PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
YIGAL SUISA; LELACH OHAYON,
Petitioners,
v.
No. 08-2343
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Argued: May 12, 2010
Decided: June 30, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, DAVIS, and KEENAN,
Circuit Judges.
Petition for review denied by published opinion. Judge
Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and
Judge Davis joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Ronald Darwin Richey, Rockville, Maryland, for
Petitioners. Russell John Verby, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent. ON BRIEF: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
2 SUISA v. HOLDER
General, Civil Division, Barry J. Pettinato, Assistant Director,
Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent.
OPINION
KEENAN, Circuit Judge:
Yigal Suisa and his wife, Lelach Ohayon, are citizens of
Israel. They petition for review of a decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (the Board) pretermitting consideration
of their applications for adjustment of immigration status
under § 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
8 U.S.C. § 1255(i).1 Finding no error, we deny the petition for
review.
I.
Suisa and Ohayon originally entered the United States on
visas as nonimmigrant visitors. Suisa’s year of entry was
1997, and Ohayon entered this country in 2000. In July 2006,
the Department of Homeland Security initiated a removal pro-
ceeding against them. In the removal proceeding, Suisa and
Ohayon conceded that they had stayed in the United States
beyond the temporary period authorized by their visas.
Under the established procedure for adjustment of immi-
gration status, certain nonimmigrant aliens may become law-
ful permanent residents without having to leave the country to
apply for an immigrant visa. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429
U.S. 24, 25 n.* (1976) (per curiam); Lee v. U.S. Citizenship
1
In the immigration context, the term "pretermit" is used when an alien
is found ineligible to apply for some form of statutory relief. See
Gonzales-Balderas v. Holder, 597 F.3d 869, 870 (7th Cir. 2010); Singh v.
Gonzales, 468 F.3d 135, 136 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006).
SUISA v. HOLDER 3
& Immigration Servs., 592 F.3d 612, 614 (4th Cir. 2010)
(describing the legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)). The
failure to maintain a lawful presence in the country ordinarily
would render Suisa and Ohayon ineligible for an adjustment
of immigration status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c). Suisa and
Ohayon (collectively, Suisa) argued in their removal proceed-
ing, however, that despite their current unlawful presence in
this country, the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) nonetheless
permitted them to apply for adjustment of status.2
A.
Congress enacted § 1255(i) in 1994, creating an exception
to the general rule that use of the adjustment-of-status mecha-
nism is limited to those lawfully present in the country. See
Lee, 592 F.3d at 614. Congress intended that this provision be
temporary and, thus, § 1255(i) included a "sunset" provision
that required an alien to apply for adjustment of status
between October 1, 1994 and October 1, 1997. See 1995
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-317, § 506(b), (c), 108
Stat. 1724, 1765-66 (effective Oct. 1, 1994); Lee, 592 F.3d at
614-15. When that "sunset" provision expired, Congress
added to § 1255(i) a "grandfather" clause that permitted aliens
to continue to apply for adjustment of status under § 1255(i)
if they were the beneficiaries of a visa petition or a labor certi-
fication application filed on or before January 14, 1998. See
1998 Appropriations Act, Public Law 105-119, § 111(b), 111
Stat. 2440, 2458 (1997); Lee, 592 F.3d at 615. In 2000, Con-
gress extended the sunset date for a final time to April 30, 2001.3
2
Section 1255(i) permits the "principal alien" and "a spouse or child" of
that alien to apply for adjustment of status. Suisa is the "principal alien"
in this case. Ohayon’s eligibility under § 1255(i) is derivative of his. For
this reason, we will refer to the petitioners collectively as "Suisa."
3
In 2000, Congress added other requirements that are not at issue in this
case. The alien must pay a $1,000 penalty in addition to the standard pro-
cessing fees associated with an adjustment of status. The alien must be
physically present in the United States and have been physically present
on December 21, 2000. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(A-C).
4 SUISA v. HOLDER
See 2001 Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 106-554,
§ 1502(a)(1)(B), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-324; Lee, 592 F.3d at
615.
When Suisa sought to apply for adjustment of his immigra-
tion status in 2006, the language of § 1255(i) provided, in rel-
evant part, that
(1) [n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsections
(a) and (c) of this section, an alien physically present
in the United States—
(A) who—
(i) entered the United States without
inspection; or
(ii) is within one of the classes enumer-
ated in subsection (c) of this section;
(B) who is the beneficiary . . . of—
(i) [an immigrant visa petition] under
section 204 [8 U.S.C. § 1154] that was filed
with the Attorney General on or before
April 30, 2001; or
(ii) an application for a labor certification
under § 212(a)(5)(A) [8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(5)(A)] that was filed pursuant to
the regulations of the Secretary of Labor on
or before such date;
...
may apply to the Attorney General for the adjust-
ment of his or her status to that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.
SUISA v. HOLDER 5
8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1). Under this enactment of § 1255(i),
aliens who can establish that they are "grandfathered" may be
entitled to apply for an adjustment of status subject to the
ordinary eligibility requirements for an adjustment.4 See Lee,
592 F.3d at 615-16.
B.
As we have noted, Suisa concedes that he is present in this
country unlawfully. Thus, in order to apply for an adjustment
of status, he must demonstrate that he is grandfathered under
the provisions § 1255(i). To do so, he relies solely on the
labor certification clause, § 1255(i)(1)(B)(ii), and the follow-
ing relevant facts.
In 2003, ABC Scholars Day Care Center (Scholars) offered
Yigal Suisa a position as a secretary. Scholars previously had
obtained an approved Labor Certification for the position on
behalf of another alien, Vayal Pramod. That Certification was
approved by the Department of Labor in 1999. Under the
practices of the Department of Labor in 2003, a sponsoring
employer was permitted to substitute a different prospective
worker than the one originally named on the Labor Certifica-
4
To be eligible for an adjustment of status, an alien must demonstrate
that (1) "the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible
to the United States for permanent residence," and (2) "an immigrant visa
is immediately available to the alien at the time the [§ 1255(i)] application
is filed." 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), (i)(2). In the case of an application for adjust-
ment of status based on employment, aliens must demonstrate that they are
eligible for an employment-based visa and that a visa is immediately
available. See Lee, 592 F.3d at 616; Lendo v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 439, 442
(4th Cir. 2007). To do so, a prospective employer must file on behalf of
the alien an application for a labor certification. Lee, 592 F.3d at 616. If
the Department of Labor issues the certification, the prospective employer
then submits a petition to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
for an immigrant work visa. If the alien is eligible for grandfathering
under § 1255(i), he can then apply to adjust his immigration status. See 8
U.S.C. § 1255(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(n); Lee, 592 F.3d at 616.
6 SUISA v. HOLDER
tion.5 See 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(c)(2). When Scholars offered
the job to Yigal Suisa in 2003, Scholars filed with the Depart-
ment of Labor an "Application for Alien Employment Certifi-
cation" naming Yigal Suisa as beneficiary of the previously-
approved Certification.
The immigration judge issued a ruling, which the Board
upheld, that Yigal Suisa’s 2003 substitution date was a dis-
qualifying fact under 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(j), a regulation
adopted by the Attorney General to implement § 1255(i) of
the INA. This regulation provides that "[a]n alien who was
substituted for the previous beneficiary of the application for
the labor certification after April 30, 2001, will not be consid-
ered to be a grandfathered alien." 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(j).
Applying this language to the circumstances of Yigal Suisa’s
substitution, the immigration judge and the Board concluded
that Suisa is not a "grandfathered alien" because he was sub-
stituted on the application for labor certification after April
30, 2001. The immigration judge pretermitted consideration
of the applications for adjustment of status, and the Board
affirmed that decision, dismissing Suisa’s appeal.
II.
On appeal to this Court, Suisa argues that 8 C.F.R.
§ 1245.10(j) is invalid because it conflicts with § 1255(i).
Suisa contends that § 1255(i) is a grandfather provision that
plainly applies to aliens like Suisa, who are the substituted
beneficiaries of labor certifications filed on or before April
30, 2001.
In support of this construction of § 1255(i), Suisa relies on
our decision in William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir.
5
The Secretary of Labor stopped the practice of Labor Certification sub-
stitution in 2007. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.11(a) (2009). The new rule, how-
ever, does not affect substitutions approved by the Department of Labor
before the effective date of July 16, 2007.
SUISA v. HOLDER 7
2007). In William, we addressed § 240(c)(7)(A) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), which permits "[a]n alien" to file
one motion to reopen a removal proceeding. William chal-
lenged an implementing regulation that imposed a bar on
motions to reopen filed by aliens who have already departed
the country. William argued that the regulation conflicted
with § 1229a(c)(7)(A), which he asserted plainly addressed
the right of all aliens, whether living inside the country or out,
to file motions to reopen. William, 499 F.3d at 331-32. The
government argued that the statute was silent regarding post-
departure motions and, thus, left a gap that appropriately was
filled by the regulation. Id. at 332.
We agreed with William, and held that the statutory lan-
guage clearly permitted the filing of motions to reopen by
aliens living outside the country because such individuals are
a subset of all aliens, as that term was used in
§ 1229a(c)(7)(A). Id. We observed that Congress, in enacting
a different section of the same statute, expressly had included
a requirement of physical presence within this country for
alien applicants. Id. at 333. We presumed that Congress acted
purposefully and intentionally by omitting that same require-
ment from § 1229a(c)(7)(A). Id.
Suisa argues that like the term "alien," the term "benefi-
ciary" includes two classes of individuals who benefit from
labor certifications, namely, direct beneficiaries and substi-
tuted beneficiaries. Suisa notes that when Congress enacted 8
U.S.C. § 1255(i), Congress was aware of the practice of the
Department of Labor permitting the substitution of beneficia-
ries in applications for labor certification. Suisa contends that
if Congress had intended to exclude substituted beneficiaries
from eligibility under § 1255(i), Congress would have done so
expressly.
Under Suisa’s interpretation, the determinative fact for
deciding a substitute beneficiary’s eligibility for grandfather-
ing is the date on which the original application for labor cer-
8 SUISA v. HOLDER
tification was filed. According to Suisa, if that application
was filed on or before April 30, 2001, an individual substi-
tuted as a beneficiary after April 30, 2001 would qualify as a
"grandfathered alien." Thus, Suisa argues that 8 C.F.R.
§ 1245.10(j) is invalid because the regulation excludes from
eligibility under § 1255(i) certain substituted beneficiaries
such as Suisa whom Congress plainly intended to grandfather,
based on their substitution after April 30, 2001, as the benefi-
ciaries of labor certifications originally filed on or before that
date.
III.
Because Suisa challenges an agency’s regulation, we
employ the two-step analysis prescribed by the Supreme
Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
A. Chevron Step One
Under the Chevron analysis, we first consider whether
"Congress has directly spoken to the precise question" at
issue. Id. at 842-43. If Congress’ intent is clear, as Suisa con-
tends, then our inquiry is at an end because an agency "must
give effect to the unambiguously stated intent of Congress."
Id. at 843. However, if the statute at issue is silent or ambigu-
ous with respect to the precise issue, then we must decide
whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable
and, thus, entitled to deference. Id.
Under basic principles of statutory interpretation, we begin
our analysis by considering the relevant language of
§ 1255(i), which grandfathers aliens who are "the beneficiary
. . . of [(i) a visa petition] or (ii) an application for a labor cer-
tification . . . that was filed . . . on or before [April 30, 2001]."
8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(B). Section 1255(i) plainly does not use
the term "substituted beneficiary." Rather, in this statute, Con-
gress referred only to "the beneficiary" of two categories of
SUISA v. HOLDER 9
legal documents, visa petitions filed under § 204 of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1154, and applications for labor certification filed
under § 212(a)(5)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A).
In the case of a visa petition filed under § 1154, Congress’
intent is clear. Visa petitions submitted under § 1154 have
one, and only one, adult beneficiary. Thus, when Congress
enacted § 1255(i), Congress plainly contemplated that only a
valid, direct beneficiary of a visa petition be permitted to
obtain grandfathered status under § 1255(i).
In the case of an application for labor certification, how-
ever, Congress’ intent is decidedly less clear. Because the
Department of Labor has permitted employers to "substitute"
one beneficiary for another, there can be several beneficiaries
of a labor certification over a period of time. As a result, the
term "the beneficiary," as used in § 1255(i), could have more
than one meaning.
On the one hand, the term "the beneficiary" in § 1255(i)
could describe the currently-named alien beneficiary of an
application for labor certification. That individual might be a
direct beneficiary of the labor certification, if no substitutions
have been made, or a substituted beneficiary for an originally-
named alien. Conversely, this term "the beneficiary" could
refer only to the initial beneficiary named on a labor certifica-
tion. Under this second interpretation, § 1255(i) would elimi-
nate eligibility for all substituted beneficiaries of a labor
certification. Finally, under a third possible interpretation, the
term "the beneficiary" could refer to a limited subset of sub-
stituted beneficiaries who were substituted as beneficiaries of
labor certifications prior to the April 30, 2001 sunset date that
Congress provided in § 1255(i).
In the same sentence of § 1255(i), therefore, Congress used
the term "the beneficiary" in relation to visa petitions, which
demonstrably cannot have "substituted" beneficiaries, and in
relation to labor certification applications, which manifestly
10 SUISA v. HOLDER
can have "substituted" beneficiaries. This juxtaposition
creates an ambiguity regarding Congress’ intent that did not
arise in William.
We were able to ascertain Congress’ intent in William,
based on the principle that when Congress includes particular
language in one part of a statute but omits that language else-
where in the same enactment, it generally is presumed that
Congress acted intentionally and purposefully in the inclusion
or exclusion of that language. William, 499 F.3d at 332; see
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 431, 432 (1987). Here,
however, we cannot draw conclusions about Congress’ intent
by comparing § 1255(i) to another subsection of § 1255,
because the term "substituted beneficiary" does not appear
anywhere in the statute. Thus, the dispositive consideration in
William, Congress’ use of particular language in one section
of a statute combined with its omission of that language else-
where in the same statute, is inapposite here. In the absence
of such distinguishing language in § 1255, we hold that Con-
gress did not express clearly its intent in § 1255(i) regarding
the application of that statutory provision to aliens substituted
on applications for labor certification.
B. Chevron Step Two
In the absence of a clear statement of Congress’ intent, we
proceed to step two of the Chevron analysis. We must deter-
mine whether the meaning that the Attorney General ascribed
to § 1255(i), as found in the text of 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(j), is
a permissible one. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see William, 499
F.3d at 332. Because Congress expressly delegated to the
Attorney General the authority to establish "such regulations
as [are] necessary for carrying out [the INA]," 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(g)(2), the challenged regulation must be "given con-
trolling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
Further, the Supreme Court has instructed that deference to
the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immi-
SUISA v. HOLDER 11
gration context because officials "‘exercise especially sensi-
tive political functions that implicate questions of foreign
relations.’" INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)
(quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).
Guided by these principles, we hold that 8 C.F.R.
§ 1245.10(j) is a permissible construction of § 1255(i). We
presume that Congress acted purposefully when it included in
§ 1255(i) a deadline by which aliens must have filed a visa
petition or application for labor certification. The imposition
of a sunset date plainly demonstrates that Congress intended
that the benefit of § 1255(i) be temporary and apply only to
a discrete group of aliens whose applications were pending on
April 30, 2001. That intent would be frustrated if an alien sub-
stituted many years later as the beneficiary of an application
for labor certification could nonetheless take advantage of the
expired provision for adjustment of status.6 Thus, confronted
with the question whether § 1255(i) applies to grandfather the
substituted beneficiaries of labor certifications, the Attorney
General reasonably determined that only beneficiaries substi-
tuted before April 30, 2001, the date selected by Congress,
may be eligible to apply for adjustment of status under
§ 1255(i).7 Accordingly, we hold that 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(j) is
a valid exercise of the Attorney General’s rulemaking author-
ity.
6
Suisa argues that because he is the beneficiary an I-140 visa petition
that has a "priority date" of May 1999, he should benefit from that date
for purposes of his labor certification application in determining his eligi-
bility for grandfathering under § 1255(i)(1)(B)(ii). Although Suisa may
benefit from the May 1999 date for other purposes related to his immigra-
tion status, that fact does not affect our resolution of the distinct question
whether Congress, in choosing the language of § 1255(i), intended to
"grandfather" aliens who did not become beneficiaries of labor certifica-
tions until after April 30, 2001.
7
Suisa relies on the canon of statutory construction providing that any
ambiguities in the INA should be resolved in favor of the alien. However,
we need not resort to this canon because the Attorney General has offered
a reasonable construction of § 1255(i). See Cervantes v. Holder, 597 F.3d
229, 237 n.9 (4th Cir. 2010).
12 SUISA v. HOLDER
IV.
Having upheld 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10(j), we conclude that the
Board properly applied the regulation to deny Suisa’s eligibil-
ity to apply for an adjustment of status under § 1255(i). For
the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED