FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 27, 2010
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 09-2244
v.
STEVEN ANTHONY FORD,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. 1:08-CR-00229-JEC-2)
Gregory J. Fouratt, United States Attorney, (Terri J. Abernathy, Assistant United
States Attorney, on the brief), Las Cruces, New Mexico, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
David L. Plotsky of Plotsky & Dougherty, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for
Defendant - Appellant.
Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Steven Anthony Ford was convicted by a jury of
being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
being a fugitive in possession of firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2),
and possession of stolen firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). At sentencing, the district
court applied a six-level offense enhancement for assaulting a law enforcement
officer during flight, under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(1), and found that Mr. Ford’s
prior convictions mandated a fifteen-year minimum sentence under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The court sentenced Mr. Ford
to 360 months’ imprisonment on the first count, and 120 months on each of the
other two counts, all to run concurrently. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we affirm.
Background
Mr. Ford was serving a state sentence at a Kansas prison until the night of
October 28, 2007. 2 R. 20-23. On that night, Mr. Ford and Jesse Lee Bell, a
fellow inmate, escaped with the aid of Amber Goff, a former corrections officer
with whom Mr. Ford was romantically involved. Ms. Goff had helped Mr. Ford
plan the escape. 3 R. 165-70. In preparation, she stole her stepfather’s .40
caliber Glock, .22 caliber pistol, and .357 revolver, obtained other supplies such
as ammunition and changes of clothes, and rented a getaway car. On the evening
of October 28, Mr. Ford called Ms. Goff to set their plan into action. Id. at 170-
79, 188. She left the rental car at a nearby shopping center and drove to the
prison in her own car. She used bolt cutters to open a gate across an access road,
and then drove up to prison’s dual perimeter fences. There, she cut through the
-2-
exterior fence, tossed the Glock and a set of bolt cutters over the interior fence,
and left the .357 on the ground for Mr. Ford and Mr. Bell. Id. at 179-82. Ms.
Goff retreated to a hiding place, until she saw the two escapees headed her way,
already through the fence. They got in the back seat of the car, each carrying a
gun. Ms. Goff then drove the group to the shopping center, where they
transferred to the rental car and headed west. Id. at 182-84.
During the drive west, Mr. Ford often kept the Glock loaded and tucked in
his waistband or in the glove compartment, and shot it from the moving vehicle at
one point. At a stop in eastern New Mexico, the trio saw a story about
themselves in USA Today. Concerned that police would connect Ms. Goff and
the rental car, they decided to find another vehicle. Id. at 185-90. In the early
hours of October 31, they entered Grants, New Mexico, looking for a car to steal
in areas where people frequently come and go. They settled on an apartment
complex. Mr. Bell and Mr. Ford, with the Glock in Mr. Ford’s waistband, left the
car to walk around the apartment complex. The men returned to the car about
twenty minutes later, but at the arrival of a police car they instructed Ms. Goff to
leave for a while. Police arrested Ms. Goff several blocks away. Id. at 192-95.
A resident of the apartment complex had seen two men looking into her car
and called the police. Id. at 10. Two officers responded. After speaking to the
resident, the officers patrolled the complex. In one indoor hallway, they saw two
men. When the officers made eye contact with the men, the men stopped and then
-3-
walked away quickly. The officers split up, and one officer saw the men running
away from the apartment building. After unsuccessfully trying to scale a fence,
the two men separated. One of the officers apprehended Mr. Bell in a field next
to the apartment complex. A few minutes after the other officer joined him, they
heard four gunshots fired at a “very close” range. The officers immediately
ducked down and ordered Mr. Bell to the ground. The officers reported the shots
by radio and requested backup. A sheriff’s deputy responded and apprehended
Mr. Ford in the apartment complex parking lot. Id. at 18-29.
A police detective found shell casings from the Glock about 100 feet from
where the officers apprehended Mr. Bell. Id. at 130. Police recovered the Glock
about 34 feet from where Mr. Ford was apprehended and found a .22 pistol on
Mr. Bell. Id. at 28-29, 130.
On appeal, Mr. Ford challenges: (1) the admission of evidence of his escape
from prison; (2) the § 3A1.2 enhancement for assaulting a law enforcement
officer during flight; and (3) the finding that a prior Kansas conviction for
criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building or dwelling qualifies as a
violent felony, triggering the ACCA’s fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence.
We address the issues in that order.
Discussion
I. Admission of Evidence of the Kansas Escape
-4-
Mr. Ford challenges the district court’s admission of evidence of his
Kansas escape as res gestae and not barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 403. We
review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Batton,
602 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2010). After considering motions in limine, the
district court allowed the government to introduce evidence of Mr. Ford’s escape
from prison. The court found the evidence admissible under the doctrine of res
gestae because it was “inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes,”
particularly “the elements of Defendant being a fugitive from justice, that
Defendant possessed stolen firearms and ammunition, and that Defendant had
knowledge that the firearms and ammunition were indeed stolen.” 1 R. 56.
Alternatively, the court would have allowed the evidence as extrinsic evidence
offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b). Id. at 57-58.
The jury learned of Mr. Ford’s escape through the testimony of two
witnesses: Todd Kuzusko, a deputy United States marshal, and Ms. Goff, the
former corrections officer who helped him escape. Mr. Kuzusko testified that Mr.
Ford initiated a conversation while Mr. Kuzusko guarded him during a hospital
visit. Mr. Ford related to Mr. Kuzusko the details of his escape and his capture,
establishing that Mr. Ford was a fugitive and that he fired a gun during the police
chase in Grants. 3 R. 89-96. Ms. Goff recounted her relationship with Mr. Ford,
their planning of the escape, and the events from the escape until their capture in
Grants. This testimony established that Mr. Ford was a fugitive, that he knew Ms.
-5-
Goff stole the firearms, and that he knowingly possessed the Glock and had
access to the .357 during the drive west. E.g., id. at 172-73, 183, 185-86, 189,
192-93.
An uncharged act is admissible as res gestae—intrinsic evidence not
subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)—if “it was inextricably intertwined
with the charged crime such that a witness’s testimony would have been
confusing and incomplete without mention of the prior act.” United States v.
Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 1994) (alteration, citation, and internal
quotation marks); see also United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1314 (10th Cir.
2009). “Evidence of other crimes should not be suppressed when those facts
come in as res gestae—as part and parcel of the proof of the offense charged in
the indictment.” United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1995)
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Ford argues that the res gestae doctrine does not apply because the
government could have conveyed the operative facts without referring to the
Kansas escape. Aplt. Br. at 46-47. According to Mr. Ford, his offer to stipulate
that he was a convicted felon obviated any need to introduce evidence of the
escape. Id.; 1 R. 33. But the offered stipulation covered only one element of one
of the three charged crimes, being a felon in possession of firearms and
ammunition. The government still had to prove Mr. Ford’s knowledge that the
firearms were stolen, his possession of the firearms, and his status as a fugitive.
-6-
At the very least, the government needed evidence of the escape to show that Mr.
Ford was a fugitive. Further, Ms. Goff was the best witness against Mr. Ford.
She offered the memory and detail of an eyewitness and partner in crime. Her
testimony about the planning of the escape was necessary to show how Mr. Ford
knew the firearms were stolen.
The Kansas escape could not be separated from the charged crimes. Mr.
Ford’s flight began with the escape, which explained his need for weapons and
the circumstances of his arrest just two and a half days later. In short, the
evidence of the Kansas escape is undoubtedly res gestae—intrinsic evidence
inextricably connected to the charged crimes.
Despite its relevance, res gestae evidence is nonetheless subject to Rule
403’s balancing test: it “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Mr. Ford
argues that “no probative facts . . . require an exploration of the inflammatory
telling of a prison escape.” Aplt. Br. at 48. As discussed above, the
circumstances of the prison escape were highly relevant to the elements of the
charged crimes. Mr. Ford has not shown how the evidence of his Kansas escape
presented any danger of unfair prejudice, which “makes a conviction more likely
because it provokes an emotional response in the jury or otherwise tends to affect
adversely the jury’s attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment
as to his guilt or innocense [sic] of the crime charged.” United States v. Tan, 254
-7-
F.3d 1204, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Any prejudice suffered on account of the escape evidence is not unfair.
Again, the evidence of the escape was necessary to show that Mr. Ford was a
fugitive, an element of a charged crime. 1 Any additional color of the escape was
closely related to Mr. Ford’s guilt. The district court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.
II. Sentencing Enhancement
Mr. Ford argues that the district court erred in applying a sentencing
enhancement for assaulting a law enforcement officer under U.S.S.G. §
3A1.2(c)(1). Aplt. Br. at 41-46. We review the district court’s interpretation of
the Guidelines de novo and any factual findings for clear error, “giving due
deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.” United
States v. Wolfe, 435 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The six-level offense enhancement under § 3A1.2(c)(1) applies if, “in a
manner creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, the defendant . . .
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that a person was a law
1
Although the district court hypothesized that it would still admit the
evidence even if Mr. Ford were to stipulate that he was a fugitive, that the
firearms were stolen, and that he knew they were stolen, we do not assess
hypothetical rulings, despite Mr. Ford’s wishes. See Aplt. Br. at 47-48.
-8-
enforcement officer, assaulted such officer during the course of the offense or
immediate flight therefrom.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(1) (2008). The district court
found that Mr. Ford’s firing the Glock near the police officers at the Grants
apartment complex qualified him for the enhancement:
[T]he evidence in this case supports all the necessary requirements
for operation of this provision, regardless of whether Defendant Ford
fired his weapon directly at the Grants police officer or fired at close
range to create a diversion, because either way it constitutes an act
which is intended to, and reasonably does, cause the victim to fear
immediate bodily harm.
3 R. 290-91.
Mr. Ford challenges the enhancement on two grounds: (1) the court could
not find that Mr. Ford created “a substantial risk of serious bodily injury” without
any evidence that he fired in the officers’ direction; and (2) the officers’ fear of
immediate bodily harm was irrelevant. Mr. Ford does not contest that he knew
that the uniformed police officers were, in fact, police officers.
First, the district court had enough evidence to find that firing a gun 100
feet from officers in the middle of the night creates a substantial risk of serious
bodily injury. Mr. Ford is correct that no evidence at trial demonstrated the
direction of the gunshots. Nonetheless, he fired four rounds in close proximity to
the police officers. In the context of a manhunt for Mr. Ford and his refusal to
surrender, the district court could reasonably infer that Mr. Ford shot at the
officers in order to escape. At least four circuits have found that a defendant
-9-
reaching for a gun during a police encounter creates a substantial risk of serious
bodily harm. See United States v. Hill, 583 F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Robinson, 537 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Lee, 199 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Bowie, 198 F.3d 905 (D.C.
Cir. 1998). Admittedly, Mr. Ford was farther away from the officers than the
defendants in those cases. But Mr. Ford’s behavior was at least as risky as those
defendants’ because he actually discharged his weapon. Regardless of the
direction of Mr. Ford’s gunshots, their proximity to the police officers during a
nighttime chase created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.
Second, the officers’ fear of immediate bodily harm relates to the assault
element of the enhancement, not the substantial risk of serious bodily injury.
“The guideline doesn’t define assault, and exact requirements for assault vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.” Robinson, 537 F.3d at 802. Nonetheless, Mr.
Ford’s conduct qualifies under even “the most demanding standard” of assault:
conduct which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery
with intent to “‘cause apprehension’ or actual ‘bodily harm.’” Robinson, 537
F.3d at 802-03 (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 16.3(b)
(2d ed. 2003)). The evidence easily supports the district court’s finding that the
gunshots placed the officers in reasonable apprehension of being shot. And the
court could reasonably infer that Mr. Ford intended to cause apprehension or
actual harm: Mr. Ford’s own appellate brief characterizes the gunshots as a
- 10 -
“diversionary act.” Aplt. Br. at 42. A gunshot gives away the shooter’s position,
so it is a diversion only if it causes the officers to duck for cover. If the gunshots
were diversionary, they were intended to cause apprehension. Whether
diversionary or intended to harm the officers, the gunshots constituted an assault
under any definition known to American law.
The district court did not err in finding that Mr. Ford’s actions constituted
an assault and created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.
III. Armed Career Criminal Act
Last, Mr. Ford challenges the district court’s finding that one of his prior
convictions qualifies as a predicate violent felony under the ACCA: his 1997
Kansas conviction for criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling or
occupied vehicle, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4219(b) (repealed and recodified 2010).
Mr. Ford does not dispute that two other prior convictions qualify as violent
felonies. We review de novo whether prior convictions qualify as violent
felonies. United States v. Scoville, 561 F.3d 1174, 1176 (10th Cir. 2009).
The ACCA mandates a minimum sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment
for a person convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and who has
three prior convictions for violent felonies, serious drug offenses, or a
combination of both. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Under the ACCA, a “violent felony”
is
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
- 11 -
. . . that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another . . . .
Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent
felony, the Supreme Court has mandated a “categorical approach.” “Under this
approach, we look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the
prior offense, and do not generally consider the particular facts disclosed by the
record of conviction.” James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007)
(citations and internal quotations omitted). “‘That is, we consider whether the
elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion’ within the
ACCA, ‘without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender.’”
United States v. West, 550 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting James, 550
U.S. at 202).
In some cases, where the statute of conviction “proscribes conduct broader
than that which would satisfy the ACCA’s definition of a violent felony,” a
“modified categorical approach” is appropriate. West, 550 F.3d at 957-58. Under
the modified categorical approach, “a federal court may then also look at the
charging documents and documents of conviction to determine whether the
defendant in a particular case was convicted of an offense that falls within the
ACCA.” Id. In the case of a guilty plea, the court may also examine “the terms
of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in
- 12 -
which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant.” Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
Mr. Ford argues that the district court improperly inquired into the
particular conduct of his 1997 conviction to determine the statute of conviction,
in violation of the categorical approach, and that the conviction does not qualify
as a violent felony. Although Mr. Ford now claims “there is no contention that
the statute of conviction is ambiguous,” Aplt. Br. at 31, he argued otherwise
before the district court. In his sentencing memorandum, he found the state court
record of his guilty plea “ambiguous” because it described his crime as
aggravated assault but cited Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4219. 1 R. 101-02. Indeed, the
state court journal entry listed the crime as “Aggravated Assault, K.S.A. 21-4219,
(severity Level 7, Person Felony).” Id. at 108. In light of Mr. Ford’s ambiguity
argument and because § 21-4219 seems to encompass conduct that might not
qualify as a violent felony, the modified categorical approach was appropriate.
Therefore, to resolve any ambiguity, the district court examined the charging
documents and plea colloquy, as the modified categorical approach allows.
Despite the stray labeling of the crime as aggravated assault, the charging
documents and plea colloquy demonstrate that Mr. Ford was convicted of criminal
discharge of a firearm at an occupied building or vehicle. The criminal complaint
and the plea colloquy both described the crime as “Criminal Discharge of a
Firearm at an Occupied Vehicle (Severity Level 7, Person Felony).” Id. at 116,
- 13 -
161. In the plea colloquy, Mr. Ford confirmed the factual basis for the plea: “he
fired two shots towards a vehicle” that was occupied. Id. at 161-62. In
consulting these documents and using Mr. Ford’s confirmation of the factual basis
for his guilty plea, the district court followed the modified categorical approach
as Shepard prescribes. Furthermore, all the available state court documents
describe the crime as “severity level 7, person felony.” Id. at 108, 116, 161. The
only crime under § 21-4219 matching that description is criminal discharge of a
firearm at an occupied building or vehicle.
With the precise statute of conviction in hand, we can now examine
whether a Kansas conviction for criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied
building or vehicle is a violent felony. First, the crime is not among those
enumerated in clause (ii) of the ACCA’s violent felony definition: burglary,
arson, extortion, or a crime involving the use of explosives. 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(2)(B). Therefore, to qualify as a violent felony, it must fall under either
clause (i), having “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another,” or clause (ii)’s residual clause,
which includes crimes “otherwise involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. The district court found that the
crime qualifies as a violent felony under the residual clause. 3 R. 290.
The government argues that the crime qualifies as a violent felony under
either clause, as it did before the district court. Aplee. Br. at 17, 24-27; 1 R. 125-
- 14 -
26. The crime does not qualify under clause (i), because it lacks “as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Criminal discharge of a firearm at an
occupied building or occupied vehicle “is the malicious, intentional and
unauthorized discharge of a firearm at a dwelling, building, structure, motor
vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, train, locomotive, railroad car, caboose, rail-mounted
work equipment or rolling stock or other means of conveyance of persons or
property in which there is a human being.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4219(b). We
have recognized that the Texas crime of knowingly discharging a firearm at or in
the direction of a person is a violent felony under clause (i). United States v.
Hernandez, 568 F.3d 827, 829-30 (10th Cir. 2009). Compared to the Texas crime
in Hernandez, the requisite person in the Kansas crime of criminal discharge is
one step removed. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.05(b)(1). The Kansas statute
requires force against a building or vehicle, but not against the person inside, as
clause (i) requires. The Fifth Circuit has distinguished between convictions for
discharging a firearm at or in the direction of a person and convictions for
discharging a firearm at or in the direction of an occupied building or vehicle.
See United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 467 F.3d 492, 495 (5th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Alfaro, 408 F.3d 204, 208-09 (5th Cir. 2005) (Virginia crime of
discharging a firearm within or at an occupied building in manner endangering the
life of another person did not qualify under clause (i) because the required force
- 15 -
was not against the person of another). Because the Kansas statute does not
require the use of force, threatened use of force, or attempted use of force against
the person of another, it does not qualify as a violent felony under clause (i).
The government makes a more compelling case that the crime qualifies
under the residual clause. 2 On its face, the residual clause includes crimes
“otherwise involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Supreme Court has
clarified that the clause encompasses only “crimes that are roughly similar, in
kind as well as in degree of risk posed” to the crimes enumerated in the preceding
clause: burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives.
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008); see also United States v.
Williams, 559 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2009). A crime is similar in kind to the
enumerated crimes if it “involve[s] purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”
Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also West, 550
F.3d at 965-68.
First, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building or vehicle is
at least as risky as burglary or arson. As the government argues, “Burglary is
dangerous because of the possibility that someone will be present when the crime
2
Although Mr. Ford’s reply brief offers a host of new arguments that the
Kansas crime does not qualify as a violent felony under the residual clause, we
decline to consider arguments not raised in his opening brief. Bronson v.
Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007).
- 16 -
is committed,” leading to a confrontation. Aplee. Br. at 29 (citing James, 550
U.S. at 203). Unlike burglary, criminal discharge requires a person’s presence in
the targeted building or vehicle. The person’s presence increases the likelihood
of at least a confrontation, if not a gunshot wound. The crime’s risks are also
similar to the risks attendant to arson. Arson directly damages a building, but
indirectly endangers any person who might be inside. See Model Penal Code §
220.1(1), (4) (arson entails “start[ing] a fire or caus[ing] an explosion with the
purpose of . . . destroying a building or occupied structure of another,” though a
structure is considered occupied “whether or not a person is actually present”).
But see 3 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 21.3(c) (“Today, most states
provide more generally that ‘buildings’ or ‘structures’ or both are the subject
matter of the crime of arson.”). Again, the Kansas criminal discharge statute
requires a person’s presence, creating a greater risk than arson, which does not
require a person’s presence. The Kansas crime of criminal discharge proscribes
conduct roughly similar in the degree of risk posed as two enumerated crimes.
The crime is also similar in kind to the enumerated crimes because it
involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. First, the statute requires
intentional conduct, which satisfies Begay’s requirement that the crime be
purposeful. West, 550 F.3d at 970 (“Begay equates purposeful with deliberate or
intentional.” (citing Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45)). Second, maliciously
discharging a firearm at an occupied structure is violent and aggressive.
- 17 -
Undoubtedly, maliciously and intentionally shooting a building or car with people
inside is “characterized [] by physical force, especially by . . . unjust or improper
force,” and therefore violent. Black’s Law Dictionary 1570 (6th ed. 1990). It is
unclear whether “aggressive” means anything different than “violent.” United
States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We consider it unlikely
that any conduct properly characterized as ‘violent’ could not also be
characterized as ‘aggressive.’”); see also David C. Holman, Violent Crimes and
Known Associates: The Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 43
Conn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 19-20,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1556463). Nonetheless, the
Kansas criminal discharge statute proscribes conduct which fulfills an
approximate definition of “aggressive”: “offensive and forceful and characterized
by initiating hostilities or attacks.” West, 550 F.3d at 969 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Because the Kansas crime of criminal discharge of a
firearm at an occupied building or vehicle involves purposeful, violent, and
aggressive conduct, and is at least as risky as two enumerated crimes, the crime
qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause.
AFFIRMED.
- 18 -