Medlock v. Gibson

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JAN 10 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

FLOYD ALLEN MEDLOCK,

Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
No. 99-6089
RON WARD; DREW EDMONDSON,
Attorney General of the State of
Oklahoma,

Respondents - Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 96-CV-2035-C)

Scott W. Braden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
for Petitioner-Appellant.

Jennifer B. Miller, Assistant Attorney General (W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney
General of Oklahoma with her on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for
Respondents-Appellees.

Before KELLY, BRISCOE and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Floyd Allen Medlock, a prisoner challenging a death sentence in Oklahoma,

sought habeas review in federal district court of his state conviction and sentence,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Medlock brings numerous claims before us after

the denial of his petition and the issuance of a certificate of appealability by the

district court. His claims are duplicative, and we reduce them to three: the

district court erred in concluding the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) applies to Medlock’s habeas petition; the district court

should have granted habeas relief based on the state trial court’s unconstitutional

use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; and the district court should

have found Medlock was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the

Sixth Amendment. We exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1291 & 2253 and conclude that, because AEDPA applies and Medlock fails to

meet its threshold for granting a writ of habeas corpus, and because his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is procedurally barred, the district court

was correct in its denial of his petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

I

The district court adopted, as do we, the following undisputed facts from

the decision of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Medlock v. State, 887

P.2d 1333, 1337-38 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). On the afternoon of February 19,

1990, Medlock was in his apartment watching cartoons on television when he

heard someone attempting to open his door. See id. at 1337. On opening the

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door, he found Katherine Ann Busch, a small girl with a bicycle, who walked into

his apartment and told him she once lived there. See id. When Medlock

admonished her against barging into his home, Kathy said simply that she was

hungry and wanted something to eat. See id. Medlock gave her potato chips and

began to prepare macaroni and cheese. See id. While cooking, he told the police,

“this real weird feeling” came over him. Id. at 1338.

Precisely what Medlock did next is unclear, see id., but the following is

undisputed. Medlock grabbed Kathy by the arm, she jerked away, he grabbed her

again, and she jerked away again. See id. He wrestled with her and covered her

mouth when she began to scream, choking her until she passed out. See id.

According to his confession, she regained consciousness, and he dragged her to

the bathroom and forced her head into the toilet bowl for approximately ten

minutes, during which time she was gasping for breath. See id. Then, while she

was still alive, he stabbed her in the back of the neck with a steak knife and later

with a hunting knife until she died, holding her head in the toilet bowl again so

that she would not bleed on the floor. See id. After the bleeding ceased, he

placed her in the bathtub, removed her clothes, and attempted to sexually molest

her lifeless body. 1 See id. Finally, he wrapped her body in a blanket, placed it in

1
Although we have indicated we are relating undisputed facts, there was dispute
in the evidence regarding whether the victim was in fact dead when Medlock attempted
to molest her.

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a box, and deposited the box and her bicycle into a dumpster behind a nearby

shopping center. See id.

The police found Kathy’s body in the dumpster early the next morning. See

id. at 1337. Later that day, Medlock called the police to confess to the murder

before he was a suspect. See id. He explained that he feared harming others in

the future. See id. at 1349. He told the police that the incident seemed dream-

like and that he had trouble remembering it. See id. at 1338. When asked what

caused him to do what he did, he answered that he had been hearing voices in his

head since the age of twelve. See id.

In February 1990, Medlock was charged with the first-degree malice

murder of Kathy Busch in Oklahoma state district court, to which he entered a

plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Accompanying the indictment, the State

filed a Special Bill of Particulars alleging two aggravating circumstances: the

murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” and there was a probability

that Medlock would commit criminal acts of violence such that he would remain a

“continuing threat to society.” Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.12.

The case was set for jury trial, but before the jury was empaneled, Medlock

entered a “blind” plea of guilty, not having reached an agreement with the State

on the punishment it would recommend. Following a hearing, the court accepted

the plea. See Medlock v. State, 887 P.2d at 1338-39.

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 At the subsequent sentencing hearing, Medlock presented mitigation

evidence, including that of expert witnesses—a licensed clinical social worker, a

professor of psychology at Oklahoma City University, and a retired clinical

psychologist specializing in multiple personality disorder (“MPD”). See id. at

1340. Those experts testified that Medlock suffered from MPD with atypical

features, explaining that his second personality was a violent twelve-year-old

named “Charley” who had been in control of Medlock at the time of the murder.

See id. at 1340-41. Appellant’s experts added that MPD is treatable and

Medlock’s prognosis was good if he received therapy. See id. In rebuttal the

State called its own expert witness, a clinical psychologist, who raised the

possibility that Medlock was malingering and questioned his credibility. See id.

The State’s psychologist also opined that Medlock demonstrated a pattern of

increasingly anti-social behavior. See id.

After the close of the sentencing hearing, but before the court entered its

sentence, Medlock filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The court denied the

motion and, upon finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the

mitigating circumstances, imposed the death penalty. See id. at 1341-45. On

direct appeal the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Medlock’s

conviction and sentence. See Medlock v. State, 887 P.2d 1333, reh’g denied, 889

P.2d 344 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Medlock v. Oklahoma,

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516 U.S. 918 (1995). In September of 1996 Medlock filed an application for state

post-conviction relief, which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denied as

well. See Medlock v. State, 927 P.2d 1069 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996), overruled on

other grounds by Walker v. State, 933 P.2d 327, 334 n.6 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).

The following June, Medlock filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the

denial of which, as noted, is the subject of this appeal.

II

As a threshold matter, our Circuit has already settled the question of

AEDPA’s applicability to this case. We have stated that “AEDPA applies to [a

petitioner’s] case because he filed his § 2254 petition after April 24, 1996, the

effective date of the Act.” Braun v. Ward, 190 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999)

(citing Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 1999)). AEDPA thus

applies to Medlock’s June 1997 petition.

Because the Oklahoma state courts have addressed on its merits Medlock’s

claim of unconstitutional use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we

review the state courts’ rulings under the AEDPA standard enunciated in

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under that section, a federal court is precluded from granting

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habeas relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court, unless the

state proceeding “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). All factual findings of the

state court are presumed correct unless the petitioner can rebut

this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

III

We examine first Medlock’s various challenges to the use of aggravating

and mitigating circumstances by the Oklahoma trial court and Court of Criminal

Appeals and afterwards his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

A

With regard to the facial constitutionality of the aggravators used by the

trial court, Medlock’s challenges to Oklahoma’s “heinous, atrocious, or cruel”

and “continuing threat” aggravators are meritless. To be acceptable under the

Eighth Amendment, the aggravating circumstance must furnish a sentencer with a

principled means of guiding its discretion. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S.

356, 361-64 (1988). Our Circuit has repeatedly upheld the facial constitutionality

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of these aggravators as “narrowed” by the State of Oklahoma, and we are bound

by that body of precedent. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1352-

54 (10th Cir. 1997); Hatch v. State, 58 F.3d 1447, 1468-69 (10th Cir. 1995).

B

With respect to the evidence used to prove the aggravators, Medlock

contends that the Oklahoma court unconstitutionally relied on duplicative and

cumulative sentencing factors. We disagree. “[D]ouble counting of aggravating

factors, especially under a weighing scheme, has a tendency to skew the weighing

process and creates the risk that the death sentence will be imposed arbitrarily and

thus, unconstitutionally.” United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1111 (10th

Cir. 1996). 2

Contrary to Medlock’s contention, these aggravating circumstances are not

duplicative. In Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1289 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting

McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1087, 1111-12), cert. denied, 1999 WL 319436 (U.S. Oct. 4,

1999) (No. 98-9420), we explained that, to overlap impermissibly, one

aggravating circumstance must “‘necessarily subsume’” another. It is not

impermissible for “certain evidence [to be] relevant to both aggravators.” Id.

Thus, Medlock is incorrect that use of evidence of his criminal record to find both

2
As previously stated, the AEDPA requires our application of Supreme Court
precedent in determining whether the state court proceeding violated clearly established
federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We assume then, for purposes of argument
only, that Medlock can rely upon a circuit court case such as McCullah .

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the “continuing threat to society” and “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating

circumstances renders those aggravators duplicative. Cf. McCullah, 76 F.3d at

1111-12. The aggravators do not “necessarily subsume” one another under

McCullah: The “continuing threat” aggravator goes to Medlock’s future

dangerousness, while the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator goes to the

nature of Medlock’s crime. The former involves future conduct; the latter

involves the nature of the act for which Medlock was convicted. Under these

circumstances the elements of one aggravator do not necessarily subsume those of

the other.

C

As support for the aggravating circumstance of “continuing threat to

society,” the Oklahoma district court relied on Medlock’s statement to the police

that he feared hurting someone in the future. Medlock argues that the court’s

reliance on this potentially mitigating evidence rendered the aggravating

circumstance unconstitutional by violating the requirement “that the sentencer in

capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor.”

Eddings v. Oklahoma , 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982). On direct appeal, the

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that “Medlock’s statement that he

feared he would hurt someone in the future should not have been relied upon to

find continuing threat.” Medlock v. State , 887 P.2d at 1349. Rather, it held the

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statement “demonstrates Medlock’s willingness and ability to remove himself

from society to minimize his threat to society” and thereby was not permissible

support for the aggravator. Id. The court nonetheless sustained the finding of

the aggravator based on evidence of the callousness of Medlock’s crime and his

prior convictions for arson and burglary. See id.

It is well established that “the fundamental respect for humanity underlying

the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of

the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a

constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of

death.” Eddings , 455 U.S. at 112 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina , 428 U.S.

280, 304 (1976)) (internal quotations omitted); see Lockett v. Ohio , 438 U.S. 586

(1973). The Lockett principle prohibits a state from excluding from the

sentencer’s consideration, and prohibits the sentencer itself from refusing to

consider, “any relevant mitigating evidence.” Eddings , 455 U.S. at 114.

The sentencing court in Medlock’s case did not indicate that it was

excluding from consideration the mitigating effect of Medlock’s expressed desire

to minimize his threat to society, which would have contravened Lockett and

Eddings . The fact that the court may have relied on his statement as aggravating

evidence does not necessarily render its sentence constitutionally invalid. See

Johnson v. Texas , 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993) (holding that “the fact that a juror

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might view [particular evidence] as aggravating, as opposed to mitigating, does

not mean that the rule of Lockett is violated” (citing Graham v. Collins , 506 U.S.

461, 475-76 (1993))); see also Penry v. Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989)

(recognizing that mitigating evidence can function as a “two-edged sword”

during sentencing, in effect operating as both mitigating and aggravating

evidence); Eddings , 455 U.S. at 114-115 (“The sentencer, and the Court of

Criminal Appeals on review, may determine the weight to be given relevant

mitigating evidence.”).

While the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found this evidence

improper for supporting the continuing threat aggravator, the court nevertheless

upheld the sentencing court’s finding of that aggravator. Contrary to Medlock’s

assertion, the Court of Criminal Appeals was under no obligation, as a matter of

constitutional law, to reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. 3
The

sentencer’s finding of the continuing threat aggravating circumstance was upheld

by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals; that court simply disapproved of

one proffered reason for the finding, which in itself does not violate Lockett .

3
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did conduct a mandatory review of
Medlock’s death sentence, pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.13(C). See Medlock v.
State , 887 P.2d at 1351. This review does not represent a full reweighing of
aggravating and mitigating factors.

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See Johnson , 509 U.S. at 368. 4

Apart from his facial challenge to the continuing threat aggravator and his

claim that consideration of mitigating evidence in support of the aggravator

violated Lockett , Medlock does not otherwise challenge on appeal the sufficiency

of the evidence to support the district court’s finding of the continuing threat

aggravator.

D

Medlock challenges the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator not only

facially but also as applied. He argues that the State presented insufficient

evidence that Medlock’s conduct fell within Oklahoma’s “narrowed,” and

therefore constitutional, construction of the aggravator.

In Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64 (1988), the Supreme Court

determined that Oklahoma’s “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator

4
Medlock cites Clemons v. Mississippi , 494 U.S. 738 (1990), for the
proposition that the state appeals court was constitutionally required to reweigh the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances after finding the sentencing court improperly
relied on Medlock’s statement to support the continuing threat aggravating
circumstance. His reliance on Clemons is misplaced. That case stands for the
proposition that a death sentence imposed based on a constitutionally invalid
aggravating circumstance is unconstitutional absent either “reweighing of the
aggravating and mitigating evidence” or “harmless error review” by the appellate court.
Id. at 741. Unlike in Clemons , the application of the continuing threat aggravating
circumstance in this case has never been invalidated. Neither the Supreme Court, nor
any decision of which we are aware, has held that a state court’s rejection of one of
several grounds for finding an aggravating circumstance at the same time as it otherwise
upholds the finding of that circumstance, would trigger the reweighing or harmless error
review contemplated by Clemons .

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was vague and overbroad unless construed sufficiently narrowly. Oklahoma has

since adopted a constitutional narrowing construction of the aggravator, which

provides that the victim’s murder—to be deemed “especially heinous, atrocious,

or cruel”—must have been “preceded by torture or serious physical abuse.”

Turrentine v. State, 965 P.2d 955, 976-77 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998); see also

Hatch, 58 F.3d at 1468-69 (holding the narrowing construction to be

constitutional). Torture includes “the infliction of either great physical anguish or

extreme mental cruelty.” Turrentine, 965 P.2d at 976 (citing Berget v. State, 824

P.2d 364, 373 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991)). With respect to the physical anguish

branch of the Oklahoma test, “[a]bsent evidence of conscious physical suffering

by the victim prior to death, the required torture or serious physical abuse

standard is not met. ” Cheney v. State, 909 P.2d 74, 80 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995)

(quoting Battenfield v. State, 816 P.2d 555, 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991))

(internal quotations omitted).

We have held that the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating

circumstance as narrowed by the Oklahoma courts after Maynard to require

torture or serious physical abuse characterized by conscious suffering can provide

a principled narrowing of the class of those eligible for death. See, e.g. , Hatch ,

58 F.3d at 1468-69. 5
Medlock fails to demonstrate that Oklahoma has applied its

5
Although the Supreme Court has suggested that the condition of torture or
(continued...)

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narrowing construction in an unconstitutional manner.

Medlock argues that the evidence—even examined in the light most

favorable to the prosecution—is insufficient to support the narrowed “heinous,

atrocious, or cruel” aggravator because evidence regarding conscious suffering by

the victim is absent. See Turrentine, 965 P.2d at 976-77 (finding inconsistent

evidence failed to support the aggravator because it was unclear whether the

victims experienced conscious suffering). Whether we treat this challenge as a

legal determination under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or one of fact under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2), the result is the same. See Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1177

(10th Cir. 1999). 6

Medlock fails to demonstrate that a rational factfinder could not conclude

that his crime, occurring in several gruesome phases, involved torture or serious

physical abuse characterized by conscious suffering. The evidence, including

Medlock’s confessions, suggests that he repeatedly grabbed his victim by the arm,

wrestled with her, struck her in the face, threw her onto his bed, and covered her

5
(...continued)
serious physical abuse characterized by conscious suffering is not the only permissible
narrowing construction for this aggravating circumstance, see Maynard , 486 U.S. at
365, we are faced with no alternative narrowing construction today.
6
Whether Section 2254(d)(1) or 2254(d)(2) applies to our review of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support an aggravator is unsettled in our Circuit because
we have applied both in the past, sometimes analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence as
a factual question and sometimes as a legal question. See Moore v. Gibson , 195 F.3d
1152, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 1999).

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mouth when she began screaming. See Medlock v. State, 887 P.2d at 1338, 1348.

He choked her until she temporarily passed out, then dragged her to the toilet and

stuck her head into the bowl while she was conscious and gasping for air, keeping

her there for ten minutes until she passed out again. See id. at 1338. When he

noticed she was still breathing and alive, he used a steak knife to stab her in the

back of the neck and, when that knife bent, took a hunting knife and stabbed her

in the back of the neck again until she died. See id.

This body of evidence is sufficient to fall within the narrowed scope of the

“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator. Taking the facts together, we

conclude it was neither “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented” nor an “unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law” for the sentencer to conclude that conscious suffering was present.

We also recognize that “the AEDPA increases the deference to be paid by the

federal courts to the state court’s factual findings and legal determinations.”

Houchin v. Zavaras, 107 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1997). In light of the

foregoing, we conclude there was sufficient evidence of conscious suffering to

preserve the constitutionality of the Oklahoma court’s application of the “heinous,

atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance. 7

7
Medlock argues that the Oklahoma district court improperly relied on evidence
concerning the condition of the victim’s underwear during the sentencing phase of the
trial to support the existence of the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating
(continued...)

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 V

Medlock sought to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his

federal habeas petition, the basis of which was not raised in his application for

state post-conviction relief. The federal district court alluded to the possibility

that Medlock’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim may have been

procedurally barred. But the court chose not to decide the question of procedural

bar, instead denying Medlock’s petition on the merits, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2), which states that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be

denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the

remedies available in the courts of the state.” The district court thus acted

pursuant to statute when it chose to deny Medlock’s ineffective assistance claim

on the merits. However, we elect instead to deny his claim due to procedural bar,

with regard to which Medlock has not shown cause for failing to exhaust his state

remedies.

In general, petitioners must exhaust available state court remedies before

seeking federal habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Smallwood v. Gibson,

191 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999). In the present case, Medlock “has not . . .

raised before the state courts any of the bases upon which his current ineffective

7
(...continued)
circumstance. Even if the court improperly admitted that evidence, however, the
remaining body of evidence was in itself so overwhelming that the allegedly erroneous
admission constituted, at most, harmless error.

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assistance of counsel claim[] rel[ies].” Smallwood, 191 F.3d at 1267. Therefore,

he has failed to exhaust his ineffective assistance claim.

In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991), the Supreme Court

held that if “the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which

the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred,”

petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas

corpus relief. Oklahoma deems waived claims that were not raised in an initial

application for post-conviction relief in a death penalty case. See Okla. Stat. tit.

22, §§ 1086, 1089(D)(2). Medlock did not raise his present ineffective assistance

claim, involving the failure of his counsel to investigate and present at sentencing

his family’s history of mental illness, in his application for state post-conviction

relief, and therefore it is barred under Oklahoma law. See Smallwood, 191 F.3d

at 1269.

We may not consider issues raised in a habeas petition “that have been

defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate procedural ground, unless

the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage

of justice.” English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50; Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir.

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1993)). 8 Despite the especially vigilant scrutiny we apply in examining

procedural bars to ineffective assistance claims, we have held that Oklahoma’s

procedural bar to claims not raised on initial post-conviction review is

independent and adequate. See Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1097 (10th

Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1266 (1999). Thus, Medlock’s claim is

defaulted unless he can show cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of

justice. See English, 146 F.3d at 1259.

With regard to “cause” for his procedural default, Medlock was represented

by different counsel on direct appeal and on application for post-conviction relief

than at trial and sentencing. We can discern no reason for his failure to raise in

state proceedings the grounds for his claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel, and he provided no insight into that failure in his briefs or during oral

argument. Because Medlock furnishes no explanation for his failure to raise his

ineffective assistance claim in the state courts, he has not shown the requisite

“cause” for overcoming his procedural default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Neither has he met the high threshold required to show a “fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” Demarest v. Price, 130 F.3d 922, 941 (10th Cir.1997)

(stating that to meet the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” standard, the

8
We consider a state’s ground for procedural bar to be adequate only if it is
“‘strictly or regularly followed’ and applied ‘evenhandedly to all similar claims.’”
Duvall v. Reynolds , 139 F.3d 768, 797 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn ,
457 U.S. 255, 263 (1982)), cert. denied , 119 S.Ct. 345.

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petitioner must supplement his habeas claim with a colorable showing of factual

innocence).

Even if his ineffective assistance claim were not procedurally barred, under

the facts of this case Medlock would not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on

that claim. If a habeas petitioner fails to develop the factual basis of his habeas

claim in state court, he is not entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing unless he

initially shows that the claim relies on a “new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable” or “a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) and (ii), or else demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence

that “but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder” would have found him

guilty, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Medlock has made no such showing here.

Therefore, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance

of counsel claim.

VI

Because Medlock has not set forth a claim that his sentence is

unconstitutional sufficient to warrant federal habeas relief under AEDPA, and

because his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is procedurally barred, we

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AFFIRM the district court’s denial of his habeas petition.

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99-6089, Medlock v. Ward, et al.

LUCERO , Circuit Judge, concurring.

I join the majority opinion. I am in agreement that the victim in the present case,

Kathy Busch, experienced conscious suffering sufficient to meet the “torture or serious

physical abuse” standard required to prove the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel”

aggravating circumstance, particularly under the deferential AEDPA standard we apply

when reviewing the Oklahoma sentencer’s findings of fact. I write separately, however,

to note that, in order to conduct a proper analysis of the sentencer’s application of the

“heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator, I think it essential to set forth the Oklahoma

test for conscious suffering we have found to satisfy the requirements of the Eighth

Amendment. Thus, to evaluate whether the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating

circumstance was properly applied, we must examine the state court’s findings as to the

duration of conscious suffering on the part of the victim.

Under the Eighth Amendment, applying the narrowing construction of the

aggravating circumstance in a manner that permitted Oklahoma courts to find “torture or

serious physical abuse” based merely on the brief period of conscious suffering

necessarily present in virtually all murders would fail to narrow the sentencer’s

discretion as required by Godfrey v. Georgia , 446 U.S. 420 (1990), and Maynard v.

Cartwright , 486 U.S. 356 (1988), leaving the sentencer “with the kind of open-ended

discretion which was held invalid in Furman v. Georgia , 408 U.S. 238 (1972).”

Maynard , 486 U.S. at 361-62. In interpreting the limiting construction we approved in

Hatch v. State , 58 F.3d 1447, 1468-69 (10th Cir. 1995), the Oklahoma Court of

Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) has identified two kinds of cases in which “torture or
serious physical abuse” is present: those characterized by the infliction of “great

physical anguish” and those characterized by the infliction of “extreme mental cruelty”.

Cheney v. State, 909 P.2d 74, 80 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). In the mental cruelty

context, the OCCA has emphasized that the torture required for finding the “heinous,

atrocious, or cruel” aggravator “must produce mental anguish in addition to that which

of necessity accompanies the underlying killing.” Turrentine v. State , 965 P.2d 955,

976 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (quoting Berget v. State , 824 P.2d 364, 373 (Okla. Crim.

App. 1991)). As the majority notes “ [w]ith respect to the physical anguish branch

of the Oklahoma test, ‘[a]bsent evidence of conscious physical suffering by the

victim prior to death, the required torture or serious physical abuse standard is

not met. ’ Cheney, 909 P.2d at 80 (quoting Battenfield v. State, 816 P.2d 555, 565

(Okla. Crim. App. 1991)) (internal quotations omitted).” (Maj. Op. at 12-13.)

There must be conscious suffering of more than the brief duration necessarily

accompanying virtually all murders. See Turrentine , 965 P.2d at 976; see also

Brown v. State , 753 P.2d 908, 913 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (refusing to find the

aggravator where it could not be ruled out that the victim might have “only

survived a few minutes at most” after being attacked) (internal quotation

omitted). 1
Were this not so, the narrowing construction would not have the

1
While the OCCA in Berget , 824 P.2d at 373 (quoted in Turrentine , 965
P.2d at 976), stated in the mental torture context that the duration of mental
anguish is “irrelevant,” that opinion indicated that the level of tension created
between the killer and his victim, rather than duration, is the proper focus of
(continued...)

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discretion-limiting effect required by Godfrey and Maynard .

The Eighth Amendment therefore requires us to determine whether the state

sentencer’s finding of the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator represents the

application of a permissible narrowing construction: one requiring evidence of

torture or serious physical abuse characterized by conscious suffering on the part

of the victim. Absent such evidence, application of the aggravator either would

“result[] in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2), or, if sufficiency of the evidence is treated as a legal question, would

“result[] in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1176-1177

(10th Cir. 1999). 2 In either case, we review whether the sentencer properly found

sufficient evidence of torture or serious physical abuse under the deferential

1
(...continued)
analysis: “Analysis must focus on the acts of the defendant toward the victim
and the level of tension created.” Berget , 824 P.2d at 373. But, for there to be
such tension, there obviously must be some meaningful period of conscious
suffering on the victim’s part.
2
As the majority correctly notes, “[w]hether Section 2254(d)(1) or 2254(d)(2)
applies to our review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support an aggravator is
unsettled in our Circuit because we have applied both in the past, sometimes analyzing
the sufficiency of the evidence as a factual question and sometimes as a legal question.
See Moore v. Gibson , 195 F.3d at 1176-77.” (Maj. Op. at 14 n.6.)

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“‘rational factfinder’ standard established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307

(1979)” by asking “whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

[aggravating circumstance] beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Moore, 195 F.3d at 1176

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319) (internal quotations and further citations

omitted).

Whether we apply 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2), I am in agreement that

a rational factfinder could conclude that Medlock’s crime involved torture or

serious physical abuse characterized by a meaningful period of conscious

suffering. The aggravating circumstance thus was properly applied in this case.

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