisively identified
Congress’ response to Dickerson, see supra, at 3, as the
cause of the multiple anomalies §921(a)(20) may produce:
“[Congress’] decision to have restoration triggered by
events governed by state law insured anomalous re
sults. The several states have considerably different
laws governing pardon, expungement, and forfeiture
and restoration of civil rights. Furthermore, states
have drastically different policies as to when and un
der what circumstances such discretionary acts of
grace should be extended. . . . [Anomalies generated
——————

whole of state law”), with United States v. Gallaher, 275 F. 3d 784, 791,

and n. 3 (CA9 2001) (individualized notice is required). We express no

opinion on this issue.

10 LOGAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

by §921(a)(20)] are the inevitable consequence of mak
ing access to the exemption depend on the differing
laws and policies of the several states.” 60 F. 3d,
at 1009.
Accord 453 F. 3d, at 807 (“When Congress replaced Dick
erso[n] . . . it ensured that similarly situated people would
be treated differently—for states vary widely in which if
any civil rights a convict loses and whether these rights
are restored.”). See also M. Love, Relief from the Collat
eral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction: A State-by-
State Resource Guide (2006), updated online at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?
PublicationID=486 (as visited Nov. 27, 2007, and in Clerk
of Court’s case file) (surveying state practices).
Were we to accept Logan’s argument, it bears emphasis,
we would undercut §921(a)(20)(B), which places within
ACCA’s reach state misdemeanor convictions punishable
by more than two years’ imprisonment. Because state-law
misdemeanors generally entail no revocation of civil
rights,5 Logan’s proposed reading of the word “restored” to
include “retained” would yield this curiosity: An offender
would fall within ACCA’s reach if his three prior offenses
carried potential prison terms of over two years, but that
same offender would be released from ACCA’s grip by
virtue of his retention of civil rights. We are disinclined to
say that what Congress imposed with one hand (exposure
to ACCA) it withdrew with the other (exemption from
ACCA).
We may assume, arguendo, that when Congress revised
§921(a)(20) in 1986, see supra, at 3, it labored under the
——————
5 See NACDL Lodging, App. 1 (compiling state laws); id., at 17–34

(indicating that Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, and
New Hampshire revoke no misdemeanant’s civil rights, but provide for
punishment of certain crimes they classify as misdemeanors by prison
terms exceeding two years).
 Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2007) 11

Opinion of the Court

misapprehension that all offenders—misdemeanants as
well as felons—forfeit civil rights, at least temporarily.
Even indulging the further assumption that courts may
repair such a congressional oversight or mistake,6 we
could hardly divine the revision the Legislature would
favor. Perhaps Congress would choose to exempt offend
ers who never lost their civil rights. See McGrath, 60
F. 3d, at 1009. But it is also plausible that Congress
would remove the exemption for civil rights restoration as
insufficiently indicative of official forgiveness. Or, Con
gress might elect to include restorations of civil rights
along with expungements, set asides, and pardons only if
the restoration was nonautomatic, i.e., granted on a case-
by-case basis. Homing in on the disparities resulting from
diverse state legislation, see supra, at 9–10, Congress
might even revise §921(a)(20) to provide, in accord with
Dickerson, that federal rather than state law defines a
conviction for purposes of §§922 and 924. See 453 F. 3d,
at 806–807.
In all events, a measure adopted ten years after
§921(a)(20) was given its current shape cautions against
any assumption that Congress did not mean to deny that
exemption to offenders who retained their civil rights. In
1996, Congress enacted §922(g)(9), which outlaws posses
sion of a firearm by anyone “who has been convicted . . . of
a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” See Pub.
L. 104–208, Tit. VI, §658, 110 Stat. 3009–371 to 3009–372.
Tailored to §922(g)(9), Congress adopted a definitional
provision, corresponding to §921(a)(20), which reads:
“A person shall not be considered to have been con
victed of [a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence] if
——————
6 But see Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245, 251 (1926) (“enlarge
ment of [a statute] by [a] court, so that what was omitted, presumably
by inadvertence, may be included within its scope . . . transcends the
judicial function”).
12 LOGAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or is an
offense for which the person has been pardoned or has
had civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable
jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under
such an offense) unless the pardon, expungement, or
restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the
person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive
firearms.” 18 U. S. C. §921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (emphasis
added).
Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) tracks §921(a)(20) in specifying
expungement, set aside, pardon, or restoration of rights as
dispensations that can cancel lingering effects of a convic
tion. But the emphasized parenthetical qualification
shows that the words “civil rights restored” do not cover a
person whose civil rights were never taken away. See 453
F. 3d, at 808. Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) casts considerable
doubt on Logan’s hypothesis that, had Congress adverted
to the issue when it drafted §921(a)(20), it would have
placed in the same category persons who regained civil
rights and persons who retained civil rights.
Congress’ enactment of §921(a)(33)(B)(ii) is also relevant
to Logan’s absurdity argument. See supra, at 7–8. Statu
tory terms, we have held, may be interpreted against their
literal meaning where the words “could not conceivably
have been intended to apply” to the case at hand. Cabell
v. Markham, 148 F. 2d 737, 739 (CA2) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d,
326 U. S. 404 (1945); see Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co., 490 U. S. 504, 511 (1989) (Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a)(1) “can’t mean what it says” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). In this case, it can hardly be maintained
that Congress could not have meant what it said. Con
gress explicitly distinguished between “restored” and
“retained” in §921(a)(33)(B)(ii). It is more than “conceiv
able” that the Legislature, albeit an earlier one, see supra,
at 3, meant to do the same in §921(a)(20).
 Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2007) 13

Opinion of the Court

In sum, Congress framed §921(a)(20) to serve two pur
poses. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 28–29. It sought to qualify as
ACCA predicate offenses violent crimes that a State classi
fies as misdemeanors yet punishes by a substantial term
of imprisonment, i.e., more than two years. See
§921(a)(20)(B). Congress also sought to defer to a State’s
dispensation relieving an offender from disabling effects of
a conviction. See supra, at 3. Had Congress included a
retention-of-rights exemption, however, the very misde
meanors it meant to cover would escape ACCA’s reach.
See supra, at 10. Logan complains of an anomalous result.
Yet the solution he proposes would also produce anoma
lies. See supra, at 9. Having no warrant to stray from
§921(a)(20)’s text, we hold that the words “civil rights
restored” do not cover the case of an offender who lost no
civil rights.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is
Affirmed.