F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 23 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ROBERT NELSON ENTRUP,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-1237
(D.C. No. 93-WM-904)
CITY OF CENTRAL, COLORADO; (D. Colo.)
JACK HIDAHL, individually and as
the Administrator and Manager of the
City of Central; JERRY DEVITT,
individually and as the Attorney for
the City of Central; MICHAEL
MASKO, individually and as City
Planner for the City of Central and
SCOTT WEBB, individually and as
former councilman for the City of
Central,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CENTRAL MUNICIPAL COURT;
FREDERICK RODGERS, individually
and as the Municipal Court Judge of
the City of Central Municipal Court
and THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF CENTRAL, IN RE: CITY
OF CENTRAL ORDINANCE NO.
252,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Robert N. Entrup, who managed a bed and breakfast in Central
City, Colorado, brought suit against the city and various officials and employees
for alleged civil rights violations arising out of the enforcement of certain zoning
ordinances against plaintiff, his son, and his business. In an earlier appeal, we
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all but one of plaintiff’s claims. See
Entrup v. City of Central City , No. 94-1422, 1995 WL 307578, at **2-**4 (10th
Cir. May 11, 1995) (unpublished order and judgment). We concluded that the
district court erroneously dismissed plaintiff’s claim that he had been retaliated
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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against by certain defendants for his participation in a recall election, and we
remanded that claim for further proceedings. See id. at **4.
On remand, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The
district court denied plaintiff’s motion and granted defendants’ motion,
concluding that plaintiff failed to establish any retaliatory animus on the part of
the individual defendants and that he failed to establish any policy or custom that
would form the basis for municipal liability. Plaintiff now appeals the entry of
judgment in favor of defendants on his retaliation claim.
Plaintiff sought leave from the district court to proceed in forma pauperis
on appeal, but the district court denied plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff has renewed
his motion with this court. We may authorize the commencement of an appeal
without prepayment of fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), however, requires us to dismiss the case at any time if we
determine that the appeal is frivolous. Based upon our review of plaintiff’s
opening brief, we conclude that this appeal is frivolous.
Plaintiff attempts to raise two issues in his opening brief. His first issue
concerns the municipal court’s denial of his request for a jury trial in the zoning
ordinance enforcement proceedings. This issue was raised in plaintiff’s first
appeal and was decided against him. See Entrup , 1995 WL 307578, at **3. For
his second issue, plaintiff simply states: “Appellant’s case is best stated in his
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Motion for Reconsideration and Appellant prays this Honorable Court to refer to
that motion.” Appellant/Petitioner’s Opening Br. at 12. Plaintiff makes no other
argument in his opening brief, though he does list some additional issues in his
reply brief.
“Despite the liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings, the court will
not construct arguments or theories for the plaintiff in the absence of any
discussion of those issues.” Drake v. City of Fort Collins , 927 F.2d 1156, 1159
(10th Cir. 1991). “[A]rguments not set forth fully in the opening brief are
waived.” Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc. , 160 F.3d 613, 624 (10th Cir.
1998). Plaintiff’s attempt to adopt by reference materials filed in the district
court rather than set forth his dispute with the district court’s reasoning in his
appellate brief is not acceptable appellate argument. See id. at 623-24; see also
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6). Even if we were to consider the “Motion for
Reconsideration” to which plaintiff refers in his appellate brief, that motion does
not discuss how the district court erred in granting summary judgment for
defendants, either.
As to plaintiff’s reply brief, we follow the general rule that issues must be
raised in the opening brief, and we will not address issues raised for the first time
in a reply brief. See Codner v. United States , 17 F.3d 1331, 1332 n.2 (10th Cir.
1994). Moreover, even if we did consider the arguments raised in plaintiff’s reply
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brief, they also fail to point to error in the district court’s rulings, except in the
most conclusory fashion. The only specific argument that plaintiff makes in his
reply brief relates to the timeliness with which the city argued that certain
individuals were not final policymakers and, therefore, their actions could not
create municipal liability. Plaintiff’s suggestion that the city waived the issue by
not raising it until summary judgment is frivolous, because plaintiff was the party
who bore the burden of proof on that issue.
Because the only error that plaintiff raises in his opening appellate brief
relates to an issue that was conclusively decided against him in an earlier appeal,
we conclude that plaintiff’s appeal is frivolous. Therefore, we DENY plaintiff’s
motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, and we DISMISS this appeal as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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